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Abstract
Current explanations of global governance fail to incorporate in their analysis the 
importance of both structural domestic and contextual factors in which global governance 
initiatives operate. More specifically, it is necessary to further investigate what global 
governance means for specific non-democratic regions and actors involved in the process 
of global governance. Current research on global governance is characterised by the 
concept of a static dichotomy between the international and domestic spheres. In contrast, 
the present thesis aims to offer a more sophisticated account of the interplay between 
these two spheres; it therefore presents an empirical and theoretical framework that is 
able to capture the transboundary character of global governance encompassing both the 
international and domestic context.
Using the case of an international governance initiative, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), this PhD thesis investigates how the standardised 
practices of global governance arrangements are implemented in the post-Soviet and 
autocratic states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Adopting a comparative case study 
perspective, the study examines, first, how shared self-regulatory governance practices as 
prescribed under the EITI function in authoritarian countries, second, whom or which 
constituencies they serve, and, finally, how the initiative’s legitimacy can be assessed. 
Most importantly, in analysing the EITI, the thesis aims to assess the role of different 
actors (state and non-state) within non-democratic countries. Furthermore, in light of the 
EITI’s focus on fighting corruption in the extractive sector, the project aims to contribute 
to the debate on the resource curse in the political economy.
The results of my thesis indicate that the EITI in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan operates as 
a dysfunctional platform for cooperation that is detached from its initial purpose. The 
research further demonstrates that the regime type, the country’s political institutions and 
the inherited Soviet legacy have considerably affected the functioning of the Initiative. In 
light of these observations, the thesis urges scholars and policy practitioners to more 
thoroughly consider the context in which global governance takes place.
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg VI
 
 
Table of Contents
List of Tables and List of Figures..................................................................................... 1
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ 2
Preface: Notes on Transliteration and Sources................................................................. 5
Introduction: Global Governance in Post-Soviet Autocratic States of Central Asia........ 6
Summary of the Study .................................................................................................. 6
Why the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)? ................................... 7
Why Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? ............................................................................... 9
Methodological Approaches ....................................................................................... 12
The Significance of the Research ............................................................................... 12
Outline of the Study.................................................................................................... 14
Chapter 1. Global Governance Arrangements: Establishing the Context ...................... 17
1.1 Globalisation and Internationalisation .................................................................. 17
1.2 Towards Global Governance ................................................................................ 19
1.3 Hybrid Forms of Governance Arrangements—Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)
.................................................................................................................................... 20
1.4 Global Governance and Non-State Actors............................................................ 23
1.5 Global Governance Arrangements, PPPs and Critical Perspectives..................... 26
1.5.1 Global Governance and Scholarly Debate ..................................................... 26
1.6 Global Governance and Authoritarianism ............................................................ 38
1.7 Global Governance: What Now?.......................................................................... 39
Chapter 2. Mapping Central Asia in the Era of Globalisation........................................ 43
2.1 The emergence of Central Asian States: From Tsarist Occupation to Independence
.................................................................................................................................... 43
2.2 Soviet States in a Post-Soviet World: Towards State Formation ......................... 50
2.2.1 Central Asia and States Transition ................................................................. 51
2.2.2 Central Asia’s Awakening in the International Community.......................... 53
2.3 Central Asian Authoritarianism in the Processes of Global Governance ............. 64
Chapter 3. The EITI and its Implementation.................................................................. 70
3.1 The EITI: Transparency as an Institutional Response to Tackle the Resource 
Curse ........................................................................................................................... 70
3.2 The EITI as a Global Governance Intervention.................................................... 75
3.3 The EITI in Practice.............................................................................................. 83
Chapter 4. Research Design and Methodology .............................................................. 90
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg VII
 
 
4.1 Research Design: Setting up the Context.............................................................. 90
4.1.2 The Site of Research: Conducting Research in a ‘Close’ Context................. 91
4.2 Research Design Framework ................................................................................ 96
4.2.1 Qualitative Case Study Approach .................................................................. 97
4.3 Methods .............................................................................................................. 101
Chapter 5. Case Study One: Kyrgyzstan and the Implementation of the EITI ............ 108
5.1 Kyrgyzstan at a Glance ....................................................................................... 108
5.1.1 Political Context........................................................................................... 108
5.1.2 The Economic Context................................................................................. 111
5.1.3 The Role of the Natural Resource Sector: Gold........................................... 111
5.2 The Implementation of the EITI in Kyrgyzstan.................................................. 115
5.2.1 EITI as a Mechanism of State Interest-Driven Strategies ............................ 116
5.2.2 EITI and Non-State Actors........................................................................... 126
5.2.3 Decentralisation and Fragmentation of Elite Structures between Rural and 
Urban Areas .......................................................................................................... 138
5.2.4 Soviet Organisational Culture ...................................................................... 141
5.3 The EITI—A Technical Success? .......................................................................... 142
Chapter 6. Case Study Two: Kazakhstan and the Implementation of the EITI............ 146
6.1 Kazakhstan at a Glance....................................................................................... 146
6.1.1 Political Context........................................................................................... 146
6.1.2 The Economic Context in Kazakhstan......................................................... 147
6.1.3 The Role of Natural Resource Sector: Oil ................................................... 148
6. 2 The Implementation of the EITI in Kazakhstan ................................................ 153
6.2.1 The EITI as a Mechanism of State Interest-driven Strategies...................... 157
6.2.2 EITI Non-State Actors............................................................................ 168
6.2.3 Decentralisation and Fragmentation of the Elite Structures between Rural and 
Urban Areas .......................................................................................................... 182
6.2.4 Soviet Organsiational Culture ...................................................................... 187
6.3 The EITI—A Technical Success?....................................................................... 187
Chapter 7. Discussion of the Findings: The EITI and Global Governance in Central Asia
...................................................................................................................................... 193
7.1 Standardised Procedures: Form and Content Lost in Translation or in-between 
Spaces?...................................................................................................................... 193
7.2 Global Governance as a Site for Domestic Re-interpretation............................. 195
7.3 Soviet Legacies Matter ....................................................................................... 197
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg VIII
 
 
7.4. Resistance .......................................................................................................... 209
7.5 Analysing the Findings in Light of the Global Governance Literature .............. 210
7.6 Concluding Remarks........................................................................................... 213
Appendix 1: Interview Consent Form and Ethical Considerations .............................. 217
Appendix 2: Interview Topic Guide............................................................................. 219
Appendix 3: EITI Workshop participation, Participant Observations ......................... 222
Appendix 4a: Survey Questionnaire............................................................................. 226
Appendix 4b: EITI-related Survey Results .................................................................. 246
Appendix 5: Contacts of EITI MSG............................................................................. 251
Appendix 6: Interview List........................................................................................... 257
Statutory Declaration.................................................................................................... 307
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 1
 
 
List of Tables and List of Figures
 
Lsit of Tables 
Table 1. Freedom House Index Index-Country Ranking 2001-2016
Table 2. Summary of the events and EITI implementations 
List of Figures
Figure 1. EITI Framework 
Figure 2. Foreign Aid Flows and EITI Progress 
Figure 3. Decentralisation and EITI process 
Figure 4. FDI Inflows (% of GDP) in Kazakhstan 1995-2015
Figure 5. EITI MSG Organisation in Kazakhstan 
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 2
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
ADB—Asian Development Bank
BG Group—British multinational oil and gas company
BIGSSS— Bremen Graduate School of Social Sciences
BONGOs— Business Organized non-governmental organizations
BP—British Petroleum 
BTI—The Bertelsmann Transformation Index
BV— Besloten Vennootschap
CEO—Chief Executive Officer
CES— Common Economic Space
CNPC—China National Petroleum Company 
CSOs— Civil Society Organisations
CSR— Corporate Social Responsibility 
CU—Customs Union
DCK— Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan 
DONGOs—Donor Organized Non-governmental Organizations
EBRD—European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EFCA—Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia
EITI—Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
EU—European Union 
EurAsEc—Eurasian Economic Community
FDI—Foreign Direct Investments
FESTI—Fuel and Energy Sector Transparency Initiative 
FT—Financial Times 
GDP—Gross Domestic Product 
GIZ—Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 3
 
 
GONGOs—Government organised non-governmental organizations
HRM—Human Resource Management 
ICNL—The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
IFC—International Finance Corporation
IIED—International Institute for Economic Development
IMF—International Monetary Fund
IR—International Relations 
JSC—Joint Stock Company 
KOC— Kumtor Operating Company
MDTF— Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MEMR— Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources
MNC—Multinational companies 
MSG— Multi-Stakeholder Group
NCO—Non-commercial organization
NCOC—North Caspian Operating Company 
NGOs—Non-Governmental Organisations 
NSC—National Stakeholders Council 
OECD—Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ion for Economic 
Cooperation and Development
OPL— Oil Prospecting Licence
OSCE—Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PPPs—Public Private Partnerships
PSA— Product Sharing Agreement 
SCO— Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
BTC—the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
UN—United Nations 
UNCTAD— United Nations Development Programme
US— United States
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 4
 
 
USAID—United States Agency for International Development
USSR—Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO— World Trade Organisation 
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 5
 
 
Preface: Notes on Transliteration and Sources
This work is written in English and covers the countries of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
in the context of global governance and globalisation movements. The Cyrillic script is 
officially used in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Cyrillic sources of material in this thesis 
have been transliterated using the Library of Congress system. 
To conduct my research project, I have consulted sources in Russian and in English. 
Being a native speaker of Russian, I have translated all my interviews myself with the 
purpose of avoiding loss of text-specific or culturally sensitive issues that are attached to 
the use of language or topic in question.
Throughout the thesis, I have applied the Harvard referencing system. However, I have 
slightly adapted the standard in light of the vast number of sources that were consulted 
during the years of the dissertation writing process. I have placed some sources used in 
footnotes to facilitate the flow of the text and to make it less confusing for the reader. I 
have also consulted references such as Wikileaks’ cables, newspapers and business 
reports, which were obtained from the online database Nexis UK.
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Introduction: Global Governance in Post-Soviet Autocratic 
States of Central Asia
“It is the trope of our times to locate the question of culture in the realm of the beyond”.
(Bhabha, 1994 p. 1)
Summary of the Study
The overall objective of the PhD thesis is to assess the functioning of global governance 
in a post-Soviet authoritarian context. In doing so, the dissertation seeks to answer the 
following research question: How does a global governance initiative like the EITI
function in post-Soviet autocratic states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? Such a question 
assesses how standardised forms of global governance work in non-democratic post-
Soviet contexts. In doing so, the thesis seeks to empirically and systematically examine 
how autocratic states with inherited Soviet legacies in Central Asia accommodate a
specific form of global governance in their domestic regimes.
Recent literatures indicate a gradual tendency of authoritarian regimes across the globe 
to produce undemocratic norms as part of their efforts to reshape global governance and 
institutions toward their own preferences (Cooley, 2015a; Ambrosio, 2012; Lewis, 
2012a). Hence, in such circumstances what can we expect from global governance 
institutions? Bartley (2011) argues that current accounts of global governance focus 
almost exclusively on the global level and, thus, ignore rules at the domestic and regional 
level. However, the implementation of transnational standards always occurs within “a 
particular nation-state, where domestic law still holds sway” (Bartley, 2011 p. 521). Levi 
and Prakash (2003) also remind us that although the enforcement of international 
arrangements is prescribed under the auspices of international institutions, their actual
implementation takes place at the national level. 
There is a lack of empirical and theoretical research on how generally applicable 
international global governance arrangements are received by and implemented in 
autocratic states (Zurn et al., 2012). In particular, it remains open of how global 
governance applies to specific non-democratic regions, and the societal interactions it 
creates within such settings need further investigation. Current research on global 
governance is characterised by the notion of a static dichotomy between the international 
and domestic spheres. In contrast, the present thesis aims to offer a more sophisticated 
account of the interplay between these two spheres when it comes to global governance; 
it therefore presents an empirical and theoretical framework able to capture the 
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transboundary character of global governance encompassing both the international and 
the domestic context. By looking at the case of an international governance initiative, the 
EITI, this PhD thesis investigates how the standardised practices of global governance 
arrangements are implemented in the post-Soviet states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Why the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)?
The EITI is a global governance transparency initiative. Its objective is to combat 
corruption and promote standards of transparency and accountability in the sector of 
extractive industries, in particular within resource-rich (cursed) countries. Established as 
a public private partnership, the initiative brings state, civil society, donor organisations 
and extractive industries under its institutional umbrella. Currently, EITI standards are
implemented by 51 countries, most of which are resource cursed and governed by 
autocratic regimes. The rationale behind the EITI, therefore, is that increased 
transparency in the management of rents stemming from extractive industries empowers 
different stakeholders, in particular, citizens and civil society organisations. It is believed 
that the EITI provides these marginalised actors with a platform to demand accountability 
for how natural resource revenues are distributed and used, which in turn further promotes 
socio-economic development. Within the EITI, civil society representation is ought to be 
key, as it represents the voice of the people and allows to hold governments and 
companies accountable for how they spend their resource revenues. This is particularly 
important as civil society in most of the EITI implementing countries lack voice, is 
repressed and does not have any right to public participation. Hence, by giving civil 
society a key role, the EITI gives civil societal actors a voice in countries where it is 
otherwise restricted. Within the literature about authoritarianism, current research tends 
to overlook how authoritarian regimes deal with non-state actors. Hence, how the 
incorporation of ‘limited plurality’ works within authoritarian systems of government 
remains an unsolved puzzle. The concept of ‘limited plurality’ was primarily explored by 
the respective studies of Linz (2000) and O’Donnell (1977), who have examined this topic 
via the approach of corporatism focusing on interests-group representation mainly from 
the perspective of corporate groups and their relationship to the political sphere. While 
these studies provide important insights into the dynamics between state and non-state 
actors in an autocratic context, they however fail to analyse tri-partite relationships 
(between the state, companies and civil society actors) in the light of globalisation 
processes. In this sense, the EITI offers an interesting case 1) to understand how the 
concept of limited plurality works in autocratic states; 2) it provides an opportunity to 
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investigate the often invisible and complex relationship between states and non-state 
actors in authoritarian regimes; 3) it allows to examine how global governance initiatives
manifest themselves in autocratic states marked with post-colonial legacies.
Further, the current literature on the EITI mainly focuses on questioning the effectiveness 
of transparency norm under the EITI framework rather than analysing how such a form 
of governance fares in the domestic regime configuration of autocratic states (Oge, 2014; 
Aaronson, 2011; Acosta, 2013; Sovacool and Andrews, 2015). The present study aims to 
fill this gap. Through the case of the EITI and its implementation in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, the dissertation assesses the functioning of the Initiative—its form and 
content, and how this deviates from the Initiative’s initial goals. In doing so, the project 
seeks to address the transnational character of global governance in post-Soviet autocratic 
contexts. More importantly, empirical and theoretical findings aim to reflect on the 
normatively standardised conceptualisation of global governance. A deeper knowledge 
of how global governance plays out at domestic levels can enable us to trace how the 
project of global governance alters and is altered by the specific contexts in which it 
operates.
Furthermore, by conducting such an examination, the project sheds light on the dynamics 
of the ‘resource curse syndrome’ and transparency. The ‘resource curse syndrome’ was
characterised as the “paradox of plenty” (Karl, 1997), particularly affecting countries 
endowed with natural resources but not able to transform them into economic growth and 
social as well as political progress (Ross, 2015). Within this approach, it is widely 
acknowledged that corruption and weak domestic institutions constitute one of the main 
aspects of the “resource curse syndrome” (Mehlum et al. 2006). In light of these 
observations, transparency emerged as the main tool to address corruption and improve 
the quality of state institutions leading to a more sustainable management of the resource 
revenues and further stimulating economic growth and wider development. The EITI is 
the “global gold standard” in the management of resource governance. The EITI has been
implemented since 2003, hence it is still in its infancy. However, given the large number 
of countries displaying features of the ‘resource curse syndrome’, it is questionable 
whether and to what extent the initiative is effective in achieving its goals. Therefore, the 
present research aims to contribute to this branch of literature working on the political 
economy of the ‘resource curse syndrome’and transparency. However, it is important to 
note that this is not the ultimate goal of the study. 
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Why Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? 
Technical, logistical reasons
The reason for examining the region of Central Asia was first attached to conditions of
my doctoral framework grant. Within the scope of my ITN Marie Curie Doctoral grant, I
was assigned to study ‘tensions’ in post-Soviet regions. I originally applied with a PhD 
project looking at European external governance and the role of energy security dynamics 
in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Within the scope of my doctoral grant, I was required to 
spend three months in partnership organisations. Unfortunately, none of them was in 
Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan. I therefore modified my initial research project maintaining 
the original idea of external governance. I choose to study Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
mainly because of the conditions attached to my research grant and ease of access to 
conduct my research.
Topical research reasons
The focus on Post-Soviet countries of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, is 
particularly justified by their institutional post-colonial and post-Soviet context. The post-
Communist states of Central Asia are still in development, to recall they only became 
independent in the 1990s. Prior, they were subject to the rule of Soviet ideology and 
Soviet governance based on a concentration of power and a colonial style of rule. The 
political culture that emerged still bears the imprints of Soviet era practices and Soviet 
type of institutions (Schatz, 2006). In this sense, political practice in Central Asia is in a
tense relationship between inherited Soviet legacies and the construction of their 
statehood in the realm of independence and globalisation processes (Adams, 2008; Dave, 
2007; Kandiyoti, 2002; Heathershaw, 2010).
In this regard, it becomes increasingly important to study how these tensions affect the 
practices of global governance. Thus, what does it mean to apply global governance in 
autocratic states with post-Soviet colonial past?
The choice was further motivated by the state’s domestic regime configuration, the level 
of economic development, resource endowment dynamics as well as the adherence to the 
EITI initiative. In Central Asia, only Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have full EITI 
compliancy status. They are characterised by varying degrees of neo-patrimonial (Isaacs, 
2014; Lauruelle, 2012; Ilkhamov, 2007; Cummings, 2002) or patronal behaviours (Hale, 
2015), are categorised as authoritarian regime type with strong perceptions about 
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sovereignty (Jones Luong, 2002; Franke et al., 2009), as rentier states or as resourced 
cursed (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2010; Kalyuzhnova et al., 2009). 
Resource-rich Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan accumulate enormous rents that stem from 
natural resource sectors (oil and gas) and mining industries that directly line the pockets 
of the presidents and their autocratic regimes while excluding large parts of the population 
from any rent benefits. For the purpose of the project, I choose to investigate the most 
significant natural resource export products per country. In doing so, I followed the IMF 
classification in which a country is defined as ‘resource-rich’, if 20 per cent of its exports 
or 20 per cent of its fiscal revenue is derived from non-renewable natural resources (IMF,
2012). According to this logic, I choose to investigate the gold sector for Kyrgyzstan as 
well as oil and gas for Kazakhstan.
Despite these similarities, the chosen countries also exhibit significant differences.
Consequently, the country selection was further motivated by the institutional variance 
the two countries show. In this regard, the selection was driven by existing variations in 
political regime type and economic conditions. While both countries display the resource 
curse syndrome with high levels of authoritarianism and corruption, their regime 
structures differ in significant ways. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), which 
evaluates the quality of democracy, categorises Kazakhstan as a “hard-line autocracy” 
(BTI, 2016a) and Kyrgyzstan as a “highly defective democracy” (BTI, 2016b). 
Consequently, the countries differ also in their institutional design and state capacity. 
Economically, Kyrgyzstan is significantly weaker than Kazakhstan. The country is best 
described as a ‘foreign aid’-dependent country, while Kazakhstan, on the other hand, is 
the largest economy in Central Asia, and its economy is largely dependent on its oil and 
gas sector. 
This study of the EITI demonstrates that a country’s domestic structural conditions play 
an important role in determining the functioning of the initiative. Reflecting on the 
experience of EITI implementation in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the dissertation 
demonstrates that, despite its successful implementation, EITI standards have very 
limited effect on corruption and good governance. More importantly, the dissertation 
shows that under contextual and institutional conditions of autocratic states, the EITI as 
a form of global governance arrangement produces dysfunctional results that do not 
match its initial imperatives. With regard to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the dissertation 
shows that actors are rationally driven to reconfigure their preferences, identities and 
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social context to take advantage of transnational global governance institutions helping 
them to pursue their own opportunistic interests which results in a ‘redefined global 
governance agenda’. In this regard, the study demonstrates that the act of implementing 
EITI standards into the domestic context of Central Asia follows the logic of 
‘performative acts’. In drama studies, performance implies “a series of authorized 
reproductions, each plotted on the blue-print of the authorial text” (Worthen, 1998, p. 
1095). As such the act of performance requires a framing within a “discourse of textual 
and cultural authority” (Worthen, 1998). Such an understanding implies that the act of 
‘doing’ performance is generated instantly through the use of language within a specific 
contextual framework. However, as Peggy Phelan argues, the act of performance itself 
implies representing the reproduction of a specific logic; this logical real produce its own 
representation (Phelan, 1993, p. 2). Within this dynamic, “representation produces 
ruptures and gaps” and as such it fails to reproduce and capture “the real exactly” (Phelan,
1993, p. 2) making difficult to distinguish between what is real and what is 
representational. Such an approach implies that meaning is generated within an act of 
performance and is disrupted from its initial content. Performance as such is a
transformative experience from the initial reference point; it as such conveys an 
interpretative frame within a range of possible other frames (Bauman, 1977). 
Fundamentally, the act of performance involves the responsibility to the audience and 
ways that the performant conveys its information and forms of expression.
Following this analytical framework, this study of the EITI and its implementation in 
Central Asian countries argues that within the domestic social setting of these countries 
we find in the words of Goffman (1990, pp. 85; 108) “a team of performers” who 
cooperate to present to an audience a given definition of a situation or “stage a single 
routine”. By exploring EITI practices and their implementation in the domestic context 
of Central Asian states, the study inadvertently became an enquiry into the logic of 
representation of the EITI project and the ways it was interpreted by the domestic 
communities of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. As such the study demonstrates that 
although global governance imposes and provides a standardised template, it however 
does not stop its recipient objects from re-interpreting and recreating their own agendas 
and ideas within the framework of these very templates. Therefore, the dissertation found 
that although the idea of global governance operates transnationally, it however acquires 
a specific interpretative meaning in a local context. Clearly, local contexts such as 
domestic regime types, the level of economic development and configurations of 
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domestic intuitions constitute important determinants in the performance of standardised 
global governance rituals. In this sense, what is particularly interesting to observe is how 
the EITI is given a meaning by its recipient actors and the autocratic states of Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan. In this regard, the study uncovers significant variations in the functioning 
of the EITI global governance initiative. Such findings provide important tools for 
examining global governance in similar post-colonial contexts. More importantly 
however, they raise questions about the transnational character of global governance 
which reach beyond the case of Central Asia and statehood in autocratic contexts.
Methodological Approaches 
The research project covers the time frame from 2004 to 2016.To conduct the research 
project, I adopted an interpretative approach. I began my research project by asking 
“What is the functioning of the EITI in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan?” By focusing on this 
question, I was brought to look at specific meanings, processes of construction and 
interpretation that the EITI generates in the contexts of my study. My research is therefore 
informed by first-hand with individual lived experiences and personal perceptions and 
the meanings they constitute in the object of my study. In light of this approach, my 
methods are qualitative and include data collection that is primarily based on interviews 
and the analysis of relevant written documents. A small part of the research involves the 
analysis of opinion poll survey data that mainly captures the perception of the wider 
population and further corroborates the interview findings. Using such a dynamic process 
of research conduct implies that the interpretation and meaning of the results are accounts 
of my own understanding assigned to the object of study. I therefore do not claim that my 
research is holistic. However, in using interpretative methods I have stuck to their 
rigorous application in order to convey knowledge as closely approximating reality 
observed as possible.
The Significance of the Research 
While there is a significant amount of research about the EITI, however it primarily 
focuses on the issue of transparency and the effectiveness of the initiative in addressing 
the ‘resource curse syndrome’. The proposed research moves away from this analysis and 
instead uses the framework of the EITI as a manifestation of global governance to 
examine how global governance plays out in regional and local contexts. More 
specifically, the study is concerned with the articulation and configuration of global 
governance in the institutional contexts of post-Soviet autocratic states in Central Asia. 
In doing so and in contrast to studies looking at the concept of transnational norm 
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implementation in the local context (for instance, Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Acharya, 
2009; Risse et al., 1999), the present research looks at global governance institutions per 
se, and how these are framed in the local context. Consequently, by examining the 
manifestation of global governance, I indirectly also look at norm transmission, however 
as stated earlier, this is not the primary focus of my investigation. Therefore, the present 
research does not aim to contribute to the debate about transparency and effectiveness of 
the Initiative per se, yet the study offers direct answers to these debates. What I am 
interested in is instead how actors in local autocratic context mobilise around global 
governance, and what effects such mobilization has on the functioning of global 
governance initiatives.
The scope of my examination is motivated by several factors: 
There is a very limited amount of research looking into the EITI in the context of post-
Soviet states. Existing research mainly looked at Azerbaijan (Sovacool and Andrews, 
2015; Oge, 2014; Meissner, 2013) and largely focused on norm transmission of
transparency and the effectiveness of the Initiative in addressing ‘the resource curse 
syndrome’. In Central Asia, the EITI is barely looked at (with the exception of 
Furstenberg, 2015) and no comparative analysis of the EITI in this region was conducted 
so far. Moreover, in Political Science and International Relations (IR), studies on Central 
Asia play only a peripheral role. It was largely through 9/11 that the region came into the 
international spotlight. In light of these events, the region was extensively analysed from 
a geopolitical angle and within international security studies (Allison, 2004; Allison and 
Johnson, 2001; Olcott, 2010; Rumer et al., 2007; Cooley, 2012). However, not everyone 
followed this path. There is also a substantial number of scholars who focused on the 
internal dynamics of these states by looking at questions of nationhood and domestic 
politics in post-communist transitions. In this context, many explored the region from the 
angles of “clan politics” (Collins, 2006) or “tribalism” (Schatz, 2004), “symbolism” or 
the power of “spectacular states” (Cummings, 2010; Adams, 2010), and “neo-
patrimonialism” (Laruelle, 2012; Peyrouse, 2012; Lewis, 2012b; Isaacs, 2014) and
“regime personalisation” (Cummings, 2005; Dave, 2007). Within this stream, another 
branch of scholars looked at the dynamics of domestic conflicts, peace, security and 
sovereignty (Heathershaw, 2009; Lewis, 2008). These studies are important and give
different accounts of autocratic governance practiced in the region and highlight the 
imprints of Soviet legacies left on the making of “states” in Central Asia (Adams, 2008;
Heathershaw, 2013). The present research contributes to these studies by looking at 
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domestic institutions and its actors and the ways they are embedded in global governance 
nods. More specifically, the project looks at how domestic actors practice global 
governance and the effects that these practices generate. Moreover, the research sheds 
also light on Central Asia and its post-colonialism, and how it affects the exercise of state 
governance and the functioning of its domestic and wider global governance institutions. 
While the research primarily investigates Central Asian countries, its findings can 
resonate when looking at other countries with similar institutional and historical patterns.
Given the angle of the study, my research further seeks to contribute to the field of global 
governance. Currently much of the literature on global governance focuses on conceptual 
issues rather than to conducti a theoretical and empirical analysis of its practical 
functioning. As noted above, the literature largely emphasises the transfer of norms of 
global governance rather than to study its manifestation. Further as some authors note 
(Zurn et al., 2012; Risse, 2011), the discussion about global governance and its interaction 
with the state remains largely centred on the ‘ideal type of modern statehood’ where 
sovereignty and decision-making processes are largely viewed in terms of Western 
modern statehood. However, global governance is transnational with its implementation 
taking place in a domestic context. In light of these observations, it is increasingly 
important to examine global governance functions in autocratic states where the concept 
of sovereignty and statehood differ from Western models. More specifically, there is a 
lack of research on the implementation of global governance in particular in autocratic 
countries with inherited post-colonial legacies. At present, the question is largely 
addressed through peace-building initiatives examining the interaction between domestic 
actors and international organisations (see, for instance, Heathershaw, 2009; Lewis, 
2008). In light of these observations, the project seeks to make an important contribution 
in investigating global governance workings in the rather underexplored post-Soviet 
region of Central Asia. Revealing variations in the functioning of global governance 
across countries of Central Asia can provide us with a solid tool to examine the dynamics 
of global governance and its manifestations in autocratic countries with similar 
configurations. By examining how authoritarian countries accommodate global 
governance in their domestic constituencies, my research further contributes to studies on 
autocratic and hybrid regimes.
Outline of the Study
Some parts of my thesis were published in my article “Consolidating global governance 
in nondemocratic countries: Critical reflections on the Extractive Industries Transparency 
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Initiative (EITI) in Kyrgyzstan”, in Extractive Industries and Society Journal, Vol. 2, 
Issue 3. August 2015, pp. 462-471. Fragments of my published article can be found in 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 7.
Chapter 1 situates global governance in the relevant literatures. The chapter starts with 
discussing globalisation and global governance. It further outlines conceptual and
theoretical debates on global governance and their limitations. The function of this 
chapter is to situate the EITI within the global governance research agenda. Chapter 2
situates the countries chosen for the case studies within their regional and historical 
context in Central Asia. It is important to consider the implications of Soviet legacies for 
Central Asian countries, and how this legacy continues to shape their present. Therefore,
this chapter discusses the historical structural conditions of the Soviet system. The chapter 
presents how Central Asia and its distinctive countries emerged in the aftermath of the 
ruling of Soviet Union and became integrated into global politics. Chapter 3 focuses on 
the EITI as a global governance initiative. The chapter starts with a short discussion of 
the emergence of transparency as a global norm and its application to the extractive sector. 
In order to understand the importance of the EITI for the extractive sector, the chapter 
discusses the literature about the resource curse and challenges related to the ‘curse’ in 
countries endowed with natural resources. The chapter further describes the historical and 
institutional construction of the EITI, and how it operates in practice. It further presents 
the shortcomings of the Initiative and objections against it. It further outlines existing 
debates on the EITI, and how these have the tendency to underestimate the importance of 
structural domestic and contextual factors, in which the EITI operates as a global 
governance initiative. The chapter therefore explains why there is a need to investigate 
the functioning of the EITI in the authoritarian contexts of post-Soviet Central Asia. 
Chapter 4 presents the research design and methodologies applied in the conduct of the 
PhD research project. The chapter starts by outlining the central research question 
addressed in the thesis. It further elaborates on research design and challenges in 
conducting field research in authoritarian or ‘closed settings’. The chapter describes 
various methodological tools used and their justification in light of the research project 
and the central research question. Chapters 5 and 6 present the case study analysis of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. They provide an overview of the political and economic 
context of the respective countries. It is important to describe these aspects in detail since 
it allows understanding the functioning of the EITI in the respective country. The case 
study chapters further discuss the implementation of the Initiative and its shortcomings. 
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Chapter 7 discusses the empirical findings of the case study analyses in light of the global 
governance literature. The distinct empirical findings are situated in a broader post-Soviet 
and post-colonial context. The chapter further discusses these meanings in light of global 
governance practices. The chapter ends with concluding remarks and outlines further 
avenues for research.
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Chapter 1. Global Governance Arrangements: Establishing 
the Context
Main Points of this Chapter
This chapter forms the literature review of my thesis. The chapter introduces the notions 
of globalisation, internationalisation and global governance arrangements. The Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is first of all a global governance initiative. 
Hence, the discussion of global governance, its origins and its theoretical debates is 
important to draw upon here, as it enables us to understand the meaning of the EITI and 
to situate the Initiative within a broader global governance agenda. Further, the chapter 
outlines different theoretical debates addressing global governance arrangements and 
their limitations. The final section of the chapter identifies gaps in the literature on the 
functioning of global governance arrangements and formulates the central research 
question of the thesis.
1.1 Globalisation and Internationalisation
The aftermath of the Cold War brought significant societal and structural transformation. 
Many authors attribute such changes to the phenomenon of globalisation and/or 
internationalisation. Although both terms are interdependent and overlapping, it is 
important to make a distinction here. According to Bernstein and Cashore (2000, p. 70), 
globalisation concerns the “increasing economic transactions that transcend borders”, and 
internationalisation is “primarily the increased activities and influence of actors, ideas 
and institutions from beyond state borders.”
Processes of globalisation and internationalisation transformed dominant patterns of 
socio-economic organisation, lead to the erosion of territorial integrity, power and states. 
As Barry Buzan (1991, p. 147) observes: In the new post-Cold War environment, the 
distribution of states’ power became more diffuse leading away from a hegemonic or 
imperial system of unified independencies to give way to interdependencies and 
multilateral forms of cooperation supplemented by actors of the secondary or third sector 
delivering public goods and security provisions (see also Kaldor, 2000; Risse, 2011; 
Rosenau, 2005, p. 10; Keohane and Nye, 2001). 
In fact, global societal transformations resulted in a new economic environment with an 
increase in cross-border trade, labour movements, technologies and innovation flows, 
faster communication, integration of markets and transnational knowledge sharing 
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(Kjaer, 2010; Held and McGrew, 2000). Yet, at the same time the advent of globalisation 
had brought about new challenges for the nation-state in terms of state capacity building 
and governance in decision-making processes (Risse, 2011; Sindzingre, 2005). A 
significant amount of empirical scholarly research undertaken in developing countries 
demonstrated that globalisation also had negative effects on economic growth and social 
as well as political inequalities (Basu and Guarigila, 2004; Cornia, 2000; Nissanke and 
Thorbecke, 2006). Globalisation, as Beck (2005) writes, implies largely interdependent 
and multidimensional processes that affect governments and people. In this sense, as 
Castells (2008) notes, due to the strategic interconnectedness of global nods, the global
networks that structure the planet affect nearly everyone. Therefore, the author further 
observes, “a number of issues faced by humankind are global in their manifestations as 
well as in their treatment” (Castells, 2008 p.81). As such many contemporary problems 
such as climate change, terrorism, migration, the financial crisis and many more are of a
transnational character, and addressing them successfully requires actions that cannot 
always be solved by states’ alone but rather at the global supranational institutional level 
(Weiss, 2009 p. 254). 
In this sense, internationalisation is increasingly embedded in the process of globalisation 
(see Scholte, 1997), as it involves activities of institutions and transnational actors that
transcend borders. Bull and McNeil (2007) argue that the present multilateral system 
grew out of a specific international order that is fundamentally influenced by the process 
of globalisation and market liberalism. Coglianese (2000) further observes that in a
globalised world, international rules and organisations have grown ever more crucial to 
the solution of major economic and social concerns. As such, globalisation generated 
specific sets of interactions between global dynamics and particular components of 
national states (Sassen, 1993). Sassen (1993) further states that in the era of globalisation, 
traditional territories and powers became increasingly enmeshed with multiple external 
actors and cross-border network sites triggering what she called the ‘denationalisation’ of 
state policies and institutions; this in order to adjust to international globalisation trends. 
Such dynamics triggered changes in nation-state political power marked by the transfer 
of national institutional power towards regional and supranational institutions (Della
Porta and Tarrow, 2005). Alongside these dynamics, international and transnational 
movements involving state and non-state actors emerge as a powerful new force in 
international politics (Khagram et al., 2002 p. 4). As further noted by Hall and Biersteker 
(2002), these non-state actors do not rely on the actions or explicit support of states; they 
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act as autonomous body and appear to have been granted with some form of legitimate 
authority to perform tasks that were traditionally associated within the domain of states 
(Hall and Biersteker, 2002, p. 4). Many of these non-state actors can be found under the 
umbrella of private market regulations for international standards, and transnational 
corporations and governmental organisations promoting human rights, peace building 
initiatives and environmental causes (Borzel and Risse, 2005; Benz and Papadopoulos, 
2006). In doing so, these non-state actors came to co-govern along with state actors and 
steer the international and domestic realm of political decision-making processes.
1.2 Towards Global Governance
In one of his first prominent articles on Governance entitled ‘Governance in the Twenty-
first Century’ James Rosenau (1995) states that governance does not just suddenly 
happen, instead it is a rather: “a continuous process of evolution, a becoming that 
fluctuates between order and disorder as conditions change and emergent properties 
consolidate and solidify” (Rosenau, 1995, p. 18). The term global governance conceives
of world politics as a multilevel system in which local, national, regional and global 
political processes are inseparably linked (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006 p. 192). 
In this process, global governance has been described as an interactive phenomena with 
intentional activities designed to regularise the arrangements which sustain world affairs. 
Its empirical manifestation is characterised by multiple strata of national and international 
regulations, transnational rules and local agreements by co-existing and overlapping 
regulatory bodies composed of state and non-state actors (Rosenau, 1995; Djelic and 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2006), inter- and supra-organisational networks of autonomous 
interdependent actors with multiple sources of power and enforcement mechanisms 
(Borzel and Risse, 2005; Zajak, 2011). Such networks cut across established political and 
sectoral boundaries to deal with contemporary issues and become a central type of 
regulation beyond the nation-state (Benner et al., 2004; Shuppert, 2011). The main aim 
of such governance networks is to serve collective interests and act as an alternative 
response to the challenges of globalisation and failure of traditional state-centric 
governance mechanisms (Risse, 2011; Neumann and Sending, 2010; Khagram et al.,
2002). The expectation is that cooperative engagements serve to meet global societal 
needs that would otherwise be left unattended (Borzel and Risse, 2010). 
Such development further marked a transformation of International Relations’ (IR) 
agenda towards new forms of multilateralism marked by non-territorial modes of 
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regulations and incrementally pluralised governing structures of state politics in the
contemporary world. In fact, the only element that distinguishes this from traditional 
forms of multilateralism lies in its ‘bottom-up’ character or as put by Robert Cox:
“The ‘new’ or emerging multilateralism is an attempt to reconstitute civil societies 
and political authorities on a global scale, building a system of global governance 
from the bottom up” (Cox, 1997, p. xxvii cited in O’ Brien et al., 2000, p. 3).
As such central to global governance arrangements is the concern over the empowerment 
of citizens and grassroots population, local institutions and the clear identification of their 
needs and wants to enable them to engage in collective action. As Rosenau (1995) notes, 
the bottom-up approach is the consolidation of “systems of rule at all levels of human 
activity from the family to the international organization in which the pursuit of goals 
through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions” (Rosenau, 1995, p.13). 
In light of this observation, at the core of governance concept as such, lies the notion of 
inclusiveness and collective action, a specific kind of institutional process and the 
necessity to tackle a collective goal that has transnational effects (see Rosenau, 1995; 
Mayntz, 2001; Borzel and Risse, 2010; Held, 2004; Keohane and Nye, 1971; Risse-
Kapen,1995). The content of global governance arrangements as such is driven by the
practices and policies of a liberal international order, in which institutions are viewed as 
purposely generated solutions to problems of a globalised world (Hurrel, 2005) and its 
actors bound by shared moral principles and norms of an international ‘society’ of states 
(Smith and Brassett, 2008, p. 6). As Hurrel (2005, p. 35) points out, global governance 
institutions are a response to “how self-interests egoist overcome the collective action 
problems arising from increased interdependence and interaction” to provide costs 
effective solutions to governance problems (Hurrel, 2005 p. 35). Consequently, such 
forms of governance came to constitute an integral part of International Relations studies. 
1.3 Hybrid Forms of Governance Arrangements—Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs)
Cooperative and voluntary forms of hybrid governance come to act as standard setters 
and complement national or global policymaking that aim at the provision of collective 
goods (Borzel and Risse, 2010). Many authors in the field (see Bexell and Morth, 2010; 
Bull and McNeil, 2007) trace the emergence of such forms of governance arrangements 
to the UN Rio Conference on Environment and Development (1992) and the UN Global 
Compact (2000), where Kofi Annan promoted stronger ties between states and the
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business community, emphasised the need for market forces to share social 
responsibilities and to support an agenda of socio-economic development (see Bull and 
McNeil, 2007; UN Global Compact, 2000). As many authors note, the 1990s signalled 
the beginning of a broadening up of the security agenda and a shift of the security 
discourse from traditional state security to individuals and their protection (Collins,2016; 
Buzan et al., 1998). As such, broader non-military security threats such as poverty, 
disease, political violence and the environment emerge and are taken more and more into 
account (Trachsler, 2011; Kaldor, 2003). Such trends broadly reflect international 
practices and discourses that found their underpinnings in ‘liberal peace theory’. The main 
assumption of which is that the adherence of states to shared norms, practices and beliefs 
as well as to cosmopolitan, democratic and moral values and economic interdependencies 
produces peace within nation-states and world politics (see Richmond, 2005).
In 2002, the UN Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development marked a 
significant move towards a more prominent place of public private partnerships (PPPs) 
on the global policy agenda (Bull and McNeil, 2007). During the Summit, world leaders 
proposed new forms of cooperative instruments based on voluntary partnership 
agreements, specifically initiatives that would bring together states, businesses and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) under one umbrella. This form of cooperative 
mechanism, also referred to as ‘Type II Partnerships’,1 is based on a voluntary, multi-
stakeholder group initiatives aimed at tackling challenges of sustainable development 
rather than to address such issues through treaties or agreements (see Bull and McNeil, 
2007; Backstrand, 2006; Fransen and Kolk, 2007; Bostrom and Hallstrom, 2013). Central 
to such partnerships is the tripartite approach and collective action in which actors with 
different institutional affiliations come together with the aim to find a common approach 
to an issue that affects them all, and that is too complex to be addressed effectively 
without collaboration (see Roloff, 2008; Schaferhoff et al., 2009). A main function of 
such partnerships is the development of norms and standards as well as the mutual 
exchange of knowledge and expertise among the actors involved. In doing so, they aim 
to enhance ‘problem-solving capacity’ (Borzel and Risse, 2005) and compensate for 
governance failures. The UN Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(2002) resulted in the launch of more than 200 partnerships, but most importantly, it 
strengthened the rights of civil society and the business sector to act as legitimate actors 
                                                            
1 Type I refers to documents or agreements negotiated by states, such as political agreements 
like conventions and declarations (see further the UN Johannesburg World Summit, 2002).
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in the global social agenda. Such arrangements turned out to be very different in their 
governance structures ranging from more institutionalised and intergovernmental formats 
to networks, private regulatory schemes and standards, public private partnerships or 
multi-stakeholder initiatives (Wouters et al., 2013; Hall and Biersteker, 2002).
They emerged in nearly all areas of world politics encompassing healthcare, corruption, 
education, regional conflicts, environment, etc. Increasingly, such forms of governance 
proliferated, since they tap as ‘innovation and effective’ into the essence of ‘governance 
from below’, counter the participatory gap and effectively address the implementation 
gap in global politics (see Haas, 2004; Backstrand, 2006). They are seen as a more flexible 
way to meet the challenges of sustainable development rather than to work via legally
binding treaties and agreements (see Biermann et al., 2007; Borzel and Risse, 2010). As 
Truex and Soreide (2010, p. 2) note, collective interests and group capacity are supposed 
to surpass the sum of the individual stakeholders. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, an 
important part of their functions lies in their transnational character, where governance 
activities are embedded in particular geopolitical structures with multiple interacting 
institutional webs transcending states and national boundaries (Djelik and Andersson, 
2006; Hale and Held, 2011). These global governance arrangements may also be 
understood as political spaces in which differently situated actors negotiate either 
formally or informally (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram et al., 2002) and in which 
issues are dealt with in a democratic fashion. As pinpointed by Held (2004), such 
governance platforms have the potential to serve as the backbone of a ‘global or 
cosmopolitan social democracy’. As such, they are advertised often as solutions to the 
shortcomings of the globalisation process that has privileged a neoliberal agenda of 
economic liberalisation and functional international cooperation over social democracy 
(see Held 2004; see also Held and McGrew, 2000 p. 59). In this sense and as argued by 
their advocates, such platforms of governance cooperation enable overcoming the 
democratic and accountability deficit in world politics. In fact, it is believed that the 
deliberative and participatory nature of various social actors in such governance systems 
in conjuncture with their democratic commitments to values such as transparency, social 
justice, solidarity as well as the rule of law helps to effectively steer policies and decision-
making processes into a more democratic and cohesive way. This is because the 
deliberative process2 of such governance systems not only involves individual political 
                                                            
2 Defined as the process of reaching a decision whereby initial preferences are transformed to take 
account of the views of others through open and free discussions (Miller, 1992, p. 55).
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preferences but also the capacity of those affected by a collective decision to deliberate 
when producing those decisions (Dryzek and List, 2003).
1.4 Global Governance and Non-State Actors
Civil Society
At the core of these hybrid forms of governance networks lies the nature of the actors 
involved. In particular, the inclusion of civil society that acts as monitoring and whistle-
blowing power (Carbonnier et al., 2011; Soreide and Truex, 2013). As several authors 
demonstrate, the rise of civil society in International Relations and its influence in world 
politics challenging the authority of states is what constitutes a pillar of the global 
governance agenda (Florini, 2000; Castells, 2008; Rosenau, 1995; Keck and Sikkink, 
1998; Khagram et al., 2002). The recognition that civil society associations can have a 
beneficial effect is viewed as an important cornerstone of the pursuit global governance 
framework and its strategies. As Khagram et al. (2002 p. 11) write, “if the business sector 
has been characterised by drive for profit and the government sector by the use of 
authority, the third sector or the nongovernmental sector could be characterise by the 
search of meaning”, which is the motivation to shape the world according to their 
principles and beliefs for the explicit purpose of promoting societal change to benefit the 
population at large (Ibid).
As such, civil society has been both perceived as a vehicle for the implementation of 
global governance strategies but also as a valuable adviser in policy-making processes by 
bringing input and perspectives from the local population to politics (Khagram et al.,
2002; Nelson, 2000). In addition, through its monitoring and evaluation activities, civil 
society is increasingly acclaimed to advance public participation and public 
accountability and to contribute to overall democratisation at the global and supranational 
level (see Held, 2004). 
Although the concept of civil society dates back a long time, its role became more 
prominent with the advent of globalisation (Khagram et al., 2002). As the authors note, 
the advent of civil society in world politics is linked to challenges induced by 
globalisation processes (Zajak, 2009). In the early 1990s, transnational activists drew
attention to the growing divide between the rich Northern states and the poor Southern 
regions of the world (see, for example, Khagram et al., 2002). Social movements further 
challenged and politicized the link between consumption and exploitation, denouncing 
the role of states and multinational corporations in these dynamics (Zajak, 2009). Civil 
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society and critical movements challenged the economic redistribution of the market and 
rising global injustice (Howell and Pearce, 2001; Zajak, 2009; Khagram et al., 2002). 
Khagram et al. (2002 p. 3) further observe the rise of transnational collective action that 
involves nongovernmental organisations and social movements interacting with 
international norms to restructure world politics. As the authors further emphasis, 
“nongovernmental organizations are emerging as a powerful new force in international 
politics and are transforming global norms and practices” (Khagram et al., 2002 p. 4). 
Such network movements proliferated in different fields ranging from environmental 
activism to human rights and international labour practices. Regardless of their domain 
of activity, transnational activists came to create, monitor and reinforce international 
norms practice (Risse-Kappen, 1995; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Reinike and Deng, 2000). 
Increasingly, civil society came to penetrate the international arena that was once 
exclusively the domain of states denouncing illicit practices and injustice towards 
minorities groups as well as citizens and focusing on transboundary-issues (Sassen, 2002; 
Khagram et al., 2002). As such, civil society came to represent the rights and interests of 
citizens and minorities across nation-states, in response to challenges posed by 
globalisation and societal transformation (Castells, 2008; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). If 
traditionally civil society was operating in relation to the state, in the post-Cold War 
environment it came to extend its scope and organised in a polycentric pattern around 
different sites–from local to regional and global giving it a character of a ‘global civil 
society’ (Kaldor, 2003). Therefore, one can conceptualise civil society in the 
contemporary globalised world as a political space (Khagram et al., 2002).
Multinational Companies (MNC)
Apart from civil societies, MNC and the business sector overall emerged as an important 
governance player in such arrangements. For instance, political economists such as Susan 
Strange (1992) state that the process of globalisation is linked with a transfer of power 
and authority from the public to the private sector. Central to her claims is the erosion of 
state power in terms of economic power exercised by agents other than the state. As she 
argues, states in contemporary politics are pushed to negotiate with companies, because 
much of their national economies and survival depends on international trade (Strange, 
1996; 1992). In particular, she stresses changes in the structure of production in the world 
economy triggered by technological progress, financial market restructuration and the 
rapid internationalisation of production together with trans-border communication and 
transportation that altered the power of companies in the global political economy. In fact, 
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as she further argues, the surplus corporate actors bring to national and international 
labour, the market and economic development as well as their knowledge transfer and 
technological expertise is recognised as of strategic importance for the material wealth of 
national economies and populations (Strange, 1991). Accordingly, states in contemporary 
politics are pushed to negotiate with companies, because much of their national 
economies and survival depends on international trade. As the author further notes: 
“[…] The nature of the competition between states has fundamentally changed, I 
mean that in the past states competed for control over territory and the wealth-
creating resources within territories, whether natural or man-created. Now they 
are increasingly competing for market shares in the world economy” (Strange, 
1996, p. 55). 
Most of the governments today accept that it is not in their interest to keep their countries 
out of the global market and consequently they cannot refrain from interacting with 
MNCs that facilitate such access (Keoning-Archibugi, 2004, p. 116). Such observations 
made states change domestic regulations to create favourable conditions for attracting 
MNCs. As such, states increasingly competed with one another to have MNC operating
in their territory (Strange, 1992). The internationalisation of production created a new 
geographic division of labour with the outsourcing of multinational activities to more 
favourable regions to take advantage of low production costs, easy market access and 
economies of scale. In doing so, national economies became increasingly entangled in the 
global system of production and exchange (Held, 2004, p. 22).
The spread of MNC activities across every sector of the global economy triggered a re-
ordering of traditional national economic activities. In the contemporary global political 
environment, corporate power increasingly came to play an influential role in decisions 
over organisations, location and distribution of economic power and resources (Held and 
McGrew, 2000, p. 26). As such, multinational companies gain great significance for the 
international agenda by establishing self-regulatory and voluntary practices to regulate 
their activities resulting in corporations being politically3 involved in public deliberations 
and participation over global governance matters (see Scherer et al., 2006). As argued in 
                                                            
3 Politically is defined here according to Young (2004, p. 377): “[…] in which people organize 
collectively to regulate or transform some aspects of their shared social conditions, along with the 
communicative activities in which they try to persuade one another to join such collective actions or 
decide what direction they wish to take”. 
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the literature, in such policy-orientated constellations firms are not passive bystanders. 
For instance, studies on environmental governance demonstrate that firms have the 
capacity to shape and influence the global regulatory agenda by lobbying governments. 
A recurrent illustration is the Rio Earth Summit (1992) in which both states and MNCs
came to share the tasks of establishing the legal and political underpinnings for 
sustainable development and environment protection (see Falkner, 2003; Kopnina and 
Blewitt, 2015). As many critics argue, the motives for such arrangements are not always 
altruistic and are largely attributed to corporate profit maximisation and reputational 
concerns, since such partnerships may reduce investments risks and provide business 
opportunities that would have been otherwise impossible to achieve (Gillies, 2010). Yet,
as Bull and McNeill (2007, p. 3) note, large corporations also seek legitimacy and 
predictability in their global environment and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are one 
of the ways to achieve such aims.
1.5 Global Governance Arrangements, PPPs and Critical Perspectives
Buchanan and Keohane (2006, p. 406) state that global governance institutions are novel,
hence they are still in their infancy. The empirical literature on the topic of PPPs suffers 
from the fact that the concept is not well developed and sometimes rather imprecise, as
Borzel and Risse (2005) claim. Nevertheless, studies on PPPs and broader global 
governance institutions produced substantial and interdisciplinary research describing,
understanding and explaining the functioning of such governance structures (Borzel and 
Risse, 2005; Borzel and Hullen, 2015; Roseneau, 2000; Held and McGrew, 2000). Much 
in the field of management and organisational business studies has been written about 
PPPs with the focus largely on the effectiveness of PPPs, their institutional design and 
market efficiency. Scholarly research on PPPs in the IR literature and its subfields 
(environmental development and public administration studies) intensely discussed the 
merits and flaws of such government arrangements. Broadly speaking, global governance 
questioned the effects global governance had on states and processes of globalisation and 
institutions. The debate about global governance arrangements fall into three categories: 
traditional state-centric power politics, normative and rational.
1.5.1 Global Governance and Scholarly Debate
Traditional State-centric Power Politics and Global Governance
From a theoretical perspective, such observations produced an intense discussion about 
manifestations of global governance, its effect on world politics and traditional ways of 
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governing. Discourses on ‘governance without government’, ‘the need for global social 
responsibility’, ‘collective actions and good governance’ came to dominate the post-Cold 
War agenda in world politics. Such global governance discourses challenged the 
traditional view of state and governance and stressed the necessity to broaden the 
traditional state-centric governance model in IR to include actors other than the state 
(Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Schaferhof et al., 2009; Liese and Beishem, 2011; 
Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Held and McGrew, 2000; Mathews, 2000). Writing about 
environmental global governance notes, Auer (2000 p. 160) argues that “nonstate actors 
are major players too—creating, assembling and disseminating knowledge, and lobbying 
for regional and global environmental protection”. Such perspectives demand to revisit 
theories of the international system conventionally based on interstate political dynamics 
and power politics (see, for example, Waltz, 1979). Not only traditional views privilege 
states as being the only legitimate actors but also it considers it as being the main actors 
of international arena. Accordingly, the global governance literature contests such views 
as they fail to acknowledge the presence of non-state actors, their influence in world 
politics as well as the implications of globalisation patterns within.
As such, the global governance literature emphasises the need to re-conceptualise the
state and state power. One of the most prominent claims in in this context relates to James 
Rosenau who suggested to view the state’s traditional governance mode as a “process of 
bifurcation” (Rosenau, 1995, p. 19; 2000, p. 227) or more as a network-based “system of 
modes of governing” (Held and McGrew, 2000). According to Held and McGrew (2000),
the international environment of the post-Cold War environment is increasingly marked 
by a shift of power from states to non-state actors and a diffusion of political authority 
from states to other actors, while ‘the local’ is increasingly imbued with expansive sets 
of interregional relations and networks (Held and McGrew, 2000 p. 3; see also Bull and 
McNeil, 2007; Sassen, 2004). Such interpretations further inspired scholars to examine 
the changing nature of state governance power in global affairs. As Peters and Pierre 
(2006, p. 30) note, it is important here to make a distinction between the rather negative 
‘hollow’ conception of the state and a more positive ‘enabling’ conception. 
According to Peters and Pierre, the ‘hollow’ conception emphasises the deterioration of 
the state’s governance power and its incapacity to provide collective goods for its 
population. As Rosenau writes: “The days when states had the capacity to conduct 
autonomous economic and social policies for the protection of their populations are over, 
encouraging people to reorient themselves to ward those authorities who may be more 
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able to provide protection” (Rosenau, 1997, p.104, see also Rosenau, 2000). Thomas 
Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (2014) further see global governance arrangements as a 
collective response to the inability of states to address worldwide problems individually.
As the authors state: “Global governance came to refer to collective efforts to identify, 
understand, or address worldwide problems and processes that went beyond the capacities 
of individual states” (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014 p. 208). Such perceptions focus on the 
incapacity of state to deal with social issues and effects generated by the global economic 
environment, transnational human and environmental security issues (Weiss and 
Wilkinson, 2014; Rosenau, 1995; Strange, 1996; Held and McGrew, 2000; Hall and 
Bierstecker, 2002). As Rosenau, (1997, p. 115) notes: “Goods, services, money, ideas, 
polluted air and water, drugs, AIDS, terrorists, migrants, crime—to mention only the 
more obvious globalizing dynamics—move too quickly across established political 
boundaries for governments to control sufficiently to satisfy their constituents”.
Krasner and Risse (2014) also acknowledge the rising power of non-state actors in 
providing collective goods and their role in enhancing state capacity building and further 
illustrate such claims in “areas of limited statehood”.4 (Krasner and Risse, 2014; see also 
Risse, 2011). In doing so, these literatures stress the shrinking role of state sovereign 
power in global politics and emphasise the transfer of states’ traditional governance 
functions and authorities towards private and transnational actors.
On the other side, the ‘enabling’ conception assumes that the state remains the central 
authority of power but that its roles shifted from mobilizing governance resources towards 
decentralised government activities through preserving the “central mind of government” 
(Pierre and Peters, 2006 p. 30). Even the proponents of ‘global civil society’ argue that 
although NGOs and other non-state actors are playing an increasingly influential role in 
institutions solving global problems (Young, 1997), they are unlikely to replace the power 
of sovereign states. As Wapner (1997, p. 67) notes, “states remain the main actors in 
world affairs” and their cooperative efforts are essential to establish building blocks of 
global governance systems.
In a similar vein, Borzel and Risse (2005, p. 7) examine these changes in terms of “state 
delegation or counteracting out” of state functions to private actors, which previously 
were provided by states. As the authors argue such forms of delegation can come in a 
                                                            
4 The “areas of limited statehood” are defined as a sovereign context where the “state does not have the 
administrative capacity (either material or institutional) to exercise effective control over activities within 
its own borders” (Krasner and Risse, 2014 p. 546).
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weak shape in which private actors are held accountable by states or can be cases in which 
“delegation” actually amounts to and resembles private self-regulation in the shadow of 
hierarchy (Borzel and Risse, 2005, p. 7). Yet, in both cases, states according to the authors 
seem reluctant to provide private actors with true governance authority outside of their 
control (Borzel and Risse, 2005, p. 11)
Further supporting such claims with reference to the literature mentioned above,
Neumann and Sending (2010) critically analyse the transformation of states in global 
politics. Using the Foucauldian theoretical framework of governmentality, the authors 
demonstrate state powers interaction, and how it operates at the transnational level. 
Contrary to some assumptions in the literature that frame the impact of globalisation on 
states as ‘state erosion of power’, their main argument is that globalisation does not result 
in states losing their power but globalisation rather implies that states shift their strategic 
rationale in terms of governing. Therefore, they place emphasis on the necessity to see 
the process of reconfiguring the state in terms of governmental rationality (Neumann and 
Sending, 2010, p. 2).
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to debate whether the power of sovereign states
‘eroded’ or to what extent state power shifted from state to non-state actors and 
institutions. Yet, it is important to note that such literature raises three important claims. 
The first one is concerned with the changes in the traditional governance of states.
Although state governance is subject to debate, it is beyond doubt that states are 
increasingly open to cross-border flows of capital, goods and services (Bull and McNeil, 
2007, p. 29). In fact, the openness of countries to the global market had a profound impact 
on the world production system and the conduct of international relations (Strange, 1992). 
Ruggie (2004) points out that the relations of states became increasingly embedded in a 
broadening and deepening transnational arena that is concerned with the production of 
global public goods requiring the reconceptualisation of the process and structures of 
international organisations and the roles of states within them.
As such, the above discussion demonstrates that global processes resulted in the 
reconfiguration of the traditional state governance power in world politics. It further 
argues that states are no longer the sole source of authority or the primary actors. This 
first claim consequently leads to a second, in which the traditional power of authority is
replaced or shared in a private / global sphere of governance encompassing both public 
and private actors as legitimate sources of authorities for the provision of collective 
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goods. It further refers to the capitalist global forces that seek to engage and build 
coalitions with non-state actors such as firms, states and civil society in an effort to 
establish policies, norms and institutions that structure the field in particular ways (Levy 
and Egan, 2003, p. 811; Levy and Newell, 2002). In doing so, these literatures share a 
similar focus on overarching governance structures that reach beyond single regime 
structures (Biermann et al., 2009). 
Normative Perspectives
Moving beyond state centric accounts in global governance, another strand of literature
examines the normative dimensions of global governance. The normative discussion of 
global governance focus on its input or output legitimacy (see Scharpf, 1998; Bexell and 
Morth, 2010; Bull and McNeil, 2007; Cutler et al., 1999; Haufler, 2001; Held and 
Keoning-Archibugi, 2004; Krasner and Risse, 2014). 
The input and output legitimacy argument finds its analytical locus in democratic theory. 
Friedrich Scharpf (1998) developed input legitimacy as the procedural turn and refers to 
deliberative participatory accounts of democracy. As Scharpf (1998, para.3) states: “The 
input dimension, ‘government by the people’ implies that collectively binding decisions 
should originate from the authentic expression of the preferences of the constituency in 
question”5. Similarly, the analysis of Bexell and Morth (2010) on input legitimacy refers 
to the identification, representation and participation of stakeholders affected by 
partnership activities. Such discussions focus on issues related to the accountability, 
transparency and morality of the participants in such pluralistic arrangements and the 
pragmatic handling of decision-making processes in such transnational sites (De Burca 
2008, p. 110; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Hall and Bierstecker, 2002; Backstrand, 
2006).
On the other side, output legitimacy relates to the effectiveness of organisation in 
delivering their promises. According to Scharpf (1998), output dimension is 
‘government for the people’ and hence implies that collectively binding decisions should 
serve the common interest of a constituency. According to Bexell and Morth (2010, p. 
15), partnerships gain legitimacy by responding and achieving goals that citizens 
                                                            
5 Scharpf, F. (1998). Interdependence and Democratic Legitimation. MPIfG Working Paper 98/2, 
September 1998. [Online]. Available at: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp98-2/wp98-2.html 
[Accessed 2 December,2016]. 
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collectively consider the most important. Hence, the problem-solving capacity of 
partnerships is what constitutes output legitimacy.
This strand of the literature questions the democratic credentials as well as the legitimacy 
of global governance arrangements (Benz and Paupadolous, 2006; De Burca, 2008; Risse, 
2011; Bexell and Morth, 2010). As mentioned in the earlier sections, global governance 
arrangements have been praised for their normative prescriptions and their inclusive 
participatory nature as well as their problem-solving capacity that prevail over ‘bad’ 
governance practices and democratic deficits in the post-Cold War environment (e.g.,
Held, 2004; Haas, 2004; Held and McGrew 2007; Florini, 2007). Yet, such claims fail to 
question analytically the implications of such arrangements. In fact, as critics point out, 
such views remain largely ‘prescriptive’ by taking the adoption of transnational 
arrangements for granted (see Risse, 2011; Acharya, 2004). Hence, normative scholarship 
precisely questions the normative claims of global governance arrangements. For 
instance, Thomas Risse argues that achieving democratic governance beyond the nation-
state is an illusion, as transnational governance lacks congruence between those who are 
governed and those to whom governance bodies are accountable to (Risse, 2006, p. 180). 
In a similar vein, Peters and Pierre question the utility of such institutional arrangements 
and their democratic character. The authors argue that PPPs suffer from serious problems 
of political steering, control, transparency and accountability (Peters and Pierre, 2010 p, 
42). Others look at the internal structural dynamics by analysing stakeholder 
participation, representation and decision-making power and mechanisms of institutional 
rules within such constellations (see Faysse, 2006; Joyner, 2007; Soreide and Truex, 
2013) and the extent to which partners’ behaviours align with the principles and practices 
of good governance and collective action (Brinkerhoff, and Brinkerhoff, 2011 p.7; 
Bostrom and Hallstrom, 2013). Borzel and Risse (2005, p. 17) argue that “participation 
of non-state actors per se does not make international governance more democratic, if this 
participation is selective and lacks transparency”. 
Within these discussions another strand of literature examines the adoption and diffusion 
of transitional norms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), for instance, look at how
international norms emerge and shape states and non-state actors’ behaviour and 
conditions under which international norms matter. In their prominent study ‘the 
boomerang model’, Keck and Sikkink (1998) were among the first to examine 
transnational activism and norms transcendence in non-democratic settings. Scholars 
such as Thomas Risse (2011; see also Risse et al., 1999) explore domestic socialisation 
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accommodating international human rights norms. Others explore how the domestic 
political structures of recipient states condition normative implementation (Borzel and 
Hullen, 2015; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Acharya, 2004; Zurn et al., 2012). Among 
them, Krasner and Risse (2014) in their special issue on ‘The influence of external actors, 
state-building, and service in areas of limited statehood’ examine conditions that 
determine the success of legitimacy. They point out that the necessary condition for 
legitimacy to be effective largely depends on its acceptance by the local actors as well as 
the domestic institutional designs in targeted states (Krasner and Risse, 2014, p. 547). As 
the authors state: “Politically relevant audiences in the target state must accept the 
legitimacy of efforts by external organizations” (Krasner and Risse, 2014 p. 547). In 
doing so, the authors make an interesting point about the function of domestic actors in 
shaping transnational agreements, as the authors note: “For activities that target national-
level governance structures, legitimation by local actors will be less important than 
validation from national political elites” (Krasner and Risse, 2014 p. 556). 
The study of Borzel and van Hullen (2014) further highlights the importance of local 
actors in legitimating transnational governance provisions. Through their case study on 
EU attempts to implement anticorruption programmes in the South Caucasus, the authors 
emphasize that “politically relevant audiences in the target states do not only have to 
accept external efforts, but these efforts will have to resonate with the prevalent social 
norms to be effective” (Borzel and van Hullen, 2014, p. 614). Consequently, it is only 
when the targeted norms prevail over specific domestic cultures of privileges that political 
actors implement norms effectively (Ibid). In doing so, the above studies highlight an 
important dynamic of norms diffusion in states subject to weak state building capacities 
often accompanied with patronage and high levels of corruption. For external actors and 
transnational initiatives to have an influence, the promotion of transnational norms needs 
to be compatible with the targeted states so that the political elites have an incentive to 
implement institutional changes, and civil society actors have leverage to pressure elites 
into compliance with the rules (Borzel and van Hullen, 2014). 
The normative approach further ackowledges that international norms can also serve as 
tools of rational choice (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2011). In this sense, 
normative approaches recognise that rational actor motivations exist, therefore they stress 
the need to unpack the connection between rationality and norms (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998). 
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Rational Views
The core of global governance perspectives is driven by the tenets of liberal normative
practices and their diffusion. As Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 24) observe, “the common 
thread linking these different sites and structures of global governance is liberalism”. 
Kantian liberal assumptions state that humans despite their self-interests are capable of 
cooperating and constructing a more peaceful and harmonious society when they adhere
to shared social democratic norms, moral commitments and respective organisations 
(Russett, 2013, p. 95). As further stressed by Moravcsik (1997, p. 525), liberals view 
politics with a ‘bottom-up’ approach in which the demands of individuals and societal 
groups are analytically treated prior to state’s rapacious and realist driven interests. As 
such politics in liberal contexts is increasingly embedded in domestic and transnational 
civil society where individuals advance their ideational interests through political 
exchange and collective action (Moravcsik, 1997 p. 525). Political representation in this 
realm is “not simply a formal attribute of state institutions but includes other stable 
characteristics of the political process, formal or informal, that privileges particular 
societal interests” (Ibid, p. 518). Embracing such views, Ruggie arguing from an 
institutionalist perspective, further claims that norms and institutions play a significant 
role in the management of regional and global challenges (Ruggie, 2003). Institutions are 
viewed as “purposely generated solutions to different kinds of collective actions 
problems” (Hurrel, 2005, p. 34). Theories of international regimes acknowledge that 
institutions enable inter-state cooperation even in an anarchic environment (Ruggie, 
2003). In this sense, global governance is perceived as a form of liberal institutionalism 
and as a means to overcome both domestic and international challenges through a concert 
of multilateral and pluralised forms of governance. Consequently, the notion of hierarchy 
in such framework is barely or impossibly to discern (Abrahamsen, 2004).
Realist sceptics of such views highlight the omission of power in liberal thinking. As 
Hurrel (2005, p. 48) critically observes: “Liberals shy away from recognizing the full 
range of roles that power plays within and around institutions”. For instance, Barnett and 
Duval (2005) critically examine the definition of “power” in global governance 
arrangements, and how it produces global outcomes and shapes the “capacities for actors 
to define and pursue their interests and ideals” (Barnett and Duval, 2005, p. 3). As the 
authors emphasize: “To understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors 
are differentially enabled and constrained requires a consideration of different forms of 
power in international politics” (Barnett and Duval, 2005, p. 3). In doing so, Barnett and 
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Duval (2005) distinguish between four sorts of powers: compulsory, structural, 
institutional and productive. Compulsory power refers to relational power that allows 
actors to have direct control over another. Structural power relates to the structure and 
social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to one another. Institutional 
power refers to situations when actors exercise indirect control over others through the 
design of institutions. Productive power is the socially diffuse power of subjective 
systems of meanings and signification (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p. 3). The 
conceptualisation of such power dynamics and its coupling with global governance 
arrangements offers interesting insights on how global governance is “organised, 
structured and regulated” in terms of outcomes, decision-making processes and the roles 
of different actors involved. Such critical views examine how institutions reflect the 
vested interests of actors that constitute them. Gregory Shaffer (2005, p. 130), for 
instance, examines how the United States, the European Union and their strategic actors 
advance their interests through the WTO. As Shaffer notes governance consists of 
multilevel, interacting, nested layers of institutional rules and decision-making processes 
that create opportunities for some actors and constraint others (Shaffer, 2005, p. 131). In 
doing so, such criticism focuses on rationality from an agency perspective (see 
Backstrand et al., 2012 p. 128) that sees norms as an instrument for utility maximisation
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Peters and Pierre, 2010). For instance, Finnemore and 
Sikkinik (1998 p. 893) arguing from a constructivist perspective, further observe that 
‘norm entrepreneurs’ often use the international norms discourse as an opportunity to 
strengthen their position in domestic politics.
In this way, rationalist views largely emphasize bargaining power constellations of actors 
within such partnership agreements (see Andonova and Levi, 2003; Bartley, 2007). 
Processes of power dynamics and interests within the global governance initiatives are 
further explored by Borzel and Risse (2005). Taking a structural view of power, the 
authors (2005, p. 8) claim that the more stakeholders are represented at the bargaining 
table in an issue area, the more one could observe cross-cutting coalitions among private 
and public actors. As Bexell and Morth (2010, p. 10) write, “partnership can also be 
considered as arrangements in which actors obtain resources that they would otherwise 
not get”. Such critics point to the role, choice and power structures of different actors 
involved in such constellations (Bexell and Morth, 2010; Borzel and Risse, 2005). As the 
authors argue, the voluntary and self-mandated character of partnerships renders their 
constituencies arbitrary and the functioning of stakeholders blurred. 
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As such, critics demur that many partnership agreements have tendencies to create a 
virtual image of democratic good governance—of inclusivity and representation (Bexell 
and Morth, 2010, p.  14). As Peters and Pierre argue, efficiency in the public sector can 
and may be achieved at the loss of democratic control and values (Peters and Pierre, 2010,
p. 43). Others criticise the nature of such arrangements for being purely driven by rational 
calculations of world politics that favour the interests of strong Westphalian states over 
weaker states in the South. Such radical views argue that non-state governance 
arrangements only profit the transnational capitalist class of the international systems and 
a fraction of the population (Weiss, 2009). 
An illustration of such perspectives can be found in Levy and Prakash (2003) who 
examine the role of MNCs in global governance arrangements. They use a bargaining
approach to understand the interaction within international governance, and why firms 
support such arrangements. While referring to CSR, Cutler (2008) argues that such 
partnerships ought to be understood as a strategy to better absorb and control the 
opposition. Such views largely emphasise state and market relations in which PPPs 
function as a policy instrument that serves the competitive resource interests of the state 
and the business sector (Singh and Bourgoin, 2013). 
For instance, in the case of the EITI, as critics point out, the voluntary nature of the public 
private partnership does not pose a challenge practicing ‘business as usual’ in states 
subject to the resource curse, corruption and patronage. As Goldthau and Witte (2010, p. 
301) note “many of the routes normally deployed to satisfy key internal constituencies 
are unaffected by the EITI brand of transparency” if reforms did constitute a threat to 
vested rapacious interests, the EITI will be endorsed in the first place.
There is a growing global trend of authoritarian countries signing and adhering to global 
governance arrangements, followed as Hollyer and Rosendorff note (2011, p. 1) by 
“wilful violation of its provisions”. As Matt Andrews further argues (2013), most of the 
adhering states in developing countries commonly adopt international reforms and global 
standards to signal their intent to reform but not to change actual government practices. 
As Cooley (2015b, p. 5) also observed, international ratings intentionally serve to support 
the agenda of hegemonic states. Rankings appeal to the status of hegemonic states by 
offering positive reinforcement for their practices or can be detrimental for their image 
through ‘blaming and shaming strategies’. In such instances, states would appear to act 
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on the indicator on which they are ranked without, however, to adopt new norms or 
standards of behaviour.
Others look at the role of civil society in such institutional constellation. Sending and 
Neumann (2006) emphasise the need to consider the context in which civil society 
operates within global governance arrangements. Similarly, Scholte (2002, p. 281) 
argues, the benefits of civil society engagement in global governance arrangements do 
not flow automatically and, hence, need to be nurtured continuously. As he demonstrates 
in his article ‘Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance’, civil society can also 
subvert the efforts of global governance democratisation, failing to maximise public 
participation, representation, accountability, transparency and consultation in the delivery 
of the promised activities and values it stands for. As he astutely states, civil society is 
itself a site of struggles (Ibid., p. 296). Andrew Hurrel (2005, p. 43) observes that although 
civil society can influence some state decisions, it is however states’ action that are 
“crucial in fostering the emergence of civil society in the first place and in providing the 
institutional framework that enables it to flourish”. As he further emphasises, “most 
importantly, state power is increasingly determined by the ability of governments to work 
successfully within civil society and to exploit transnational and transgovernmental 
coalitions for their own purposes”. In so doing, Hurrel points to an important element,
namely, states’ domestic institutional predisposition to absorb civil society and broader 
transnational advocacy coalitions. Similarly, in her concluding book chapter 
‘Restructuring world politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms’,
Katherine Sikkink (2002, p. 312) states that one needs to consider carefully the 
relationship between NGOs and state. As she further argues, in many cases the vision of 
autonomous NGO is misleading, and the relationship between NGOs and states is far 
closer than one would expect. Further, as observed by Borzel and Risse (2005, p. 17),
there is an existing gap between those representatives of transnational civil society who 
are allowed inside the governance mechanisms and those who remain outside. In addition,
while they claim to represent the public interest, some NGOs tend to be self-selected and 
elite-driven (Keohane and Nye 2001 cited in Borzel and Risse, 2005, p. 17). Moreover,
transnational civil society often works to influence political, social or economic domains
in weaker societies by legitimising, favouring and funding one group of claims over 
another, which indirectly undermines the authentic process of democratising global 
governance affairs (Hurrel, 2005, p. 45). As Hurrel (2005, p. 45) states, in such contexts
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“decision making process and outcomes may be just as subject of powerful manipulation 
by power actors as in the world of interstate politics”.
Towards Global Assemblages
As Drezner (2004) astutely points out, theoretical debates on globalisation focus on small 
parts of a larger question and omit to question how globalisation affects governance. 
Therefore, having considered these divergent theoretical accounts in the literature, the 
approach taken by Saskia Sassen (2006) and Ong and Collier (2005) offers an innovative 
avenue to study global governance arrangements. As these authors suggest, because 
globalisation processes take place within national territories, it is important to view 
globalisation in terms of ‘global assemblages’ that is “the actual and specific articulation 
of a global form” (Collier, 2006, p. 400). Such a definition implies to see globalisation as
global configurations operating in various institutional domains. As Collier (2006) further 
argues, “the implication is not that global forms are everywhere but that they have a 
distinctive capacity for decontextualization and recontextualization, abstractability and 
movement, across diverse social and cultural situations” (Collier, 2006 p. 400). In this 
sense, as Saskia Sassen (2006, p. 6) further argues, it is crucial in such processes to 
observe how the “global is structured inside the national, producing multiple specialised 
denationalisations”. As she further stresses, rather than talking in terms of the erosion of 
state power the discussion of globalisation need to be orientated towards state 
transformation.
In this regard, I concur with these authors. Rather than viewing globalisation and states 
as two separate entities, my analysis views globalisation processes as intertwined with 
state apparatuses. Adopting such views enables me to unpack the sort of interaction global 
governance arrangements create among different actors in authoritarian post-Soviet 
settings with limited plurality. I further explore how structural constrains in authoritarian 
regimes impact on state and non-state actors, the roles of actors within as well as the 
outcomes of global governance. In doing so, the thesis seeks to explore how global forms 
are shaped and reconfigured in the domestic context, and how these in return affect state 
institutions in particular in non-democratic states imprinted with Soviet legacies. 
Additionally, the thesis seeks to explore what sort of socio-political and global 
implications such arrangements produce.
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1.6 Global Governance and Authoritarianism
Writing about liberal democratic norms promotion before the backdrop of a wave of 
authoritarianism, Alex Cooley (2015a) argues that regional groups themselves have 
become “institutional arenas where democratic norms are contested and counternorms 
introduced” (Cooley, 2015a, p. 58). Such accounts are relevant to the study of Central 
Asian countries. In the case of Central Asia, as David Lewis further observes (2012a),
processes of norm diffusion are no longer a case of external ideas and values being simply 
accepted or rejected, but rather norms promotion in such settings have acquired a more 
complex outlook with multiple actors as norm entrepreneurs both at domestic and 
international levels. As Lewis further states, (2012a, p. 1228) “in that process of 
contestation, the identities of actors are also questioned, challenged and adapted to suit 
new constellations of norms and ideas”. 
As the recent review of Cooley clearly demonstrates, increasingly global changes in world 
politics “have turned a world that was once relatively favourable to the spread of 
democratic norms into one where authoritarians can push back—and have learned to do 
so in innovative ways” (Cooley, 2015a, p. 60). The emergence of new norms, such as
‘civilizational diversity’ and the principle of non-interference into domestic affairs of 
sovereign states, the revival of traditional values against the iliberal constitutional 
democratic values and state security came to dethrone traditional western liberal 
democratic norms promotion (Ibid). Such changes have triggered increasing repression 
against NGOs and civil society across states subject to authoritarian rule (Coley, 2015a;
Buxton, 2011). In some instances, as in Central Asia, NGOs move towards practices that 
serve to shield their authoritarian members from outside criticism; as Sikkink (2002, p. 
312) points out, a list of new acronyms of such NGOs emerged. Described as GONGOs 
(government organised NGOs), BONGOs (business organised NGOs) and DONGOs 
(NGOs organizsd by governments, business and donors), these new forms of NGOs 
significantly challenge the traditional perceptions of NGOs (Axyonova, 2011; Aliyev,
2015). Abramson observes (1999, p. 244) that civil society is context sensitive: “Different 
cross-cultural usage reflects a disjuncture between western and post-Soviet values and 
expectations”. 
In the case of Central Asia, the newly independent states have embraced the transition 
from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy (Kalyuzhnova, 2008). 
Yet, the rule of old Communist regimes came quickly to be replaced by divergent 
authoritarian styles of rule subject to personality cults and a politics of patronage with
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high levels of corruption and repression (Kalyuzhnova, 2008, p. 33; Lewis, 2012b;
Najman et al., 2008). At the same time, most of these countries adhere to international 
rules of democratic norm provision and global governance arrangements. Such 
engagement involved the signing of bilateral or multilateral partnerships with the West, 
accession to international organisations and engagement with foreign diplomacy (Schatz, 
2006). Yet against expectations, the adherence to such democratically acclaimed treaties 
and practices did not produce the desired ‘democratic transition’ in the countries of 
Central Asia; on the contrary, authoritarian rule appeared to be hardening. As the studies 
in the literature point out, many factors could be attributed to explain such outcomes. In 
this instance, the literature paid increasing attention to leverage and external linkages 
(Levitsky and Way, 2010), socialising and conditionality (Schimmelfennig, 2002; 
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). Moreover, scholars observed that a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms or absence of coercion, such as the “carrot and stick” approach,
often failed to make non-democratic states change their behaviour in a meaningful way
(Young, 2004; Simmons, 2009). Further as being outlined in this literature review, a 
major problem with international reforms and global governance arrangements lies in 
their implementation process. As Matt Andrews argues (2013, para.2), many of them pay 
little attention to the “contextual realities that actually shape (and constrain) change 
opportunities, promise overly demanding ‘best practice’ solutions that look impressive 
but are commonly impossible to reproduce”. Hence, the success of such arrangements 
remains weak in practice. At present, empirical investigation and the questioning of 
global governance and international agreements focused much on either the norm 
compliance of states and non-state actors in these arrangements or on the effectiveness of 
these norms in producing the expected results. Yet, little is known empirically and 
theoretically about “how generally applicable international standards are received and 
translated at the national levels” (Randall et all, 2012, p. 323; Zurn et al., 2012, p. 4)—
this in particular within authoritarian states. Recent research indicates that there is a 
gradual tendency of authoritarian regimes across the globe to create “new illiberal norms 
and institutions as part of their efforts to reshape global governance toward their own 
preferences” (see Cooley, 2015a; Ambrosio, 2012; Lewis, 2012a). Hence, what can we 
expect in such settings from global governance institutions?
1.7 Global Governance: What Now?
Jan Wouters and colleagues (2013) notethat global governance is highly diverse, complex 
and a continuously changing phenomenon. The manifestation of global governance is 
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empirically embedded within the respective governance modes, processes, logics, agents, 
outcomes and subjects involved as well as the timeframe and issue area in which a 
particular governance arrangement takes place (Wouters et al., 2013, p. 197). Similarly,
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 893) write that international norms must always work 
their influence through the filter of domestic structures and norms, which can produce 
variations in their interpretation impacting on the compliance of these norms. Bartley 
(2011, p. 523) further states that one needs to take into account domestic political contexts
and their variations, as this shape the effects of global governance and its standards 
regulations substantially.
The literature on global governance is still expanding, but few researchers provided a 
strong analysis of governance arrangements in countries subject to authoritarian rule. In 
other words, what does it mean to transfer global governance practices to countries that 
are subject to an authoritarian style of rule and subject to weak state institutions, in which
government actors can exploit state resources for personal gains while private actors such 
as NGOs and companies have limited capacity to operate in such political systems. And 
what sort of organisational and institutional practice do such governance forms require in 
an authoritarian context?
At present, as Thomas Risse (2011) astutely points out, governance discourse remains 
centred on the idealtype of modern or democratic welfare statehood and is based on the 
assumption that complying states are capable of implementing and enforcing global 
norms and rules, and, hence, the conceptualisation of governance remains biased towards 
modern developed nation-states6. Similarly, Zajak (2017, p. 131) also observes that 
current studies and analyses tend to see global governance arrangements as a static system 
that “either focuses on how global change is brought about or treats global institutions as 
rather stable open or closed opportunities that activists use to produce domestic change”.
As Bartley (2011, p. 521) further argues, current accounts of global governance focus 
almost exclusively at the global level, ignoring existing rules at domestic and regional 
levels. Yet, the implementation of transnational standards, always occurs within “a 
particular nation-state, where domestic law where still holds sway” (Ibid). Benz and 
Yannis Papadopoulos (2006, p. 4) note: “Governance is not just politics beyond the nation 
state; rather it is, in different ways, coupled to the institutions of the nation state”. Further 
                                                            
6 See also dDOÕ%DQG(UJXQ$, (2005). Global Governance and Domestic Politics: Fragmented Visions. 
In M. Lederer, P. Muller (eds). Criticizing Global Governance. Chapter 7.
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supporting such claims, Levi and Prakash (2003) also remind us that although the 
enforcement of international arrangements is prescribed under the auspices of 
supranational institutions, their implementation and enforcement takes place at the 
national level. In a similar vein, Bartley (2011) emphasises the need to analyse the 
generalisability of such accounts in terms of multiple rules and levels in different national 
settings.
As these studies point out, there is a need for a deeper enquiry of global governance 
arrangements and their manifestation at regional and local levels, in particular in 
nondemocratic societies.
In light of these observations, the study of Michael Zurn and colleagues (2012) provides
a good starting point to deepen such investigations. The study provides an important 
insight into how international norms are “received, adopted, adapted and resisted” (Zurn
et al., 2012) in targeted nondemocratic countries. The research further raises significant 
issues with regard to international norm transferability and to what happens with efforts 
to promote the rule of law in recipient countries (Zurn et al., 2012, p. 6). This research is 
interesting as it represents one of the few available studies looking into the forms that 
transnational governance assumes in nondemocratic states and the complex relationship 
of different actors across levels ranging from the local, regional, national to the 
transnational. 
Conclusion 
As the transfer of global governance practices is necessarily intertwined with national 
arrangements, there is a need for closer examination of such practices. The current 
conceptualisation of global governance puts much emphasis on the emergent role of non-
state actors, and, as shown above, very few studies examine the different manifestations 
of global governance arrangements in the interplay between the domestic and 
international levels. Since the global governance literature had always focused on the 
interaction of state and non-state actors in these arrangements, its analytical 
conceptualisation provides opportunities for IR scholars working on authoritarian 
countries to understand better the functioning of these actors in a non-democratic society 
and their contribution to the global governance agenda and international norms. Hence,
such an approach provides a chance for further investigating how practices of global 
governance arrangements are framed in non-democratic contexts. Clearly, it is important 
to ask what sort of actors is involved in such arrangements, and what is the form of 
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interaction among these actors? And what sort of tasks do these governance actors 
perform? And more importantly, what form do global governance practices assume in 
non-GHPRFUDWLFVHWWLQJV"$VdDOÕDQG(UJXQSHPSKDVLze “the need for a 
deeper understanding on these interactions can enable us to trace how the project of global 
governance is altered and modified by specific contexts and how it also alters the contexts 
within which it operates”. In so doing, the present study aims to focus on actors involved 
in global governance arrangements, and the impact they have on global governance. In 
so doing, the thesis aims to fill the identified gaps in the literature and provide new 
insights on how global governance arrangements function authoritarian settings. 
Hence, in light of these observations, the question I pose is the following: What is the 
functioning of a global governance initiative such as the EITI in the post-Soviet autocratic 
states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan?
In doing so, the thesis seeks to examine the role shared self-regulatory governance 
practices as prescribed by the EITI play in authoritarian countries, whom or which 
constituencies they serve, and what sort of legitimacy they acquire. Most importantly,
through the framing of the EITI, the thesis aims to assess the role different actors (state 
and non-state actors) play within non-democratic countries. Additionally, the thesis aims 
to unpack the nature of global governance in authoritarian settings and further contribute 
to the debates on global governance arrangements.
This chapter has provided an overview of global governance arrangements. As the chapter 
demonstrated, global governance is a complex concept that is associated with 
globalisation and internationalisation trends. Although the existing literature extensively 
contributed to the understanding of global governance arrangements, the concept is still 
in its infancy. Important aspects of global governance, such as its transferability to non-
democratic regions, lack theoretical and empirical examination. Current explanations fail 
to incorporate in their analysis the importance of structural domestic and contextual 
factors in which global governance initiatives operate. Ignored is in particularly, what 
global governance means for specific non-democratic regions and actors involved in the 
process, and what sort of societal interactions global governance creates within such 
settings. Considering this observation, the study of Central Asian Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan through the angle of the EITI platform provides an excellent opportunity to 
examine such arrangements. 
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Chapter 2. Mapping Central Asia in the Era of Globalisation
Main Points of this Chapter
This thesis will be incomplete without situating the objects of the case studies, Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan, into their historical context. For decades, the Soviet system of rule
shaped and redefined Central Asia. It is therefore important to consider the implications 
of Soviet legacies on Central Asian countries, and how this legacy continues to shape 
them post transition. Consequently, the following discussion is important to understand 
the Kazakh and Kyrgyz case studies that follow this chapter. The present chapter outlines 
how the region of Central Asia emerged in the aftermath of Soviet rule, and how it 
integrated into global politics. As such, the chapter further demonstrates how the region 
of Central Asia plays a part in and is subject to global governance via various economic 
and political and transmission belts.
2.1 The emergence of Central Asian States: From Tsarist Occupation 
to Independence
The dissolution of the Soviet Union generated a large academic debate about the meaning 
and transformation of the Soviet state and potential implications for nation-states 
emerging out of the collapse of the USSR. It is therefore important to situate the path of 
Central Asian republics to national sovereignty within their historical context. The history 
of Central Asia is important, as it enables us to understand the functioning of these 
independent states today. The case of Central Asia, as Deniz Kandiyoti (2002, p. 286) 
notes, is particularly interesting as it carries a dual trajectory as it was first colonised in 
the expansion of the Russian empire in the late 19th century and then exposed to new 
forms of rule by a non-capitalist regime after the victory of the Bolsheviks.
Central Asia was conquered in the context of imperial competition with other European 
powers and coincides with the ‘Great Game’—the geopolitical competition between 
Russia and Great Britain. In the 19th century, Russian military expeditions gradually 
brought the countries of Central Asia under tsarist occupation. The years of tsarist 
occupation changed regional politics, economics, state society relations and culture
tremendously. The Russian colonisation in Central Asia shows many similarities with the 
conduct of other empires. However, the integration of Central Asia into the tsarist empire 
was regarded as highly problematic, as the Russian state had neither the desire nor the 
capability to integrate the indigenous population under its rule (Khalid, 2006, p.236). 
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Under the tsarist rule, the main concern was securitisation and stabilisation in the region 
(Haugen, 2003). Hence, strategies for the integration of Central Asia gave way to 
segregation and non-intervention (Haugen 2003, p. 49). As a result, Central Asian people 
did not become full subjects of the empire and the empire-wide systems of social 
classification (Khalid, 2006; Geiss, 2003). Yet, increasingly, the tsarist occupation 
resembled the character of European colonial rule. For instance, under the tsarist 
occupation, the population of Central Asia was given the judicial status of inorodtsy
(aliens) or tuzemtsy (natives). With such differentiations in place, Central Asian people 
were given different rights in comparison to the remaining population of the empire 
(Khalid, 2006; Geiss, 2003; Haugen, 2003). As Khalid notes (2006, p. 237) “the state 
recognized the native population as different and institutionalized that difference in legal 
practice”. The tsarist occupation further introduced colonial economy: Tsarist railways 
funnelled the development of a cotton economy and helped the large scale resource 
exploitation at the expense of local food crops. As Haugen (2003, p. 50) writes, “the 
strategy of segregation and non-interference enabled the tsarist ruleto achieve maximum 
control at minimum cost”.
The tsarist rule came to an end with the February Revolution and the arrival of the 
Bolsheviks. However, as Northrop (2004, p. 17) observes, in Central Asia instead of 
diminishing colonial control, the presence of Bolsheviks only increased patterns of 
colonial style rule. In his book Unveiled Empire, Northrop writes, unlike their 
predecessors who saw Central Asia in terms of military security and tax revenue,
Bolsheviks considered this region as ‘primitive’ that needed to be “wrested from its 
timeless past and thrown headlong into the modern (Soviet) era” (Northrop, 2004, p. 19). 
While under the tsarist regime local practices were tolerated, they were now dismissed 
and replaced by a universal vision of a socialist society alongside with the centralised 
economic planning. The ultimate aim was to homogenise society and attain universal 
goals (Khalid, 2006, p. 233). Such aims led to a complete social, cultural, political and 
economic transformation of the states of Central Asia. New family codes, including the 
emancipation of women, the modernisation of state agricultural policies, literacy 
programmes accompanied by the secularisation of religion and socio-cultural practices
were introduced (Khalid, 2007; Roy, 2000). As Khalid (2006) observes, there was a need 
to impose sudden change and more importantly a revolution of the minds. To achieve 
these aims, the Bolsheviks did so through the means of nationality. Soviet states 
institutionalised nationality as a major organisational principal of Soviet totalitarian 
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strategy aiming at a universal nation (Haugen, 2003; Roy, 2000). Such strategies also 
worked towards integrating non-Russian territories into a Soviet state (Hirsh, 2005, p. 
65). Hence, beyond territorial occupation, the Soviet regime under the Bolsheviks 
propelled the multi-ethnic populations of Central Asian states into a particular type of 
nation-building project. The emerging states became the titular nationalities of the various 
Union Republics with the notion of Soviet identity attached to it.
Consequently from 1924, the map of Central Asia and its institutional political structures 
were completely redesigned. To distance themselves from imperial rule, Bolsheviks 
organised the territoriality of the Soviet Union into 15 Union Republics and nominally 
divided autonomous regions, further organised into: republic, rayon, oblast, orkug and 
krai. The Unions were organised according to ethnographic, administrative and economic 
criteria (Haugen 2003, p. 13; Hirsh, 2005, p. 186). The Soviet regime fostered the 
emergence of national cultures that were compatible with the overall Soviet communist 
ideology. The Russian language was the lingua franca of all the Republics’ nations in 
order to achieve “ideological fusion”. As Marc Beissinger (2002, p. 52) notes, Russian 
was viewed as the “main medium for fostering a common political identity that was to be 
overlaid on the individual's fixed attachment to ethnicity”. In fact, any other expression 
of national pride was discouraged or harshly persecuted during Stalin’s reign (Beissinger, 
2002; Hirsh, 2005; Martin, 2001).
The Union’s configuration of political, economic and social structures in the Republics 
followed a top-down centralised approach, with Moscow being at the top. Such an 
approach allowed to replicate power structures in each of the Soviet Republics (Collins, 
2006, p. 81). In fact, each Republic had its own Communist Party that paralleled the 
central Soviet system. Republics were further organised into a hierarchy of controlling 
administrative territorial units with attached forms of collectivisation, such as kolhoz
(collective farms) or sovkohs (state farms). Such institutions were the centre for the Soviet 
economic, social and political regionals. Subsequently, they were the basis for Soviet 
state control and the vehicle for the consolidation of Soviet power. As Oliver Roy (2000,
p. 87) observes, such institutional settings produced a category of leaders whose role was 
to serve as an interface between the Soviet state and regional and local communities. 
Accordingly, the function of the Communist party was then to represent the Soviet state 
apparatus and Soviet control as well as to guarantee circulation between the upper and 
lower reaches of society (Ibid). 
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As Alexander Stringer (2003, p. 158) observes, the ability to impose the Bolsheviks 
project in a highly traditional society, divided from Russia by its language, culture and 
religion, demanded the recruitment of Central Asian natives into the Communist Party 
acting as a bridge between the centre (Moscow) and the various peripheries. Therefore, 
the state actively intervened in society and created new cadres that helped carrying out its 
work on modernisation and socio-cultural transformation. Through policies such as 
korenizatsiia (indigenisation), native leaders come to dominate political leadership and 
gained formal representation in the Moscow party apparatus (Collins, 2006). It was 
principally through these cadres that the Party received information about regional and 
rural development, and it was also through these cadres that Soviet decrees were carried 
out (Ibid, p. 92). 
The use of such practices, as Bhavna Dave (2007, p. 19) notes, allowed the Central Asian 
population to transform “their purported ‘backwardness’ into a subaltern consciousness”,
which formed the roots for preferential treatment and a culture of clientelism. As 
Critchlow (1988 p., 145) states, “party leaders whose ability to do their jobs to Moscow's 
satisfaction earned them long terms in office” (Critchlow, 1988, p. 145). The conquest of 
the Soviet project was further characterised by material and ideological recompense for 
the once complying with and implementing its rule but by coercion for the once that did 
not. As Terry Martin notes (2001, p. 350), during Stalin’s rule the concerns that individual 
nationalisms triggered could not be disarmed by ‘korenizatsiia’—nationalities policy7 but
would remain a permanent danger and necessitated periodic purges and terror campaigns.
Martin here highlights an important dynamic: There were tensions between ‘Soviet’ and 
the ‘national’ that would outlast the collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, as noted further 
by Brubaker (1996), nationhood was given without national consciousness; nationhood 
was promoted in terms of its forms but not content.
The Bolshevik concerns over self-sufficiency and security resulted in the creation of a
planned and centralised national economy. In doing so, the Soviet presence revolutionised 
the economic landscape of the Central Asian states by turning them from agrarian and 
pastoral economies into industrialised nations. This meant that regions would specialise 
in the production deemed important by the core (Stinger, 2003; Kandiyoti, 2002). As 
such, the Soviet extraction of natural resources and cultivation of resources, such as 
                                                            
7 The nation building efforts policies took the name of NRUHQL]DWVLLDLQUXVVLDQɤɨɪɟɧɢɡɚɰɢɹ it is often 
translated as “indigenization”, the objective was to make Soviet power seem more “indigenous” to the 
non-Russian periphery in order to achieve the Soviet state-building project.
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cotton, transformed the region into an extractive source. The economic relationship was 
best described as Moscow being the ‘hub’ for all economic activities. As, for instance, in 
the sector of natural resource extraction, all oil and gas resources travelled through Russia 
(Cummings, 2012). 
Pauline Jones Luong observes (2004a, p. 13) that such processes further fostered the 
development of interregional political competition and the development of patronage 
networks. Dave (2007, p. 25) further argues that the rents from resource extractions were 
not accumulated by the Russian Federation but rather by the Communist Party 
nomenclature, the elites at the core and its peripheries. Therefore, paradoxically as Oliver 
Roy (2000, p. 85) observes, the Soviet system created a two-level political system: One 
defined by the conformity and homogenisation of the Soviet cultural project, and the 
second characterised by the subversion of that project to coercive practices (elimination 
of all forms of opposition movements) and clientelism. The systematic territorialisation 
and collectivisation systems of kolkhoz (collective farm) and districts further intensified 
these trends (Roy, 2000).
In the literature, however, some would argue that the Soviet system was not the only 
engine behind the emergence of such patron-client relations. Others attribute the features 
of patron-client relationships to the tribal and clannist nature of Central Asian societies
that was conserved and adapted itself to new societal factors. The historian Francine Hirsh 
(2005) in her book Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the 
Soviet Union, for instance, observes that under the Soviet Union the traditional clannist 
or tribal structures of Central Asian societies were integrated into the Soviet national 
identities and the Union state apparatus. As such, proponents of such claims argue that 
the Soviet system helped to exacerbate informal practices that were already present in 
Central Asian societies. Olivier Roy (2000, p. 85) further argues that Central Asian 
societies have organised themselves around the elements that were thought to destroy it. 
The Central Asian societal structures such as awlad, mahalla and triable segments were,
according to Roy, reincarnated in the kolhoz structures and its sub-divisions (Roy, 2000, 
p. 87). Hence, in his view, the Soviet system and collectivisation provided a 
recomposition or re-adaptation of old traditional tribal lineage structures and solidarity 
groups defining Central Asian society. Collins also supports these claims and argues that 
clans and tribal lineage were often integrated in the kolkhoz and sovkhoz as well as in 
cadre policy further fostering the preservation of clan structures (Collins, 2006, p. 87). As
she (2006, p. 106) further states, “Moscow understood interclan norms, but the party may 
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have been conscious of the necessity to preserve an interclan and regional balance of 
power as well, since top Party posts in each Central Asian republic were often filled with 
representatives of different clans”. Anderson (1997, p. 36) also points out that “in many 
areas, traditional regional and tribal alliances underlay the internal politics of republican 
party organisations”. Therefore, the practices of Soviet governance policies were 
increasingly entangled with informal politics and traditional tribal clan relations that only 
intensified throughout the years of Soviet rule.
The last years of the Soviet Union were characterised by social unrest and crippling 
corruption. By the Gorbachev era, Central Asia acquired the shape of hybrid colonial-
like, federal structures (Cummings, 2012). During the post-Stalin years, the five Central 
Asian Republics were acting with relative autonomy. The centre’s policy towards the 
Republics allowed freedom of action as long as the Republics would ensure regional 
stability and meet economic targets (Anderson, 1997, p. 55; Collins, 2006). In many areas,
as Anderson (1997, p. 36) notes, traditional regional and tribal alliances were entangled 
with the internal politics of Republican Party organisations. Informal practices came to 
dominant Party politics and access to state resources (Collins, 2006). Increasingly, as
Anderson (1997, p. 36) further observes, the disruptive nature of such practices meant 
that the loyalty of local Russians could not be taken for granted as people were co-opted 
or bribed for supporting these modes of rule. Huskey (1995, p. 816) observes in his 
analysis of Kyrgyzstan that although Moscow retained an upper hand in appointing key
positions, at the level of the local nomenclature increasingly power was exercised under 
the personal control of the party ruled by informal politics of patronage and co-optation. 
The use of such practices reached its pick during the Breznev’s era and the ‘cotton 
scandal’ (Collins, 2006). The cotton scandal involving the Soviet Union's first deputy 
interior minister and Brezhnev’s son-in-law is the typical example of Breznev era 
corruption. The incident signalled endemic corruption and patronal relationship between 
centre and periphery. After the death of Brezhnev, the significance of corrupt networks 
between the centre and the local prompted the centre to intervene in local politics and law 
enforcement (Huskey, 1995, p. 816). 
By the end of the USSR, Central Asian states had undergone a profound transformation 
bringing about a particular formal and informal institutional reconfiguration and balance 
of power that would dramatically shape the very elites managing the transition (Collins, 
2006, p. 117). By the Gorbachev era and under its reform policies of ‘perestroika’ and 
‘glasnost’, Central Asia undeliberately was set on a path of disintegration (Ibid). The 
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critical decline of the Soviet economy by the mid 1980s fuelled social injustice and 
popular discontent leading to intensified concerns about social justice and corruption 
(Ibid). By the late 1980s the Soviet state’s failure to provide for its people let alone to 
keep up with technological advancement with the West made the need for radical change
obvious (Roy, 2000).
Despite the introduction of political and economic reforms, tensions with Moscow 
increased. In Central Asia, political and social unrest occupied the political agenda. As 
many analysts note, very quickly Moscow realised the volatility of Central Asian 
Republics (see Collins, 2006; Cummings, 2012). For the last time, Moscow reshuffled 
the Party leadership in Central Asian Republics (Roy, 2000). These appointed leaders 
(with the exception of Kyrgyzstan) took power in the years following independence.
It is therefore against the backdrop of these specific Soviet dynamics that the newly 
independent Central Asian states emerged in the 1991. The dissolution of the Soviet 
Union marked the entry of the Central Asian states as independent sovereign states into 
the arena of world politics after decades of Communist party and Moscow colonial-like 
rule. Processes of regime change or decolonisation (if one perceives Soviet rule through 
the lens of colonialism) marked the Soviet transition. However, in sharp contrast to other 
colonially ruled countries (like, for instance, in Latin America), independence came 
without a violent struggle. Neither society nor elites played a significant role in breaking 
with the Soviet regime, independence, as Collins (2006, p. 136) notes, “were de facto 
consequences of the exogenous shock of the Soviet collapse”. Despite Russian colonial 
style rule and decades of Soviet oppressions and coercive politics, in Central Asia there 
was no strong mobilisation of national opposition movements. As several authors note 
the revolts that emerged in Central Asia were not characterised as revolutionary 
nationalist mouvements. The 1986 Jeltoqsan revolt in Alma-Ata (today renamed as 
Almaty) directed against Gorbachev’s dismissal of First Secretary Dinmukhamed 
Konayev, an ethnic Kazakh, and the appointment of Gennady Kolbin, was mainly the 
expression of anger against Moscow’s interference in domestic affairs (Collins, 2006). 
As Laruelle (2015) further notes in her analysis, the Jeltoqsan protests and the emergence 
of nationalist parties were seen as opposition movements to the Communist regime, 
however, they were not nationalist. In Central Asia, a spirit of nationalism was weakly 
developed providing a weak foundation for the emergence of strong nationalist 
movements against the Soviet elite in power, but also the success of the Soviet 
indoctrination showed in these Republics. Central Asian countries were to a great extend 
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created by Soviet rule. Individual nationalist feelings were therefore weakly developed. 
The few nationalist or ethnic movements that emerged (see Edgar, 2006) were too weak 
to mobilise the population and galvanise a mass movement. Social counter-movements 
protesting against the overthrow of the Communist Party and the Soviet elite emerged in 
many parts of the USSR (particularly in what is now Eastern and Central Europe as well 
as the Southern Caucasus). In Central Asia, as Mark Beissenger (2002) writes, the level 
of social mobilisation was lower than in any other parts of the USSR. In the same vein, 
Victor Zaslavsky (1992, p. 108) notes that “the virtual absence of separatist claims has 
been one of the most intriguing features of the situation in Soviet Central Asia”.
The explanation for such a puzzle can largely be found in how Central Asian leaders 
perceived Moscow. The leaders of the Central Asian Republics all opposed separation 
from the USSR. In the Unions’ last referendum (17 March 1991) on the future of the 
Soviet Union, all the five countries largely (by 90 per cent of the vote) expressed their 
solidary for retention of the Union (Pravda.Ru.,2016)8. As Zaslavsky (1992, p.108) points 
out, “throughout the years of perestroika, the Central Asian republics remained staunch 
supporters of Gorbachev’s efforts to save the Soviet Union with its strong central state”. 
As he further demonstrates in his analysis, Central Asian state elites feared the proposed 
markets reforms, as they were hindering local state-dependent groups and redistributive 
policies of the central state seeking to secure internal stability. As such, one can note that 
in the absence of dissident movements independence in Central Asia was unexpected and 
to a great extent unwanted unlike in other parts of the Soviet Union (see Beissinger, 2002; 
Cummings, 2012).
2.2 Soviet States in a Post-Soviet World: Towards State Formation
What is central to retain from the above discussion is that the Soviet occupation of Central 
Asia left important imprints that are salient in the functioning of these states today. In 
their investigation of post-Communist state building, Anna Gryzymala-Busse and Pauline 
Jones Luong (2002) understand the process of state formation in the post-Soviet context 
dominated by formal and information institutions and elite competition as well as the 
influence of structural resources and the international environment. In doing so, the 
authors further treat state formation and regime transition as simultaneous and convergent 
                                                            
8 Pravda.Ru (2016). Soviet referendum in 1991 was criminal in nature.17 March 2012[Online]Available 
at: http://www.pravdareport.com/russia/politics/17-03-2016/133848-soviet_referendum-0/ [Accessed : 
17March, 2017]
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processes (see Gryzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002, p. 535). However, such an 
analysis is rather misleading, as we have seen in the discussion above that state formation 
in Central Asian countries gradually took shape alongside Soviet institutional 
consolidation (Dave, 2007). As Olivier Roy argues (2000, p. xv): “Certainly the Soviet 
postulate, endlessly repeated, was that this was only a form, and that the content, whether 
in literature or politics, had to be Soviet. But this form ended up created the life of its 
objects”. As such, Roy calls for the process of ‘re-adaptation’ and the need to include in 
the studies of nation-state model “concomitant social process which enabled a social 
space to restructure itself around elements that had been conceived in order to destroy it” 
(Roy, 2000, p. xviii). 
Kathleen Collins (2006, p. 8), on the other hand, describes Central Asian society much 
more like ‘traditional societies’ in African and Middle East regions that are organised 
around clans, kin and Islamic institutions. In her analysis, she calls for a greater need to 
distinguish formal and informal institutions, the later having a deeper impact on 
consolidating state formation and regime transition. However, such an approach, as Dave 
(2007) notes, contrasts sharply with ‘modernisation’ processes that Central Asian states 
were exposed to during Soviet times.
Therefore, what these studies highlight is the difficulty to embed historical and social 
constitutive elements salient in the transition of Central Asian states into analysis today. 
As such, there is a need to incorporate the dynamics of the Soviet experiment and its 
legacies into a comprehensive understanding of the present reconfiguration of post-Soviet 
states.
As Taras Kuzio (2002, p. 248) argues, “the former USSR imparted a legacy of confused 
and shared identities to its fifteen successor states”. In her analysis of Central and Eastern 
European transition, Helga A. Welsh (1996) further notes that the policy choices in 
Central and Eastern Europe have been heavily influenced by legacies of the past and 
current political circumstances. Therefore, unique historical legacies in Central Asia 
define how post-Communist states navigate the build up of their individual national 
statehood today and its reconfiguration in the global institutional landscape.
2.2.1 Central Asia and States Transition
The collapse of the Soviet Union paralleled the rise of a neoliberal economic agenda in 
the West. The Soviet demise was interpreted as the final vindication of free market theory 
or neoliberalism (Kotz, 1998) and saw the triumph of Western liberal ideas over 
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Communist ideologies. American liberalised capitalism became the dominant economic 
system to be followed in the world. Free market and trade, deregulation, privatisation
were the trends to adapt in the global market economy (Marangos, 2004). 
Emerging from decades of Soviet centralised planned economy, in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the USSR the newly independent states were faced with the challenging task 
of creating new state institutions, building legitimacy and embracing the transition from 
planned to market economies (Jones Luong, 2004a; Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013; Olcott, 
1996). Just like many countries with a communist legacy, Central Asian states suffered 
from severe macro-economic problems after gaining their independence (Hoen, 2010, 
p.235). The collapse of the central planned economy in the early stage of the transition 
led to a sharp decline in output and further strained supply and demand chains (Cooley, 
2012; Pomfret, 2003). As a result, Central Asian states, just after gaining their 
independency, rapidly fell into a transitional recession that led to high inflation rates 
(Pomfret, 2003). The redundancy of the rubble in the 1990s further generated widespread 
macro-economic turmoil (Cooley, 2012). What is important to note in this context is that 
historically the ‘economic viability’ (Haugen, 2003) of Central Asia was not in doubt, 
since during the Soviet times the economies of Central Asia were imbedded in a larger 
supranational Union and its system-level management (Ibid, p. 231). Hence, what 
followed after the independence of Central Asia is the collapse of long established 
economic links and especially of trade among the Republics with the former Soviet 
Union. As Linn (2004) explains in his analyses, the recession triggered by transition was 
more severe in Central Asia, as it was highly integrated in the economy of the Soviet
Union and was dependent on the external links and financial transfers with the Union. As 
Hill and Gaddy (2003) note, remote regions (including the region of Central Asia) in 
Soviet times depended heavily on central government subsidies for fuel and food and 
relied on preferential transportation tariffs. Therefore, the removal of the Soviet planned 
economy heavily affected the functioning of these states. The costs of economic 
disintegration were extremely high. In the aftermath of independence, there was little 
room for manoeuvre for Central Asia’s economy, as it was confined considerably by the 
dependency Moscow had created (Haugen, 2003). As a result, this limited the ability of 
Central Asian states for undertaking greater action. Even today, the former Soviet 
‘empire’ is still palpable. For instance, in the energy sector, although Central Asian states 
have gained independence, in terms of energy geopolitics, Russia continues to dominate 
the Central Asian energy market. Currently, the Soviet pipeline system is still in use and 
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major transportation routes for oil and gas crucially run to and through Russia (Chow and 
Hendrix 2010; The Economist, 20139). Moreover, the lack of adequate institutions in 
Central Asia did not bring the expected benefits from privatisation, as special interest 
groups were able to influence policies (Dowling and Wignaraja, 2006). Weak legal 
institutional framework, low technical skills and transparency contributed to further 
diminish poor performances (Ibid). As a result, despite the support of the IMF and World 
Bank and its neoliberal agenda administered through economic programmes, the 
countries of Central Asia did not achieve productivity increases and economic gains as 
expected.
2.2.2 Central Asia’s Awakening in the International Community
The fall of Soviet rule broke down the isolation of Central Asian states from the rest of 
the world. Since their independence, the elites in these states were gradually forging ties 
with the international community as well as with social, political, economic and cultural 
actors involved in the globalisation process. In a remarkably short period of time, a 
constellation of states, companies, nongovernmental and transnational organisations 
became part of the Central Asian domestic scene (Menon, 2007). As Rajan Menon further 
observes (2007, p. 8), “what we have witnessed since 1991 is the demolition of the 
imperial edifice and the emergence of multiple and multifarious horizontal lines 
connecting Central Asia regions to its west, south and east”.
Central Asia in the Global Economy 
From the mid 1990s, all the Central Asian states with the exception of Tajikistan10
actively sought to diversify their foreign policy relations and form new partnerships
outside the context of the CIS or bilateral relations with Russia (Jonson and Allison, 2001, 
p. 3). 
The presence of strategic natural resources attracted flows of investment and trade. The 
geostrategic location of the oil and gas rich countries of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
their connection to the Caspian Sea played further a pivotal role for energy security 
programmes of global and regional powers—or one can also call it the politics of ‘Great 
Games’ powers. Diverse national interests in terms of energy-trade and security 
catapulted Central Asian states into the international system. Vying for energy security 
                                                            
9 See: The Economist, 2013. Rising China, sinking Russia. [Online [. Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21586304-vast-region-chinas-economic-clout-more-match-russias-
rising-china-sinking [Accessed: 5 December 2016].
10 Shortly after its proclaimed independence, Tajikistan entered in Civil War in 1992.
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 54
 
 
and pipeline diversification, the European Union and the United States also became 
increasingly involved in the region. The openness of Kazakhstan’s market reforms and 
trade liberalisation made the energy company Chevron become the first major Western 
oil company to enter the newly independent Kazakhstan under the Chevron-Tengiz 
project and to start oil production and exploration drilling in the country (Chevron 
website, n.d). In the years that followed, Kazakhstan become a major energy platform for 
FDI investments, and both the EU and the United States have signed a plethora of energy 
agreements with the energy producing countries of Central Asia. As Chow and Hendrix 
(2010) observe, Western oil companies’ determination to control their own transport 
routes without overly relying on Russia played an important role in strategies of energy 
route diversification. The mountainous region of Kyrgyzstan on the other hand mainly 
attracted investments in its mining sector, largely connected to the Kumtor gold mining 
site. Tajikistan is the most volatile among the five states in terms of economic and 
political insecurity. 
In addition to the Western and American presence, Central Asian neighbours came to 
play a crucial role in these international trade dynamics. China is one of the biggest 
investors in the region. Despite Chinese economic slowdown, China is by far the most 
energy hungry international actor. Chinese investment in the region, particularly in the 
energy sector, is significant. According to IMF data, China is the single largest trade 
partner in the region and had surpassed Russia (FT, 2015a). The presence of other 
international players such as India, Japan and Iran were more discrete, nevertheless their 
impact on the regional economic landscape through bilateral and multilateral relations 
gradually increased in importance (Rakhimov, 2014; EurAsiaNet, 2015; Roy, 2000).
In this regard, Central Asian states learned to craft their power carefully in order to guide 
many of the region’s domestic and international interactions (Cooley, 2015a). As Laruelle 
and Peyrouse (2013, p. 5) note “despite a power differential that is not in their favor, they 
are able to deploy strategies to force regional actors and global powers to compete with 
one another, and have the capacity to limit the power of outsiders”. For Central Asian 
states, the choice of trade partners (in particular in the energy sector) is important, as these 
five states significantly lack technological know-how, and many of the natural resources 
exploration sites require costly technological investments. As Laruelle and Peyrousse 
(2013, p. 166) write “the Central Asian national companies are unable to do the work 
alone, and the reliance on Russian companies are less qualified in this regard than the 
large international majors”. Therefore, the Central Asian states must rely on foreign 
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investments from the West or East to develop their industries. Consequently, the choice 
of forming specific geopolitical alliances with major global powers is what has led Central 
Asia to be described as a site for games of great power competition.
Despite being a platform for attracting foreign investments, the economic exploitation of 
the region comes with many risks for doing business. According to the World Bank data 
on doing business, the countries of Central Asia score poorly in global comparison (World 
Bank, 2014; 2016a). There are many risks of doing business in Central Asia. As 
mentioned earlier, issues of corruption but also political risks stemming from the features 
of authoritarian regimes, such as human rights violations and issues of law enforcements,
pose challenges to investors unfamiliar with such circumstances. As Ariel Cohen (2006) 
notes in his analysis, none of these issues deters Russian and Chinese investment but 
presents Western firms with a real challenge. Furthermore, in the sector of natural 
resource extraction, patron-client relationships, entrenched corruption and tensions 
between the private and public sector dominate interactions. As Savin and Ouyang (2013) 
argue, in the energy sector “pipelines are built by consortiums of governments and oil 
companies, and the views of Public do not always match those of Private” (Savin and 
Ouyang, 2013, para. 8). Similarly, in the field of mineral resources, the exploitation of 
mining sites is highly political and subject to rapacious behaviour of domestic actors 
(Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013; Gullette,2013).
Moreover, globalisation (mainly through its global financial system) and information 
flows increased the mobility of capital across porous territorial boundaries (Hampton and 
Christensen, 2002; Sikka, 2003). In this aspect, Central Asia is not an exception. As the 
recent study of John Heathershaw and Alex Cooley demonstrates (2015), Central Asian 
elites learned to use global financial instruments such, as the offshore financial hubs, to 
their advantage. Money laundering and shell corporations are all recurrent practices 
among Central Asian leaders. As the authors note (2015, p. 1), even the most isolated and 
economically closed states of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan “have embedded their 
transactions in a set of informal transnational networks with global reach”.
In this process and before the backdrop of earlier observations, it is important to note that
the “Soviet culture of deceit” (Wilson, 2005, p. 8) continued to be an essential part of 
Central Asian state governance.
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Central Asia and Domestic Regimes 
Melvin (2008) observes that the 1990s was the period when Central Asia was the most 
open to embrace change and Western institutions. In the years that followed 
independence, Central Asian states embarked on a path of internationalisation. With the 
intention of creating a new foundation for inter-state cooperation post independence, the 
Central Asian states joined many Western-led democracy-orientated organisations and 
signed a range of cooperative policy arrangements with international institutions that 
promoted good governance and democratic reforms (Gleason, 2001; Laruelle and 
Peyrouse, 2012). This trend occurred concomitantly with awave of democratisation or,
what has been described by Francis Fukuyama (1989, p.1) “the ultimate triumph of 
Western liberal democracy” in the aftermath of the collapse of Communism, when the 
global resurgence of democracy became the pivotal political trend in international 
politics. Democracy promotion became an important element of Western and American 
foreign aid programmes, policy initiatives and their global agenda of good governance 
(Carothers, 1999). The United States and Western actors tried to encourage the spread of 
democracy through a combination of different tools (Lewitsky and Way, 2010). In the 
light of the war on terror, for instance, military and security engagement was coupled 
increasingly with the discourse of democratisation. Further, aspects of democratisation
strategies were also employed in the pursuit of foreign policies and external assistance,
in which bilateral or multilateral engagement was based on democratic principles and 
political conditionality. In the case of Central Asia, this is best demonstrated by the 
‘European Central Asia and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership’ (200911),
which based financial assistance on the merits of democracy criteria:
“The development and consolidation of stable, just and open societies, adhering 
to international norms, is essential to bring the partnership between the European 
Union and Central Asia states to full fruition” (EU Central Asia and Central Asia: 
Strategy for a New Partnership, 2009, p. 10).
As Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 18) emphasize, “political conditionality was accompanied 
by efforts to create permanent international legal frameworks for the collective defense 
of democracy”. The aftermath of 1990s saw the rise of transnational organisations and 
intuitions advocating democratic values and human rights. Moreover, the boom in 
                                                            
11The European Union General Secretariat of the Council. 2009. The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a 
New Partnership. [Online]. Available at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/docs/2010_strategy_eu_centralasia_en.pdf [Accessed: 07 July, 2016]
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communication and technologies further strengthened the speed of information flows. As 
such, abuses against human rights or democracy were exposed faster to the international 
society, drawing much attention and leading to naming and shaming campaigns and other 
forms of publicity directed against abusive regimes (Meernik et al., 2012).
Yet, despite such efforts, democracy assistance programmes in Central Asia failed reap 
significant results. Caught between domestic political instability (as the civil war in 
Tajikistan), declining economies and stagnating political orders, a lack of political and 
economic culture and knowhow of state-building or state construction, the countries of 
Central Asia drifted steadily towards authoritarianism (Melvin, 2008, p. 3). By the late 
1990s, the democratic optimism that had accompanied the independence of Central Asia 
states had largely vanished from the Western agenda. Central Asia was no longer the 
promised land of Western democracy, as one might have thought. In the absence of strong 
institutional frameworks for democratisation and domestic incentives, transition in many 
countries in the world, just as in Central Asia, showed forms of multi-party elections and 
‘democratic facades’ combined with aspects of authoritarian rule (Levitsky and Way, 
2010; Carothers, 2002)
Levistky and Way (2010) provide a lengthy explanation why certain states (including 
countries of Central Asia) did not move towards democratisation but settled into a more 
authoritarian style of rule with diverging degrees of ‘authoritarianism’ applied. As the 
authors (2010, p. 18) note, “changes of the international environment raised the external 
cost of authoritarianism and created incentives for elites in developing and post-
communist countries to adopt the formal architecture of Western-style democracy, 
which—at a minimum—entailed multiparty election”. As they further suggest, external 
(in this case Western) pressure was insignificant in implementing democratic standards. 
The assumptions that elections and political liberalisation echoed democratisation were
misleading. In fact, many autocrats learned to get around these processes by 
implementing institutional democratic facades. Holding elections was often sufficient to 
deflect international pressures for a more complete political opening (Levistky and Way, 
2010). As Carothers (2002, p. 15) further argues, beyond elections “political participation 
remained shallow” and “state accountability weak”. As such, as Levitsky and Way (2010,
p. 19) note, “the post-Cold War international environment raised the minimum standard 
for regime acceptability, but the new standard was multiparty elections, not democracy. 
As such many autocrats learned that in order to meet international standards, they did not 
need to democratise (Ibid). Moreover, domestic structural and socio-cultural conditions 
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were disregarded in democracy building efforts. As Carothers (1999) further argues, 
programmes of democracy promotion should have focused more on fostering state 
capacity than just parachuting in democratic standards. 
In the context of Central Asia, as Martha Olcott (2007) points out, there should have been 
more efforts from the United States and other Western powers to view events in the region 
through a local lens. Authors, such as Catherine Collins (2002) and Pauline Jones Luong
(2004c), further stress the unique nature of clans and patronage networks in Central Asia,
which impeded on democratisation efforts. The effect in Central Asia was the ‘faking of 
democratic’ institutions, thus, a political system in which state institutions are based on 
the mimetic reproduction of forms leaving aside substance and not assuming real 
meaning. In the literature, this produced broad research on the nature of Central Asian 
politics as the politics of “spectacular” (Adams, 2008), or “performative” (Rasanayagam 
et al., 2014) or “virtual politics” (Wilson, 2005). For instance, writing about democratic 
processes in Russia, Andrew Wilson observes that democratic politics is a series of state 
designed projects, rather than a real pattern of representation and accountability (Wilson, 
2005, p. 39). As he further argues, the use of ‘political technologies’ that he broadly 
defines as the industry of political manipulation, the state is able to maintain its power
(Wilson,2011) As Pauline Jones Luong (2002, pp. 275-276) describes in her analysis of 
institutional reforms and elections processes that Central Asian states were interested in 
adopting reforms as long as they were able to take advantage of the distributive gains 
coming with them. Haugen (2003, p. 231) further observes that “the main problems of 
Central Asian states is the unwillingness of the part of the political leadership to institute 
reforms as these leaders cling to their positions at the costs of their constituencies”.
In the case of Central Asia, the prospect for not achieving democratisation can further be 
explained by the logic of path-dependency. In Central Asia, political transition was 
significantly shaped by Soviet legacies. Except in Kyrgyzstan, the transition from the 
Soviet Union saw the old nomenclature taking power and creating new sovereign states 
with technocratic, bureaucratic policy-making and hegemonic parties (Cooley, 2012, p. 
18). In this sense, as noted by Sally Cummings (2012, p. 61), “Central Asia experienced 
a process of non-rupture, in which the old Soviet container almost seamlessly 
metamorphosed into one of a new national state”. Consequently, in what follows, the 
leadership of Central Asian states directly emanated from the old nomenclature, whose 
style of governance was the product of the Soviet system. Hence, the new leaders that 
came to power in Central Asia were the old leaders of the Communist Party (Piacentini, 
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1994). Even in the case of Kyrgyzstan, although often seen as an exception, President 
Akayev—despite being elected by the Parliament after the failure of the communist leader 
Absamet Masyliev to take power—nevertheless appointed Kyrgyz intellegentia and 
technocrats in his party. In Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the First Secretary of 
the Communist Party was automatically appointed as the first President of the country. 
Rather than rejecting Soviet legacies, the emerging leaders of these states (except for 
Kyrgyzstan) managed to maintain Soviet institutional and policy legacies of which they 
were an integral part (Jones Luong, 2004a p. 12). It was thus ‘business as usual’, as the 
elites did not perceive their relative power to have significantly changed once the Soviet 
Union had collapsed (Cummings, 2012). In this sense, the Presidents in place simply 
continued nurturing old practices and further maintained the primary mechanisms for 
distributing political and economic resources and the system for resolving political 
disagreements (Cummings, 2012, p. 63). As a result, the emerging new states transformed 
their former republican apparatuses into hegemonic political parties by creating 
presidential regimes and state institutions that overwhelmingly favoured the ruling 
executive power (Cooley, 2012; Pomfret, 2010; Jones Luong, 2004c; Cummings, 2010). 
All five countries of Central Asia opted for an authoritarian rule with variations in the 
degree of authoritarianism practiced as well as in the geopolitical and economic contexts.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan opted for a repressive and closed authoritarian style of rule.
While Kazakhstan is perceived as the most prosperous country that practices a 
consolidated form of modern authoritarianism. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, was
initially presented as a site for democratisation and liberal reforms, however, the regime 
quickly turned into a corrupt and authoritarian state that led to two subsequent 
revolutions—the Tulip Revolutions of March 2005 and April 2010. The report of 
Freedom of House (2015a)12 categorizes Kyrgyzstan’s regime as ‘partly free’. Finally,
Tajikistan’s authoritarianism is characterised as a consolidated form of authoritarian 
regime with centralised power build around the President Emomali Rahmon and his close 
inner circle.
Considering the evolution of Central Asian regimes, once again we can notice the 
influence of Soviet ways of doing politics. Clearly, the Soviet occupation of Central Asia 
created strongly rooted preconditions for practicing politics characterised by the 
manipulation of formal institutions, norms and wider government arrangements with the 
                                                            
12 Freedom House (2015a). Kyrgyzstan. [Online]. Available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/country/kyrgyzstan [Accessed:07 July 2016].
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aim to satisfy the ruling regime’s interests. The character of such forms of political 
behaviour is further embedded in neo-patrimonial practices or client-patron relationships 
and the ‘resource curse’ syndrome. I now explore these aspects in more depth.
Authoritarianism Defined by Patronal and Neo-Patrimonial Practices
The ‘neo-patrimonial’ or ‘patronalistic’ character of the regimes in Central Asia was 
often compared with those in African countries. Like in many countries in Africa, 
power in Central Asia is acquired through a web of inter-personal and informal 
relationships within patron-client relations rather than the rule of law.
Henry Hale (2005, p. 138) defines patron-client relationships as “the exercise of political 
authority primarily through selective transfers of resources rather than formalized 
institutional practices, idea-based politics, or generalized exchange as enforced through 
the established rule of law”. As noted earlier in this chapter, the organisational structure 
of Central Asian society is traditionally based on kinship and client- patron relationships.
The significance of these relationships was further increased during Soviet occupation.
In todays’ post-Communist environment, the form of patron-client relationship in Central 
Asia is often labelled ‘neo-patrimonialism’ or ‘patronalism’. Regardless of the 
terminology employed, both terms define the dichotomy between formal and informal 
practices when conducting politics in Central Asia. The core underpinnings of these 
terminologies is closely related to the Weberian notion of patrimonialism. Coming from 
a sociological perspective, Weber’s core claim is that the exercise of political authority is 
based on sources of “legitimacy” and “domination”. According to the Weberian 
conceptualisation, practices of political governance are based on traditional forms of 
domination based on kin-ties or patron-client relationships with few formal ties and 
regulations attached to them (Weber, 1978, p. 231).
Weberian views are important to consider in light of the trajectory of authoritarian states 
and their functioning, in which rule is based on personal ties and network relationships
and where the work of state bureaucracy and administration is strongly influenced by the 
personal networks of political leaders (Geiss 2003; Laruelle, 2012; Peyrouse, 2012; Jones 
Luong, 2002; Collins, 2006; Medar, 1978). In such societies, political forms of 
governance are organised vertically with powerful patrons sitting at the top of a
hierarchical network of clients (Hale, 2015 p. 29). The prefix ‘neo’ in this sense indicates 
a departure from the Weberian concept to signify that authority in the context of 
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contemporary authoritarian regimes relies on diverse sources of legitimation and 
mechanisms, as Franke et al (2009, p. 113) point out: “networks today are no longer 
necessarily formed along family, kinship or traditional lines” but are also increasingly 
formed on “rational bases” involving external actors and not specifically family ties (see 
also Hale, 2015). In this sense, the character of ‘neo’ broadens the earlier view of Central 
Asian politics as being primarily influenced by clan elites and family networks (see 
Collins, 2006; Schatz, 2004). 
Typically, in the neo-patrimonial regime context, the ruler’s demands are orientated 
towards the maintenance and accumulation of power rather than the production of 
common public good (Francke et al., 2009; Medard, 1982) As Erdmann and Engel (2006) 
further argue, the allocation of ‘rents’ through informal non-transparent network explains 
the internal dynamics of these regimes. It allows us to grasp the power of institutions in 
non-democratic settings. In fact, contrary to democratic intuitions, the real power as 
Cammack (2007, p. 600) indicates resides:
“Outside formal institutions where decisions lies in the hand of ‘big men’ and their 
cronies, who are linked by ‘informal’ (private and personal, patronage and clientelist) 
networks that exist outside (before, beyond and despite) the state structure, and who 
follow a logic of personal and particularist interest” rather than national collective good”.
In essence and as being observed by Bratton and Walle (1997) in their work on 
transitional regimes in Africa, neo-patrimonialism characterises states in which unofficial 
institutions exist in parallel to official legal-rational institutions, and where informal 
institutions is given more power that the authority of formal institutions.
Henry Hale (2015), on the other side, prefers to use the term ‘patronalism’ to characterise 
such regime dynamics. In his view, a ‘patronalistic’ society is defined as:
“a social equilibrium in which individuals organize their political and economic 
pursuits primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and 
punishments, and not primarily around abstract, impersonal principles such as
ideological belief or categorizations that include many people one has not actually 
met in person” (Hale, 2015, p. 20).
At the heart of these social dynamics lies the notion of power expectations. The clients 
will be most likely to carry out the task assigned by their patrons, if they expect payoffs 
and rewards for their behaviour or punishment if they omit to do so (Hale, 2015). 
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Therefore as Hale (2015, p. 36) emphasises: “Whoever or whatever can direct 
expectations, then, can wield extraordinary power in patronalistic societies”.
Consequently, the challenge for patrons is to of manage the expectations of clients.
Although slightly nuanced, the conceptual framework introduced by Hale closely mirrors 
discussions on neo-patrimonialism. It further reflects the difficulty to apply a single 
approach to study regime dynamics in Central Asia. Therefore, for the purpose of my 
research it is important to take from the above discussions that regime dynamics in 
Central Asia are characterised by systems of personalised relationships based on tight 
networks of patrons and clients driven by reward or punishment.
Moreover, as Isaacs (2014) rightly points out and as highlighted by the above discussion, 
regime dynamics labelled as ‘neo-patrimonial’ or ‘patronalisitic’ often perceive the 
governance of Central Asian states as a political competition among different patron-
client networks (Hale, 2015; Radnitz, 2010), in which the character of informal politics 
subverts the formal (Cummings, 2002; Francke et al., 2009). Yet, it is also important to 
consider how the existence of formal institutions matters in facilitating ‘neo-patrimonial’ 
or ‘patronal’ practices. In this regard, it is important to consider how formal institutions 
enable regime legitimatisation by supporting authoritarian practices, or, as put by Isaacs,
how “institutions serve to allow regimes to reproduce themselves over time” (Isaacs, 
2014, p. 238). In this sense and in the context of Central Asia, it is important to question 
how formal and informal institutions coexist and interplay to consolidate the existing 
regime. 
Resource Curse to Define the Regime Dynamics
As obvious from the above discussions, in main motivational logic underlying client-
patron relations is the expectation of appointees or ‘clients’ to have access to strategic 
resources when they mobilise or show political support for the patron. In this regard, it is
acknowledged that natural resource endowments played an important role in 
consolidating authoritarian leadership in Central Asian states (see, for instance, Cooley, 
2012; Jones Luong, 2002; Cummings, 2012). Political economy devoted particular 
attention to explain how access to exploitable or strategic resources motivates 
authoritarian regime consolidation. 
Such discussion relates to the political economy literature on the ‘resource curse’ and 
theories about resource rents. The resource curse literature describes the ‘curse’ as the 
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relationship in which the abundance of natural resources produces a negative impact on 
socio-economic development (see Le Billon, 2001; Rosser, 2006a; Ross, 2003; Sachs and 
Warner, 1999). Theories of resource rents imply that the procured revenues from natural 
resources accrue directly to the government, which later redistributes them to the 
population as a form of social and political control (Jones Luong, 2001, p. 368; Karl, 
1997). Rents are controlled by few actors, among which the government is the principal 
recipient of revenues (Belawi and Luciani, 1987; Isham et al., 2002). Such economies are 
further characterised by a patron-client system of governance, in which political elites 
alter institutions to get better access to resource rents (Ross, 2001; Karl, 1997). As argued 
by Karl (1997, p.15), such rents produce a distinctive type of institutional setting, which 
expand the state’s jurisdictions and simultaneously weaken its authority by multiplying 
the opportunities for public and private actors to engage in rent-seeking activities. 
Legislatures have limited capacity to exercise power over authorities and quasi-state 
agencies (Moore, 2004, p. 308). As a result, corruption increases as state officials become 
reliant on rents as a substitution of public spending (Karl, 1997, p. 16); political elites 
further allocate natural resource wealth to secure its support and allies (Boschini et al.,
2007; Deacon and Mueller, 2006, p. 145; Jones Luong, 2001; Robinson and Torvik,
2003). Such a resource context makes states less reliant on the taxation revenue, which in 
turn further undermines the stability and good functioning of institutions and socio-
economic development (see Shaxson, 2007; Moore 2004; Karl, 1997). For example, 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2003) note that countries suffering from the resource curse 
syndrome often neglect to develop strong taxation rules and thus reduce the incentive to 
develop efficient governance mechanisms. Because there is a quasi-absence of tax 
payment in society, citizens tend to demand less accountability from their government
(Overland et al., 2010); as a consequence, this produces negative effects on the 
government’s responsibility and accountability for public revenue spending. As further 
stated by the authors and Karl (1997), taxes enable citizens to hold their government 
accountable; checks and balances are important determinants of the economic and 
political trajectories taken by the resource curse and its consequences. Additionally, the 
study of Keefer and Knack (1999) also indicates that weak rule of law, the absence of 
constraints on government responsibility to hold accountability on repudiation of 
contracts and arbitrary action by the authorities undermine property rights, independent 
of the level of redistribution in a society (Keefer and Knack, 1999, p. 16). Paul Collier 
(2010, p. 1106) also states that without the notion of accountability, both property rights
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and the supply of public goods depend upon the will of the ruling power. Sharing similar 
views, Moore (2004, p. 307) also writes that when public revenues stem from a small 
number of concentrated sources, it is relatively easy for revenues and expenditures to be 
hidden from view. 
In this sense, it has been argued that the endowment of natural resources forms the pillar 
of the institutional trajectories characterising Central Asian states, where leaders have 
used their country’s natural resources to consolidate practices of political clientelism and 
to cement informal economies (see Cooley, 2012; Jones Luong, 2004b; Cummings, 2012; 
Heathershaw, 2011). As Pauline Jones and Erica Weinthal (2010, p. 6) argue, what one 
calls a ‘resource curse’ in countries of Central Asia is strongly associated with the 
management and institutional ownership structure of the natural resource sector. 
Consequently, in such a context, corruption entrenched itself as a standard form of doing 
politics, which is based on ‘reward and exchange’patron-client relationships and operates 
via informal networks and criminal activity (Cooley, 2012, pp. 24-25; Satpayev, 2014; 
Hale, 2005). Such a setting further undermines the emergence of a strong civil society, as 
governments tend to either co-opt or oppress civil society movements (Ziegler et al., 
2015). Therefore, because the natural resource sector in Central Asian countries accounts 
for an important part of the state budget and the political system very much depends on 
them, its role needs to be considered in consolidating authoritarianism in the countries of 
Central Asia. 
2.3 Central Asian Authoritarianism in the Processes of Global 
Governance
The authoritarian nature of Central Asian states was heavily exposed in the literature. In 
the realm of international relations, it triggered Western criticism of undemocratic 
practices. The latest European review of the ‘European Union-Central Asia Strategy: 
Recommendations for EU action in Central Asia’ (2016) is a good example of such 
discourse. 
‘The European Union-Central Asia Strategy: Recommendations for EU action in Central 
Asia’ (2016, p. 4):
“The region has become more unstable; forecast gas deliveries from the region to 
Europe have so far not materialised; trade is minimal with the exception of EU-
Kazakhstan links, democracy is seen by the Central Asian regimes as a threat to 
their survival; corruption severely undermines economic development and 
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siphons off much of the development aid; and the human rights situation has been 
backsliding”.
Such an observation reflects the broader evolution of Central Asian authoritarian regimes.
In international rankings, for instance, Central Asian states are among the most 
undemocratic. In response to such criticism, Central Asian states managed to resist 
Western pressures and instead embarked on creating new relations with countries 
endorsing their authoritarianism. Kopstein and Reilly (2000) argue that such a trajectory 
is unavoidable for Central Asian states which are surrounded by autocratic leaders in their 
close neighbourhood. According to the authors, the geographical proximity is an 
important factor influencing regime transition of Communist states. As such geographical 
proximity with the West had a positive impact on regime transformation in Eastern and 
Central Europe rather than on more remote Central Asia, whose backyard is populated by 
autocratic governments, such as Russia, China and Iran. Ambrosio (2008) also supports 
this idea that authoritarian neighbours, such as Russia or China, hinder the prospect for 
democracy in the countries of Central Asia. However, the study of Levitsky and Way 
(2005) offers a more nuanced analysis that captures variations in democratisation in the 
respective post-Cold War environment. As authors note, it is mainly the influence of 
Western leverage (the governments’ vulnerability to external pressure) and linkages to 
the West (the density of a country’s ties to Western-led multilateral institutions) that 
determine the degree of democratisation. As the authors argue “leverage is most effective 
when combined with extensive linkage to the West” (Levitsky and Way, 2005, p. 22). 
Hence, in the post-Cold war environment in their view, it is the variation in leverage and 
linkages that explain the divergent outcomes of regime transition. 
Such observations demonstrate that international factors play an important role in regime 
dynamics. Central Asian states entered into new multilateral cooperation and 
international organisations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the 
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) and its Customs Union (CU) and the 
Common Economic Space (CES), which denounce Western norms and promote 
according to Ambrosio (2008, p. 1326) “regime survival, over democratisation”.
As such, as Ambrosio (2008, p. 1322) notes, “international organisations can promote 
and sustain not just democracy, but also authoritarianism”. Acharya (2009) further argues 
that accession to or creation of such non-liberal organisations as opposed to Western 
liberal and cosmopolitan values implies the reaffirmation of the norms and identities of 
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the members of such organisations. Clearly and as has been observed by Cooley (2015a),
“counternorms to liberal democracy have taken root and are helping authoritarians to 
retain power”.
As pointed out by David Lewis (2012a, p. 1228), this new understanding of norm 
diffusion is important for the perception of rules and norms in the global system, in the 
sense that the meaning of the same norm and its perception would “diverge markedly
from those proposed by rival groupings and established global governance institutions”.
Such issues become particularly interesting in light of authoritarian states taking part in 
the global governance agenda. In fact, how authoritarian countries consolidate and 
translate demands of global governance domestically remains largely neglected in the 
current literature.
As Sally Cummings (2012, p. 178) describes, the relatively new countries of Central Asia 
remain largely “consumer rather than producer” of the international system. The young 
countries of Central Asia are still in the process of creating and defining their statehood;
this also implies the transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ societies. In this process, 
emerging from decades of Soviet rule, they desperately seek to acquire the status of a
‘modern global state’ to gain international recognition and demarcate their location on
the map of world politics. Yet, the assimilation of global norms in the countries of Central 
Asia is increasingly subject to individual national interpretation (Adams, 2008; 
Cummings, 2010)
Such analytical observations raise then questions about how standardised global 
governance norms are interpreted in the context of post-Soviet Central Asia. The conduct 
of such an enquiry enables to further expand Sally Cummings’ statement cited above by 
asking: To what extent are Central Asian states consumers of international norms, and 
what effects does this have on the domestic configuration of state institutions and actors?
To answer these questions, it is important to understand how globalisation operates and 
moves from global to local. In this regard, the work of Saskia Sassen (2002) stresses the 
importance to distinguish between the processes and institutional contents through which 
globalisation operates. In doing so, she emphasised the character of transboundary 
network formation, in which a web of local / national processes are embedded within a
international or transnational agenda. Similar to her views, Robertson (1995, p. 28) refers 
to the concept of ‘glocalisation’ to define the interplay between globalisation and 
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localisation or, as he puts it, the “global outlook adapted to local conditions”. In this 
regard, the authors refer to the phenomenon of ‘glocalisation’ as the processes in the 
trajectory of globalisation that lend autonomous significance to smaller territorial spaces 
(Scholte, 2008) and in which the local is increasingly embedded into parts of the 
globalisation process (Robertson, 1995; Scholte, 2005). According to Scholte (2008),
these spatial reconfigurations indicate a shift of governance systems that were 
traditionally dominated by a static state-centric culture towards a more polycentric form 
of governance encompassing global, regional and local levels.
Such an approach is particularly important for examining the states of Central Asia, in 
which local and national practices and conditions become rapidly interwoven with cross-
border dynamics of globalisation. As demonstrated throughout this chapter, exogenous 
and endogenous factors conditioned these former Soviet Union Republics increasingly to 
adhere to different forms of globalisation. More importantly, forms of globalisation were
channelled and enabled by institutions and networks of state apparatuses. As Sassen 
(2008, p. 63) argues, “global can also be constituted inside the national”. In relation to 
this, as Ong and Collier (2005, p. 11) state, it is important to note that global forms are 
malleable in their capacity to ‘recontextualise and decontextualise’. As the authors 
explain:
“Global forms are able to assimilate themselves to new environments, to code 
heterogeneous context and objects in terms of that are amenable to control and 
valuation. At the same time the conditions of possibility of this movement are 
complex. Global forms are limited or delimited by specific technical 
infrastructure, administrative apparatuses, or value regime, not by the vagaries of
a social or cultural field” (Ong and Collier, 2005, p. 11).
It can be argued whether social or cultural conditions obstruct the forms of globalisation. 
However, what is certainly valid is that that such a debate demands a view of globalisation 
that takes account of its multiple layers of impact and the position of state and external 
actors across these layers. Ultimately, such enquiry demands greater attention to the 
relatively young states of Central Asia. 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) provides a good case to conduct 
such an enquiry. Among the countries of Central Asia, only Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
managed to fully adapt the Initiative. Hence, for this purpose the thesis only look at these 
two countries.
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The EITI is increasingly a polycentric form of governance that works through various 
kinds of actors and rests on the interconnection of a dense policy network. The puzzle to 
explain is therefore how actors who are embedded in a global governance framework 
interact within divergent authoritarian contexts. As Amitav Acharya (2004, p. 244) 
observes, transnational norms are usually performed by “outsiders” but little is known “of 
whether, to what extent, and how the pre-existing norm helps to redefine the emerging 
norm at least in the local context, or at the receiving end”. Such questioning is particularly 
relevant in the case of the EITI as the Initiative ultimately works through the MSG in 
implementing countries, thus ultimately through the domestic realm of states that provide 
a space for transnational actors (here companies and civil society) to work and interact. 
In such a context, it is therefore important to examine who is the “norm-maker and who 
is the norm-taker” (Lewis 2012a, p. 1228). Thus, as pointed out by Fiona Adams (2008,
p. 618), there is a need to pay attention to the actors that “constitute the very transnational 
institutions that serve to diffuse global models”. Such an enquiry in an authoritarian 
context calls for a focus on elite networks and practices of epistemic communities 
(Adams, 2008), and how the presence of global governance institutions affects the
domestic politics of the respective autocratic states. 
The case of the EITI provides a theoretical and analytical puzzle to examine the 
relationship between global transnational governance and the effects it has on the local 
domestic political systems of autocratic states. It further enables us to understand how a 
country’s foreign relations affect its domestic politics, particularly within the 
authoritarian settings of Central Asian countries. The enquiry focussing on the EITI in 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan draws on a unique set of tools to study the trajectory of Post-
soviet countries in the era of globalisation.
Conclusion
Today, Central Asian states are full members of the international community. As the 
above sections demonstrate, in the 25 years since their proclaimed independence, the 
countries of Central Asia became increasingly embedded in the processes of globalisation 
and internationalisation. The character of their foreign policy evolved alongside the 
forging of identities at the domestic and global stage. The present chapter provided an 
overview of the emergence of Central Asian states in global politics. It further described 
the unique features of the region that have conditioned countries’ individual paths. The 
chapter also demonstrated how in the era of globalisation Central Asian states became 
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increasingly embedded in various forms of global transnational governance. In relation 
to this, the chapter demonstrated that there is a lack of research on how forms of 
transnational governance manifest themselves at and affect the local domestic political 
systems of autocratic states. The following section draws on the case of the EITI to fill 
this gap in the literature from an empirical, analytical and theoretical perspective.
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Chapter 3. The EITI and its Implementation 
 
Main Points of this Chapter
This chapter focuses on the EITI as a global governance initiative. The chapter starts with 
a short discussion of the emergence of transparency as a global norm and its manifestation 
in the extractive sector. In order to understand the importance of the EITI in the extractive 
sector, I outline in particular the literature on the resource curse and challenges the ‘curse’ 
poses to countries endowed with natural resources. The chapter further describes the 
history of the EITI, and how it operates in practice. It further presents the shortcomings 
of the Initiative and the criticism levelled against it. However, as I argue in this chapter, 
the current conceptualisations and debates about the EITI have the tendency to 
underestimate the importance of structural domestic and contextual factors in which the 
EITI operates as a global governance initiative. Such observations require the need to 
investigate the functioning of the EITI in practice, particularly within authoritarian and 
post-Soviet regimes of countries in Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
3.1 The EITI: Transparency as an Institutional Response to Tackle the
Resource Curse
The institutional manifestation of transparency in world politics relates to the challenges 
stemming from the globalisation processes. Florini (2007, p. 53) writes that in the era of 
globalisation the shift from state-centric to a more complex form of governance led to the 
rise of new multilateral configurations of institutions, actors and instruments, in which 
transparency and disclosure is the guiding means to enforce those mechanisms. As further 
pointed out by Gupta (2010) and Haufler (2010), the notion of transparency is closely 
associated with moral and political imperatives as solutions to contemporary global 
issues, such as market failure, democratic deficiency and environmental degradation. In 
this sense, transparency is increasingly viewed as converging with interests of multiple 
and diverse actors leading to ‘procedural global turn’ (see Gupta, 2010). Hence, in the 
context of increasing multilateralism and globalisation among institutions and actors, the 
importance of access and the free flow of information is of primary importantance (see 
Gupta, 2010; Florini, 2007; Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2006). At the same time, global 
economic integration and financial crises highlighted the need for an open information
policy of corporations, governments and international institutions (see Kaufmann and 
Bellver, 2005). By the end of the 1990s, anti-corruption regimes and discourse came to 
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be a dominant part of the global political agenda. The need to promote greater 
transparency was promoted by transnational advocacy actors and platforms, such as the 
Berlin based Transparency International (founded in 1993) fighting corruption, led to the 
development of an anti-bribery agenda. In parallel to these developments, a number of 
international anti-bribery and anti-corruption regulations emerged in world politics. The 
OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention signed in 1997 was the first and only international anti-
corruption instrument that focused on the ‘supply side’ of corruption. It also mirrored the 
global consensus on the fight against corruption13. Such developments further facilitated 
the emergence of transparency as a global norm.
The EITI is a global governance transparency initiative which has the objective to combat 
corruption and to promote transparency and accountability standards in the sector of 
extractive industries. 
EITI Principles (1) and (2) respectively state: 
1. “We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an 
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create 
negative economic and social impacts” (The EITI Standard 2016, p. 10)
2. “We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a 
country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in 
the interests of their national development”. (The EITI Standard 2016, p. 10)
In this sense, through the notion of transparency the EITI was a response to global societal 
challenges and in particular to those concerning human developments. Bellver and 
Kaufmann (2005, p. 2) note “beyond the human rights and the market efficiency 
arguments, transparency is also critical for human development because it provides 
incentives for redistribution and inclusiveness”. The concept of redistribution is 
particularly important within resource curse countries. As the political economy research 
observes, in many resource-rich countries, natural endowments failed to generate 
sustainable economic growth and prosperity as regimes distribute and utilise resources to 
keep themselves in power (Karl, 1997, p. 26). This phenomenon has been much attributed 
                                                            
13 A full list of anti-corruption conventions is provided by OECD website. OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. [Online]. 
Available at https://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/internationalconventions.htm [Accessed 8December, 
2016].
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to the resource curse syndrome. Therefore, before jumping into the analysis of the EITI,
it is first important to understand the resource curse syndrome and the role of the EITI 
within it.
The resource curse literature describes the ‘curse’ as a negative relation in which the 
abundance of natural resources produces a negative impact on socio-economic 
development (see Le Billon 2001; Karl, 1997; Rosser 2006b; Ross, 2003; Sachs and 
Warner, 1999). For example, the influential cross country study by Sachs and Warner 
(1999) shows statistically significant evidence that greater economic dependence on 
mineral and fuel resources is negatively associated with economic growth. 
Theories of the resource curse imply that procured revenues from natural resources accrue 
directly to the government, which later redistributes it to the population as a form of social 
and political control (Jones Luong, 2001, p. 368; Karl, 1997). Rents are controlled by few 
actors, among which the government is the principal recipient of revenues in the economy 
(Belawi and Luciani, 1987; Isham et al., 2003). Such economies are further characterised 
by patron-client systems of governance, in which political elites alter institutions to get 
better access to resource rents (Ross, 2001; Karl, 1997).
Hammond (2011, p. 352) and Shaxson (2007, p. 1132) respectively point out how 
corruption within resource-rich countries with weak institutional structures legitimates 
state actors’ behaviour and creates opportunities for illegal enrichment. Karl (1997, p.15) 
further argues that resource rents produce a distinct type of institutional setting which 
expand state’s jurisdictions while simultaneously weakening its authority by multiplying 
the opportunities for public and private actors to engage in rent-seeking activities. 
Legislatures have limited capacity to exercise power over authorities and quasi-state 
agencies (Moore, 2004, p. 308). As a result, corruption increases as state officials become 
reliant on these rents as a substitute for public spending on state activity (Karl, 1997, p. 
16), the political elites further allocate natural resource wealth to reinforce their supports 
and allies (Boschini et al., 2007; Deacon and Mueller, 2006, p. 145; Jones Luong, 2001; 
Robinson and Torvik, 2005). Additionally, the study of Keefer and Knack (1999) also 
indicates that weak rule of law, the absence of government responsibility for keeping 
contracts and arbitrary action by the authorities undermine property rights, independent 
of the level of redistribution in a society (Ibid, p. 16). Paul Collier (2010, p. 1106) also 
states that without the notion of accountability, both property rights and the supply of 
public goods depend upon the will of the ruling power. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) as 
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well as other authors (see also Le Billion, 2001; Basedau and Lay, 2009; De Soysa, 2002) 
point to the linkages between natural resource dependency and civil conflict. Their 
findings gauge the importance of the institutional environment as an important and 
instrumental determinant factor in the likelihood of civil war conflicts. Moore (2004, p. 
307) shares similar views; he writes that when public revenues stem from a small number 
of concentrated sources, it is relatively easy for revenues and expenditures to be hidden 
from view. 
This research demonstrates that the quality of institutions in resource-rich countries 
matters to counteract the negative effects of resource exploitation. More specifically,
Pauline Jones Luong and Erica Weinthal (2010, p. 6) argue that states in Central Asia are 
“cursed” not by their mineral wealth but rather by the structure of ownership on which 
state leaders decide to manage their mineral wealth. As the authors further demonstrate,
in particular the strategies of ownership structure in particular affect the fiscal regime,
which subsequently impacts on institution building and long term economic growth.
In sum, an important strand of the resource curse literature stresses institutional quality 
as an explanatory and important cause of the ‘curse’. For instance, the work of Mehlum
and colleagues (2002; 2006) focuses on institutional arrangements to explain trajectories 
of the resource curse hypotheses. Building upon the work of Sachs and Warner (1999),
authors emphasize the allocation of rents from natural resources and develop a model in 
which the distribution of the resource rents correlates with the quality of institutions. 
Their main findings demonstrate that depending on the quality of institutions within 
resource endowed countries, resource rents may be channelled into productive economic 
activities or captured by the elite for personal gains (Mehlum et al., 2006, p.3). Institutions 
as such produce ‘grabber’ friendly versus ‘producer’ friendly behaviours. ‘Grabber’ 
friendly institutions typically feature weak rules, high risks of expropriation and 
bureaucratic malfunction and high levels of corruption diverting entrepreneurial 
resources out of production into unproductive activities (Mehlum et al., 2002, p. 4). The 
extent to which ‘grabbing’ succeeds will depend on the institutional quality of the 
country. In this respect, authors claim that natural resources abundance hinders economic 
progress in countries with ‘grabber’ friendly institutions but does not in countries 
‘producer’ friendly institutions (Ibid, p. 14). As Mehlum and colleagues, Boschini et al. 
(2007) advance a similar claim in which the challenges associated with the resource curse 
syndrome can be countered by good institutions. Similarly, Isham et al. (2003) look at 
natural resources extracted from narrow geographic or economic bases, and the way they 
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are associated with weak public institutions and effect economic development. 
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) also explore the effect of natural resources and 
institutional regime foundation. Their findings highlight that the quality of democratic 
institutions constitutes an important factor in the trajectory of the curse and corruption. 
In this sense, the functional improvement of institutions through transparency initiatives
such as the EITI was seen by many as a key instrument to respond to these challenges. In 
the context of the resource curse syndrome, this means that greater transparency would 
enable to curb the negative effects of the resource curse, mainly associated with 
corruption, and provide public accountability to ensure better conduct of extractive 
industry affairs by holding governments and companies responsible for their resource 
spending. The overall goal is that the mechanism of transparency enables the population 
to achieve socio-economic prosperity. As the EITI Article of Association 2(2) explicitly 
states:
“The objective of the EITI Association is to make the EITI Principles and the EITI 
Requirements the internationally accepted standard for transparency in the oil, gas 
and mining sectors, recognising that strengthened transparency of natural resource 
revenues can reduce corruption, and the revenue from extractive industries can 
transform economies, reduce poverty, and raise the living standards of entire 
populations in resource-rich countries” (EITI Standard, 2013, p.46)
Therefore, the main argument for implementing an initiative such as the EITI is that 
greater transparency in the management of natural resources in extractive industries 
empowers different stakeholders, in particular citizens and civil society organisations, as
it allows them to demand information on how revenues stemming from natural resources 
are distributed and used to further promote socio-economic development.
Moreover, the motivation to promote transparency, although tacitly stated in the EITI 
documents, also relates to its indirect capacity to contribute to better governance of 
domestic institutions and the processes of democratisation. Examining the transmission 
of the norm transparency in East and Central Europe (2002, p. 469), Alexander 
Grigorescu writes that in the context of new democracies, transparency is important as it 
leads to greater public understanding and support for government policy. Such claims are 
broadly relating to studies of democracy where transparency is seen as an important factor 
implicitly contributing to democratic consolidation and democratic legitimation (Heritier, 
2003). Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996, p. 3) define democratisation as “open 
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contestation over the right to win control of the government, and this in turn requires free 
competitive elections, the results of which determine who governs”. Given these notions,
transparency determines the procedures and governance of democratic association, as it 
enables to ask questions on who rules, and how rulers came into power, how the elections 
are held and how decisions are taken. In doing so, transparency forms the cornerstone of 
democratic processes. 
The EITI documents hint at such notions. For instance, the EITI requires extractive 
industry operations to work under a fully transparent legal framework and demands the 
disclosure of information on “how the extractive sector is managed, enabling stakeholders 
to understand the laws and procedures for the award of exploration and production rights, 
the legal, regulatory and contractual framework that apply to the extractive sector, and 
the institutional responsibilities of the state in managing the sector” (The EITI Standard, 
2016 p. 17). In addition, the World Bank Group (2013, para.12) further states: “although 
EITI originated in the extractives industries, the same tools could be used as successfully 
in other sectors by underscoring citizen participation, institutional strengthening of 
government agencies and strengthening the rule of law to attract investment”.
3.2 The EITI as a Global Governance Intervention 
The unique commitment shown by the UK government to support transparency in 
extractive industries played a key role in the creation of the EITI. The demand for 
transparency in the extractive sector increasingly resonated with UK policymakers and 
found support among the political leadership and civil community (Gillies, 2010, p. 112). 
The idea of launching a global governance initiative that promotes transparency in the 
resource sector is closely associated with the constellation of factors at work in the late 
1990s. These factors relate to the political climate under UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
the role of the World Bank in the extractive sector and the pressure of civil society 
campaigns denouncing the negative effects of the neo-liberal practices in developing 
countries.
In the late 1990s civil society groups such as the UK Global Witness with the publication 
of its influential report ‘Crude Awakening’ raised attention to state-corporate relations 
between the Angolan government and Western companies. The report highlighted the 
government illegal handling of state oil revenues and shed light on business practices, 
described as corrupt and secretive, between the Angolan state and multinational energy 
corporations (Global Witness, 1999). It urged to introduce greater transparency and 
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accountability into extractive industries, stressed the need for an improved ethical role of 
businesses and more efficient involvement of the international community. The 
publication of the ‘Global Witness’ report found widespread international attention and 
triggered collective action of all stakeholders to ensure that revenues from natural 
resource extraction ended in transparent official accounts and that the respective 
governments could be held accountable for their expenditures (Eigen, 2006, p. 333). 
Specifically, Global Witness targeted the lack of transparency and murky deals of oil 
companies, such as BP-Amoco, US Chevron, Exxon/Mobil as well as the French 
company Elf Acquitaine, with the Angolan government. The pressure of other 
transnational civil society organisations, such as the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) 
campaign, increasingly pressured international oil companies and their home country 
governments to fully disclose payments made to the governments of countries where they 
operate. The close relationship between Tony Blair and the oil company BP, often nick-
named as ‘Blair Petroleum’, further added pressure on the UK Labour government to 
react14. Under Tony Blair, one can observe that the UK government saw transparency 
initiatives as a unique instrument to respond to Labour party critics and to face 
governance challenges stemming from the resource sector in the developing world.
In parallel, growing criticism of the World Bank Group over its approved loans to mineral 
and petroleum industries (e.g., in 2003, the Board of the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) approved a loan of up to $125 million for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline—in which the British government also took part) raised attention to the 
Bank’s role in this sector and its aim of promoting sustainable development and poverty 
reduction (Richards, 2009). Aiming to assess the role of the Bank’s organisational 
involvement in the sector, the commissioned ‘Extractive Industries Review’ (EIR) 
generated a flood of criticism towards the Bank’s financial interests and developmental
approaches (Richards, 2009 p. 470). Hence, the launch of the EITI was timely to counter 
the criticism of the EIR and the role of the World Bank Group in the extractive sector.
In 2001, discussions began between the NGO community, oil companies, the UK Cabinet 
Office and policy makers and the Department for International Development (DFDI) as 
well as the World Bank to establish transparency standards for extractive industries (see 
EITI website, n.d.-a; Gillies, 2010, p. 112; Richards, 2009, p.470). The Initiative was 
introduced during the UN Johannesburg World Summit (2002) and launched during the 
                                                            
14 The Guardian, 2003. Prime minister argues case for 'Blair Petroleum'.17February,2003 [Online]. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/feb/13/russia.politics [Accessed 21 February
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inaugural conference held in London in 2003. Initially, the Initiative started with four 
pilot countries in 2004 and increased its membership throughout the years. Today, the
EITI includes 51 countries which are at different stages of EITI implementation.
The launch of the EITI as a multi-stakeholder initiative was considered by many as a 
progressive move to tackle challenges posed by resource extractive industries by 
revealing inefficiencies in the way revenues from the resource dependent sector are 
collected and managed. The role of transparency was highlighted to countering the 
pervasive effects of the resource curse and institutional failure. As pointed out earlier, this 
argument derives from the logic that transparency can obstruct the illegal appropriation 
of resource rents but at the same time also strengthen domestic institutions or prevent 
their impairment respectively (Mroß, 2013, p. 30). The latter effect assumes that access 
to information enables accountability on revenue spending, while the former takes a lack 
of transparency as a condition that increases the likelihood for corrupt practices to occur 
(see Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). 
The most compelling argument is that bringing transparency to the handling of resource 
revenues, the EITI aims to address the issue of political power relation arising in the 
management of the natural resources sector. In other words, as a solution to a principal-
agent problem arising in the context of the resource curse syndrome in which agents do 
not faithfully serve the interests of principals (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). In this respect, 
the government and corporate actors are the agents for citizens, who are the principal 
because they ultimately own the resources. In the context of the resource curse, in the 
absence of transparency and with a lack of institutional regulation, agents have the 
incentives to behave in a corrupt manner to gain wealth at the expense of citizens. By
creating a space for dialogue between extractive industries, civil society (representing the 
voice of citizens) and governments, the EITI could be seen as a powerful tool to counter 
the detrimental dynamics of agent-principle relations within the context of the resource 
curse. 
However, research on countries implementing the EITI suggests that the adoption of an 
institution demanding transparency does not constitute its successful transmission. Extant 
studies on EITI implementing countries demonstrate that the Initiative is mainly 
ineffective, ‘symbolic’ or used as a ‘window dressing’ tool for authoritarian practices and 
is unlikely to trigger change (Shaxson, 2007; Aaronson, 2011; Pleines and Wostheinrich, 
2016). Studies on the participatory model of the EITI find that the Initiative did not
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improve local resource management or the well-being of the community (Soreide and 
Truex, 2013). A number of authors and policy advocates remain sceptical about the 
Initiative and its capacity to produce tangible effects in mitigating the resource curse 
syndrome within non-democratic countries (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Bauhr and Grimes, 
2013). Empirical investigations of EITI pioneering countries, like Nigeria and 
Azerbaijan, suggest that a lack of stakeholder leadership and pre-existing institutional 
constraints are obstacles to the effective functioning of the Initiative (see Acosta, 2013; 
Oge, 2014; Meissner, 2013). For instance, the recent publications of Kerem Oge (2014), 
Benjamin Sovacool and Nathan Andrews (2015) on EITI implementation in Azerbaijan 
suggest that the adoption of the norm and the institution of transparency does not trigger
real change in practice. Problems related to the institutional designs of the extractive 
sector, the monitoring of revenue use and the autocratic politics of patronage networks 
all pose challenges to effective implementation and lead to only small governance 
improvements in the extractive sector. Kolstad and Wiig (2009) argue that in resource-
cursed countries that implement the EITI, transparency in form of information disclosure 
has little effect on reducing illicit behaviour as individual incentives are weak to act on 
available information and do not come with the power to punish abuse of office. This 
argument is further supported by Collier (2010) who notes that transparency in revenue 
collection does not ensure accountability, if an effective judicial system is not in place 
(Collier 2010, p. 1127) and if the public is not able to question information and use that 
information to hold to account its governments and institutions. Similarly, Kaufmann and 
Bellver (2005, p. 14) also point out that the provision of information alone is insufficient. 
To be effective, it is critical for different social groups to participate in the decision-
making process and have the capacity to analyse and act on it. Within the EITI framework, 
the predatory nature of the extractive industry is identified as an obstacle for reaching a 
consensus among actors with competing interests. Indeed, as several authors point out the 
process of deliberation and negotiation poses a major challenge in a multi-stakeholder 
context as participants often lack incentives to act in the interest of common and public 
goods (see Soreide and Truex, 2013; Bostrom, 2006; Jensen, 2001; Wollenberg et al. 
2007).
Olcer (2009) in his report for the OECD further outlined that the adherence to the 
Initiative made no visible improvements in EITI countries. The report highlights that 
perceptions of corruption in EITI countries are worse than in non-EITI countries. 
Although corruption indices are not limited to extractive industries, a change would still 
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be expected given the size of these industries in the economies of countries adopting the 
Initiative (Olcer, 2009, p. 3).
In addition, a newly emerging strand of literature in public policy on indicators of global 
governance and its regulation remains critical of global indicators as “accountability 
enhancers” (Cassese and Casini, 2012; Cooley, 2015b). The literature on global indicators 
points out that they are mainly part of state ‘branding’ strategies. For example, in a study 
of Georgia and its accession to World Bank Doing Business Indicators (DBI), Sam 
Schueth (2015, p. 176) demonstrates how DBI were used by the Georgian government to 
reconfigure institutional relationships both within government and to attract a broader 
international policy network but without making any institutional changes to illiberal 
aspects of business activities in Georgia. For the Georgian government, it was ‘business 
as usual’. As Schueth further argues: “then country rankings may reflect little else than 
relative success at transferring specific policies” (Schueth, 2015, p. 176). David-Barrett 
and Okamura (2013) also notice in their analysis that many countries join international 
organisations for ‘reputational concerns’ and to bolster their access to foreign aid. 
Consequently, such findings call into question the significance of both global governance 
and indicators as well as their institutional quality.
As the empirical observations above demonstrate, it is certainly true that decision-making 
procedures and state access to specific institutions are motivated by rational choice and 
the calculations of individuals. Such claims find broader resonance within the literature 
on institutional theory and realist perspectives where institutions are defined as 
“persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural 
roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” (Keohane, 1989, p. 3). Writing on 
institutional theory, Dimaggio and Powell (1991, p. 28) claim that “actors and their 
interests are institutionally constructed”. Authors such as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998),
and Risse (2001) demonstrate in their work how normative ideational concerns shape 
state’s behaviours. Accordingly, the literature on authoritarian regimes acknowledges that 
the accession to global governance initiatives in non-democratic countries is often used 
as an instrument for regimes’ domestic and international survival, legitimacy and power 
maintenance (see Lewitsky and Way, 2002; Hollyer et al., 2014). It is therefore perhaps 
not surprising to see such behaviour in the framework of the EITI. 
Such debates broadly relate to the tensions discussed in chapter 1 on globalisation,
international market integration and global governance institutions—to what extent do
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global challenges find an adequate response from global governance institutions?
Throughout chapter 1, we saw that such platforms of governance cooperation have 
difficulties reconciling the pursuit of an agenda of democratic sustainable governance, on 
one hand, and the power and interests of its individual actors, on the other hand. As 
O’Brien and colleagues argue, “complex multilateralism has not challenged the 
fundamentals of existing world order, but it has incrementally pluralised governing 
structures” (see O’Brien et al., 2000, p.3). As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
tensions over global governance further ramify over its form, i.e., its institutional design 
and structure, and its content and internal decision-making process.
Moreover, as mentioned previously, processes of global governance are based on a
Western centric view and tend to adapt a ‘one size fits for all’ approach. Such governance 
forms span across a variety of social, political economic and cultural spaces that differ 
from Western constellations. Hence, this broad application hampers the effective 
implementation of global governance institutional and tends to undermine the effective 
delivery of promised services or programmes.
Consequently, the literature examining the effectiveness of global governance 
arrangements as discussed in chapter 1 demands that greater attention is given to the 
contextual dimension in which transnational norms are diffused and adopted by domestic 
agents. Global governance institutions and their manifestations are embedded in a wide 
web of networks that impact on the life of people within. As such, it is crucial to study 
and understand what sort of effects they produce on people at the receiving end, and what 
sort of institutional structures and policy formulations they create further.
In this sense, while the current literature on the EITI mainly emphasizes the rapacious 
behaviours of actors within the MSG and paid far more attention to the general standards 
of the EITI, transparency and accountability in particular (see Aaronson, 2009; Kolstad 
and Wiig, 2009; Acosta, 2013; Locke and Henley, 2013; Sovacool and Andrews, 2015; 
Oge, 2014), it provided little evidence about how such a form of governance translates 
into domestic practice in an autocratic context. The current enquiry mainly focuses on
questioning the effectiveness of the norm of transparency under the EITI framework 
rather than analysing how such a form of governance translates into the domestic regime 
configuration of autocratic states, in the present cases, imprinted with post-Soviet 
legacies. Hence, my argument is that current conceptualisations of the EITI have the 
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tendency to underestimate the importance of those structural domestic and contextual 
factors in which the EITI initiative operates.
Laura Adams (2008) in her article ‘Globalization, Universalism, and Cultural Form’ calls 
for the need to analyse global forms from an analytical perspective. As she states in her 
article on the globalisation of culture, there is a need to distinguish between the form and 
content of global models, since in much of the existing studies “the evidence of form is 
taken as evidence for content” (Adams,2008 p.616). Discussing global governance anti-
corruption indicators, Mlada Bukovansky (2015, p. 66) further states that many global 
governance initiatives are based on a technocratic approach that mainly focuses on formal 
aspects but fails to embed in their analysis the “problem of cultural and moral relativism”. 
Therefore, she argues (p. 71, 2015) that “the practice of global corruption rankings has 
been a central part of the construction of the corruption issue as a global, rather than 
comparative, country-specific issue”. Such features are particularly distinct within the 
Soviet traditions. Writing about the end of Soviet socialism, Alexie Yurchak (2006) 
provides a clear example of the dynamics between human agency and its interplay with 
language and discourses of power. As he argues in his analysis, although the authoritative 
representation of the Soviet system was reproduced uniformly, the meaning of Soviet life 
was reinterpreted and displayed from within. 
“They were the system’s heroes, who lived according to script of reality provided 
by authoritative discourse, and, at the same time, the system’s authors, who 
created their own new, unanticipated interoperation of the reality with the 
parameters afforded by performative reproductions of the form of that 
authoritative script” (Yurchak, 2006, p. 290). 
The above authors highlight in their analysis the importance to distinguish between form 
and its rituals (performative reproduction), on the one hand, and the interpretation or 
reinterpretation of reality, on the other–i.e., how form is given meaning by recipient 
actors.
Scholarly literature and research formulate a clear demand to give weight to the content 
of global governance initiatives, and how it is interpreted at the recipient level. Giving 
weight to content and its structural factors in the realm of the EITI enables detailed 
examination and allows to explain how global governance initiatives based on the concept 
of limited plurality work in non-democratic settings, marked with Soviet legacies and 
authocratic regimes as in the case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Existing research on
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 82
 
 
the EITI manifest in case studies of EITI implementing countries and policy reports 
conducted by non-governmental organisations such as the World Bank, Publish What 
You Pay Campaign or Resource Revenue Watch Institute fails to use its findings to 
critically reflect on the broader theoretical and political implications of these practices for
governance in contemporary authoritarian states. It remains poorly explored how the EITI 
platform operates to consolidate divergent actors’ interests and how different actors 
within such regimes consolidate EITI demands. Consequently, such an approach demands 
to examine the implementation of the Initiative at multiple layers.
To examine this question, the work of recent scholars working on international 
organisations promoting authoritarian norms is important. Although much of their 
analysis focuses on the role of ‘autocratic’ international institutions promoting illiberal 
norms, I argue that the same argument can be applied to democratic global governance 
organisations that authoritarian states choose to adhere and implement through MSG 
initiatives in their domestic context. 
One of the main mechanisms for norm transmission is made through international 
organisations. The literature on democratisation largely demonstrated by looking at 
Europeanisation or European external governance how norms are diffused by 
international organisations via processes of conditionality, adaptation and socialisation 
(Schimmelfennig and Lavenex, 2009; Economides, 2005). Such literature further 
examines questions of how and under what conditions norm transfer is successful. 
More recent literature in the field of norm promotion started extend the research agenda 
and looked at how international organisations promote authoritarianism and non-
democratic norms. Thomas Ambrosio (2008) demonstrates via the example of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) how an international organisation can 
promote not only democratisation but also authoritarianism. As he shows, international 
organisations such as the SCO have the power to act against democratic norms and to 
become an instrument to sustain authoritarian rule. As Ambrosio (2008 p. 1326) states in 
his analysis: “Regimes would create and utilise international organisations to establish 
regional or global norms which make it illegitimate to criticise or interfere in the domestic 
politics of countries”. Another example of such practices is OSCE and Kazakhstan’s
chairmanship in 2010. As Shkolnikov (2011 p. 4) reports, “the Astana OSCE 
Chairmanship was mainly a public relation event and resulted in the curtailment of civil 
and political rights for Kazakhstan’s population rather than producing any advancement 
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for democratic reforms”. In this case, international democratic organisations and the 
promotion of norms of good governance enabled the autocratic state of Kazakhstan to 
shield and coordinate its activities against external critics. 
It seems that increasingly the form of global governance is becoming more important than 
the content of its formulations and its meaning. But to what extent do such formal and 
standardised procedures matter in the context of authoritarian regimes? Are they simple 
intended to mimic the process of standardisation of the form or is there a meaning attached 
to it? And if so what sort of meaning is it, and what effect does it produce? 
As it was demonstrated through the cases of formal democratic institutions (see the work 
of Shedler, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010), I argue in this thesis that global governance 
arrangements contain some instrumental value for the authoritarian regime in place.
When writing about democratic institutions in autocratic contexts, Andreas Shedler 
(2009, p. 327) observes that “dictators are likely to respond not to isolated threats, but to 
configurations of threats”, which will trigger the tendency to create “not isolated 
institutions, but configurations of institutions”. In this sense, the following chapters 
stretch the existing boundaries of institutional analysis of authoritarian regimes. The 
following section focuses on the Extractive Industry Transparency initiative (EITI) as a 
global governance initiative in practice.
3.3 The EITI in Practice
The EITI initiative is a public private partnership or a multi-stakeholder group between 
state, companies and civil society. The cooperation of all stakeholder groups addressed 
through a multi-stakeholder platform was considered one of the most suitable ways for 
achieving a better and sustainable management in natural resource sector with broader 
positive spillover effects on the domestic level. 
The EITI provides a clear schematic framework with its institutions implemented at both 
local and global levels. At the international level, the EITI operates through the EITI 
International Board, which provides checks and balances to protect against abuses at the 
national level. At the national level, the EITI is represented through the multi-stakeholder 
group (MSG), which involves states, civil societies and companies. An independent 
administrator supervised by the MSG reconciles and reports disclosed information 
(payments and revenues) made by companies and governments in the respective EITI 
country reports (the EITI website n.d.-b; Olcer, 2009; Locke and Henley, 2013).
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Figure 1. EITI Framework
The framework below illustrates the functioning of the EITI processes: 
(Table 1: adapted from Olcer, 2009)
It is voluntary for governments to enter the Initiative but all companies and agencies 
operating in a country implementing the initiative are required to disclose their financial 
transactions to the implementing country (see EITI website n.d.-b). The cornerstone of 
the EITI initiative are its 12 principles to increase transparency in the resource sector and 
its seven requirements which must be met by countries implementing the Initiative. To 
become a member of the EITI, i.e. to comply, a country intending to implement the EITI 
must undertake a number of steps which can be broadly categorised into: initiation, 
implementation and review phases (see EITI Source Book, 2005).
The initiation phase
To become a EITI candidate country, a country must go through four ‘sign-up’ steps and 
submit an application to the international EITI Board (EITI Standard, 2013). These four 
steps require the government to make an unequivocal public statement of its intention to 
implement the EITI; government’s commitment to work with civil society and companies 
on EITI implementation; the appointment of a senior individual to lead EITI 
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implementation; the publication of a work plan with measurable targets and an 
implementation timetable that has been agreed on by the multi-stakeholder group (EITI 
Standard, 2013). After the government completed these four sign-up steps, it can proceed 
further with the application to the international EITI Board. The application needs to 
demonstrate activities with evidences undertaken within the sign-up steps. Once the 
application satisfied the EITI Board, the country can proceed further to the 
implementation phase. 
The Implementation Phase
The implementation phase consists of the publication of annual reports and periodic 
audits compiling and evaluating payment and revenue figures from extractive industries 
and governments. Since the 2013 EITI Conference in Sydney, published EITI reports 
must contain disaggregated company-by-company data with respect to each company and 
each revenue stream. The MSG is required to set up the level of disaggregation for the 
publication of data (EITI Standard, 2013). Additionally, reporting at the project level is 
to be consistent with US and EU rules and requirements. Under the revised version of 
EITI standards, state-owned companies (SOEs) are required to report their financial 
activities (expenditures and revenues) with other government entities. SOEs are also 
required to disclose their level of ownership in any extractive companies operating in the 
country (EITI Standard, 2013). In addition, the new provisions further mandate the 
disclosure of subnational transfers and payments received from transit-related activities 
in natural resources. Moreover, the new requirements also demand the full disclosure of 
expenditures for social contributions made by extractive companies (see further EITI 
Standard, 2013). The implementation phase as such forms a key aspect in pursuing the 
objective of the EITI—to provide information about the revenues and receipts for the 
citizens. 
The Review Phase
The review phase consists of validation processes. For candidate countries, validation 
measures progress in their implementation, while for compliant countries, they act as a 
litmus test of whether or not they are compliant with EITI standards (principles and 
requirements). When a candidate country meets all the EITI requirements, the Board 
grants the country the status of EITI compliant. Under the new EITI requirements, EITI 
compliant countries are required to conduct validation ever three years, instead of every 
five year as previously (see EITI Standard, 2013; EITI Rules, 2011). In this process, the 
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EITI Board deserves special attention, as it holds the ultimate power to make a country 
an EITI candidate, to specify corrective actions or to suspend or delist a country. If the 
validation report indicates that a country made progress but does not meet all the EITI 
requirements, the country remains a candidate, or if no meaningful progress was made or 
where the maximum candidacy period is exceeded, the Board may revoke a country’s 
candidate status (see the EITI website n.d.-b). The EITI Board members have also the 
power to suspend or delist a country where significant aspects of the EITI principles and 
requirements are not met or adhered to by the implementing county (see EITI Report). 
Following reform (EITI, Standard 2013), the EITI established a new Board Committee 
and an Outreach and Candidacy Committee which is tasked to review the candidacy of 
applicant countries and to make amendments if required. 
The organisational structure also relies on the World Bank Group and a multi-donor trust 
fund (MDTF) supported by bilateral and international development agencies and civil 
society organisations, such as the Revenue Watch Institute, to provide financial and 
technical assistance to countries implementing or considering implementing the Initiative.
One of the key differences of the EITI compared to other transparency initiatives (e.g.,
the Kimberley process) is the EITI's tripartite structure with an emphasis on civil society. 
Under the EITI implementation framework, civil society plays an essential role in the 
design, monitoring and evaluation of the whole EITI process and is tasked to contribute 
effectively to public debates about the outcomes (see EITI Rules, 2011). In doing so, it 
entrusts civil society with monitoring and whistle-blowing power enabling it further to 
constraint the power of political and economic elites (see Carbonnier et al., 2011; Soreide 
and Truex, 2013). Hence, it is mandatory for governments to ensure that civil society is 
fully, independently, actively and effectively engaged in the process at all stages of the 
EITI process (see EITI rules, 2011). 
In 2016, the EITI adopted a new set of standards: ‘The EITI Standard, 2016’. The new 
EITI standards, encourage countries to base EITI reporting on existing reporting systems 
rather than to duplicate the process through the EITI reporting. The new standards further 
ensure greater transparency and accountability in all facets of the natural resource sector
now including tax transparency, commodity trading and licensing. In addition to this, the 
new 2016 EITI standards further strengthen validation which ensures that all EITI 
requirements are met. Under the new EITI, assessment within the validation process pays 
greater attention to the diversity of EITI members among implementing countries and 
additional efforts that go beyond minimum standards in EITI implementation. The 
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ground-breaking new aspect of the Initiative is that now it contains provisions about 
beneficial ownership that requires disclosure of the full identity of the oil and gas 
companies operating in EITI countries. 
The EITI 2016 Standard state: 
“By 1 January 2017, the multi-stakeholder group publishes a roadmap for disclosing 
beneficial ownership information” (EITI Standard, 2016, p. 20).
“As of 1 January 2020, it is required that implementing countries request, and companies 
disclose, beneficial ownership information for inclusion in the EITI Report. This applies
to corporate entity(ies) that bid for, operate or invest in extractive assets and should 
include the identity(ies) of their beneficial owner(s), the level of ownership and details 
about how ownership or control is exerted. Any gaps or weaknesses in reporting on 
beneficial ownership information must be disclosed in the EITI Report, including naming 
any entities that failed to submit all or parts of the beneficial ownership information” 
(EITI Standard, 2016, p. 20). 
There are currently 51 resource-rich countries affiliated with the EITI, 31 of them with 
the status of fully compliant. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are among the 51 resource-
endowed implementing countries under the EITI umbrella. The Initiative is supported by 
90 of the world’s largest mining, oil and gas companies, 17 supporting countries, 21 
international organisations and 95 blue-chip institutional investors representing over $19 
trillion in assets under management (EITI, 2015). 
The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan initiated and validated the EITI process 
and became fully compliant countries. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the only Central 
Asian countries to have implemented the Initiative. Kyrgyzstan was among the pioneering 
EITI countries that launched the Initiative in 2004. The two post-Soviet countries provide 
a good example of contemporary authoritarian regimes. They are resource-rich and suffer 
from weak governance institutions, corruption and poor socio-economic development. In 
addition to this, Communist legacies still shape both countries. Corruption in these 
countries is described as an ‘omnipresent phenomenon’, the adoption of the EITI was 
hence viewed as a progressive movement and much acclaimed both nationally and 
internationally. However, despite the adoption of the Initiative, none of these countries 
achieved significant levels of improvement. According to Transparency International, 
both states are the highest ranking countries in their corruption performance index (see 
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Transparency International, 2015a; Transparency International, 2015b). Recent studies 
on the EITI and wider transnational anti-corruption regimes note that the lack of 
improvement is caused by the important role that patronage networks play in those
countries implementing measures (see Pleines and Wostheinrich, 2016). Kerem Oge
(2014, p. 1496) in his study on the EITI in Azerbaijan concludes that “institutions are 
very resistant to change, especially in countries where power is concentrated”. Such 
observations provide a perspective to address the functioning of global governance 
initiatives in practice: How does such a form of global governance coagulate in the 
domestic context and whose constituencies does it serve? 
Conclusion 
The present chapter provided an overview of the EITI as a global governance 
transparency initiative. Michael Zurnand colleagues (2012, p. 7) note that dynamics of 
the transnational rule of law embed mechanisms, modalities and processes promoting the 
rule of law. As such this also includes the recipient actors (states, transnational actors and 
institutions), and how they react (resistance, reception or adaptation) to the promotion of 
the rule of law both internally and externally. 
On paper, the EITI provides a very clear institutional design for its participants to follow, 
however how it is enforced and translated into practice remains to be explored. Further,
there is a lack of evidence about the extent to which transnational standards and 
procedural conditions as formulated in the EITI documents affect the behaviour of 
recipient states? And to what extent recipient states are committed to non-binding 
declarations and ideals expressed under the EITI? The procedural standardisation of EITI 
takes place at the contextual level, however echoing Yurchak’s analysis (2006) here the 
meaning of an act is never determined in advanced because of the indeterminacy of the 
context. Hence, the EITI process and its standardisation only assume concrete meaning 
within the context in which it is implemented. Given the social, political and economic 
context of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as implementing countries, the EITI provides an 
excellent avenue to study empirically how its schematic and procedural provisions are 
transferred to and interpreted in these countries. Consequently, the enquiry further aims 
to answer what meaning and function standardised governance initiatives acquire in such 
contexts?
Therefore, there is a need to examine the institutional configuration of global governance 
in practice and critically analyse the relationship and role of different actors within. In 
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doing so, the thesis questions and reflects on the underlying logic of global governance 
initiatives and their functioning within authoritarian contexts. Against this backdrop, it 
becomes then increasingly relevant to study the functioning of the EITI as a global 
governance initiative to answer the central research question formulated in this thesis. 
The subsequent chapters (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) focus on the functioning of the 
Initiative in the post-Soviet and authoritarian states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
However, before the analysis is presented in the empirical chapters let me first introduce 
the research design that guides my empirical enquiry.
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Chapter 4. Research Design and Methodology
Main Points of this Chapter
The present chapter presents the research design and methodologies applied in the 
conduct of the PhD research project. The chapter starts by outlining the central research 
question addressed in the thesis. It further elaborates on research design and challenges 
that relates to conducting field research in authoritarian or ‘closed settings’. The chapter 
describes the various methodological tools used and their justification in light of the 
research project and the central research question. 
4.1 Research Design: Setting up the Context
The central research question of the thesis is framed as follows:
What is the functioning of a global governance initiative such as the EITI in the post-
Soviet autocratic states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? This means: How does the 
authoritarian governance structure of post-Soviet states accommodate global governance 
demands within their domestic context, and what sort of organisational and institutional 
practice does such a governance form acquire?
To answer the central research question, the thesis will further explore additional sub-
questions:
How do inherited Soviet legacies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan impact on the 
functioning of the global governance initiative? What happens to shared self-regulatory 
governance practices based on state and non-state actors’ association, when they are 
instituted in an authoritarian context? What are the links or degree of interactions between 
state and non-state actors represented in the Initiative, and to what extent do they diverge 
between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? What role do shared self-regulatory governance 
practices as prescribed under the EITI play in the authoritarian countries of Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, and whom or which constituencies do they serve? In doing so, the 
research pays special attention to regime type, Soviet legacies and the domestic authority 
structures in which shared self-regulatory global governance practices take place.
The dissertation research relies on qualitative case study methodology. Using the cases 
of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, this research is based on an in-depth study of complex 
interactions, along with an analysis of the interacting forces and their possible 
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combinations contrasting them by looking at different elements of the two countries. In 
doing so, the research further establishes how causal processes work in such settings and 
affect outcomes. 
Conducting social enquiry within ‘closed’ regimes (Koch, 2013) can be challenging 
compared to more open political contexts. The selection of reach objects and field work 
techniques is greatly exacerbated by the challenges of the domestic context.
As studies in political geography, development research and anthropology demonstrate, 
research design tools and textual methods geared towards the Western and democratically 
open political context prove to be challenged or unfit to be applied to institutional regime 
configurations that are not Western democracies. As, for instance, Natalie Koch (2013,
p. 393) writes when reflecting her experience in conducting focus research group in 
Kazakhstan: “Opinion is itself a technology of government in democratic systems. But in 
various places around the world, people are not necessarily governed and do not govern 
themselves through this technology”. As such the fact that such elements are subject to 
research necessitates the researcher to show critical awareness when engaging with 
intermediators as well as the research objects per se. 
Therefore, it is important to note that given the scope of the topic studied in the context 
of authoritarian regimes, the time constraints, my research funding and the availability of 
information in different languages, it would be misleading to assume that my research 
offers a comprehensive analysis of the topic studied. My methodological considerations 
are therefore geared towards how I will best answer the central research question with the 
help of available research tools within the given research context. 
4.1.2 The Site of Research: Conducting Research in a ‘Close’ Context
Olaf Heidelbach notes in his field work experience (2005, p. 46) on surveying Kazakh 
agriculture:
“Field research is always a complex process involving many contextual factors, 
discontinuities, negotiations, and compromises. Comprehending cultural and 
historical peculiarities of the research area, learning how local institutions 
function, and being willing to adapt personally to new circumstances that affect 
planning and negotiation strategies are key qualifications for conducting 
successful data surveys, especially in transition and developing countries.”
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Stefan Malthaner (2014, p. 173) distinguishes two elements when conducting field work: 
1) Field work takes place in a social environment that spans beyond the researcher’s 
control or upon which the researcher depends and which can “hamper, restrict, and shape 
the research process in various ways” 2) field research involves personal relationships,
the process of interacting with people or being part of social situations are one the main
sources of the data collection process. 
These contextual factors (domestic and PhD research funding constraints) impacted on 
my research design and the methods applied. The conduct of my field work in ‘close’ 
contexts further shaped the strategies of research design and methods used to collect data 
on my cases. In addition, due to time constraints of my PhD funding as well as challenges 
related to organisational and transport logistics, I only met major stakeholders that were 
city-bound or ready to commute to cities. As such, I was not able to do further interviews 
or rural observations with EITI MSG implemented a regional levels15.
Nathalie Koch (2013) argues in the special issue on ‘Field Methods in Closed Contexts’ 
(in Area, 45: 390-395) that conducting research in ‘spaces of closure’ or ‘closed context’ 
can be a challenging task for Western academic researchers or practitioners. ‘Closed 
context’ involves coercive and more productive forms and relations of power (Koch, 
2013). Such an interpretation is broadly inspired by the work of Michel Foucault. 
Foucault (2007, p. 16) defines power as “the set of mechanisms through which the basic 
biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a 
general strategy of power”. Such a perspective implies that subjects are shaped by the 
practices of actors and institutions in power. Such productive forms of power are 
particularly prevalent within closed and controlled contexts as in the case of autocratic 
regimes, where there is an absence of liberal freedom, or where freedom is used as a 
government tool “a key invention and most significant resource tool” of governing the 
others and the self (Rose, 1999; Foucault, 1997). 
However, within such settings, it is important to distinguish variations in practices of 
freedom. In this sense, the degree of freedom varies according to regime type, the more 
open a regime is the more spacious and dimensional is the degree of freedom practiced.
Consequently, existing variations in political regime types, local institutional structures 
and underlying power impedes or facilitates the conduct of fieldwork (Malthaner, 2014,
                                                            
15 The principle of EITI MSG has been also extended to regional levels through ‘Public reception Desks’ 
particularly in Kyrgystan, in Kazakhstan this is still in its launching phase.  
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p. 175). Variations in the levels of autocratic regime types are: Kyrgyzstan as being 
defined as illiberal or hybrid democracy and Kazakhstan as being a ‘hard core’ 
authoritarian regime impacted on research design and data collection processes of the 
research project. It was more difficult for me to collect data in Kazakhstan than in 
Kyrgyzstan. The stronger and more entrenched hierarchy in Kazakh domestic institutions 
posed obstacles for conducting interviews or doing participant observations, as many of 
the institutional structures demanded additional bureaucratic paperwork as, for example,
security clearings and further administrative checks. Janine Clark’s survey (2006 p. 418)
on conducting field research in the authoritarian context16 concludes that challenges of 
conducting field work under an authoritarian context and cultural differences represent 
greatest impact upon filed work.
The degree of ‘hard core’ authoritarianism practiced in Kazakhstan and the political 
sensitive nature of the topic had an impact on my field research. In this context, many of 
my interviewed participants in Kazakhstan feared to speak openly about the topic of my 
PhD research. Therefore, the conduct of my field work conducted in Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan shows some variations: For example, the number of interviews conducted in 
Kazakhstan is smaller than in Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, I could conduct a participant 
observation while in Kazakhstan I could not. 
In this dissertation, although I am using survey data, research is predominantly qualitative 
with the principal research method of the semi-structured, open-ended interview. I have 
further used document analysis and observed meetings related to the EITI to corroborate 
my interview data. 
Access to my informants was established through formal and informal channels. Initial 
formal inquiries were made through the EITI International Secretariat based in Norway. 
Informal personal networks emerged through internships in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. 
Therefore, the institutions where I was based during the period of my field work were 
used as intermediaries to get access to respondents. As Malthaner, (2014, p. 179) writes 
about the conduct of field work in conflict zones: “Informal personal networks are 
particularly important in conflict settings as they can create trust through common 
acquaintances and introduction by a familiar person who, in some way, ‘vouches’ for the 
researcher”. In my case, colleagues both in Kyrgyzstan (organisation SIAR/Bishkek) and 
                                                            
16 Although her study focus primarily in the Middle East, the results of her analysis are transferrable to 
other autocratic contexts,
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Kazakhstan (Public Opinion Institute/Astana) greatly assisted me to liaise with key 
stakeholders of my research project. Through them I got numerous opportunities to be 
invited to conferences and events related to my research. In some cases, formal and 
informal access was combined upon recommendations of my interviewees.
Pre-existing informal ties were crucial in my research for opening doors but also for 
estanlishing trust in situations where people were reluctant to talk.
One of the main ethical requirements of field research is to obtain consent of subjects
participating in the research project and the potential risks related to it (Wood, 2006; 
Malthaner, 2014). In my research, I have used ‘do not harm’ principles to ensure that 
subjects made their own decision to participate and that participants to the research project 
did not run into any risks as a result of my research project. Prior to my field work, I 
prepared research protocols and consent forms that were approved by my Research Centre 
for East European Studies in Bremen and by BIGSSS at the University of Bremen, 
Germany. 
However, once in the field I realised that adherence to protocol proved to be inadequate
to the context of my field work. I therefore used my own ethical judgement to solve ethical 
dilemmas. As authors (see Wood, 2006; Koch, 2014; Malthaner, 2014) note there is a 
necessity for the researcher to adapt to the contextual conditions of field work when 
conducting field work in ‘risk prone zones’. 
One of the main ethical challenges that I encountered was the consent form. During my 
first round of interviews, I presented written consent forms and protocols related to my 
research project; all my interviewees were very reluctant to take part in the research 
project and suspected me to be a spy or other form of intelligence service member (in two 
of my interviews conducted with EITI members in Kyrgyzstan, I was asked whether I 
was a ‘foreign agent spy’17). 
Moreover, as Mitchell argues (1990), local views can be structured by the culture of 
hegemonic fear. The population of post-Soviet Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is subject to 
state surveillance (Gentile, 2013; Privacy International, 2014). While state surveillance is 
more entrenched in Kazakhstan than in Kyrgyzstan, there was fear of written consent, as
any record could link them directly to my project and would expose them to public or 
government officials and turned out to be a real security issue. Paradoxically however, all 
                                                            
17 These reflections were related to draft Law on Foreign Agents (2014). 
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my interviewees were happy to be mentioned in my research and gave me interviews
without a written consent form. Therefore, in the course of my field work I used oral 
consent procedures. All my participants were contacted prior to the interview via email 
or phone explaining my research purpose, institutional affiliations and examples of 
questions to be asked (this was mainly upon the participants’ request). In all my email 
communication with participants, I had attached a brief overview of my research project, 
my institutional affiliation and the ethical consent form18. The majority of my interviews 
conducted in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were tape recorded. Participants also gave me 
their consent to be named in my research project. Anonymity was guaranteed when 
requested. In some instances, particularly in Kazakhstan (with government officials of 
the EITI Board and KazEnergy Association) I was not allowed to record the interview. In 
such cases I took written notes. Moreover, as observed during my field work and echoing 
the work of James C. Scott (1990), the discourse of my interviewees was very much 
conditioned according to social power relations and the concepts between “hidden and 
public transcripts”. According to Scott, public transcripts are the “open interaction 
between the dominant and the subordinate groups” (Scott, 1990, p. 2) on the other hand, 
hidden transcripts represent “the critique of power” (Scott, 1990 p, xii) and specific 
behaviours that are practiced behind the scenes, far from the view of the dominant groups. 
The degree of authoritarianism in a regime appears to influence the practice of hidden 
transcript outside the earshot of power holders (Scott, 1990, p. 20). In this regard, the 
number of informal interviews conducted in Kazakhstan was significantly higher than 
Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, the act of responding to my interview questions also varied 
between the two countries. In Kazakhstan many of my respondents, particularly those 
working for the government, responded to a rehearsed and nearly unified script, while in 
Kyrgyzstan the answers to my questions were more nuanced. Such dynamic further 
displays features of power dynamics: the more severe is the domination of power the 
more unified is the act of performance. As Elisabeth Wood (2006, p. 385) notes, “even 
with research practices and protocols tailored to specific field conditions, inevitably field 
researchers rely on their judgment in interpreting those norms”. In this sense during the 
data collection process, I tried to articulate the findings of my field work in the most 
objective manner, however the data collected and knowledge produced in this thesis is 
also the product of my own interpretation, situations and collaborations encountered 
during the research.
                                                            
18 See Appendix 1: Consent Form and Ethical Considerations
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4.2 Research Design Framework
My research design was guided by the question addressed by Peter Hall (2013): What are 
we doing when we do Social Science? Citing Imre Lakatos (1970), Hall looks at science 
as a project entailing the formulation of theories and their examination in light of 
empirical observations (Hall, 2013, p. 20). This statement forms the guiding point of my 
research design. The conduct of my research is largely qualitative and is based on 
interpretive thought commonly associated with the work of Max Weber in which 
knowledge stems from experiences, senses and perception as opposed to positivist 
thinking (Weber, 1949). The interpretivist approach includes questions that relate to 
meaning—in particular individual meaning—or the ways in which cultural meanings 
affect the actions of individuals (Benton and Craib, 2001, p. 76); and how this meaning 
is constructed and understood within the social context of the material conditions of 
people’s lives (see Weber, 1949; Cupchik, 2001; Beach, 1990). Hence, participants’ 
perceptions are being studied and interpreted, as they provide a window into a reality 
beyond those perceptions (Healy and Perry, 2000, p. 119). In this sense, the extrinsic view 
of reality is discerned through a reconstruction of the perceptions of respondents (see 
Stake, 1995).
In doing this, my enquiry strives to select the most appropriate inductive research methods 
to discover and build theory and address the research question, rather than to test theory 
through analytical lenses and deductive approaches as applied in positivist paradigms. 
Qualitative research practices in this study reflect the use of methods which attempt to 
provide a holistic understanding of research participants’ views and actions in the context 
of their lives in general with the key feature of striving for objectivity and neutrality in 
the collection and interpretation of data. Locke et al. (2013) point out that when research 
is exploratory or qualitative, it sufficient to work with a research question rather than a
hypothesis or hypotheses. In fact, as Punch further argues, hypotheses should be included,
if appropriate (Punch, 2016). In my case, working with hypotheses and a theory testing 
paradigm was not deemed practical for conducting my research. 
The scientific method of enquiry often involves a circular process, where the researcher 
goes back and forth between the reality observed and theoretical assumptions. As many 
students who start their research project, I embarked on the PhD project with some initial 
conceptual thoughts taken from my literature and desk-based research, primarily focusing 
on the resource curse and authoritarian regimes as well as the role of good governance 
transparency institutions. Hoover and Donovan (2004, p. 34) outline five components of 
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scientific enquiry. One of their five elements involves a ‘reality test’, in which changes 
in variables are measured to see if the hypothesised relationship is evidenced and 
‘evaluation’, in which the measured variable is compared with the original hypothesis. In 
doing so, one can observe a two-level process, one level is based on priory assumptions 
and another one is the field of testing and emerging observations. Hence, the conduct of 
my scientific enquiry involved moving back and forth between these two paradigms. In 
this sense, once in the field, it became clear to me that working with hypotheses was not 
helpful and that the formulation of my hypothesis was misplaced, as my research was 
taking a merely explorative form and moved rather towards theory building than theory 
testing research designs.
4.2.1 Qualitative Case Study Approach
The reason for employing a case study design is to allow the study of complex phenomena 
within their specific contexts (see Rosenberg and Yates, 2007; Baxter and Jack, 2008; 
Scholz and Tietje, 2002) with the help of a method that is implicitly based on the existence 
of micro-macro links in social behaviour (Alexander et al., 1987, cited in Gerring, 2007 
p. 1). In other words, as described by Robert K. Yin (2002a, p. 13), a case study approach 
allows the researcher “to cover contextual conditions—believing that they might be 
highly pertinent to the phenomena of study” because “the case study method allows 
investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 
2002, p. 2). As further argued by Gerring (2007, p.65), a case study design is the best fit
for intensive and in-depth studies of a single or small set of cases with the aim of 
generalising across a larger set of cases of the same general type. Perri 6 and Bellamy 
(2012, p. 103) distinguish case studies from other research designs in their ability to look 
at a whole set of interactions rather than at the principal or interdependent contribution of 
one or few variables. In doing so, case-based research designs adapt a holistic approach. 
In addition, as Ragin (1987) points out, the relations between parts of a whole are 
understood within the context of the whole, where causation is understood in terms of 
conjuncturality and instances of the way in which variables operate in concert (see further 
Becker, 2000, p. 226) and outcomes are analysed in terms of the intersection of conditions 
and settings. Eisenhardt (1989, p. 540) further writes that within-case analysis typically 
involves detailed case study write-ups for each site. As a result, such a process gives the 
investigator rich data and familiarity with it, which in turn allows cross-case comparison. 
In addition, case studies are able to provide an in-depth and detailed study of phenomena 
and to unpack causal mechanisms or particular conditions prompting a causal mechanism. 
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Case studies also have the advantage of being particularly helpful in the process of theory 
development. As Achen and Snidal (1989, pp. 167-168) write: “analytic theory cannot do 
without case studies, because they are simultaneously sensitive to data and theory, case 
studies are more useful for these purposes than any other methodological tool”. Hence, it 
is precisely for these reasons that the case study design approach was chosen to help 
addressing the central research question posed in this dissertation. 
By looking at the internal and cross dynamics of the countries of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, the research employs a comparative case-orientated approach on most 
similar systems designs. As defined by David Collier, comparison is a fundamental tool 
for analysis; not only does it sharpen the power of description, but it also plays a key role 
in the process of concept formation by highlighting similarities and contrasts among cases 
(Collier, 1993, p. 105). As Ragin (1987, p. 1) further adds, comparison allows statements 
to be made about empirical regularities and to evaluate and interpret cases relative to 
substantive and theoretical criteria. In this sense, most social scientific studies are 
comparative, yet in the social sciences the term ‘comparative method’ is defined as a 
comparison of large macro-social units (Ibid)) concerned with cross-societal differences 
and similarities (Eastrope, 1974 cited in Ragin, 1987, p. 1). In qualitative enquiry, this 
involves comparing configurations where cases are examined as a combination of the 
characteristics they exhibit. In other words, as defined by Gerring (2007, p. 20), a 
comparative cross-case study is “the shift point from a study from an individual case to a 
sample of cases”. Consequently, the focus on cross-case comparison rather than a single 
case study was further motivated by the aim to draw stronger inferences.
The selection of cases followed the approach advanced by Adam Przeworski and Henry 
Teune (1970) based on the most similar systems design. In such a framework, intersystem 
similarities and intersystem differences are the focus of the approach. Systems in such 
designs constitute the original level of analysis, and variations occurring within systems 
are explained in terms of systemic factors (Przeworski and Teune, 1970, p. 35). At the 
opposite end, the most different systems design is based on the logical opposite to the 
most similar systems design, where the selection of cases is based on the assumption that 
the phenomenon being explained resides at the lower level of that systems.
In the cases of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, countries were chosen as follows: The two 
countries exhibit a very similar historical, institutional and cultural context, but very 
different patterns of authoritarian styles of rule. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan feature 
high levels of corruption, and both have endorsed the EITI standards on a voluntary basis. 
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They are both former states of the Soviet Union and, therefore, share a common history 
and institutional setup in the political and economic spheres. They are characterised by 
varying degrees of neo-patrimonial and authoritarian regime aspects with strong 
perceptions about sovereignty (Pomfret, 2006; Spechler, 2008; Franke et al., 2009) and 
are rentier states (Jones Luong, 2000; Kalyuzhnova et al., 2009). Yet, despite these 
similarities, the countries also exhibit the following variations: A significant difference 
exists with regard to how their political regimes can be categorised. That is, while both 
countries exhibit a high level of authoritarianism, their regime structures differ in 
significant ways. Kazakhstan is described as an authoritarian regime (see Jones Luong, 
2000; Bayulgen, 2005), while Kyrgyzstan is characterised by a neo-patrimonial regime 
(see Engvall, 2007, 2011). The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), which 
evaluates the quality of democracy, categorises Kazakhstan as a “hard-line autocracy” 
(BTI, 2016a) and Kyrgyzstan as a “highly defective democracy” (BTI 2016b). Such 
striking differences, as noted by Jones Luong (2000), also manifest themselves in the 
different trajectories of institutional democratisation. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan implemented 
the greatest amount of democratic reforms since its independence compared to its 
neighbour Kazakhstan. Consequently, the countries further differ in terms of their 
institutional design and state capacity. 
Although case studies by now are recognised as a form of empirical investigation, many 
critique the rigour of its research designs. As Gerring (2007, p. 7) notes, case studies often 
are labelled as “non-rigorous”, “non-systematic” or as applying “non-scientific methods”. 
In addition, a small sample of cases, as further observed by Gerring (2007, p. 43) as well 
as George and Benett (2005, p. 23), also raises the issue of representativeness when 
attempting to make generalisations. Critics also point out issues of reliability and validity 
when applying case study designs, as they are based on interpretive judgements (see 
Gerring, 2007). 
The notions of reliability and validity demand particular attention. As Polkigorne (1988, 
p. 34) notes, a central focus of the social sciences is concerned with justifying findings as
objective and free from personal and cultural bias. This makes the notion of reliability 
and validity important in assessing the quality of research produced. The SAGE 
Encyclopaedia of Research Methods (2008 p. 2) defines reliability as: 
“an instrument or the measurements of a test will consistently produce the same 
result, measure, or score if applied two or more times under identical conditions. 
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A technique is reliable, or has achieved a high level of agreement, if it yields 
consistent results on repetition”.
Various tests are designed and applied for evaluating the reliability and validity of 
research, with the most common ones known as: construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity and reliability (see more in Drost, 2011, Yin, 2003, p. 34; Riege, 2003). 
However, there is an ongoing debate among scholars about how appropriate these tests 
are when applied to case study research, as most of these tests are based on positivist 
epistemological assumptions (Salner, 1989 p. 47; Kvale, 1995; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
Some scholars categorically reject the notion of reliability and validity when applied to 
qualitative research enquiry (see Taylor, 1987). As Bryman further observes (2012), the 
relationship between rationalistic (quantitative) and naturalistic (qualitative) paradigms is 
often muddled and confused, which in return mirrors the blurriness surrounding the 
concepts of reliability, validity and generalizability. 
Within these debates and ‘tests’, an interesting approach is the one advanced by Patton 
(2002), which argues that triangulation would be a typical strategy for testing the validity 
and reliability of findings. This approach is also adopted by proponents of case study
research such as Yin (2002, see also Voss et al., 2002). In response to the critics of the 
case study approach, they too propose to use multiple sources of evidence to increase the 
reliability and validity pertaining to the phenomena studied. Gerring (2007, p. 68) further 
suggests that case studies should not be defined by distinctive methods of data collection. 
Therefore, the triangulation method of data collection in this dissertation is not only used 
as a data collection strategy but also as a strategy to enhance the quality of the research 
project. Triangulation, as defined by Patton (1999, p. 1192), is based on the assumption 
that no single method could ever adequately solve the problem of rival explanations; this 
is because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality. Therefore, the 
premise of triangulation implies collecting data from a variety of perspectives and 
drawing upon a variety of sources (Guba, 1981, p. 87). Using multiple sources and 
methods of data collection in the analysis of the study provide “more grist for the research
mill” and further, as noted by Guba (Ibid), strengthen the credibility of research. The 
advantage of using such a strategy further strengthens the process of interpretation of the 
overall study. As Gerring (2007, p. 69) points out, all techniques of evidence based data 
are interpretive, hence subjective in nature, which in turn affects the meaning of each 
individual part (see Ragin, 1989, p. 24). Further, Ragin (1989, p. 89) argues that the use 
of multiple sources of evidence through the use of different techniques provides an in-
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depth grasp of causation. Hence, the key consideration for social scientists, as pointed out 
by Ragin (1989), is to find how different conditions or certain factors affect each other or 
interact. Determining causality and its complexities therefore represents a challenging 
task for researchers in their construction of knowledge statements. Triangulating different 
types of evidence enables one to overcome such challenges. Using multiple sources of 
evidence contributes as such to avoid a judgemental bias of the social scientist, establishes
a meaningful dialogue between evidence and ideas and offers a compelling representation 
of causation and causal inferences. This dissertation therefore focuses on the triangulation 
of data collection sources, collecting information from multiple sources but at the same 
time seeking to corroborate the same phenomenon (Yin, 2002, p. 203) and strengthening
the methodological justification employed in the study. As such, to conduct this research, 
the dissertation relies on: document analysis, interviews, participant observations and
survey methods. The next section describes the methods used in the data collection 
process. 
4.3 Methods 
Ethics
As a part of the ethical aspects of doing research, the researcher adhered to the code of 
conduct of the employed institute: The Research Centre for Eastern European Studies at 
the University of Bremen19. The researcher developed an information guide on the nature 
of research conducted and consent forms for interviews and participant observation. The 
researcher also took time with each targeted participant to explain the nature of the 
research and the reasons for engaging with different stakeholders. Confidentiality and 
anonymity were guaranteed upon the consent of participants. 
Data Sources
To do my analysis, I used different sources based on secondary and primary data on global 
governance, authoritarian regimes as well as documents and reports which were 
mentioned to me by participants during my interviews and by my colleagues. This 
enabled me to assess different aspects of the research question. Therefore, my empirical 
study is based on a wide variety of sources and include interviews, document analysis 
(official reports, policy reports of international organisations and statements, legal policy 
documents) as well as the existing academic literature, participant observations and 
                                                            
19 See Appendix 1: Interview Consent Form and Ethical Considerations
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survey analysis. Each of these sources and the respective data collection methods 
employed enabled me to draw a full picture to answer my central research question and 
its sub-questions. In addition, it is important to emphasise that because my study delves 
into often informal practices and organisations of involved actors, comprehensive and 
detailed written information on such topics is scarce and quantitative data on such 
practices is hardly available. Therefore, I relied primarily on qualitative sources, such as 
interviews and participant observations, to obtain such information. The following 
sections provide a detailed examination of the specific methods of data collection used.
Interviews 
Andrew Benett and Jeffrey Checkel (2014) note that interviews are important ways to 
measure causal mechanisms. The authors further argue that the respondents’ behaviour
(jokes, laugh, gestures and silences) during the interview process should be considered as 
valuable data in its own right, as it provides information on how the socio-political 
landscape shapes what people are willing to say (Bennet and Checkel, 2014, p. 24). 
Similarly, Tansey (2007) observes that interviews, in particular elite interviews, play an 
important supportive role in process tracing analysis and more attention should be 
devoted to such methods of data collection. Elite interviews are particularly important as 
they enable one to reconstruct events and shed light on hidden political actions and 
meanings. In this sense, they form an important source of information about the topic of 
interest. Further, the advantage of using such an interview method is that it is not static 
but enables direct interaction with the subjects and probes for questions which go beyond 
describing events or episodes, gathering information about the underlying context or the 
motives of the actors involved (Tansey, 2007).
In-depth interviews and open-ended questions were used as interview strategy in this 
dissertation. The in-depth interview and open-ended format enables a deeper and fuller 
understanding of participants’ meaning-giving by allowing the respondents to express
their opinion, knowledge as well as their beliefs, feelings and reasons in their own way 
and manners (Legard et al., 2003, p. 141; Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). 
To conduct my interviews and with the purpose to answer the main research question of 
the thesis, I have elaborated a topic guide20 with questions and themes to be covered. I 
have adjusted the guide according to my interview contexts. In-depth and open-ended
elite interviews were conducted with state officials and non-governmental actors in order 
                                                            
20 See Appendix 5: Contacts of the EITI MSG
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to capture the underlying value configuration unique to individual cases, reconstruct an 
event or set of events, explore possible divergent views among partners as well as the cost 
and benefits of EITI association, and draw larger inferences from the more general 
relationship between the EITI and policy outcomes. The interviews included key 
stakeholders, such as EITI Board members, members and executives of extractive 
industries, public officials and civil society actors. 
Interviewing was based on purposive sample of participants taking part in the EITI MSG 
group. The full names and their contacts were provided by the EITI International 
Secretariat in Norway. The interviews in Kyrgyzstan were conducted in the cities of 
Bishkek and Osh from October till December 2014. In Kazakhstan, the interviews were 
conducted in the cities of Astana and Almaty from end of May to June 201521. Additional 
data for conducting my interviews were also provided through to conferences and events 
related to my research as well as snowballing technique. I therefore used this snowballing 
technique to gain access to their close friends and official whose expertise was relevant 
to my research purposes.
The interviews in both countries were conducted in Russian and English. In total 27
interviews were conducted in Kyrgyzstan: 23 were tape-recorded and four of them were 
not. In Kazakhstan 11 interviews were conducted, among them 10 were tape recorded and 
one was not. In addition, many unofficial discussions were held with key stakeholders 
involved in the EITI coalition. Moreover, additional primary data on the EITI was 
supplemented during the conference on ‘Insights into Regional Development’ held in 
Almaty (2-3 June 2015), where a panel on the EITI was presented.
The interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality. In addition, I had obtained individuals’
consent to publicise their opinion. Interviews were transcribed and translated into 
English. On average the duration of each interview was 45 minutes22. To analyse data 
from my interviews I have used coding categories. To analyse data interviews from 
Kyrgyzstan I have applied a manual coding while for Kazakhstan I have used the NviVo 
Software tool.
                                                            
21 See Appendix 2: Topic Guide
22 See Appendix 6: Interview List
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Document Analyses
In this study, document analyses are considered to be a valuable source of information, 
as they help to contextualise, trace and provide historical insight on the events studied. In 
this study, document analysis was used as a systematic procedure for reviewing and 
evaluating documents in both printed and electronic formats (Bowen, 2009). Document 
analysis focused on EITI reports and formal communications and included case reports, 
legislation reforms, media articles and reports from newspapers as well as official 
statements and policy documents. To collect these data, the research also relied on the 
LexisNexis database.
Participant Observations
Participant observation, as defined by Atkinson and Hammersley (2007), is when the 
researcher plays an established participant role in the scene studied. As noticed by 
Schensul et al. (1999), it is “the process of learning through exposure or involvement”. 
Using such a technique allows penetration of phenomena, which are obscured from the 
outside. In doing so, the method of participant observation provides a window into 
interactions, perceptions and meanings, as experienced from the standpoint of insiders 
(Kawulich, 2005; Jorgensen, 1989). 
Participant observation was used during an EITI workshop ‘EITI implementation 
problems within the EITI Standard: Kyrgyzstan’s case’ held in Bishkek on the 9 
December 2014,
The workshop brought together all members of the MSG participating in the EITI process. 
The utility of using such a technique is that it allows deeper penetration of the studied 
phenomenon, which would otherwise be obscured externally. Participant observation can 
be conducted with or without revealing research purpose and research identity to those
researched (Li, 2008). However, as Dewalt et al. (1998) suggest, it is advisable for 
researchers to be transparent about collecting data for research purposes. In this sense, 
participants in the EITI workshop were informed about my presence, the purpose of my 
research and could raise questions related to my project. Actions of the participant 
observations were recorded in notes in my field work journal, via photography and 
documentation received during the workshop23.
                                                            
23 See Appendix 3: EITI Workshop, Participant Observations
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One of the ethical concerns related to participant observation is the preservation of 
anonymity of the participants in the writing up of the analysis. It is important to note here 
that prior to the workshop most of my participants were already interviewed,24 hence, I
cannot fully guarantee full anonymity; it can only be guaranteed for those participants 
who were not interviewed but were present in the workshop. 
In Kazakhstan, I had an opportunity to conduct such analysis during a meeting held in 
Astana on the 8 June 2015, however as I could not obtain the security clearing form from 
Kazakh authorities, this method of analysis was not used in this case.
Survey methods
Survey methods are a particularly useful method of analysis to discover relationships 
common across organisations and, hence, to provide generalizable statements about the 
object of study at a certain point in time (Barnett, 2002; Gable, 1994). As Gable further 
states, survey methods are used as a tool of verification rather than discovery, as they fall 
short of providing information on the underlying meaning of data. Therefore, surveys in 
my study are used as a technique to corroborate my findings. The survey data collection 
process in this study relied on national public-opinion polls based on face-to-face 
interviewing. The advantage of using opinion polls is that they provide personal views or 
preferences about a given topic. In my research, it enabled me to quantify, map and assess 
national public opinion about the EITI and transparency. 
The opinion poll survey in Kyrgyzstan was conducted by SIAR, a marketing research 
consultancy firm based in Bishkek. The survey was based on face-to-face structured 
interviews and was conducted in the seven regions and the two cities of Kyrgyzstan (City 
of Bishkek, Batken, Chuy, Jalal-Abad, Naryn, Osh, Talas, Issyk-Kul, Osh City), in 
October 2014. The sample of the survey consisted of all member of 1,000 households 
over 18 years of age. The survey was conducted in both urban and rural settings in the
Russian and Kyrgyz languages from 24 October to 18 November 2014. The results have a 
margin of error of ±3.1 percentage points at a 95 per cent confidence level. The analysis 
of the survey data was based on statistical correlation and frequency techniques.
Additionally, I also conducted an opinion survey in Kazakhstan with a local social 
research based organisation called ‘Public Opinion’ in October-November 2015. The 
survey was administered in the 14 provinces of Kazakhstan and the cities of Astana and 
                                                            
24 I had obtained their individual consent on data confidentiality.
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Almaty. The sample of the survey consisted of all members of 2000 households over 18 
years of age. The margin of error consisted of ±1.99 per cent.
However, it is important to note that because I was not able to administer the survey 
myself, the survey responses need to be considered carefully. I therefore use the survey 
responses as an indicative tool25.
The questions addressed in the survey in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were the 
following26:
1. Did you hear about the EITI (The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative)
Yes
No
2. Are you receiving enough information about the extractive resource sector in your 
country? 
Yes
No 
3. From whom did you receive the information? 
Civil Society Sector
Government
Companies
Others
Conclusion 
The research design chapter demonstrates that conducing field research in authoritarian 
setting is challenging and affects the research design and the methods used in data 
collection. In the case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the degree of authoritarianism had 
a significant impact on the methods used as well as the amount of data collected. The 
study further used a variety of data sources to make up for missing data and corroborate 
findings from the interviews. As the research design demonstrates, cultural and contextual 
                                                            
25 For more information on the results of the surveys see Appendix  4
26 For Kyrgyzstan I have received the full questionnaire of the survey administered by SIAR team 
however for Kazakhstan due to client confidentiality I could only obtain the questions on EITI that I have 
asked to be included in the survey.
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factors are important and significantly affect the conduct of the field work, which, as a 
result, demanded greater flexibility in research design and methods applied in this study. 
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Chapter 5. Case Study One: Kyrgyzstan and the 
Implementation of the EITI
 
Main Points of this Chapter
This chapter introduces my first case study country: Kyrgyzstan and the implementation 
of the EITI in the country from 2004 to 2014. The first part of the chapter provides an in-
depth overview of the case study country and focuses on political and economic contexts
dating from the first President Askar Akayev in the 1990 to the present times in 2014.
This is important as domestic context and the respective dynamics significantly impact 
on the functioning of the EITI. The second part of this chapter focuses on the 
implementation of the EITI in Kyrgyzstan. I start this section by reporting my field work 
findings. Then I move on to the discussion part, and what the findings mean for the 
functioning of the EITI.
5.1 Kyrgyzstan at a Glance
5.1.1 Political Context
Among the five states of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan presents a softer form of authoritarian 
regime practiced in the region. Freedom House (2016) characterises Kyrgyzstan as “semi-
consolidated authoritarian regime” with a score of 5.8927.
                                                            
27 The ratings are based on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic 
progress and 7 the lowest. 2001 was chosen as the starting point, as they were missing data for the year
2000.
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Table 1. Freedom House democracy scores for Central Asia (2001-2016) 28
Under its first President Akayev, Kyrgyzstan was in desperate need of rebalancing its 
economy. The break-up of the Soviet Union, the breakdown of inter-republican trade 
links and division of labour severely damaged the economies of the newly independent 
states. In the years of proclaimed independence in 1991, Akayev adopted many liberal 
political and economic reforms which helped him to secure donor resources in financial 
and development aid. Under its first President Akayev the country used the language of 
internationalism and democracy to receive international assistance to boost its economy 
and promote its sovereignty. In doing so, the strategy pursued under Akayev’s regime 
was to gain the trust of international actors and investors, which meant making 
Kyrgyzstan a democratic project or, as Eugeny Huskey (1997, p. 242) put it, “an oasis of 
democracy”. By accepting international standards for reforms, Kyrgyzstan seemed to be 
set on the path of radical transformation. Unfortunately, the prospect for democratisation 
was short lived and began to wane in the mid 1990s. Ethnic tensions underlying many of 
the political conflicts (Anderson, 1999, p. 83), inefficient and corrupt state bureaucracies 
coupled with the economic crisis, shored up the political leadership towards anti-
democratic measures (Huskey, 1997, p. 242). Further, corruption involving Akayev’s 
family further contributed to his unpopularity (McGlnychey, 2011; Radnitz, 2010; 
                                                            
28 Based on authot’s compilatiions on sources availabale at Freedom House website’s Individual 
Country’s Rankings data. [Online]. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world  
[Accessed :4 April,2016].
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Cummings, 2009). Akayev was thrown out in the 2005 ‘Tulip Revolution’. Following 
Akayev’s fall, Kurmanbek Bakiyev took the reins of power. Ironically, however, rather 
than to impose radical changes as suggested during his protest speeches, Bakiyev’s rule
recreated his predecessor’s regime. The corrupt network machinery of the Bakiyev’s era,
also talked of as ‘mafia’, is well documented. A prominent example of such practices is 
the case of the British company Oxus Gold29. The case demonstrated the danger for 
foreign actors and the unanticipated costs relating to property rights and the rule of law 
encountered in Kyrgyzstan during the Bakiyev’s time (McGlynchey, 2011). Eventually,
Bakiyev’s term came to an end with his overthrow in 2010. He left behind a bankrupt 
state hollowed out by corruption and crime (Crisis Group, 2010). After his removal from 
power, a provisional government formed by his former supporters took charge of Kyrgyz 
politics. Roza Otunbayeva took the reign of the country as the provision interim President. 
When Roza Otunbayeva came to power, Kyrgyzstan was in political turmoil. Ethnic 
clashes that flared up in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 triggered a state of emergency.
Accordingly, the short tenure of Roza Otubaeva’s regime was characterised by building 
stability and security in the region. Otunbayeva’s foreign policy consequently tried to 
attract foreign aid and humanitarian assistance to mitigate the conflicts. Otoubaeva’s short 
tenure in office ended in 2011, when she formally turned office over to Almazbek 
Atambayev, making her the first president in Central Asia to leave office at the end of his 
or her designated term. In October 2011, Almazbek Atambyev was elected as the 
President of the Republic in what most observers describe to be a relatively free and fair 
voting procedure, despite some significant irregularities observed in vote counting and 
tabulation (OSCE, 2011). The political situation in the Kyrgyz Republic is now more 
stable, however, the regime under Atambayev experienced a melange of measures for 
democratic developments, on one side, and others gravitating towards greater 
authoritarianism. As Carnegie analysts Quinn-Judge and Stronski (2016) note, the mixed 
presidential-parliamentary model has not produced more transparent democratic 
government, as the electoral system is based on close-list process, in which the party 
leadership, not the voters, determine the deputies entering parliament. This results in a
non-transparent system of governance, in which party leaders use their parties as 
patronage networks allowing them to arbitrate between competing interest groups 
(Quinn-Judge and Stronski, 2016). Moreover, Kyrgyzstan's legal system is still subject to 
                                                            
29 Simpkins, E. (2006). Oxus asks PM to take action on Kyrgyzstan. The Telegraph, 23 Jul 2006 . 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2943971/Oxus-asks-PM-to-take-action-on-
Kyrgyzstan.html [Accessed: 23 March, 2013].
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government influence and lacks independence (Freedom House, 2016). More worryingly 
under the current regime, the realm of civil society deteriorated. As Freedom House 
rankings demonstrate, from 2014 to 2016 civil society scores increased from 4.50 in 2014 
to 4.7530 in 2016 (see Freedom House 2016). 
5.1.2 The Economic Context
Twenty-five years now passed since Kyrgyzstan gained its independence and embarked 
on open market economic reforms. Yet, these reforms are yet to bear fruit. According to 
Anderson (1999), the reforms adopted during Akayev’s tenure disproportionally 
benefited a small elite rather that the population at large. Corruption, weak rule of law, 
poor functioning of market institutions and the politics of client-patron relationship 
eroded the effective implementation of reforms (see Christenssen and Pomfret, 2008).
Further, a lack of diversified industries, as the country relies heavily on the production 
and export of gold, and the high energy dependency (mainly in petroleum resources) 
makes the country increasingly vulnerable to external trade shocks. Kumtor is the biggest 
gold producing company in the Kyrgyz Republic and operates the largest Western 
operated gold producing site in Central Asia. It further forms up to 50 per cent of the 
country’s industrial exports (see Centerra Gold Inc. website, 201631). In 2014, Kumtor’s 
share in Kyrgyzstan’s GDP was 7.4 per cent (see Centerra Gold Inc. website, 201632). 
Such dependency makes the country increasingly vulnerable to external shocks, such as
a fall in gold prices or increase in energy prices. Instead of using earlier privatisation 
reforms as spring board to increase efficiency a dysfunctional economy emerged 
characterised by a poor state governance system, where resources are inefficiently 
allocated and subject to rapacious behaviours of various actors. With a population of 5.9 
million people of which 64 per cent live in rural areas (UNCTAD, 2015) and a GDP per 
capita of $1,103.2, Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest economies in the world (World Bank, 
2015a). 
5.1.3 The Role of the Natural Resource Sector: Gold
As noted above, the Kyrgyz economy is highly reliant on gold. The largest resource of 
the country is the gold mining company Kumtor, owned by the Canadian mining company 
                                                            
30 Note: the highest level of democratic progress is 1 and 7 the lowest.
31 Centerra Kumtor Gold website, (n.d). Kumtor Gold Company basic indicators for the entire period of 
activities [Online]. Available at: http://www.kumtor.kg/en/infographic/ [Accessed: 4 November 2016]
32 Centerra Kumtor Gold website, (n.d.). Contribution to the economy [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.kumtor.kg/en/media-relations/contribution-to-the-kyrgyz-economy/ [Accessed: 4 November 
2016]
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Centerra Gold33 through its wholly owned subsidiary, Kumtor Gold Company. Currently,
the Kyrgyz government has a 33 per cent stake in the company through its state agency 
Kyrgyzaltyn34. Kumtor is the country’s main source of income, a vital contributor to the 
country’s GDP and the largest private employer. The agreement regulating the mining 
ownership structure and its operations changed several times over the years. In the first 
agreement signed in 1992, the Kyrgyzstani government had a 67 per cent interest via 
Kyrgyzaltyn JSC, whereas the Canadian company then called Cameco Corporation held 
33 per cent (Fumagalli, 2015). In 2004, Cameco and the Kyrgyz government negotiated 
a deal governing the ownership of the Kumtor gold mine in Kyrgyzstan. The 2003-2004 
agreement signed by the former President Askar Akayev provided Kyrgyzstan with only 
a 16 per cent share of the company and stipulated that 2 to 4 per cent of the profit should 
be distributed among the local population. Cameco, the main investor in Centerra, is 
exempt from profit and other taxes for ten years (Marat, 2008). In April 2009 Centerra 
signed a new agreement with President Bakiyev that gave Kyrgyzstan a 32.7 per cent
share in the mine. As part of the new agreement, Centerra Gold Inc. pays the Kyrgyz 
government 14 per cent tax on gross revenue from Kumtor, which Kyrgyzstan wants to 
increase to 17 to 20 per cent, as paid by other mining companies working in the country 
(Daly, 2013). The government had been in talks with Centerra for more than three years 
to swap its 32.7 per cent stake in Centerra for a 50 per cent stake in Kumtor, but the two 
sides failed to reach an agreement, and the government pulled out of the talks in 
December 2015. Centerra is continuously in the centre of political dispute in Kyrgyzstan,
and the government desperately aims to tighten its grip on the Kumtor gold mine. Periodic 
protests over Kumtor but also other mining sites in Kyrgyzstan continued ever since. In 
this regard, the example of the Kumtor gold mine may point out the danger of corruption 
and rapacious behaviours that is behind such protests. During my interviews in Bishkek, 
the representative of the EITI MSG at the regional level as well as experts from the Soros 
Foundation and GIZ told me explicitly that “some people involved in these protests are 
seeking to promote their own interests and take over the profits rather than promoting 
community interests”35.
                                                            
33 Centerra was founded in 2004 as a spin-off from Saskatoon-based Cameco Corp.
34 Liezel Hill, 2013. Centerra to Look for Acquisitions After Kumtor Resolutio. Bloomberg, September 
23, 2013. [Online]. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-23/centerra-to-look-
for-acquisitions-after-kumtor-resolution  [Accessed: 4 April,2016].
35 Author’s Interview with employees of the Soros Foundation, Bishkek ,31 October, 2014. Author 
interview with Nathalie Lee, GIZ, Bishkek, 16 October, 2014.
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Corruption in the mining sector in Kyrgyzstan is endemic and spans through several 
layers of the industry. Since the gold mining industry appears to be an attractive business, 
throughout the years the gold mining sector was highly exposed to corruptive practices 
and fraud (see Doolot and Heathershaw, 2015; Gullette and Kalybekova 2014). Until 
2012, there was no transparent bidding process to license trade in the country. As such 
many licenses in the extractive sector are subject to illegal practices by the different 
governments. From the times of Akayev on, the newpaper Respublika run by Zamira 
Sydykova condemned the government for corrupt acts revolving around the production 
and sale of gold by Kyrgyzaltin that involved the illegal transfer of gold bars to Swiss 
banks (Hiro, 2009, p. 293). After the removal of Bakiyev in 2010, at least a dozen officials 
at the State Geology Agency (which oversees licensing and tenders), including the former 
head, were arrested on suspicion of mishandling licenses and corruption36. Recently, in 
June 2016, Len Homeniuk a former Centerra Gold chief, in a letter addressed to the 
general prosecutor, alleged that Kumtor Operating Company (KOC) and Cameco Gold 
Inc. periodically made payments to the state agencies and Presidential family and its 
entourage upon the request of two former senior managers (Dastan Sarygulov and Ernest 
Karybekov) of the state-owned gold company Kyrgyzsaltyn, which holds the 
government’s current stake in Centerra37. Such payments varied in form from payments 
to the Finance Ministry to donations to charitable funds, as the Meerym foundation run 
by Mrs Akayeva. The amount of money requested from government agencies and actors 
represented more than $200,000 in month (KirtcoNews, 2016).
The revelations of Mr. Homelniuk are important, as they highlight important features of 
authoritarian states and their power to shape foreign investors’ practices and to influence 
markets to their advantage. Following the statement of Homelniuk, in June 2016 the 
Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev ordered state prosecutors to probe the legality of 
investment agreements signed with Canada’s Centerra Gold in 2003, 2004 and 2009 
based on the suspicion that previous deals made with Centerra Gold might have involved 
corruption (The Globe and Mail, 2013; The Diplomat, 2015). 
Moreover, large-scale investments in the mining sector are constrained by a weak legal 
and regulatory regime and non-transparent licensing procedures (ADB, 2013). In the 
                                                            
36 EurasiaNet (2013). Kyrgyzstan: Amid Price Plunge, Gold Mine Auction Faces Multiple Hurdles. 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66845 Accessed: October 3, 2016]. 
37 See KitcoNews, 2016. Kyrgyz president questions legality of Kumtor mine deals after-corruption 
allegations. [Online]. Available at: http://www.kitco.com/news/2016-06-15/Kyrgyz-president-questions-
legality-of-Kumtor-mine-deals-after-corruption-allegations.html [Accssed 16October 2016]
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Kyrgyz government, the State Geology Agency is responsible for licensing decisions, but 
it remains weak in its administrative capacity and lacks independence from the central 
government. The government regulates private sector participation in the extractive 
sector. Trust in licencing agreements made with the government is shaky, in particular
when it comes to license renewal. In 2013, some gold mining licenses were annulled for 
the two major gold deposits—Jerooy and Taldy-Bulak Levoberezhny—and assigned to 
different investors, because the original investors were allegedly not meeting contracted 
exploration investment obligations (ADB, 2013; EurasiaNet, 2013). Lately, in 2015, the 
State Geology Agency issued overall 12 licences for subsoil exploitation of all kinds. 
Through this very year, 11 existing licences were withdrawn due to insufficient 
performance by their holders38. Such facts indicate the uncertainty revolving around 
licence agreements and their renewal. 
In addition, the economic benefits of the extractive sector that mainly operates in rural 
areas are weak. According to the latest World Bank report (2015c), almost two-thirds of 
the Kyrgyz population lives in rural areas. The poverty level is much higher in rural areas 
with 41.4 per cent in 2013 compared to 28.5 per cent in urban areas (Ibid). Further, the 
lack of communication between government bodies, companies and civil society in recent 
years led to serious popular unrest against mining activities resulting in violent conflict 
and road blockades in the country (Gullette, 2013). In late August 2012, around 50 
protesters blocked the first-ever attempt of the Kyrgyz government to sell the country’s 
mineral deposits through an open tender. Other mining protest also erupted in the regions 
of Jalal-Abad and Naryn. Reflecting the general sentiment among the population, the core 
claim of the protesters is that they do not get enough benefit from the extractive sector39.
In sum, the mining sector in Kyrgyzstan is characterised by poor institutional governance 
structures and mechanisms, a lack of transparency coupled with corruption related to 
licensing agreements and royalties, and widespread distrust and tensions between 
government, mining companies and communities (see Doolot and Heathershaw, 2015; 
Gullette, 2013). Moreover, the frequency of Kumtor gold mine disputes and arbitrary 
renegotiations of concession agreements also undermined foreign investor confidence in 
the country (ADB, 2013). Given the significance of the extractive gold sector for the 
                                                            
38See:  The Times of Central Asia (2016).Gold mining in Kyrgyzstan: too many licenses, little 
performance. [Online]. Available at: http://www.timesca.com/index.php/news/26-opinion-head/16577-
gold-mining-in-kyrgyzstan-too-many-licenses-little-performance  [Accessed: October 3, 2016].
39 Author’s interview with Soros Foundation. Bishkek, 2014
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country’s domestic budget, the EITI can be viewed as an important tool to address 
multiple domestic challenges addressed in this section. 
5.2 The Implementation of the EITI in Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan was the first Central Asian country to initiate the EITI process. In the EITI 
framework, it was also the first pilot country (among Nigeria and Azerbaijan) to launch 
its implementation. The government of Kyrgyzstan initiated and validated the EITI 
process in 2004 and received its compliant status in March 2011 (EITI website
Kyrgyzstan, 2016). In line with the requirements of the EITI initiative, Kyrgyzstan 
created an MSG composed of government officials, industry representatives and non-
governmental organisations and submitted several national reports to the EITI 
International Board, the most recent covering 2012 (see EITI website Kyrgyzstan, 2016).
The EITI implementation in Kyrgyzstan is coordinated by the State Agency for Geology 
and Mineral Resources and is overseen by a Supervisory Board, which involves five 
representatives from each stakeholder group in the MSG. Additionally, the Supervisory 
Board is further complemented by observatory bodies from each sector. As a means to 
address the shortcomings of the EITI MSG at the national level, the Kyrgyz Republic 
implemented subnational MSGs at the local level in 2012, known as ‘Public Reception 
Desks’. Similarly, to the role of MSG, the ‘Public Reception Desks’ operate as tripartite 
groups and are viewed as a ‘neutral’ platform between local communities, mining 
industries, local administration municipalities and representatives of civil societies. The 
study of EITI in Kyrgyzstan reveals that the Initiative operates largely as a dysfunctional 
MSG platform disconnected from its initial purpose. Although at the surface, the form 
the EITI takes appears to be compliant with international demands, its internal 
procedures, however, and the roles of its actors within give a different picture. By a large 
part, the Kyrgyz government adopted the Initiative purely for instrumental reasons, which 
have little to do with the Initiative’s aims. The meaning of the Initiative in this sense needs 
to be carefully considered, as it is largely down to the interpretations of its recipient actors,
and what sense they make of it. More importantly, a finding from the analysis of the EITI 
in Kyrgyzstan is that the layout of the Initiative is largely designed to serve government 
needs at the expense of the targeted population. In this sense, the role of different actors 
within the initiative is subject to the influence of government rule. In fact, the government 
affects and steers indirectly all aspects of the Initiative. Moreover, client-patron 
relationships and the weak capacity of civil society actors further impedes on the 
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functioning of the Initiative. The following sections examine each of these problems in 
turn.
5.2.1 EITI as a Mechanism of State Interest-Driven Strategies
One of the main reason explaining the adoption of the Initiative relates to the access to 
foreign aid revenues. A sharp decline in socio-economic conditions and the desperate 
need for foreign aid as consequence prompted the country to adopt and advance the
implementation of the Initiative. This is particularly significant during both Akayev and 
Roza Otunbayeva’s tenures. During Bakiyev’s time, the Initiative stagnated. Bakiyev’s 
tenure demonstrates that the adherence to the Initiative does not always reflect actual 
practical commitment. In the Atambayev time, the motivation to make further progress 
in the Initiative was largely motivated by regional socio-economic instabilities stemming 
from the mining sector. The graph below illustrates the inflow of foreign aid into the 
country. Each time when the country is faced with a period of strong socio-economic 
decline and instabilities stemming from the mining sector, as in 2013, there was a
deepening of the Initiative, which systematically triggered an increase in foreign aid. As 
the chart of aid flows below demonstrates, each time there is a willingness from 
Kyrgyzstan to reach a mile stone in the Initiative, aid flows also increase in the country’s 
overall budget.
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Figure 2. Foreign Aid Flows and EITI Progress
Sources: The World Bank Indicators40
                                                            
40 See: The World Bank Indicators. [Online]. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=KG [Accessed: 4 April,2016]
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Akayev’s Tenure: 1990-2005
The implementation of the EITI in the 2004 coincides with the unpopularity of the 
Akayev’s regime at the end of his tenure. One of the main accusations against the regime 
in place was the widespread use of corruption for private gains. Although, during 
Akayev’s time, the Kyrgyz government had made well-publicised, visible rhetorical 
commitments to curbing corruption; they were, however, short in practice. As Scott 
Radnitz (2010 p, 62) further argues, the “Akayev regime was marked by ceding power to 
regional elites and adopt reform that could win him friends from abroad”. As many note, 
the nature of Kyrgyz politics is increasingly influenced by regional elite dynamics 
between the North and South. Akayev’s cabinet was heavily staffed by people of his 
wife’s native northern region, excluding the Southern part of the country (Radnitz, 2010,
p. 63). As McGlnychey further writes, the disproportionate capture of economic resources 
undermined the regime’s ability to maintain stable wining coalitions. As the analysis of 
McGlnychey (2011, p.81) demonstrates, during Akayev’s tenure, foreign aid flows rather
than to be directed towards reforms and the wider population were embezzled by the 
regime in order to sustain the regime’s fragile winning coalition. At the end of Akayev’s 
tenure, aid flows decreased. Moreover, the end of Akayev’s era was further characterised 
by the President’s image being tarnished by corruption scandals, weak domestic 
economic performance with low financial flows in capital. Among the sources of rents 
open to the Presidential family, the US air base Manas is a prominent example of corrupt 
practices41.
In this context, the adoption of the Initiative was instrumental. It was important for 
Akayev’s regime to renew the image of Kyrgyzstan at both the domestic and international 
levels, and, in doing so, to attract foreign aid which form a significant part of domestic 
revenues. As Gillies (2010) notes, state reputational concerns play a crucial role in state’s 
interest-driven strategies. In the case of the Akayev’s regime, the benefits for taking up 
international norms and thus cooperation outweighed the short-term costs of compliance
(Brewster, 2009). The accession to the EITI through the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust 
fund gave Akayev’s regime the opportunity to renew donors’ aid flows. As the World 
                                                            
41 According to United States contractors who oversaw the payments and transactions, the United States 
military steered more than $100 million in sub-contracts to the Akaev family’s fuel monopoly (Roston, 
2013). That windfall to the Akaev family businesses represented about 5 per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s annual 
gross national product (Information clearing house, 2006). After Akaev’s removal from power, a 
commission compiled a list of 42 businesses (including a cement factory and the Kumtor gold mine) 
allegedly owned or partially controlled by the Akaev family (EurasiaNet, 2005). 
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Bank indicators show, aid flows picked up in 2005, just one year after Kyrgyzstan’s 
accession to the EITI. 
Bakiyev’s Tenure: 2005-2010
Corruption and nepotism continued during Bakiyev’s tenure. The case of Oxus Gold 
demonstrated the danger for foreign actors and the unanticipated costs relating to property 
rights and the rule of law encountered in Kyrgyzstan during the Bakiyev’s time 
(McGlynchey 2011). In 2006, an Oxus representative claimed that it had been corruptly 
deprived of the mine by oligarchs with the political backing from leaders in Kyrgyzstan 
(Simpkins, 2006). The case took a sinister turn, when Sean Daley, the Oxus representative 
in Bishkek, was badly injured by gunmen, who ambushed him outside his home one day 
before his representation in court. In January 2005, before the incident, Tony Blair had 
written to the President of Kyrgyzstan requesting the continuation of Oxus’ license 
(Cooley and Heathershaw, 2017). Blair reportedly accused the country of failing to live 
up to its obligations under a global anti-corruption initiative (referring to the EITI), to 
which Bakiyev angrily replied that he did not need to be reminded of his obligations and 
claimed the reason for the withdrawal of Oxus' licence was that the company was 
“irresponsible” and “unlawful”42. Shortly after the incident, the mining licence to operate 
the Jerooy mining site was awarded to the rival bidder company ‘Global Gold’, an 
Austrian registered group ultimately owned by offshore funds (Simpkins, 2006). 
Similarly, in WikiLeaks cable, the President of Kumtor Operating Company, Andrew 
Lewis, reports that problems caused by officials associated with President Bakiyev pose 
difficulties for the company to operate on Kyrgyz soil. He quotes the Parliament's vice 
speaker Kubanychbek Isabekov who according to Lewis employed increasingly “petty”
tactics to squeeze more money out of Kumtor operations (WikiLeaks, 2007). Lewis 
further denounced illegal practices of Isabekov, such as demands for additional revenue 
from the company and unlawful requests violating KOC's existing agreement with the 
Kyrgyz government. Unfortunately, as Lewis cable report states, legislation and judiciary 
                                                            
42Armitage, J. (2015) London property used for money laundering: the curious case of a despot's son. The 
Independent. 2015. 2 April 2015. [Online]. Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/the-curious-case-of-a-despots-son-
10150608.html [Accessed: October 3, 2016].
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are of only little importance during Bakiyev’s time, as the nomination and approval of 
Supreme Court judges was decided from above, in this case, from Isabekov43.
Andrew Lewis’ revelations as well as the case of Oxus Gold prompting an intervention 
by Tony Blair demonstrate that the signing of the transparency initiative for the extractive 
sector did not restrain the government to engage in corrupt practices in the mining sector. 
At the international level, however, Kyrgyzstan was committed to fight corruption in the 
extractive sector. In 2008, Kyrgyzstan formed a multi-stakeholder group, which is also a
major prerequisite for access to the Initiative. At the end of the 2009, EITI reports 
disclosed payments from mining companies from 2004 to 2008 (EITI website, 
Kyrgyzstan, 2016). Bakiyev’s tenure in the EITI process demonstrates the often naïve 
perception of the international community that autocratic leaders would fully commit to 
respect international norms laid down in the Initiative. For instance, a statement of the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development clearly supports 
the argument above: 
“For Germany, Kyrgyzstan's commitment to the EITI is an important sign on the 
part of the government to both the Kyrgyz population and the international 
community. This commitment not only signals the government's desire for 
transparency but also its intention to implement reforms, tackle corruption and 
foster close cooperation between the state, the private sector and civil society” 
(German’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation, 2016, para.2).
As the case of Oxus Gold and the whole Bakiyev’s tenure demonstrated, the signing of 
international norms at the domestic level does not translate into effective implementation 
in practice. Hence, as Michael Zurn and colleagues rightly point out, in the process of 
international norm adaptation one must think in terms of translation thus in terms of a 
transfer of meanings that are changed or transformed (Zurn et al., 2012, p. 6).
                                                            
43 Other corrupt cases directly linked to Bakiev’s family include the Manas United States air base as well 
as fuel and petroleum industries and money laundering activities (see further Global Witness Report 
Grave Secrecy, 2012). 
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Roza Otubaeva’s Tenure: 2010-2011
When Roza Otunbayeva ‘picked up’ the Initiative, it was mainly to restore the image of 
Kyrgyzstan at the global stage and increase foreign aid that Kyrgyzstan was much in need 
of. Kyrgyzstan at that time suffered from political turmoil alongside with poor working
institutions inherited from Bakiyev’s tenure, coupled with ethnic conflicts tearing up the 
country. It was, therefore, vital for Roza Otunbayeva to redress the country and restore 
order. After the removal of Bakiyev, her main task was to put Kyrgyzstan back on the 
map. Drawing on her legendary diplomatic reputation, in the aftermath of Bakiyev’s 
eviction from power she searched for alliances with both the United States (US troop 
flights to Afghanistan) and Russia (the Russian role in Central Asia),44 but she was also 
desperate for foreign aid to mitigate ethnic clashes in the regions. Otunbayeva’s foreign 
policy consequently included to attract foreign aid and humanitarian assistance. At a 
donor conference entitled ‘High Level Donors Meeting for the Kyrgyz Republic’,
organised in Bishkek in July 2010, The World Bank and the Kyrgyz government invited 
donors and international organisations to pledge support for humanitarian aid and 
reconstruction efforts (see European Commission Press release, 2010). In total,
representatives of 14 countries and 15 international organisations pledged $1.1 billion in
response to appeals from Kyrgyz interim government leaders (Radio Free Europe, 2010). 
Given the country’s past in squandering financial aid, she reassured the international 
donor community by reaffirming that there would be tight control over the use of 
international aid: 
“The new Constitution adopted in the July referendum has greatly strengthened 
legal barriers to corruption, and will help to destroy the schemes of grand larceny 
of people’s money that were devised by the previous regimes”. (Otunbayeva
speech The High Level Donors Meeting for the Kyrgyz Republic, extracted from 
the World Bank Press release, 2010, para.4).
Roza Otunbayeva was a fervent opponent of corruption. However, given the history of 
corruption linked with foreign aid, in order to regain trust from the international donor 
community she needed to show her commitment to anti-corruption measures. It was 
crucial for her to regain trust from Western leaders and attract much needed foreign aid . 
The EITI initiative allowed her to accomplish both of these aims. Hence, the EITI was a 
                                                            
44 See Reuthers 2010.Otunbayeva draws on diplomacy to seal Kyrgyz rule. Reuthers, 13 April 
2010.[Online]. Available at: : http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE63C14V [Accessed : 8 December 
2016]. 
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tool to demonstrate this commitment in practice. This is why many reforms and the 
validation phase took place in that time. In a remarkably short period of time (exactly one 
year 2010-2011), Kyrgyzstan passed the validation phase in 2010 and acquired the 
compliant status in 2011. Moreover, under Roza Otunbayeva’s tenure, it was the first time 
that the format of the initiative was applied to other sectors, such as in the Fuel and Energy 
Sector Transparency Initiative (FESTI), aiming to increase transparency and 
accountability in the energy sector; however, as my interviews informed me, this process 
was slow to implement. In this sense, it is important to note the ‘transformational’ role of 
the leader in his/her capacity to interact with followers in a way which changes their 
behaviour (Peele, 2005; Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2011). Personal features of Roza 
Otunbayeva such as her commitment to fight corruption as well as her will and skills 
(acquired through her diplomatic career in the West) and her cosmopolitan personality 
certainly played an important role in this process. As such, one should not underestimate 
strong conscious state leadership and the willingness of state leaders to commit to norms 
laid out by the Initiative as remedies for a lack of progress. 
Alzambek Atambayev’s Tenure: 2011-Present
Since the tenure of Alzambek Atambayev’s, protests against mining activities dominate 
the political landscape of the country. From 2011 to 2012, environmental issues played 
an important part in the conflict in villages near deposit sites throughout the county 
(Gullette, 2013), yet the biggest clashes in the mining sector are related to the Kumtor 
gold mine. Protests over Kumtor culminated in 2013 with violent clashes and hundreds 
of demonstrators blocking the road to the Kumtor site and cutting its power supply. The 
intensity of clashes between police forces and the protesters led the government to declare 
a state of emergency (BBC News Kyrgyzstan, 2013; Global Risk Insights, 2014). The 
main demands of the protestors relate to the nationalisation of the gold mine, as they claim
that the 2009 deal was unfair and that the mine contributes to little in taxes and social 
welfare while damaging the environment. More specifically, such protests highlight the 
fragility of the Kyrgyz government and its difficulty to establish stable governing 
coalitions. Given the history of protests in Kyrgyzstan, protests over Kumtor 
nationalisation were linked to attempts to seize power from the current government 
(Muzalevsky, 2013). As Dally (2013) reports, the 2013 demonstration over Kumtor 
nationalisation was the outcome of an opposition rally (Daly, 2013). Similarly, Matteo 
Fumagalli (2015, p. 4) also points out in his analysis that disputes over the mine are 
complicated by the positions of political actors within the government, who campaign 
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“for either a renegotiation of the deal on more favorable terms (for the state) or outright 
nationalization”. At the same time, the government of Kyrgyzstan also understands that 
full nationalisation of Kumtor would be difficult to achieve alone, as it requires 
technological know-how and capital that the country lacks.
The events in 2013 and frequent government disputes over nationalisation of the Kumtor 
mine, together with low gold prices have as a result weakened investor confidence in the
mining sector in Kyrgyzstan (Gullette, 2014). Given the fact that the economy of 
Kyrgyzstan is highly gold-dependent, a decline in foreign investment can have 
detrimental effects for the development of the country. To curb these negative effects and 
attract foreign investment, the country needed to introduce significant reforms in the 
mining sector in order to boost investor confidence. Therefore, in such a context, a further 
deepening of EITI reforms was facilitated by the country’s incentives to favour reform. 
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, this incentive was domestic economic security. In this sense, 
the deepening of the EITI MSG at the regional levels (through the introduction of Public 
Reception Desks) and amendments made to the legislation ‘On Subsoil Use’45 are 
strategies aimed at making the mineral resource sector more attractive for corporate 
investors. In this sense, the EITI MSG at regional levels (‘Public Reception Desks’)
represents import government tools to mitigate the mining conflicts in the regions. As the
foreign aid graph above demonstrates, the deepening of EITI reforms, further boosted the 
inflows of foreign aid into the country.
However, although such changes can be seen as positive, it is also important to examine 
to what extent such reforms hold strong. As the subsequent analysis demonstrates,
compliance with the deepening of EITI reforms is, however, weak and manifests in a
precariuous state of implementation. 
Although an important step was achieved with the mentioning of the EITI in the 
legislation on the ‘On Subsoil Use’ in 2012, the EITI has no obligatory status. Article 35 
clause (5) ‘On Subsoil’ states: 
“Subsoil users are entitled, within the framework of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (hereinafter, the EITI), to submit on an annual basis, 
before the end of the first quarter of the year following the accounting year, to the 
                                                            
45 Kyrgyz Republic. The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic "On Subsoil" 2012. ɁȺɄɈɇɄɕɊȽɕɁɋɄɈɃ
ɊȿɋɉɍȻɅɂɄɂ ɝȻɢɲɤɟɤɨɬɚɜɝɭɫɬɚɝɨɞɚ1. [Online]. Available at : 
http://www.geoportal-kg.org/index.php/investor-s-guide/law/mining. [Accessed: October 3, 2016].
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authorised government body for implementation of state policy on subsoil use, 
reports on all taxes and payments made by subsoil users on a cash basis. The 
procedure for submitting reports under the EITI, the forms of reporting and the 
indicators shall be governed by the laws and regulations of the Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic.” 
Hence, this implies that it is not an obligation for companies to comply with EITI 
standards and reporting procedures. This weak involvement of the government is further 
reflected in the representation of the EITI Supervisory Board. In contrast to other EITI 
compliant countries in the region, as, for example, Kazakhstan, the EITI Secretariat in 
Kyrgyzstan is not a member of the parliament or part of the ministry and thus has weak 
power over the decision-making process at governmental level. In fact, the EITI in 
Kyrgyzstan is considered to be an independent working body. Interviews with members 
of the governments, as well as with former President Roza Otunbayeva, clearly 
demonstrated that the EITI is not a priority for the government: 
“When I picked up the EITI it was buried under inside the resource sector, no one 
was interested by it or looked at it”.
“I don’t think that people in the government know about this initiative, people 
change very fast in the government, I don’t think that they know that there is 
something like EITI”.
“You understand we always need to engineer the mechanisms of this process, 
working on this, there is need for people who have the desire to work on this”. 
(Roza Otunbayeva, Bishkek, December 2014)
This statement was later confirmed by the World Bank official of MDTF representative46,
who further argued that the biggest challenge was a lack of prominence of the Initiative 
in the Kyrgyz government. Due to the lack of financial support from the government, 
Kyrgyzstan is currently the only post-compliant country in Central Asia requiring support 
by the World Bank MDTF Grant (see World Bank, 2013). As a result, the government’s
weak participation in the Initiative and its poor support for providing stable financing of
the Initiative impedes its effective functioning overall. The organisation of EITI 
consultations and meetings is often dependent on available financial resources. The 
organisation of such events is often led and initiated by donor groups, as the Kyrgyz 
                                                            
46 Author’s Skype Interview with Gary McMahon, The World Bank MDTF, Bishkek, 18 December 2014.
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national EITI secretariat is under-resourced and relies on external funding continue its 
work. This is demonstrated by a statement of the director of the Tree of Life, EITI-NGO 
consortium coordinator in Kyrgyzstan: 
“We try to meet at least once in a year with the consortium, if we have financial 
resources to organise such meetings, if not then of course we don’t gather because 
we need to have financing to reimburse transport cost of the participants, we need 
to rent the conference space, need to provide accommodation, so yes if we do have 
such resources we hold these meetings otherwise we communicate via emails, 
telephone calls, discussion on the website as we have EITI forum were we also 
held discussion platforms” (Tree of Life, Author Bishkek , October 2014).
The issue of stable financing as a result affects the effective participation of stakeholders 
with a lack of travel reimbursement being highlighted as a burden for their participation 
in the meetings. This was mentioned by several interviewed members of civil society, 
who report that because of the fact that meetings are always held in Bishkek, it is not 
always possible for all regional civil society representatives to travel to the city47. The 
interviewed EITI stakeholder members further indicate that due to the high turnover of 
staff in government offices, the decision-making process is very slow and has a negative 
impact on the functioning of the EITI initiative48 .With Kyrgyzstan’s domestic politics 
that saw two subsequent revolutions within the EITI implementation time, rapid turnover 
of ministers in the government made difficult to build sustainable relationship.
The observations above demonstrate that the commitment to the initiative is not reflected
in its implementation in practice. Such issues lead us to explore the role of non-state actors 
in the EITI, to what extent is their function aligned with the global requirements of EITI 
standards? The following sections examine the role of each of the non-state actors in the 
EITI multi-stakeholder group. 
                                                            
47 Author interviews with members of civil society and members of ‘Public Reception Desks’ Bishkek, 
2014 
48 Authori interview with employees of Soros Foundation, Bishkek, 31 October 2014. 
Author’s interview with Nathalie Lee, GIZ, Bishkek,16 October 2014. Author’s
Author’s interview with interview with Tolekan Ismailova, Chairman of the “Bir duino–Kyrgyzstan” 
Humna Rights Movement Bishkek, 31 October 2014
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5.2.2 EITI and Non-State Actors 
Public Reception Desks
The implementation of the EITI from being solely based at the national level to the 
regional level can be viewed as positive indicator of government commitment to the 
Initiative. Yet, as the field work demonstrates, the implementation of ‘Public Reception 
Desks’ is weak. The inclusion of the MSG at the local level aims to represent the 
perspective of the population affected by extractive mining activities. The MSG at the 
local level encompasses the local governments, affected communities and grass-roots 
civil societies and is known as ‘Public Reception Desks’49. The role of ‘Public Reception 
Desks’ is to create a platform for discussion among these three stakeholders, particularly 
for the local community, as it has extremely limited access to information related to 
extractive industries and their resource revenue management. Currently, there are six 
public reception centres operating in the regional districts of Kadamjai, Ala Buka,
Chatkal, Naryn, Chong Alay, Talas. In the EITI MSG coalition, the regional MSG is 
represented by the Public Reception Desk from Chatkal.
The inclusion of the local MSG in the EITI coalition is crucial for deepening the EITI at 
the national level. Both the interviewed members of the regional MSG and participant 
observation analysis, however, demonstrate that members representing the MSG at the 
regional level do not understand their role within the coalition, nor do they seek to 
ascertain the views of their wider public constituency and, hence, are marginalised in the 
national EITI coalition. There is also a lack of liaison and outreach procedures between 
the regional MSG and EITI members. One of the main civil society actors in the coalition 
is Tree of life, however, as my interview reports the interaction between civil society and 
the ‘Public Reception Desks’is weak. As the MSG regional representative states: “it is 
very rare that we enter in contact with Tree of Life or other members of the EITI coalition, 
most of the time we solve the issues among ourselves”50. This lack of liaison is also 
apparent between the ‘Public Reception Desks’ themselves. The frequency of MSG 
regional cooperation is influenced by regional proximity and mining conflicts. Thus, 
members are often isolated from each other and enter into contact only if necessary.
                                                            
49 The Public Reception Desks stems from the United States Agency for International Development 
USAID initiative under the project ‘Local Transparency and Cooperation Initiative’ Project (Cooperative 
Agreement No AID -176-A-12-00004) and is incorporated within the EITI framework.( Authors, 
Personal Communication, December,3 2014) 
50 Author interview with representative of Public Reception Desk representative of Chong-Alay District, 
Osh, 17 November 2014. 
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Usually, members enter into communication via phone or an Internet portal, where they 
can login and see the activities of other members as well as important EITI 
announcements. However, the procedure is not standardised; members usually visit the 
website once every two weeks, which partly depends on the Internet network coverage, 
as most of the ‘Public Reception Desks’ are implemented in remote regions where 
coverage is weak.
These observations highlight the weakness of the EITI process that is characterised as 
top-down implementation carried by central coalitions situated in Bishkek versus the 
regions. This is clearly reflected in the EITI organisation, where all actions and decision-
making are centralised in Bishkek, leaving the regions aside. There is a clear lack of 
coordination by the State Agency for Geology and Mineral Resources and civil society 
in Bishkek to effectively oversee the implementation of EITI policies at the local regional 
levels. As the study of Jailobaeva (2006) on NGOs in Kyrgyzstan also demonstrates, most 
professional (highly educated) NGOs are based in cities and mainly in Bishkek remote 
from rural areas. Too much of their knowledge and understanding of what is needed is 
based on assumptions rather than facts. Hence, this situation creates a deep fragmentation 
between ‘urban and local’ based communities. The fragmentation is further influenced by 
interest-driven purposes that in turn curtails collective action and responses to specific 
community needs. Such an image further demonstrates that the role of the ‘Public 
Reception Desks’is neglicable in the whole EITI process. As such, although on paper and 
at the institutional levels, the role of the MSG at regional levels is well acclaimed, in 
reality, however, their role is purely representational and symbolic.
Civil Society 
Civil society together with the representatives of the EITI national secretariat are the key 
active drivers in the Initiative. In the national opinion poll survey conducted in this study, 
only 16.7 per cent of respondents had heard about the EITI, of those, 33.2 per cent had 
received the information from civil society organisations51 (in comparison to 24.5 per 
cent from media, 24 per cent from state agencies, 12.2 per cent from extractive industries, 
and 6.1per cent from friends and family). The interview statements from donor agencies 
and the extractive sector further confirm that civil society organisations are the main 
drivers of the EITI process52.
                                                            
51 See SIAR National Opinion Poll, October-November 2014.
52 Author interview with Author interview with representatives of  GIZ, Bishkek, 16 October, 2014.
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The main activities of civil societies engaged in the EITI process revolve around creating 
public awareness, transparency and disclosure of revenue data in extractive industries, 
particularly at the community level. In addition, civil society plays an important role in 
supporting the different phases of the EITI process and their implementation. 
Civil society representation in the EITI MSG in Kyrgyzstan, however, is fragmented and 
lacks a strong consolidating approach. There is a clear disconnect between different 
groups of civil society. This is partly due to their activities and the timing of their entry 
into the EITI process. In Kyrgyzstan, civil society represented in the MSG is composed 
of five actors working on environmental and human rights issues as well as seven 
observatory bodies composed of donor agencies and independent experts.
Among the five permanent civil society organisations represented in the MSG, Tree of 
Life acts as the EITI-NGO consortium coordinator in Kyrgyzstan and is the main group 
representing environmental civil society in Kyrgyzstan. In 2011, the director of the centre, 
Kalia Moldogazieva, served as deputy chair of the Interagency State Commission on the 
Evaluation of Compliance with Environmental and Industrial Safety Standards at the 
Kumtor gold mine. One of the interviewed stakeholders described Tree of Life as being 
‘The EITI’: “I think EITI is Tree of Life, the only one who does something”53. Tree of 
life was the first NGO to enter the EITI process in 2004. The organisation was formed by 
activists hoping to ensure safe environmental development surrounding the exploitation 
of the Kumtor gold mine. The group mainly engages with communities affected by 
environmental damages caused by mining exploration. The organisation has no regular 
funding source and is mainly dependent on donor funds and their projects. Due to its 
reputational capital, however, and its organisational ties, it has the tendency to attract the 
biggest donor agencies, leaving little opportunities for other smaller organisations to 
participate in the process. As the interviews demonstrate, there is a tendency of NGOs 
within the coalition to meet and work with the same people54. This observation is further 
supported by Tiulegenov (2008), who rightly argues that parochial networks tend to 
dominate NGOs’ organisational structure and serve the self-comfort of their members and 
supporters. In this sense, Petric (2005) and also Roy (2000) further note that the Western 
concept of civil society needs to be broadend when applied to Central Asia. As Roy 
(2000) argues, traditional society solidarity networks dominate the functioning of civil 
society in Kyrgyzstan. In this sense, as Petric (2005, p. 325) rightly observes: 
                                                            
53 Author Interview with Author’s Interview with Karibek Isaev, Aarhus Centre, Osh, November 2014 
54 Author Interview with an employee of Soros Foundation, Bishkek October 2014
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“the solidarity networks that existed within the state are present in today’s NGOs. 
A new elite—or rather a reincarnation of an old one—has evolved through NGOs. 
They are not driven by the values of not-for-profit work or volunteerism. Rather 
they benefit from salaries and privileges that make them accountable to their 
foreign patrons”. 
Such views are echoed in my field work observations. As stated during the interviews by 
some donor agencies, “some civil societies have seen EITI as an opportunity for their 
organisational survival and ‘sat’ on the Initiative for their own interests”55. As a result,
this created a monopolistic organisational system with patterns of civil society 
reproducing elements of authoritarian behaviour in their own organisational structures 
and operations—with associations being dominated by patron-client relations (see also 
Lewis, 2013). Traditional hierarchical relationships are strongly present in the structure 
of civil society as such, which further determine its functioning in society. As Isabekova 
(2014) argues, modernisation does not make relationship based on clientelist patronage 
irrelevant in Kyrgyzstan, rather such forms of traditional relationships evolved and 
adapted to the new conditions in their environment. As she further observes, “patronage 
is an important mechanism through which those involved in it mutually benefit and one 
that selective distributions of resources” (Isabekova, 2014, p. 81). 
The evidence from the EITI demonstrates that civil society actors are replicas of local 
authority and the regime in power. The EITI enabled the emergence of a new elite or 
‘expert groups’ that are closely linked to government, international organisations and 
donor groups. The EITI provided them with opportunities for gaining recognition and 
access to strategic resources (funds and expertise); in return, these organisations, as in the 
case of Tree of Life, used this social capital to build their own network in civil society in 
which Tree of life decides ‘who is in or who is out’, or who or which village will benefit 
from Tree of life, thus EITI funds. This reminds me of a conversation with Global Witness 
representatives in April 201456 in London who referred to the EITI civil society meeting 
as: “It was Kalia and her friends”. Similarly, ‘Public Reception Desks’ representatives 
refer to Kalia as their ‘patron’ in the EITI.
Such forms of association further entail a complex and an interwoven web of relationship 
between local villages, civil society and international institutions: local MSG that are 
                                                            
55 Author Interview with representatives of Soros Foundation and GIZ, Bishkek, October 2014
56 Author’s converstation with Global Witness representative, London, April 2014
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directly dependent on Tree of life, which itself is dependent from donor agencies or 
international organisations, which are in return dependent on their Western countries’
budget allocation. As such, the process of NGO participation in Kyrgyzstan, as Petric 
(2005) also points out, is top-down rather than bottom-up. This top-down fragmentation 
further reflects a lack of communication, cooperation and participation among members 
of the EITI MSG from the centre and the regions. Consequently, it further is mirrored in 
the budget allocation of EITI implementation programmes, which significantly impede 
development for planning and implementing EITI programmes at the local village level,
where much of the actions take place and donor money is distributed according to the 
interests of the most powerful civil society members. As Petric (2005 p. 327) further 
comments, it seems that the creation of NGOs corresponds to a strategy designed to tap 
into strategic resources; this applies in particular to the most vulnerable regions and issues 
at stake. Such views are further reflected in my interview with members of donor 
organisations, who question civil society representation within the EITI process and 
described the work of civil society as “activity based rather than output based”57.
The World Bank clearly acknowledges that the EITI national-level initiative does not 
have significant impact at the local level, mainly because of weak civil society capabilities 
(World Bank/EFCA study, 2014). A large part of civil society in Kyrgyzstan (as my EITI 
observations also demonstrate) are financed and sustained by donors or international 
organisation funds. Civil society in Kyrgyzstan and within the EITI mainly operate 
through donor-based projects, hence, they are only accountable on the delivery of the 
projects. Therefore, NGOs tend to focus on donor priorities rather than local problems 
and as such perhaps undermine and neglect some of the most pressing issues. 
The problem of civil society is further exacerbated by a lack of knowledge and public 
support. As the spokesman from Kumtor Gold states58: “Some members of the civil 
society critique the work of extractive industries but without prior adequate knowledge 
on the topic”. As Kasybekov further notes (1999p. 80), “public sector officials are 
reluctant to collaborate with NGOs because in part they are seen as possible competitors 
or opponents, and in part because NGOs themselves have too often provided evidence of 
weakness and unreliability”. My interviews with representatives of Kumtor and with the 
donor partners GIZ and Soros Foundation indicated that CSOs are not always playing the 
                                                            
57 Author interview with an employee of Soros Foundation  Bishkek, October 2014
58Author interview with an employee, Kyrgyzaltin, Bishkek, November 2014. 
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role of mediators but rather are “good criticizers” they usually claim that either 
“companies are bad or governments are bad”. In this regard, as Petric (2005, p. 330) notes,
NGOs in Kyrgyzstan “are an element of a complex power system that has replaced the 
state. They are tightly dependent on powerful entities that are redefining the limits and 
opportunities of the Kyrgyz state’s sovereignty”.
Civil society and MSG regional actors are supposed to be the main channel for spreading 
EITI information and inform the population about the use of resource budgets. However, 
there is agreat lack of sufficient knowledge to read budget reports. For instance, at the 
regional level, the EITI MSG is represented by two to three people, and these are the ones
who ought to be capable of reading the budget. Moreover, the use of budget information 
is further complicated by technical complexities, hence, it is difficult for the ordinary 
citizens to understand financial data59 (World Bank/EFCA study, 2014). Hence, such 
conditions make access to information on budget readings (revenues and spending) 
inefficient. Consequently, this further explains the low level of citizen participation in 
decision-making processes, and more importantly, it demonstrates the inability of citizens 
to hold their representatives accountable for revenue spending. In 2016, the EITI 
introduced beneficial ownership and disaggregated reporting as requirements in the EITI 
reporting countries. Such steps were very welcomed, as it allows for more transparency 
and accountability. Disaggregated reporting enables anyone to see what each company 
operating in Kyrgyzstan is paying to the government in terms of licencing, taxes, royalties 
and social contributions. Beneficial ownership enables to see who the ultimate owners of 
the company are. Although such steps are important and would help to increase 
accountability and contribute to ease social tensions between the population and 
companies in the mining sector, their benefits are, however, limited as the population is 
not interested or badly educated in reading budget reports. Civil societies are considered 
to be the key actors steering and implementing global governance tasks. Therefore, giving 
their weight in this process, the weakness in capacity building significantly devalues their 
role and ability to influence collective actions. In sum, the functioning of civil society and 
‘Public Reception Desks’ becomes largely ‘virtual’, characterised by technocratic 
procedures and behaviours imposed by external donor demands or the state apparatus. 
The problem is further exacerbated by weak state-civil society relations. As seen by the 
case of the EITI, civil society in Kyrgyzstan lacks legitimacy from the state and public 
                                                            
59 Author interview with Turgunbek Atabekov, Head of the “Foat” Public Association, Bishkek, 
November 2014 
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support. Yet, as the evidence from the EITI shows, despite their limitations, civil society 
actors (including the Public Reception Desks) created an internal life of their own 
independent of the EITI. 
Donors 
Donor agencies also play an important role in supporting EITI activities. They are mainly 
engaged in community development and the effective management of revenue resource 
transparency projects. Kyrgyzstan relies on both bilateral and multilateral aid funds. What 
we can see is that during the time of Alzambek Atambayev until the present day, the role 
of donors in the EITI transformed from a simple supporting role to an integrative part of 
activities helping the decentralisation process in Kyrgyzstan. Such a trajectory further 
transformed the EITI from being a stand-alone Initiative to a more integrative project. 
Such arrangements parallel domestic developments related to decentralisation. 
Decentralisation involves the transfer of powers and responsibilities (administrative, 
fiscal and political) from the central government to local constituencies or their 
intermediaries (Bichsel et al., 2010; Jones Luong, 2004b; The World Bank, 2001). In 
doing so, decentralisation enables the establishment of mechanisms by which citizens can 
hold different tiers of government accountable. The process of decentralisation in 
Kyrgyzstan is messy and is ongoing. Local governments and communities have limited 
capacity to establish and maintain participatory approaches to governance and 
development. A study of the German Development Institute published in 2006 on 
decentralisation in Kyrgyzstan reports that local governments are limited in their ability 
to meet the high expectations associated with decentralisation and the introduction of 
local self-government (Gravingholt et al., 2006). In particular, the report further 
highlights that many barriers (such as unclear legal and real divisions of competencies 
between the different levels of government, insufficient financial resources and a lack of 
qualified personnel) pose problems for the effective participation of the population in 
local political decision-making processes. The problem of decentralisation is further 
exacerbated by the weak legal framework of revenue allocation from the centre down to 
the regions. A study of the IMF in 2008 found that although a legal framework defining 
revenue responsibilities exists, it does not provide adequate guidance on determining
revenue sharing in practice (IMF, 2008). Such a situation leaves local self-governed 
administrations economically dependent on the centre. Additionally, the report of the IMF 
further states that the process of budget sharing allocation is not transparent. 
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The process of decentralisation and, particularly, the mobilisation of local community 
development is largely supported by donor communities that operate through grant 
provisions, subcontractors (local and international NGOs) or specially created projects
operating under or with various state agencies. As such, with the aim to improve 
transparency and accountability in local self-governance and to strengthen local self-
governance capacity over all, the EITI has been incorporated as an instrument of the 
World Bank and donor organisations. This is, for instance, reflected in the 
implementation of the World Bank/EFCA project on ‘Improving Civil Society Awareness 
and Engagement in the EITI Process in the Kyrgyz Republic for the year 2012-2013'
(Contract numer 7164963)’60. The project intended to strengthen civil society 
engagement in the EITI process in the Kyrgyz Republic. More explicitly, through the 
MDTF project grant, it aimed to enhance “local CSOs with greater knowledge and skills 
to enable them to engage in the EITI process and to act as a local resource to transfer the 
benefits of EITI to their communities in a way that makes the initiative relevant and 
accessible” (The World Bank/EFCA, 2014, p. 4). This move coincides with the National 
Sustainable Development Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the period of 2013 to 
2017. Many of the EITI aims converge with the National Sustainable Development 
Strategy and, more specifically, with decentralisation goals. For instance, the actions 
planned on decentralisation in the ‘National Poverty Reduction Strategy from 2002 till 
2010’61 (2002 p. 15) specifically states: 
“Policy for decentralization of public administration and development of LSGs 
will be oriented at the following: formation of harmonious legislation; 
continuation of political and administrative reforms; economic and financial 
decentralization; improving effectiveness of property management on community 
level; developing municipal services; enhancing human potential of LSG 
structures; increasing openness and accountability of agencies; building civil 
society partnership; and enhancing social mobilization in local communities”. 
Further among the key decentralisation and local self-government development principles 
the ‘National Strategy for further Decentralization and Local Self-Government 
                                                            
60 Author’s personal communication with a representative of The World Bank, December 12, 2014. 
61 See Kyrgyz Republic. National Poverty Reduction Strategy from 2002 till 2010Comprehensive 
Development Framework of the Kyrgyz Republic to 2010 EXPANDING THE COUNTRY'S 
CAPACITIES National Poverty Reduction Strategy. [Online]. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Country-Papers-and-JSAs/Kyrgyz_PRSP.pdf
[Accessed 8 December 2016]. 
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Development in the Kyrgyz Republic till 2010’62 highlights partnership, transparency 
and effective management as one of the main tools to support decentralisation processes.
It explicitly states: 
“The government of the Kyrgyz Republic, local self-government bodies, civil society, the 
private sector, international organisations and donor countries direct their efforts at 
implementation of the aims and tasks of this strategy based on partnership and consent”.
(National Strategy for further Decentralization and Local Self-Government Development 
in the Kyrgyz Republic till 2010, para 7).
The recent National Sustainable development strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the 
period of 2013-201763, Article 2.5 and 2.6 (pp. 14-17) further emphasise “the legal and 
institutional side of preventive anti-corruption measures also requires strengthening and 
involvement of the civil society institutions as an integral part of any anti-corruption 
measures”. Article 2.6 ‘Increasing effectiveness and ensuring transparency of governance 
Strengthening cooperation between the government and the civil society’ explicitly states: 
“State agencies and local governments must operate under the close supervision 
of the civil society. Increased collaboration with civil society, inclusion of citizens 
and their associations into discussion and making coordinated decisions, constant 
informing of the public about their work should become integral elements of the 
work of public authorities, local governments and their officials” (National 
Sustainable Development Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the Period of
2013-2017, pp. 16-17).
Accordingly, several programmes of donor agencies, such as the USAID/EFCA project
‘Local Transparency and Cooperation Initiative Project’ (Cooperative Agreement No 
AID -176-A-12-00004) issued under tender grant agreement in Kyrgyzstan, included the 
EITI as a part of their tools. Similarly, the GIZ promotes the EITI as a part of their local 
self-governance development strategies64. They further fill the gap left by the state in 
delivering governance provisions to the local population. The main objectives formulated 
                                                            
62 National Strategy For Further Decentralization and Local Self-Government Development
in the Kyrgyz Republic Till 2010.[Online]. Available at: 
http://www.citykr.kg/en/decentralis_rash.php?ify_id=1 [Accessed: 8 December 2016].
63 Kyrgyz Republic (2013). 2013-2017 NATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR 
THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC. ɌɟɤɫɬɇɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɢɭɫɬɨɣɱɢɜɨɝɨɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɹɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɤɨɣ
Ɋɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɧɚɩɟɪɢɨɞ-ɝɨɞɵ[Online]. Available at : 
http://www.president.kg/ru/news/ukazy/1466_tekst_natsionalnoy_strategii_ustoychivogo_razvitiya_kyirg
yizskoy_respubliki_na_period_2013-2017_godyi/  [Accessed: October 3, 2016]
64 Author Interview with representatives of GIZ Bishkek, October 2014
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under local self-governance concerns the promotion of accountability, transparency and 
participation of all stake-holders involved. In this sense, the EITI through its institutional 
formulations came to be embedded into donor agendas that directly align their aid with 
recipients’ national development strategies. In doing so, what we can observe here is that 
under such circumstances the work of donors and civil society within the EITI becomes 
increasingly state-orientated and confined by state regulatory frameworks, which 
undermines their power for individual actions and agenda setting. In doing so, both donors 
and civil society become embedded in domestic political spaces, which makes them 
instrumental in supporting state actions and consequently, the state’s political survival.
The Extractive Sector
The extractive sector in EITI Kyrgyzstan is represented by companies and mining 
associations. The latest EITI country report indicates that 73 companies are submitting 
reports under the EITI umbrella, however, critics point out that the submitted company 
reports are not always complete and in line with EITI requirements (EITI, 2012). In 
addition, the latest report also highlights discrepancies between the amounts reported by 
mining companies and government agencies. Despite this critique, important steps were 
made in the way reports are presented; since 2012, companies are now obliged to submit 
disaggregated reports which break down their expenditures by sectors and their individual 
contribution to public funds. Interviews with Kumtor and Kyrgyzaltyn state that the 
biggest challenge in revenue reporting in Kyrgyzstan lies in convincing smaller 
companies that transparency in their reporting is beneficial and that it brings advantages 
to the local community and their overall business65. Convincing smaller Chinese or 
Russian companies of transparency in revenue reporting is complicated, as most of these 
countries are not EITI members. Due to the voluntary aspect of the Initiative, it is not a 
prerequisite for them to comply with transparency norms. In addition, smaller companies 
often lack resources for doing EITI reporting, or they are situated in remote, hard to reach 
locations. Therefore, the challenge of transparency in revenue reporting lies in the 
creation of a common standard for all companies involved in the extractive industries. 
The case of Oxus Gold and Kumtor demonstrates that in an authoritarian context, when 
rules are bound by the regime in power and the judiciary is weak and insufficiently 
independent from the state apparatus, companies have little space for manoeuvre. As 
these prominent cases show, foreign companies pay lip service in exchange for running 
                                                            
65 Author interview with George Glukhov, Kyrgyzaltin Bishkek, November 2014. 
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their business in the country. As such, mining industries have little power to resist 
governments. Companies operate under the government’s umbrella and avoid interfering
with domestic politics, as this would run the risk of government backlash and 
consequently compromise the ‘survival’ of their activities in the country. In fact, rather 
than being active rule and norm entrepreneurs, as the literature suggests (see Haufler, 
2001; Fuchs, 2007), the contribution of companies was limited at best to the function of 
norm followers. Importantly, the environmental and social unrest around the mining 
sector explained their rationale for joining the Initiative. Therefore, corporate 
participation is best described as ‘practical instrumental engagement’ and as an 
embodiment of their corporate social responsibility. All of the interviewed confirmed that 
the issue of Kumtor was not discussed in the EITI66. It is, however, unavoidable to note 
that the political sensitive topic of Kumtor—perhaps as consequence—prevented active 
engagement of the company in the Initiative. As discussed in this Chapter, Kyrgyzstan is 
subject to several mining conflicts as, for instance, the disputes involving Kumtor 
nationalisation that had led to the Kyrgyz state of emergency in June 2013. Yet, such 
critical issues are hardly discussed in the respective meetings. Moreover, as the Kumtor 
Wikileaks cable demonstrates, only one aspect of reporting is shown in EITI reports, the 
rest is signed and negotiated behind closed doors. As such, transparency in the reporting 
of the EITI does not reflect transparency in practice. Most importantly, however, EITI 
reporting does not show how revenues received by the government from extractive 
companies are spend and redistributed. During both Akayev’s and Bakiyev’s tenure, the 
EITI certainly failed to reveal the lavish spendigs of both Presidents and their personal 
enrichment from mining companies, while leaving large parts of the population in misery.
There is a strong divide in the perception of mining associations in the EITI process and 
their role in the Initiative. The role of mining associations is undefined within the EITI 
process and is characterised by tensions among its members. Out of the three mining 
associations participating in the Initiative, two are fueled by anti-American sentiments
and criticise the Initiative as being a ‘plaything’ of American interests67. Due to the 
voluntary nature of the EITI and the lack of leverage from the members representing the 
Initiative, for some mining associations the EITI is ‘useless’. For some others, it is a ‘good 
                                                            
66 Author’s interviews in Bishkek, October-December 2014
67Author interview Orozbek Duisheev, Chairman of the Association of Miners and Geologists of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, December 2014. Author interview with Vyacheslav Isaev, President of the 
“Guild of Miners” Association, Bishkek, December 2014.
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Initiative’ for the country, but lack of support from companies and government agencies 
compromise its implementation. It becomes increasingly evident that just as in case of the 
‘Public Reception Desks’, the role of mining associations is purely framed as symbolical 
and figurative without substantial meaning attached to it.
Discussion
As the observations above reveal, non-state actors in the EITI are subject to state 
manipulative practices and lack the power to challenge the regime. In the EITI, the state 
of Kyrgyzstan exercises ‘discretionary state control’ with economic resources 
concentrated in state hands. As Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 66) argue, “rulers exert 
discretionary control where they can routinely use tax system, credit, licencing, 
concessions and government contracts, and other economic policy levels to punish 
opponents and reward allies”. Such discretionary use of economic power provides the 
autocratic rulers with tools to effectively co-opt the opposition, compel compliance and 
punish the opposition (Levitsky and Way, 2010, pp. 66-67). In the case of Kyrgyzstan, 
the government effectively applies these tools to the individual non-state actors within 
the EITI. The weak financing to support the EITI and civil society groups is an indication 
of how the state manipulates the allocation of resources to render the functioning of the 
EITI platform ineffective and the work of civil society groups unsustainable. By using 
tactics, such as centralised decision-making processes, revocation of licence contracts, 
bribery, tactics of intimidation against extractive companies or civil society, weak source 
of financing and the oppression of critical voices against the government (typically human 
rights activists), the regime carefully manages the scope of space assigned to its non-state 
actors. In a context, when the sustainability of business is tightly linked to the decisions 
of the government and where civil society is coerced and has no source of financing, non-
state actors as the EITI demonstrates abide to the rules laid down by the government.
However, as Wilson (2005, p. 41) argues, the stability of such form of governance 
requires a united elite; in the case of Kyrgyzstan, the fragmentation of elites within the 
local and central state structures further distort the effective implementation of the 
Initiative, as elites at the local levels do not always respond to demands emanating from 
Bishkek. In Kyrgyzstan although regional network ties and elite fragmentation between 
North and South play a critical role in shaping the governance of the country (see further 
McGlynchey, 2011; Radnitz, 2010), there is also a larger divide between the state and its 
representation in local practices as consequence of decentralisation policies. This is 
discussed in more depth in the following section. 
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5.2.3 Decentralisation and Fragmentation of Elite Structures between Rural 
and Urban Areas
The process of resource sharing with the wider population is further exacerbated by the 
complex and weak decentralisation process in Kyrgyzstan. Decentralisation saw major 
accomplishment in the transfer of state-owned assets to rural municipalities. Under these 
conditions, municipalities are responsible for their own budget management without 
direct accountability to the national government. The 1992 Act on ‘Local Self 
Government and Local State Administration’ ensures the transfer of local government 
powers to local councils (Alymkulov and Kulatov, 2001 p. 526). The principle of local 
self-government was subsequently codified in Article 7 of the Constitution (1993): “Local 
self-government in the Kyrgyz Republic is exercised by local communities, which govern 
affairs of local importance according to the law and at their own initiative” (Ibid). It 
provides a base for the operation of local self-governance at the village level. The Land 
Code under the Act ‘On communal property’ further defines the land as the property of 
village communities. Village administrations as such are independent from the central 
government. According to the law on self-governance, the use of natural resources should 
be managed via local self-governance. In reality, however, the hybrid institutional 
bricolage of Kyrgyzstan prevents the effective redistribution of rents stemming from the 
natural resource sector. Most of the natural resources are based at the community level 
and are managed by local self-government bodies. However, there is a lack of interaction 
between local and central state structures as well as between local populations and 
extractive companies (see also World Bank, 2015d). Moreover, local self-governments at 
the village level represents the first source of power and help. Yet, how effectively theses 
authorities respond to population needs depends significantly on the degree of 
accountability, by whom and how they are formed, and how they relate to the
population. The World Bank/EFCA (2014) study notes that in many communities the 
vision of state agencies do not fall in line and is sometimes conflicting to the one of the 
local population. As the study further emphasises, the influence of state agencies on the 
opinions of the local populations is small. My interviews conducted with regional MSG 
representatives and also donor organisations working at village level reported that,
although the post-Bakiyev68 government is trying to introduce regulatory mechanisms, 
their effective implementation is complicated or blocked at the local regional level, where 
                                                            
68 Interviews with representatives of ‘Public reception Desks’ and GIZ, Bishkek, 2014
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local power structures override central authority69 rules and instead impose their own 
governance system, which in return further serves to fuel local tensions. In fact, as Pauline 
Jones (2004b) describes in her analysis, subnational leaders exercise much greater 
influence in practice that they are allowed to on paper. The anthropologist Judith Bayer 
(2007, p. 3) notes “what we can observe in local political action are not representations 
of the state or state practices, but often entirely new practices”. The implication is that the 
state in Central Asia must often engage in political negotiations with its peripheries in 
order to implement its policies. Therefore, the context of political and economic 
decentralisation in Kyrgyzstan further explains the ineffective implementation of the 
EITI. Such a fragmentation between the national and local levels poses significant 
challenges to EITI implementation at regional levels. As a result, money is not always 
adequately distributed or lost in transfers between different structures of money 
allocation. The study of Baimyrzaeva (2011, p. 32) indicates that self-government bodies 
are ought to retain 90per cent of the locally collected revenue, but in practice they retain 
only 10 per cent. To complicate matters further, the budget is redistributed by the national 
government and also filtered through oblast and rayon levels of territorial state 
administrations before reaching local self-government bodies (Ibid). Taxes collected from 
mining industries at the local self-governance level directly go to the state national budget 
that later distributes the respective monies to relevant state agencies and regions to reach 
at the end local communities. As the graph below illustrates the multi-layered process 
makes resource distribution untransparent and consequently creates losses in the system.
                                                            
69 Similar findings were reported by David Trilling in EurasiaNet 2013. Kyrgyzstan: Amid Price Plunge, 
Gold Mine Auction Faces Multiple Hurdles. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66845 [Accessed 8 December, 2016])
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Figure 3. Decentralisation and EITI process in Kyrgyzstan
The graph below shows decentralisation and the EITI process: 
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What we can clearly observe is that the decentralisation process follows a top-down 
approach marked by weak accountability and monitoring processes. Moreover, many of 
the rural councils in Kyrgyzstan are subsidised, and those subsidies are allocated for 
earmarked targets (CABAR, 2016). Hence, such a system creates an inequitable structure 
of budget allocation with some rural villages receiving more resources than others70. In 
such a fragmented system, it becomes then evident that budget allocation does not match 
local conditions and the needs of the population. This further explains why central 
government rules and expectations mismatch with local village levels. Clearly, as the 
graph demonstrates, there is a huge gap between the central level, civil societies and the 
population. Donors interact with the government to mainly support governance 
development of the state, however, their work is tightly monitored by the state. Interviews 
from the field work show that in the overall process extractive companies mainly deal 
                                                            
70 Author interview with Turgunbek Atabekov, Head of the “Foat” Public Association, Bishkek, 
November 2014 Author Interview with an employee of Sorous Foundation,  Bishkek, October,2014
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 141
 
 
with the natural resource sector in providing revenues for the government budget and 
have little interaction with civil societies and local communities. 
5.2.4 Soviet Organisational Culture 
As discussed above, the EITI has clearly limited impact on improving the way resource 
revenues are shared. The problem is further exacerbated by organisational managerial
cultures dating back to Soviet times. When I interviewed a state member71 from the EITI 
coalition and asked her, if she had received a specific training on the EITI prior to joining 
the coalition, she blankly told me “No”. She had simply taken over the EITI dossier and 
work from her colleague. This is perhaps why the EITI in her views was transparency in 
reporting revenue. For this state employee, the EITI is just a function of her job. Such 
observations are important to consider, as they highlight the Soviet legacies of a
management style, which includes highly hierarchical structure of commands and orders 
that follow a top-down approach as well as avoiding risk and accountability, mistrust
towards others and a lack of entrepreneurship (McCarthy et al., 2005; Intrac, 2007). As 
Nielsen and colleagues observe: the transition to the market economy did not occur in a 
“institutional vacuum” but depended on “a dense and complex institutional legacy such 
that the (often invisible) remnants of previous economic and political orders still shape 
expectations and patterns of conduct” (Nielsen et al., 1995, p. 4). Studies on management 
in post-Soviet transition economics demonstrate that socialist culture was characterised 
by a lack or absence of investment in human resource management (HRM) (see the 
literature review study of Horie and Kumo, 2015). Most of the personal or cadre 
management was carried out by state level departments in accordance to central economy 
planning. The job of the cadre department was characterised by narrowly defined job 
contents with the main objective to meet administrative functions on paper (Gurkov and 
Settles, 2013). A lack of broader analytical vision further features such forms of 
organisational culture and is also visible among the members of the coalition. Interviews 
and my personal observations reflect that the EITI for all the members of the coalition 
represent a function of their work duties. As such, they are so absorbed to work on EITI 
tasks that they fail to analyse how their micro-level activities contribute to the wider 
development of the Initiative at the national level.
                                                            
71 Interview with representative of First Deputy Chairman of State Customs Service under the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, 1 December 2014.
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5.3 The EITI—A Technical Success?
However, despite its limitations, the EITI has achieved some substantial progress, mainly 
categorised as ‘technical successes’. EITI consultations are designed to create a 
knowledge-sharing platform and peer-to-peer learning. The analysis of the EITI MSG 
consultations in Kyrgyzstan reveals that although consultations do not occur regularly, 
they however created a space for discussions and deliberations, where different actors 
from the sector meet to express their opinions. It is also a platform for learning and 
exchanging information related to the extractive industries in the mining sector among 
different organisational actors. This is confirmed by the statement of the State Agency 
for Environmental Protection under the Government 
“First the EITI broadens our horizons, if we wouldn’t take part in the initiative we 
wouldn’t know about the activities of each other, here we see opinions of others 
and what happens in other regions. Before that we were completely unaware about 
‘how and why’ revenues flows related to resource management now we somehow
understand it”. (Elmira Usupova, Bishkek, December 2015)
In addition to having received the status of compliant, there is now a systematic process 
and standardisation of procedures guiding revenue earning reporting. Companies are 
aware of the necessity to submit reports on transparency, and local administrations now 
understand the importance of such reporting procedures. The EITI National Board also 
realised the necessity of implementing the EITI deeper and of making reporting available 
to all segments of the population. The implementation of the EITI principles at the 
subnational levels through the ‘Public Reception Desks’, and the current translation of 
the reporting and documentation from English into Russian and Kyrgyz are significant 
steps taken in this direction. Moreover, the capacity of local communities, government 
officials, NGOs and companies to understand the importance of reporting in the extractive 
industries has increased considerably since the implementation of the Initiative.
The improved ability of these actors to read EITI reports and to understand financial flows 
of the extractive industries has been noticeable. Moreover, there is an increase in demand 
for getting detailed analyses of revenue flows stemming from mining industries. Local 
communities gradually start to raise questions about revenue expenditures and their 
management. Prior to this, the mining sector of the Kyrgyz Republic was extremely 
opaque. In this sense, partnership agreements have the capacity to produce a 
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transformative effect and shape the behaviours of their parties, but this very much 
depends on the political will and mobilisation of the actors involved. 
Conclusion 
The empirical observations from the EITI MSG in Kyrgyzstan demonstrate that the 
effective functioning of the MSG in Kyrgyzstan is influenced by the relative paucity of 
actors involved in the procedure of the EITI. Kaufmann and Bellver (2005, p. 14) point 
out that the provision of information alone is insufficient. To be effective, it is critical for 
different social groups to participate in the decision-making process and to have the 
capacity of analysing and acting upon an analysed situtation. In a client-patron society,
such as in Kyrgyzstan, the public sphere is not a space based on the ideas of common 
good and social justice, but a place where individuals strive for power and personal gains 
(see Luong, 2002; Cummings, 2012; Shulte, 2008). Consequently, the relatively weak 
representation and accountability in the national governance systems, where wide gaps 
exist between local representatives as to who they represent and how (see Huskey and 
Isakova, 2010), has negative consequences for the development of effective 
representation and, hence, on multilateral global governance initiatives, such as the EITI. 
What the study further demonstrates is that it is important to question who the actual 
NGOs are, and how they are connected to the population they claim to represent within 
the EITI. The study of the EITI in Kyrgyzstan shows that a deliberative and neutral form 
of governance in a non-democratic setting reproduces rather than challenges practices of 
power relations and serves personal gains rather than constituencies they ought to 
represent. It seems that the pursuit of anti-corruption efforts in Kyrgyzstan is increasingly 
entangled with elements of authoritarian governance and is more about ‘who is in the 
network and who is not’. The close association of some local NGOs with international 
donors created powerful gate-keepers, who use their access privilege or status to favour 
some groups over others and to cement and further strengthen their position. The state 
(under different leadership) used the EITI as a political tool to enhance its legitimacy at 
both national and international levels, to curb domestic security threats and present itself 
as compliant with international norms while in practice largely ignoring them. The little 
reforms that were adopted in relation to the EITI, as for instance the adoption of the EITI 
in the ‘Subsoil use law’ or the ‘Public Reception Desks’ are weak and easy to bypass. 
Further, the government’s weak participation and lack of financial support also 
demonstrate the unwillingness of the Kyrgyz government to commit to transparency 
reforms in the management of the resource sector. What we depict from these 
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observations is that the Kyrgyz government merely adopted the EITI to please its 
international and domestic audience but with little commitment to alter its everyday 
politics. In this sense, the adoption of the EITI merely represents a ‘performative or virtual 
act’. Just as in the analysis of Andrew Wilson (2005) on ‘Virtual Politics’, what we can 
depict from the analysis of Kyrgyzstan is that the government seeks to control and steer 
the EITI according to its interests. In this sense, the EITI plays largely an instrumental 
role. As a result, the process reproduces the dynamics of a neopatrimonial regime in 
which formal institutions help to consolidate client-patronage relations. As such, although 
at the surface the EITI operates as a multi-stakeholder group, its inside dynamic is,
however, carefully orchestrated by the regime and its close allies. Clearly, by bringing 
different non-state actors into the EITI, the regime had ‘virtually’ assigned some forms 
of opposition or ‘simulated forms of plurality’ largely designed to please the international 
EITI community. 
Further, the process of the EITI is further problematised by weak decentralisation 
processes and regional dynamics between urban and rural areas. In Kyrgyzstan, as the 
study demonstrates, top-down state authority is not always followed by the individual 
leaders of rural communities. As a result, such developments further exacerbate the 
implementation of the Initiative. Additionally, domestic organisational culture marked by 
Soviet institutional legacies and traditional clientelistic behaviours impede on the well-
functioning of the Initiative. As a result, the EITI implementation process in Kyrgyzstan 
suggests that, although the Initiative has a standardised path of implementation, its 
structural governance mechanisms follow a distinct internal logic, which disconnects it 
from the rules and principles imposed externally72. However, this is not to say that the 
Initiative is a complete failure. The benefit of the EITI became largely visible to the actors 
involved in the Initiative through various organised trainings and workshops rather than 
to those individuals it is targeting. As the observations on the EITI demonstrate, the 
population remains largely excluded from the EITI process. The need to share the benefits 
with the local population is one of the pressing issues that was poorly addressed so far. 
Additionally, in Kyrgyzstan, the population saw two subsequent revolutions that did not 
bring any promised change from the government. After seeing a parade of corrupt 
                                                            
72 On March 9, 2017, the board has suspended the status of Kyrgyzstan due to its failure to comply with 
EITI standards. Main points of concern in Kyrgyzstan relate to insufficient state participation and 
inadequate representation of the MSG as well as data quality related to revenue disclosure and mandatory 
social expenditures. Kyrgyzstan has until 8th of September to address corrective actions and pass the 
second Validation process (for further information see EITI Website: Kyrgyz Republic 2016 Validation 
[Online]. Available at: https://eiti.org/validation/kyrgyz-republic/2016 [Accessed: 5 April, 2017]  
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government and being ‘accustomed to corruption’, there is low trust in official state 
bodies; more generally, there is a general feeling of ‘laissez-faire’, as the population 
believes that any promised reforms or changes would be left unfulfilled. In the context of 
Kyrgyzstan, where economic development is weak, jobs are scarce and poverty rampant, 
the major concern for the population is to ensure their own survival. Hence, the meaning 
of the EITI and benefits that the Initiative could provide for the population are barely 
noticed. In the national opinion poll survey conducted in this study, only 16.7 per cent of 
respondents had heard about the EITI, of those, 33.2 per cent had received information 
from civil society organisations73.
                                                            
73 Survey results, SIAR National Opinion Poll, October-November,2014
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Chapter 6. Case Study Two: Kazakhstan and the
Implementation of the EITI
 
Main Points of this Chapter
Since gaining its independence from the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan’s politics was 
dominated by President Nazarbayev and its inner family circle and elites. The 
hypercentralised regime build by the President enabled him to create a strong coalition of 
elites, active in both political and economic domains to appropriate public resources for 
the regime’s personal gain. Resource-rich Kazakhstan combines enormous rent income 
that stems from the natural resource sectors of energy (oil and gas) and mining directly 
lining the pockets of the President and its autocratic regime, while leaving the large part 
of the population outside of these rent sharing. The first part of this Chapter provides an 
overview of the political and economic context of the country. The reason for describing 
these parts in details is to provide a basis for understanding the functioning of the EITI in 
the country. The second part of this Chapter discusses the implementation of the Initiative 
and it shortcomings. What the case of Kazakhstan reveals is that the implementation of 
the EITI was instrumental in growing domestic and international pressures. Faced with 
domestic instabilities in the mining sector, corruption scandals and international pressure 
of the EITI secretariat, Kazakhstan responded by adopting the Initiative mainly for 
reputational concerns and state legitimacy. As the case demonstrates, the adoption of the 
Initiative does not mean norm compliance. As the case further illustrates, domestic 
institutional structures and neopatrimonial practices shape the functioning of the 
Initiative.
6.1 Kazakhstan at a Glance
6.1.1 Political Context 
The latest Freedom House data described Kazakhstan as a “consolidated authoritarian 
regime” (Freedom House, 2014). Since gaining its independence from the Soviet Union,
Kazakh politics was single-handedly ruled by President Nazarbayev and its inner family 
circle and elites (Peyrouse, 2012; Cummings, 2005). As Sally Cummings notes (2002 p. 
63), “the president is at the epicentre of all state- and institution-building efforts, and the 
presidential office and executive order have come to dominate all branches of 
government”. Political openness, independent media and civil society are present by 
‘design’ and remain largely underdeveloped. Since the 2007 reforms, the President can 
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seek re-election as many times as he wishes and stay in office for an unlimited number of 
terms. Democratic institutions are present, however, they are primarily for ‘window 
dressing’; the political arena is dominated by the party of the President, the Nur Otan, 
with very restricted or quasi absent space for the opposition to act (Freedom House, 
2014). 
As the report of Freedom of House (2014, p. 296) states “under President Nazarbayev’s 
rule, Kazakhstan has mastered the rhetoric of reform and democratization without 
demonstrating any genuine commitment to these processes”. The various democratic 
institutions including civil society and media are all tightly controlled under the 
President’s tutelage and its inner elite circle. It is almost impossible for civil society in 
Kazakhstan to function independently from the state. Although it was acknowledged in 
the 1995 Constitution in Article 23, Paragraph 174 on the clauses related to individual 
rights and the freedom of association and then again in 2006 with a presidential decree 
recognizing its space for social relations distinct from the state. Most of the existing civil 
society organisations in Kazakhstan are recognised as ‘non-commercial organization’
(NCO) instead of ‘non-governmental’ and are organised as GONGOs. The USAID Civil 
Society Sustainability Index (2014) gives Kazakhstan a 4.1, which reflects a moderately 
weak civil society75 that is mainly characterised by limited political rights, weak capacity-
building and low democratic freedom to participate.
6.1.2 The Economic Context in Kazakhstan 
In the last decades, the growth of the country’s GDP was primarily fuelled by the 
petroleum sector. In 2015, the oil and gas sector formed 30 per cent of the GDP, 70 per 
cent of exports and 20 per cent of budget revenues (UK Government, 2016). Thanks to 
its petroleum industry, the GDP per capita (PPP expressed in thousands $) grew from 
8,790.8 in 1991 to 25,876.5 in 2015 (World Bank data, 2015b). 
The severity of the economic crisis in the late-nineties impelled the Kazakh leadership to 
pursue a hydrocarbon-based path to economic development by attracting foreign direct 
investment in the oil and gas sector (Ipek, 2007; Luong and Weinthal, 2010). The collapse 
                                                            
74 “Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall have the right to freedom of forming associations. The 
activities of public associations shall be regulated by law”. Kazakh Constitution 1995 [Online] Available 
at: http://www.parlam.kz/en/constitution .[ Accessed 2 November 2016]
75 Score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, score of 7 
indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development (see USAID: CSO 
SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY: https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-
rights-and-governance/cso-sustainability-index-methodology)
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of the Soviet centralised economy put Kazakhstan in an economic and socio-political 
crisis. The situation was further exacerbated by the departure of skilled ethnical Russians 
(Brauer, 2012, p. 167). Lacking technical know-how and investment to develop its 
economy, Kazakhstan very quickly realised that its survival depended on the development 
of its natural resource sector. However, with the Russian and European/Slavic population 
highly concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of the country and Kazakhs in the 
south (Melvin, 2001), the challenge for Kazakhstan was to maintain statehood (Ipek, 
2007; Olcott, 1996). As Brigit Brauer (2012, p. 167) notes: “one of the main worry in 
Kazakhstan was that Russia might make claims on sizeable parts in the territory in the 
north”. Another worry of Kazakhstan was its border with China. 
The geopolitical situation of Kazakhstan, i.e. being a landlocked country surrounded by
Russia and China and being economically and military weak, prompted President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev to embark on pragmatic and multi-vector foreign policies trying to 
balance its immediate with interests in the wider neighbourhood (Cummings, 2003b;
Ipek, 2007). Such policies, as Brigit Brauer (2012, p. 167) further argues, were also 
extended to the energy sector, where the national origin of oil companies was an important 
factor in concluding energy contracts. In the late 1990s, Nazarbayev’s foreign policy 
strategies took a multi-vector course in seeking to ensure economic stability via the 
economic assistance of multilateral agencies backed by the US and European 
governments, investment from big Western oil firms and cultivating a strategic 
partnership with Russia and China (Ipek, 2007; Cummings, 2003; Domjan and Stone, 
2010).
6.1.3 The Role of Natural Resource Sector: Oil
According to an OECD report, FDI inflows and exports from Kazakhstan are highly 
concentrated in the natural resource sector (mining and oil explorations) forming more 
than 70 per cent of capital inflows (OECD, 2012). By late 1998, the country ranked third 
in energy production among former Soviet Republics and was the second largest oil 
producer after Russia (Luong and Weinthal, 2001). Since this period and until 2008, 
Kazakhstan entered an oil boom; the country's gross domestic product (GDP) rose on 
average by 8 per cent per year, until the 2008 global financial and economic crisis led to 
a slowdown (Satpayev, 2014). This trajectory is primarily boosted by the Kazakh 
government in pursuit of a pipeline diversification strategy relieving its dependence from 
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Russia combined with the desire to attract world markets and to maximise profits76. Major 
investors in this sector were US companies, such as Chevron, followed by the UK, the
Netherlands, Italy, China and Russia (OECD, 2002; OECD, 2012). 
Figure 4. FDI inflows (% GDP) in Kazakhstan 1995-2015
Source: FDI inflows in Kazakhstan (per cent of GDP) 1992-2015. The World Bank, (2016b)77.
The largest oil reserves in Kazakhstan are situated in the western part of the country in 
four major oil fields: Tengiz, Karachaganak, Kashagan and Kurmangazy (Kaiser and 
Pulsipher, 2007). The energy ownership structure in Kazakhstan is organised based on a
consortium of companies, where more than 50 per cent of the total energy production is 
provided by foreign investors operating in the field of extraction and exploration (Tsalik, 
2003; Kaiser and Pulsipher, 2007; Guliyev and Akhrarkhodjaeva, 2009). Chevron and its 
consortium (which also includes Exxon Mobil and Russia’s Lukoil) are Kazakhstan’s 
largest private oil producers, holding important stakes in the nation’s two biggest oil-
producing projects—the Tengiz and Karachaganak fields. Other important foreign 
companies include BP, BG, ENI-Agip, Royal-Dutch/Shell, Total and the China National 
Petroleum Company (CNPC). The establishment of these companies in the Kazakh 
natural resource sector date back to 1992, when the Kazakh government signed the first 
                                                            
76 Since the drop of oil prices in 2014, the country entered a period of economic instability. 
77 FDI inflows in Kazakhstan (per cent of GDP) 1992-2015. The World Bank, (2016b), available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=KZ [Accessed: 26th of 
September, 2016]
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international joint-venture agreement with Chevron to exploit its Tengiz oil field. 
Recently, Kazakhstan and a group of oil companies led by Chevron have approved a 
$36.8 billion plan to boost the production of the Tengiz field, a rare major investment in 
an industry hit by the recent oil crisis.78
However, the openness of Kazakhstan towards FDI does not mean that the business 
environment is easy to navigate. With the gradual reinforcement of autocratic power in 
Kazakhstan, domestic policies towards FDI openness and, in particular, towards the 
energy sector became more aggressive. At the end of the 1990s and from the beginning 
of 2000, Nazarbayev was confronted with discontent from parts of the Kazakh 
government and the business sector, which blamed FDI to harm their national interests
(Ostrowski, 2010; Kusznir, 2012). FDI were seen as exploiting the country’s natural 
resources without giving anything back in return. As a result, Nazarbayev gradually 
tightened his control over FDI operations in the country. From then on and marked by the 
period of the oil boom in the mid-2000s and the discovery of the Kashagan oil field (the 
world’s largest oil find), the Kazakh government embarked on strategies of resource 
nationalism seeking to increase its control over the management of the state’s natural 
resources (Domjan and Stone, 2010; Brauer, 2012). The reinforcement of resource 
nationalism in Kazakhstan was mainly undertaken in two ways: 1) by placing cost 
burdens on international oil companies; 2) by increasing state ownership control in major 
projects through the state company KazMunayGaz. These strategies are discussed below. 
1) Placing Cost Burdens on International Oil Companies
The reinforcement of nationalisation policies significantly affected the contractual and 
regulatory arrangements of FDI operations in the country. The government became more 
assertive in determining the rules of the game in its favour or changing them as needed 
(Brauer, 2012, p. 169). In such an environment, FDI became increasingly vulnerable to 
the government’s new strategies. International energy companies were highly pressured
by the government in increasingly sophisticated ways. The government used fiscal threats 
and all sort of fines (such as the failure to respect environmental legislation) and other 
arbitrary practices to increase the fees on the contractual agreements or to renegotiate 
better terms for existing contracts (Domjan and Stone, 2010; Brauer, 2012; Ostrowki, 
2010). As a result, international companies are often faced with the choice but to give in 
                                                            
78 Katakey,R. & Gizitdinov, N. (2016). Chevron Bets $37 Billion on Expansion as Oil Rises, Costs Fall
Bloomberg  July 5, 2016.  [Online]. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-
05/chevron-approves-37-billion-expansion-of-kazakh-oil-project  [Accessed: 2 November, 2016
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to the demands of the state. In such a context, foreign companies are secondary and lack 
leverage against the presidential regime. As my field work interviews reveal, foreign 
companies are very much dependent on government policies79. Many of my interviews 
indicate that Kazakhstan does not offer a friendly business environment and lacks a strong 
legal protection of investors, when their rights were violated. The country’s judicial 
system further lacks accountability and independence (see further Freedom House, 
2015b). It remains largely a political instrument that protects the interests of the regime 
rather than those of its citizens and other strata of the population80. In such a system, 
many individual rights are unlawfully violated. As one member working for a foreign 
company indicated: “the business environment is very bureaucratic—and government is 
ready to use fines for anything and nothing”81. Such a picture, as a result, creates an 
environment in which financial transactions linked to the exploitation of oil and gas are 
opaque and subject to the extreme influence of the state.
2) Increasing the State’s Control through the State Company KazMunayGaz.
In 2002 with the aim to consolidate power over the management of the natural resource 
sector and through the merger of TransNefteGas and KazakhOil, the Nazabayev 
government formed the state company KazMunayGaz. In 2008, the company was further
integrated in the national welfare fund Samruk-Kazyna. Despite the transfer of decision-
making authority to private ownership deals, the government of Kazakhstan retains the 
upper hand in determining the size, stability, composition and degree of transparency of 
its energy deals with foreign contractors (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p. 259). Since 
2005, all major energy deals need to be signed with the national Kazakh state-owned 
company KazMunayGaz (Tsalik, 2003; Kusznir, 2012; Guliyev and Akhrarkhodjaeva, 
2009). The state-run company KazMunayGas consolidates major contractual agreements 
in oil and gas projects. New consortiums must show a 50 per cent share owned by
KazMunayGas (Olcott, 2010; Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013). The Production Sharing 
Agreements (PSAs) sharing agreements further obliged foreign companies to source 
goods, services and employees locally (Kusznir, 2012, p. 113). 
Although the state is the official shareholder in KazMunayGaz, Nazarbaeyv’s family 
indirectly controls its financial and organisational activities through the appointment of 
                                                            
79 Author’s informal interviews with the employee of KazTransOil 15 June  2015, Astana.
Author’s informal interview with an employee of BG Group Kazakhstan, 4 June 2015, Astana.
80 Author’s informal interview with an employee of BG Group Kazakhstan, 4 June 2015, Astana.
Author’s interview with Managing Partner of Parlink Consulting /Oil and Gas, 29 April  2015, Astana.
Author’s informal interview with the employee of Friedrich Eberti Fond, 2 June 2015, Almaty.
81 Author’s interview with an employee of BG Group Kazakhstan, 4 June 2015, Astana.
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family members or government allies. For instance, until 2011, Timur Kulibayev the 
President’s son in law was the deputy CEO of KazMunayGas and was also the Chief 
Executive Officer, Chairman of the Management Board, and Director of Samruk-Kazyna 
National Welfare Fund JSC. In 2011, he was removed from this position82, however, he 
still holds a considerable influence in KazMunayGaz through KazEnergy Association,
where he assumes the position of the Chairman, and through Samruk-Kazyna, where he 
is a member of the Board of Directors (see KazEnergy Association website, 2011). He is 
also of the richest man in the country and abroad, his business empire that touches almost 
every aspect of the oil sector is estimated to be worth $2.1 billion by Forbes (FT, 2015b). 
The above observations provide a good illustration of how the natural resource sector is 
embedded within the state’s ruling elite. The role played by the natural resource sector in 
Kazakhstan is trivial, as it not only insures the well-functioning of the economy but also 
guarantees the survival of the regime. Consequently, as Pauline Jones and Erica Weinthal 
(2010) argue, what one calls a ‘resource curse’ in countries of Central Asia is strongly 
associated with the management and institutional ownership structure of the natural 
resource sector. In this regard, the relations between the petroleum industrial sector of 
Kazakhstan and the political sphere are very tightly intertwined with state-society 
relations. The presidential family and its circle are the major actors dictating the politics 
of the natural resource sector. Hence, a major challenge for the President lies in his ability 
to maintain a balance of power between these competing interest groups and to respond 
adequately to their demands. Therefore, the decision-making process is always connected 
to the regime’s interests. As such, relations in the energy sector are both formally and 
informally subordinated to the President and its close circle. Such a situation results in a 
blurring of the boundaries between state politics and business. As many observe, corrupt 
and informal practices such as bribery, black mailing, proxy ownership and other illicit 
behaviours are all very common in Kazakhstan’s public government and its energy 
resource sector (see Pleines and Heinrich, 2012). According to the statement of
KazMunaiGaz First Vice President Maksat Idenov, in Kazakhstan “market economy 
means capitalism, which means big money, which means large bribes for the best 
connected” (Wikileaks cable, 2010). In the Transparency International Index (2015a),
Kazakhstan ranks 123th out of 168, making it one the worst performing countries in the 
world. McPherson and MacSerraigh (2007) further argue that because of the complex 
structure of the oil industry, revenues from these resources are largely opaque and 
                                                            
82 His removal was mainly due to the failure to deal with Zhanojen protests.
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therefore are impenetrable to public scrutiny and transparency. Therefore, as a result of 
regime practices regarding resource rents, the economic boom of the petroleum sector in 
Kazakhstan was not accompanied by wider socio-economic development and rents 
sharing with the population. Although Kazakhstan succeeded to reduce its poverty rates 
form 46.7 per cent in 2001 to 2.8 per cent in 2014 (see World Bank data, 2015b), still
significant disparities between urban and rural area impede the development of the 
country. Paradoxically, such disparities are hugely concentrated in resource-rich regions. 
About 70 per cent of the hydrocarbon reserves are situated in western Kazakhstan 
(KazMunaiGaz, website, n-d.). The western oil producing regions are Aktobe, Atyrau, 
West Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Kyzylorda and Mangystau. The IMF ‘2014(a) Country 
Report’ observes a huge disparity between the western resource-rich regions and the 
resource-poor regions of the country. As the IMF report further points out, the oil sector 
in Kazakhstan acts as an enclave, “it is capital intensive and does not generate many jobs, 
and thus does not create significant economic spillover effects” (IMF, 2014a, p. 4). The 
poverty level is highly concentrated in rural areas (ADB 2012; IMF, 2014b; World Bank,
2015b). Such observations further demonstrate that much of the revenues is concentrated 
in the two major capital cities of Astana and Almaty. In this context, the development of 
the Extractive Industries Transparency can be seen as an important step towards 
improving transparency and resource sharing with wider segments of the population.
6. 2 The Implementation of the EITI in Kazakhstan
In the year 2005, Kazakhstan endorsed the EITI initiative and became a fully compliant 
country in October 2013. In line with the requirements of the EITI, Kazakhstan created a 
multi-stakeholder group (MSG) composed of government officials, industry 
representatives and non-governmental organisations and submitted national reports to the 
EITI from 2005 on with the most recent report covering 2014. At present, the EITI 
implementation in Kazakhstan is coordinated by the Ministry of Investment and 
Development under the Committee of Geology and Subsoil Use. It is further overseen by 
a Supervisory Board, the National Stakeholders Council (NSC), which forms the EITI 
multi-stakeholder group (MSG) that is characterised by the representation of members 
from the sectors of civil society, state and extractive industries. In addition, the EITI NSC 
in Kazakhstan also includes deputies of the Majilis of Parliament.
However, the road to achieve the status of a fully compliant country in the EITI was not 
straight forward for Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan did not pass validation the first time. From 
2009 to 2012, Kazakhstan struggled to achieve the full compliancy status. As many of 
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my interviews state, in “2009 there was a disagreement and split (raskól) among the civil 
society groups in the EITI MSG on the ways EITI was operating”83. Others refer to the 
companies and state disagreeing with civil society that resulted to veto civil society 
decisions on reporting84.
In 2010, it again failed to achieve full compliancy status, the EITI International Secretariat 
rather awarded Kazakhstan with the status of “Candidate Country close to compliance” 
(EITI report Validation in Kazakhstan, 2013a). The EITI official documents refer to 
coordination challenges resulting from a institutional reshuffling in the Ministry of 
Industry and New Technologies (MINT), responsible for overseeing the EITI 
implementation in the country (EITI report Validation in Kazakhstan, 2013a).
In 2011 and 2012, as the EITI official statement document (see EITI Validation Report, 
2013a), the implementation of the EITI process in Kazakhstan slowed down, mainly 
because of a lack of consensus among the national stakeholders involved in the EITI 
process as well as a lack of coordination from the government side on the implementation 
of the Initiative. This was largely due to a cabinet reshuffle within the Ministry of Industry 
and New Technologies (MINT) and domestic oil protests as well as parliamentary 
elections in 2011. As the EITI official documents state: “The NSC did not convene in the 
period July-December 2011, nor did they respond to the Secretariat’s request for 
supplementary information” (EITI Validation Report, 2013, p. 2). In 2011, the EITI 
International Board set 12 June 2011 as the deadline for four corrective actions to achieve 
compliance to be implemented by Kazakhstan; two out of four corrective actions were 
achieved, but they were insufficient to achieve the full compliancy status. In 2012, the 
EITI International board decided to prolong Kazakhstan status as a candidate country by 
18 months, during which a new validation needed to be held. In 2013, Kazakhstan was 
finally given the status of full compliancy. It is important to note that the 2012 ENI 
corruption85 scandal implicating the Nazarabyev political clan and the parliamentary 
elections coupled with the external pressure of the EITI International board correspond 
                                                            
83 Author’s Skype interview with member of the EITI civil society coalition, 15th June Astana. 
84 Author’s Skype interview with representative of Soros Foundation, June 17th, 2015 Astana 
85 Reuthers, (2012). REFILE-UPDATE 1-Eni probe will not stall Kazakh oil project. Reuthers, 
May 11,2012. [Online]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/eni-kazakhstan-
idUSL5E8GB89220120511 [Accessed: 27 September 2016].
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to the year when Kazakhstan became again actively involved in the EITI implementation 
resulting in Kazakhstan passing the validation process in 2013.
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Table 2. Summary of the events and EITI implementations
Kazakhstan EITI Process 
2004 
James Giffin corruption scandal 
Parliamentary elections
Presidential elections (2005) 
2005
Kazakhstan accession to EITI 
2007
Energy corruption scandal 
Parliamentary elections 
2010
Government cabinet reshuffle gives the state a more central role in the oil and 
gas sector.
Government dissolves MEMR
2008-2009
Continuous financing from the Republic budget to EITI reporting
Appointment of government representative to the EITI 
2009- split in the EITI coalition 
2010 – Amendments to Subsoil use Legislation
2010- Kazakhstan fails to pass the validation 
2010- EITI passes from MEMR to Ministry of Oil and Gas and the Ministry for 
Industry and New Technologies
2010-Transfer of duties in the cabinets over EITI implementation in the 
country 
2011
Zhanojen protest
Transfer of duties in the cabinets over EITI implementation in the country 
Parliamentary elections 
2011
Kazakhstan fails to pass second validation
2012
The revival of the Initiative 
2012
Energy corruption scandal
Parliamentary elections 
EITI External Board pressure
2013
Kazakhstan full compliant country 
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The table above shows that just as in the case of Kyrgyzstan, changes in the Ministry and 
cabinet handling the Initiative delayed the process of EITI implementation in Kazakhstan. 
However, more importantly, we can see important patterns that impacted on the process 
of Initiative implementation. As such, each time there was a national election coupled 
with energy scandals involving the presidential family, in the subsequent year there is a 
positive boost in the implementation of the EITI. The year 2012 demonstrates a 
significant shift in government responses towards EITI implementation. The government 
decision to reinvigorate the Initiative in 2012 is the result of several factors: the 
Zhanaozen oil protests, parliamentary elections and the energy scandal involving the 
presidential family as well as external pressure by the EITI International Secretariat to 
pass the validation process. These observations illustrate that the autocratic leader of 
Kazakhstan could not ignore domestic and international pressure. A deeper analysis 
further reveals that responses were largely driven by government policies to use the EITI 
as a strategic governance tool to manipulate the political agenda protecting the regime’s 
legitimacy and its public image. 
6.2.1 The EITI as a Mechanism of State Interest-driven Strategies
When I asked members of the coalition of what the EITI brings to Kazakhstan, all of them 
responded— “image and prestige”. Many also noted that losing the status of a candidate 
country would be a negative hit/ “udar” to the image of Kazakhstan86.
As the interview with the EITI National Secretariat states: 
“Image of Kazakhstan is important, international initiatives bring visibility and creates 
knowledge and exchange platform as Kazakhstan interacts with international actors” 
(Interview with EITI NSC Secretariat, June 2015, Astana)
Access to the EITI represented diplomatic recognition from the international community 
and powerful states. Barret and Okamura (2015) argue that the adherence to international 
standards, such as the EITI, boost country’s reputation and, in doing so, contributes to 
them gaining social and material benefits. Studies further demonstrate that the access of 
a country to the EITI is positively correlated with FDI inflows, as Kerem Oge (2016, p.
133) states: “resource-rich countries use the EITI to consolidate their international 
                                                            
86 Author’s interview with Soros employee, June 2, 2015, Almaty
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prestige as eager reformers, which serves to both maintain and lure foreign investment”. 
In this regard, certainly the adoption of the EITI in Kazakhstan is part of state image-
building strategies to boost its international reputation. In 2012, after failing its first 
validation, Kazakhstan was facing pressure from the EITI International Board for 
completing its second validation process otherwise its status was to be revoked. For these 
reasons, the EITI represented an important tool for the nation’s reputational capital. As 
the members of EITI National Secretariat report:
“When EITI in Kazakhstan didn’t passed validation the first time it brought “shame on 
the country”. The president got personally involved and told everyone to reach the 
compliancy status. Image of Kazakhstan was at stake at the international level. So, we 
work hard to get the compliancy status”. (Interview with EITI NSC Secretariat, June 
2015, Astana).
In order to pass the second validation, the government took decisions to introduce policies 
which would facilitate compliance with EITI requirements and pass the second validation. 
In this regard, as the EITI 2013 Validation Report shows, in addition to introducing 
technical changes related to the country’s national reporting and meeting EITI 
requirements, Kazakhstan pursued a strong ‘advertising’ campaign to promote the EITI 
in the country and abroad. In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was instructed 
to promote the reporting and coverage abroad of the EITI process in Kazakhstan and to 
organise meetings with the International EITI Board (EITI Validation report, 2013b pp. 
35-36). Also, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Culture and 
Information were assigned to develop a plan on the media coverage of the EITI (EITI 
Validation report, 2013b, pp. 35-36). As such, it was crucial for Kazakhstan to pass the 
second validation process and achive full membership in the Initiative. However, this 
only explains one part of the story, in Kazakhstan, as the analysis of the case study reveals,
the Initiative was primarily adopted for domestic events related to corruption scandals 
and instabilities in the mining sector. As such, the implementation of the EITI in 
Kazakhstan corresponded with developments having a destabilising effect on 
Kazakhstan’s domestic image and its state leadership. In this sense, the use of the 
Initiative was strategic for the government. 
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Corruption Scandals
The decision of Kazakhstan to join the EITI transparency initiative can be closely traced 
to a high profile political incident, also called µ.ɚ]ɚNKJɚWɟ¶, a scandal that occurred in 
2004. The case is based on allegations that James Giffen, an American businessman and 
former Nazarbayev advisor had supposedly paid $78 million in bribes to unnamed 
Kazakh officials to secure contracts for Western oil companies, such as Chevron (now 
Chevron-Texaco) and Mobil (now ExxonMobil) (Solach, 2010). The revelations were 
considered as politically damaging for the image of Nazarbayev in light of the 
parliamentary elections in 2004. The scandal highlighted the urgent need for President 
Nazarbayev to rebalance his political ‘clean’ status and restore his image. As many 
commentators observe, political tensions were growing and signs of a deepening split 
within the country's ruling elite became evident, following the founding of a new political 
movement, the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) on 18 November 2001. As 
Ostrowksi notes (2010, p. 131) “Nazarbayev’s response to the looming crisis, which was 
only growing with the 2004 parliamentary elections, was to reinforce its domestic 
position and to appropriate at least on paper the opposition’s proposal’s for further 
political and economic reforms”. Writing about the 2004 parliamentary elections in 
Kazakhstan and in a similar vein, Dave (2005) warned that hearings on the Giffen case
would affect the Nazarbayev regime and would have an impact on the 2005 presidential 
elections. Corruption is not new to Kazakhstan’s politics. In the words of Dossum 
Satpayev, an independent political analyst and director of the Kazakhstan Risks 
Assessment Group in Almaty, “corruption scandals involving government officials 
become almost normal feature of life” (Satpayev, 2014, p. 1). However, as the James 
Giffen incident demonstrates, when exposed, such scandals can have detrimental effects 
on the leadership of Nazarbayev, particularly in times of elections. In addition to the 
James Giffen corruption scandal, in 2007 the UK banker Robert Kissin was accused of 
playing the middleman helping Texas oil service company Baker Hughes pay $4 million 
in bribes to the Kazakh government in exchange for an oil contract87. The year also 
                                                            
87 Leigh, D. (2010). WikiLeaks cables name UK banker as middleman in Kazakh corruption ring. The 
Guardian. 12 December 2010.  [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/12/wikileaks-british-banker-kazakh-corruption) [Accessed: 
27 September 2016].
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coincided with parliamentary elections in the country. Similarly in 2012, a court in Milan 
had condemned the giant Italian energy company ENI due to corruption activities in 
Kazakhstan. According to the investigators, ENI had paid at least $20 million in bribes to 
certain Kazakh politicians at the first development stage of the Kashagan field88. This 
also corresponded to parliamentary elections in 2012. 
Domestic Socio-Economic Discontent 
In addition to these corruption scandals, in 2011 Kazakhstan was facing mass protests 
from oil workers. The 2011 Zhanaozen mass protest (that took place across the Mangistau 
region) of oil workers expressed the grievances over the use of natural resources and the 
popular exclusion from its profits. The protests ended in violence, which left more than a 
dozen dead and temporarily shook the stability of the country leading the government to 
proclaim a state of emergency. The incident in Zhanaozen destabilised the country’s 
autocratic rule by allowing the rise of opposition movements demanding accountability 
from the government of Nazarbayev. In the same year, Kazakhstan was facing 
presidential elections.
The Zhanaozen oil protests alarmed the regime about the stability of the country and its 
rule. As recent studies demonstrate, with the rise of Colour Revolutions, popular revolts 
increasingly posed a threat to autocratic leaders. The popular mass protests of the ‘Colour 
Revolutions’ more than ever highlighted that autocratic leaders did not only face threats
from their elites but also from the popular masses. Popular protest sends costly signals to 
the leaders, as they represent a serious threat to regime stability. In such a context, as the 
study of Taylor and Frantz (2014) demonstrates, leaders are more likely to place greater 
emphasis on addressing threats from mass protests and respond to the demands of the 
population. Access to mineral resources is crucial for the Kazakh economy, hence, a halt 
in the extractive sector posed a threat to the country’s economic stability. As Umbetalieva 
and Satpayev (2015) report, the oil strike caused great damage to state oil production. 
Moreover, the country’s political and economic stability represent an important factor for 
FDI investments. More importantly, however, the incident demonstrated the 
                                                            
88 Reuthers, (2012). REFILE-UPDATE 1-Eni probe will not stall Kazakh oil project. Reuthers, May 
11,2012. [Online]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/eni-kazakhstan-
idUSL5E8GB89220120511 [Accessed: 27 September 2016].
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repercussions state practices of handling resource rents can have on peace and stability of 
the country. As mentioned in earlier Chapters, the resource curse has been associated with 
institutional causes of violence and civil conflicts (Ross, 2004; Le Billion, 2001; Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2005). In this regard, the government of Kazakhstan could not ignore 
protesters’ demands in Zhanaozen, as they carried the power to bring about significant 
destabilisation. Moreover, as the academic literature further argues, repression against 
protesters (as in the Zhanaozen oil protests leading to the shooting of civilians) runs the 
risk of leading to high reputational concerns for domestic and international audiences,
potentially increasing the base of support for opposition groups and placing greater 
pressure on the government (Giraud et al., 2016). Therefore, in 2012 in light of the 
Zhanozen events coupled with parliamentary elections, the government was pressured to 
respond to some provisions demanded by the oil protesters. The EITI served as a perfect 
tool to respond to the demands regarding greater transparency and sharing of revenues in 
the extractive sector. To further demonstrate its empathy with the oil workers, the 
President further dismissed his son-in-law Kulibaev from the post of CEO of Samruk-
Kazyna and accused the entire management of irresponsibility. The move of firing his 
son-in-law, as many observe, was a strategic decision to stop the conflict and shield 
Nazarbayev and portray Kazakhstan as a haven of stability in Central Asia (Kusznir,
2012; BBC, 2012). 
Domestic instabilities and corruption scandals, if left unaddressed can represent a real 
threat to the country’s leadership. Therefore, as Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991, p. 80) 
argue, “the perception of and response to the corrupt activity among sizable or powerful 
groups can transform corruption into a politically salient issue”. In this regard, the 
adoption of the EITI as an anti-corruption measure was mainly motivated by political 
calculus, as the accusation of corruption can represent a potentially powerful political 
weapon for the party’s leadership. In such a context, as White (1996, p. 163) argues, the 
leadership tends to steal the latter's thunder by giving prominence to the issues
themselves. In this sense, as Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991, p. 82) argue, political 
corruption clean-ups serve to legitimate the regime in place: 
“cleanups are political instruments which may be used to achieve several 
objectives: to delegitimate the previous regime, to purge opposition, to manipulate 
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the political agenda, or to decrease the incidence of corruption and thereby 
legitimate the current regime” 
In their study, the authors identify internal and external stimuli for political corruption 
clean-ups to occur. Internal stimuli stem from domestic socio-economic tensions posing 
challenges to the incumbent. External stimuli originate from outside the country having 
major implications for the domestic political development. Following this framework, in 
Kazakhstan both internal and external stimuli prompted the adoption of the Initiative.
As seen above, the largest incidents of corruption involve the international petroleum 
companies and the Kazakh government. The ensueing international publicity can have a 
damaging effect on the image of the President and its political leadership, particularly in 
times of elections. Moreover, in Kazakhstan the social feeling of injustice gradually 
spread among different layers of the population. In addition to Zhanozen in 2011, the 
2016 land reform protests that spread in different corners of the country further 
highlighted the discontent among the population due to the worsening of the economic 
climate, the governance of the country and the pervasive effects of corruption. Such 
events raised concerns about stability and security in the country. Popular unrest can 
prompt a virulent press campaign against corruption and further pose a threat to the 
legitimacy of the regime in place (Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991).
In such a context, the adoption of anti-corruption institutions, such as the EITI merely 
serves to divert popular attention from real socio-economic conditions. In addition to 
domestic pressure, in 2012 Kazakhstan was also facing pressure from the EITI 
International Board to complete the validation process, otherwise its status was to be 
revoked.
As Osin Tansey further observes (2016), when autocratic regimes face intense pressure 
from their domestic audience and certain quarters of the international community, 
authoritarian states may opt for international diplomacy, or in Tansey’s terms “diplomatic 
sponsorship”, as a strategic choice to reinforce its regime. Such form of “diplomatic 
sponsorship is designed to reassure and protect incumbents rather than to pressurise and 
compel” (Tansey, 2016, p. 69). Such measures further allow the government to control 
the rise of opposition movements and reinforce its domestic legitimacy. The EITI 
represented an important tool to foster the nation’s reputational capital and, therefore, the 
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government expressed its credible commitment to comply with the Initiative’s 
requirements. By creating and engaging with anti-corruption measures, the government 
of Kazakhstan would appear to address the problem and ease the popular tensions, while 
in reality business as usual continued.
As the literature on autocratic regimes outlines, in times of elections (even if they are 
flawed) the leaders seek more than ever to get their power legitimised by their citizens
(Morgenbesser, 2017; Gandhi, 2008; Levitsky and Way,2002). In this regard, leaders 
would seek to conform to some established rules of political power to ensure their 
legitimacy (Miller, 2014). Further, when the regime faces domestic instabilities, autocrats 
can then implement strategic policy concessions in the form of general public goods or 
appeals to specific groups (Miller, 2014; Gandhi, 2008). As the literature points out (see 
Desai et al., 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), when popular revolt unsettles the 
status quo, rulers engage in strategic concessions to pre-empt violent popular revolt, as 
this can cause their removal from power. In this sense, as Desai and al (2009, p. 97) state:
“although autocrats would prefer to keep all available rents and set policies according to 
their own preferences, they will share rents and/or accommodate policies toward citizens’ 
preferences in order to limit popular discontent, or to contain the threat of a coup or 
uprising”. As Jenifer Gandhi (2008) further argues, mass mobilisation compels autocratic 
leaders to make concessions. This means share rents and establish institutions that give 
credibility to such concessions. In this regard, the EITI was a perfect tool for the 
government to strike a deal accomodating popular discontent and to enhance its 
legitimacy. By accessing an international initiative that fights corruption in the extractive 
sector, the Kazakh government was demonstrating its credible commitment to address the 
issue of corruption in the extractive sector and improve resource revenue sharing for its
population. In this way, the government responded to citizens’ demands by offering a 
tangible and formalised policy concession. Yet, as Gandhi and Przeworsk (2007) observe,
such policy concessions, however, subvert their actual intent. As such policy concessions 
require an institutional setting that allows leaders to continue to practice their rentier 
behaviour and ensure their survival. 
The EITI framework offers a particularly good venue for realising such concessions. The 
voluntary aspect of the EITI with its weak institutional design (that primarily focuses on 
the consolidation of revenues received) represent little added burden for autocratic leaders 
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and does not pose a challenge to practices of ‘business as usual’ in Kazakhstan. If reforms 
had constituted a threat to the informal practices of the regime and its actors, the Initiative 
would not have been adopted in the first place. Clearly, the authoritarian state of 
Kazakhstan learned to bypass international reforms that could pose a threat to its informal 
practices. Such observations are largely attributed to the voluntary and flexible character 
of EITI policies on disclosure of contractual procedures. Under the current Initiative’s 
guidance, there is no mandatory clause on disclosure of contracts negotiated between 
companies and governments. The EITI Business Guide (2013c p. 18) explicitly states: “if 
confidentiality clauses prevent companies from publishing commercially sensitive 
information, the government must provide a clear and unambiguous indication to each 
company that the clause does not apply in the case of EITI implementation”. Hence, since 
the EITI does not require the disclosure of contracts, governments and companies will 
ultimately adopt a level of disclosure that will not risk to expose any sort of illicit 
activities occuring between companies and governments. This is particularly evident in 
the ‘Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use’. One of the most visible commitments of the 
government to EITI implementation can be highlighted by pointing to amendments made 
to the 2010 ‘Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use’89. According to Article 8 clause 2, Article 
50 clause (3.8) and 76 section 1 clause (6), and clause (22) subsoiled users are obliged to 
comply with the Memorandum of Understanding related to EITI requirements: 
                                                            
89 Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (2010). ɈɧɟɞɪɚɯɢɧɟɞɪɨɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɢɁɚɤɨɧɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢ
Ʉɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɨɬ ɢɸɧɹɝɨɞɚʋ-IV.[Online]. Available at: 
http://geology.gov.kz/images/stories/Zakoni/o_nedrah_i_nedropolzovanii.pdf [Accessed: 29 October, 
2016].
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Article 50, subsection 3.8 related to bidding obligations must contain: 
“Obligations to the Memorandum of Understanding with respect to the implementation 
of the Initiative on Transparent Performance of Extractive Industries in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan prior to the signing of a contract, except for the bids for obtaining the
subsurface use right with respect to commonly occurring minerals and underground 
water.” 
Article 76 on subsoil user obligations: 
Clause 1. 6 states: 
“Follow the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding relating to the implementation 
of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in the Republic of Kazakhstan, with the 
exception of contracts for ground waters and commonly occurring minerals.” 
Clause 1. 22 states: 
The subsoil users must submit a report confirmed by an audit report in compliance with 
EITI requirements laid out and approved by the government of Kazakhstan”. 
Article 8 on subsoil use operations
“Transfer of information, which is recognised by the parties as confidential, to state 
bodies, the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and local representative bodies shall 
not be treated as a breach of confidentiality.” 
Yet, although to recognise the EITI as mandatory and not as a voluntary exercise is an 
important step, the present regulations give large room for manoeuvre and lack clarity in 
their formulations. This applies particularly to Article 8 on subsoil use operations, on the 
clause of confidentiality and the extent to which reporting done in the EITI by both 
companies and the government is really representative? Another issue is raised regarding 
pre-existing contracts; the current regulation makes reporting compulsory for new 
companies, but it has no such explicit provision for pre-existing contracts. Finally, the 
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present law demands companies to provide reporting certified by an audit in accordance 
with EITI requirements. However, how can one be sure that auditing is truly accountable? 
A review from the EITI national MSG in Kazakhstan reveals that small companies are 
unlikely to comply with these laws (EITI, 2012). 
Additionally, the government of Kazakhstan further learned to use the weaknesses of the 
EITI design to its own advantage. One of the main weaknesses of the EITI design is 
mainly attributed to its failure to capture the expenditure side of revenues. The focus of 
the Initiative is concentrated only on the collection of revenues derived from extractive 
industries and fails to effectively capture the expenditure side. Currently, the EITI 
requires companies and the government to report their revenues and payments on a
disaggregated basis. With regard to the expenditure side, revised EITI Standard (2016) 
only demands ‘social expenditures’ made by companies or states to be reported. Hence,
it fails to capture the broader and more corrosive aspect of revenue expenditures. Indeed, 
as many studies on resource rentierism indicate (see Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001; Shaxson, 
2007), the aspect of revenue expenditure in a resource-rich and rentier country, such as 
Kazakhstan, forms a central element of regime survival and its functioning. In a client-
patron regime type, governments tend to redistribute rents to their favoured supporters,
which ensures regime longevity and its rent-seeking interests. My informal 
communication with members active in the extractive industries indicate that the state-
owned company KazMunaiGaz often performs national tasks, such as financing local 
populations and provide social services that makes it ‘act as a state’. Such government 
tactics to divert capital from NOC to social welfare only contributes to worsen the issue 
of accountability and serves to reinforce the authoritarian practices of regime patronage. 
By making use of NOC as ‘welfare state provider’, the state demonstrates that it is sharing 
the benefits of natural resources with the population and, as such, keeps the population 
from demand state accountability.
Moreover, the current framing of the EITI as multi-stakeholder institution realises a
tightly controlled state-build design that embeds crystallisation of different strata of the 
population and social hierarchies. Clearly, the EITI platform is used symbolically to 
legitimise state interests and consolidate authoritarian practices of the regime. As such,
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although in practice and formally the EITI is designed as a MSG, in reality, however, its
functioning is highly centralised by the state apparatus. 
Figure 5. EITI MSG Organisation in Kazakhstan
The illustration of the MSG demonstrates that the degree of autonomy of each unit of 
actors is limited as their decisions and activity are performed under the watchful eye of 
the ‘invisible’ centralised authority of the state. In Kazakhstan parliamentarians are key 
players in the EITI multi-stakeholder group. The parliamentary body is responsible for 
monitoring the transposition of the EITI into national legislation. However, since the 
appointment of the MSG is made by the government, there is a chance that the 
appointment of the EITI MSG is not based on a broader national interest but rather on the 
interests of the narrow elite, leaving citizens aside. Currently, the Minister of Ministry of 
Investment and Development Zhenis Kassymbek is in charge of the EITI implementation 
in the country. At the time of writing, he announced a proposal to replace a part of NCS 
candidates for whom NCS members voted unanimously (Kazakhstan Committee of 
Geology and Subsoil Use website, 2016). Although such decisions represent a breach to 
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EITI practices, they, however, increasingly reflect the authoritarian mechanisms of 
domestic power overruling international standards and their effective implementation. 
Clearly, as the table above illustrates, the regime affects every actor of the MSG via its 
state agencies. Such conditions further compel us to question what role, if any, EITI non-
state actors play? 
6.2.2 EITI Non-State Actors
Civil Society 
Civil society in EITI Kazakhstan is represented by the Civic Alliance of Kazakhstan, civil 
society members from the coalition on ‘Oil Revenues under the Public Oversight’, the 
Society of Young Professionals of Kazakhstan, the Union of Civil Society from the 
southern oblasts of Kazakhstan, the Independent Confederation of Unions from the 
Aktobe oblast. Overall, more than 800 civil society organisations are part of the civil 
society representation. They are very diverse in their activities90. However, at the time of 
writing, the most represented and active civil society organsiations were the once 
operating through the Civic Alliance of Kazakhstan and civil society members from the 
Coalition on ‘Oil Revenues under the Public Oversight’.
In 2009, there was disagreement among the members of the national MSG. In the process 
of achieving first validation in 2010, the WikiLeaks cable conversation of members of 
the EITI coalition (WikiLeaks cable, 201191) reports that the validators and members of 
civil society coalition expressed concerns about companies and the government 
complying with the most basic requirement of the EITI. The cable demonstrates that in 
2009 civil society members, as, for instance, the coalition on ‘Oil Revenues Under Public 
Oversight’, were concerned that the government and energy companies will not have any 
further incentives to push for greater transparency, once Kazakhstan would pass 
validation in 2010 (WikiLeaks cable, 2011). In the same WikiLeaks cable, the EITI 
validator further reports that in 2009, when they approached the national oil company 
KazMunaiGas (KMG) to ask questions about its cash flow and its contributions to 
                                                            
90 Author’s Skype interview with a member of the EITI civil society coalition Astana, 15 June 2016.
91 WikiLeaks Cable (2011). KAZAKHSTAN CLOSES IN ON EITI VALIDATION 
https://wikileakskz.wordpress.com/category/unclassifiedfor-official-use-only/page/4/ [Accessed: 2 
November 2016)
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government revenue, the KMG refused to meet with them (WikiLeaks cable, 2011). As a 
result of such tensions, as my interview with a member from the coalition from the ‘Oil 
Revenues under the Public Oversight’ further corroborates, a part of the civil society 
actors involved in the EITI process considered that there should have been more 
aggressive actions from the side of the civil society towards the government and 
companies to comply with EITI requirements. Civil society groups were split in two 
camps: One camp considered that it was important to pursue more aggressive and direct 
actions so that Kazakhstan would not pass the first validation process. Another camp 
insisted on Kazakhstan to pass the validation due to fears that in the opposite case the 
government would lose its interest in the Initiative or in the topic of promoting 
transparency92. Moreover, in that moment there was also criticism that civil society 
groups where not equally represented, or that there was a monopolisation of certain 
groups of civil society leaving no space for others to participate. The disagreements 
among civil society groups led to the temporary entrance of the Civic Alliance from the 
EITI coalition. At the same time, companies and the government vetoed the decisions of 
the civil society members, as decision-making is based on unanimity of all the members 
of the EITI coalition. Hence, as a result of these internal disagreements within the 
coalition, in 2010 Kazakhstan did not pass the validation process. Yet, at some point, the 
three actors were obliged to come to a consensus in order to continue implementing the 
EITI. This incident highlights that when external pressure outweighs the domestic costs 
of non-compliance, an autocratic state is able to make concessions. In the case of 
Kazakhstan, the pressure of not being allowed to enter the EITI represented high 
reputational costs to the image of the state. Kazakhstan increasingly seeks to portray itself 
as being part of the ‘global community’ of modern nation-states. The failure of not 
passing the first validation in 2010 was perceived as a ‘tar’ to the image of the state. Faced 
with the pressure of the International EITI Board, the government changed its behaviour 
and worked towards passing the second validation, otherwise running the risk to be 
delisted from the EITI. The realisation that full EITI compliance could not be achieved 
without an effective MSG pushed the government to enter in dialogue with civil society 
actors. The companies in this process followed government decisions, as their business 
interests were tied up to it. The creation of dialogue with civil society actors was as such 
                                                            
92 Author’s interviews with a member of the EITI coalition of the Civil society, 15 June 2015, Astana.
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instrumental for the state’s interests. However, this does not mean that civil society actors 
are powerful within the coalition. As the case study revealed, their role is largely 
marginal, yet in extreme cases, when government interests are tied up to civil society 
actor, the state creates opportunities that expand their scope of action. 
Among the civil society coalition and with the aim to pass the second validation, it was 
decided that it was important to to act as a united body in the coalition. For this reason, 
the members of the coalition on ‘Oil Revenue under Public oversight’ decided to create a 
dialogue platform that should serve as a tool for improving interactions, effective 
participations and enhance decision-making processes among civil society groups in the 
EITI national MSG. In doing so, it 1) provided a platform for all civil society actors to 
express their opinion, and what they want from the Initiative in Kazakhstan; 2) through 
an electoral voting system, it gives opportunities to all civil society groups to participate 
in the EITI MSG. Elections are held on a yearly basis. Each group of civil society chooses 
three candidates from its association to participate in the EITI national MSG. Electoral 
members vote the candidate according to a point base system from one to six. All scores 
are then counted by an electoral committee in the presence of an auditing group including 
members from the Soros Foundation or Eurasian Bank. The first three candidates are the 
main representatives of civil society group in the EITI national MSG, the other three serve 
as deputy members of the association. Information about the EITI is transmitted via these 
members. Such system allows any member of civil society outside the national EITI 
coalition to access information on the EITI. However, as my interview with a civil society 
member reports, it is nevertheless difficult for the population to access this information. 
Moreover, channelling information and civil society representation through such a 
platform raises some questions as to what extent the views of all the NGOs are truly 
accountable to the constituencies they represent. The EITI validation report 2013 in 
Kazakhstan notes that requests from external NGO to the EITI are automatically directed 
to NGOs in the national EITI coalition, which as a result can create a barrier or filter to 
an adequate response (EITI Validation Report, 2013b). 
Civil society in the EITI process largely supports government activities and, hence, its 
role is largely limited to the confines set by the government. A large proportion of civil 
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society in the EITI is represented by the Civic Alliance of Kazakhstan93, which is largely 
pro-government. Such associations can become an ‘iconic partnership’ or an alternative 
way to expand the government’s voice. As documented in the literature, political 
involvement with NGOs can further lead to preferential treatment and bribing (Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2013; Ziegler, 2015). As several authors observe (Charman and Assangaziyev, 
2015; Bhuiyan and Amagoh, 2011), civil society in Kazakhstan is largely used as an 
essential tool for Nazarbayev’sregime to ensure public service delivery in light of 
government strategies (as, for instance, ‘Kazakhstan 2030 National Strategy’ and lately 
‘Kazakhstan 2050 National Strategy’) to build a competitive socio-economic 
environment. Yet, such reforms are implemented in an increasingly coercive and corrupt 
political landscape, in which the government rewards its followers via the redistribution 
of economic advantages or spoils in political office. Consequently, the processes within 
civil society are principally driven ‘top-down’. Further, as in the case of Kyrgyzstan, the 
state of Kazakhstan makes a distinction between threatening and non-threatening civil 
society groups. Threatening groups, such as human rights advocacy groups, are very 
closely monitored by the state apparatus, and their scope for action is significantly 
reduced in comparison to non-threatening civil society groups, which are to a large part 
merely societal apolitical service providers. In such a context, collaboration between state 
and civil society largely depends on the sensitivity of the topic. At present, within the 
government of Kazakhstan, the idea to promote an independent civil society is alien; civil 
society groups merely act as providers of social services to the public, thus as 
intermediators in the affairs of the state and society by raising issues and dealing with 
issues in ways that are not threatening to the state. At the same time, the state also 
participates in nurturing and creating a civil societal culture that supports regime 
legitimacy (Charman and Assangaziyev, 2015; Bhuiyan and Amagoh, 2011).
Such framing raises concerns about the representation of civic space and freedom for 
action within the civil society coalition. In fact, to what extent is civil society truly free 
from state domination? Interviews report that civil society mainly intervenes for minor 
decisions not affecting state interests.94 Such observations suggest that politicised issues 
                                                            
93 See Appendix 5:  EITI member composition: ³ɄɨɧɬɚɤɬɵɱɥɟɧɨɜɇɋɁɋɢɢɯɡɚɦɟɫɬɢɬɟɥɟɣ´
provided by the EITI Secretariat in Oslo. 
94 Author’s informal interview with an employee of BG Group Kazakhstan, 4 June 2015, Astana.
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are not discussed. The little space that civil society has for action is largely taken up by 
communication about the EITI and revelation of information in the EITI reporting.
As the EITI national Secretariat states: 
“Well civil society plays an important role. For example they told us that the reporting 
was too complicated to read and needed to be simplified. In this sense yes, we learn 
something as well” ( EITI NSC National Sectretariat, 10 June, 2015, Astana).
In the opinion poll survey, 58.5 per cent responded that they received information about 
the EITI from civil society, 23.8 per cent from the government, 10.9 per cent from 
companies95. Interviews with members of the EITI coalition and independent experts 
indicate that the civil society groups within the EITI lack technical expertise and 
knowledge to basically understand the financial reporting produced by companies96.
Moreover, the population is marginalised in the EITI process. Such issues raise further 
questions about interest representation: To what extent does civil society represent the 
population’s demands and concerns about effective resource sharing? Until 2014, the 
respective information was not available on websites or leaflets. It was mainly accessible 
in the major cities, i.e. at the country’s national level and in turn hardly accessible at the 
regional local and rural levels97. A 2014 report of the World Bank on EITI civil society 
engagement in Kazakhstan98 indicates that prior to 2013, a communication strategy with 
the wider population was absent. The report further highlights that even the most detailed 
document presented by the NGO Coalition ‘Oil Revenues—Under Public Control’
outlining a communication strategy was never implemented. In total, the report found that 
although attempts were made improve communication strategy, this plans never 
materialised. Such findings illustrate a lack of transparency on the dissemination of 
information to the population.
                                                            
95 Survey Results Public Opinion Institute, October-November,2015.
96 Author’s Skype interviews with a member of the EITI coalition of the Civil society, 15 June 2015, 
Astana. 
97 Author’s interviews with a member of the EITI coalition KazEnergyAssociation, 5 June 2015, Astana.
Author’s Skype interview with a member of the EITI coalition of the Civil society, 15 June 2015, Astana. 
Author’s interviews with a member of the EITI coalition The World Bank, 29 June  2015, Astana.
98 Appendixe, The World Bank Report Report No: ACS9609, Expanding Civil Society Engagement in 
EITI in Kazakhstan Communications and Regional Outreach
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Donors
Moreover, the EITI field work observations demonstrate that the tightening of 
authoritarian practices in Kazakhstan affected the behaviour of donor agencies. Donor 
agencies are more cautious in their collaboration with civil society, as this also impacts 
on their interaction with the state but also on their work in the country. Their role as agents 
of democracy promotion in Kazakhstan was replaced in favour of engagement insocial 
partnership, state collaboration and capacity-building discourse. Many international 
donor agencies collaborate with the state and its state-run civil society groups in social 
service provision and capacity-building. As one interview member of the Ebert 
Foundation indicates “We don’t act aggressively or against the government. We try to 
show that our aim is not to start a revolution hence working a lot in transparency. The 
goal is to enhance expertise of the civil society”99. Similarly, the interview with EITI 
national Secretariat confirms that international donor agencies such as the World Bank 
play an important role in supporting workshop activities in the EITI process100.
In the framework of the EITI, the principal task of donor agencies is to support the role 
of civil society and the development of its capacity. A large part of this function is 
exercised through the World Bank MDTF that liaises with civil society and donor 
organisation regarding various EITI project developments. For instance, in 2013, the 
World Bank launched a project aiming to strengthen the communication strategy of the 
EITI in Kazakhstan. An important part of this project involved the participation of civil 
society and improvement of its capacity building efforts. In particular, through the 
involvement of donor organisations, such as the Soros Foundation, the project aimed to 
reinforce civil society expertise on the EITI and communicating the EITI to the wider 
population101. The interviewed member of the Soros Foundation102 further confirmed that 
their principal work in the EITI revolves around supporting EITI implementation and, 
more precisely, enhancing the capacity building of civil society and their expertise. 
However, the role and work of donor agencies is not always welcomed. Interviewed 
members of the EITI collation indicate that external involvement in the national MSG as, 
                                                            
99 Author’s interview with a Fond Eber Member, Almaty, 2 June  2015.
100 Author’s interviews with EITI national Secretariat in Kazakhstan, Astana,10 June,2015.
101 See Appendixe, The World Bank Report No. ACS9609 Republic of Kazakhstan, Expanding Civil 
Society Engagement in EITI in Kazakhstan Communications and Regional Outreach. 
102 Author’s interview with a member of the Soros Foundation, Almaty, 2 June 2015
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for instance, from the World Bank regarding the implementation of the EITI in 
Kazakhstan is not well received by some members. As the interview with a member of 
the company (also involved in the EITI MSG) indicates: “The World Bank has taken its 
role in the initiative a bit too seriously”103. Moreover, the deepening of the Initiative in 
some issues, as, for instance, beneficial ownership, pose problems for many international 
companies104. As my interview with a representative of a company (also involved in the 
EITI MSG) indicates: “Why do we need to deepen up the initiative, why should we 
provide additional data on beneficial ownership. We should focus efforts on enhancing 
the expertise of civil society at first”. In this sense, the role of donor agencies is challenged 
by actors involved in the EITI, which further exacerbates their work to improve good 
governance and population empowerment. According to Stefen Brown (2011), once 
donors operate in the country, they become actors in domestic politics. However, as 
Brown argues (2005; 2011) by focusing on technical and capacity-building standards, 
donors downplay the deficiencies of autocratic regimes. As Brown (2005) further states, 
competing exogenous factors, such as geopolitical and commercial interests of Western 
states, put pressure on donor communities to maintain the status-quo in the region, which 
as a result prevent donors to actively condemn the wrong-doings of the autocratic 
government. In the aftermath of the Colour Revolutions, autocratic states became 
increasingly suspicious towards Western governments and the influence of their wider 
institutions on domestic politics and popular mobilisation105. Moreover, in the case of 
Kazakhstan, Western governments have direct interests in maintaining good relations 
with the Nazarbayev government, as their energy interests are at stake. A more illustrative 
example of such practices comes with the Azerbaijani suspension in the EITI. In 2016, 
the EITI International Board issued an ultimatum to the government by giving it four 
months to rewrite its legislation on NGOs otherwise Azerbaijan would risk complete 
removal from the EITI106. However, governments and international foreign companies on 
the group’s Board (EITI International Secretariat) were asking NGOs to delay such 
                                                            
103 Author’s interviews with a member of the EITI coalition of the Company North Caspian operating 
company, 5 June 2015 Astana
104 Author’s informal interview with a member of an international company BG Group, June 2015, 
Astana. 
105 Author informal interview with the employee of the Friedrich Eberti Foundation, 2 June 2, 2015, 
Almaty.
106 On March 10,2017, the government of Azerbaijan decided to withdraw from the EITI process
following EITI International board’s decision to suspend the country’s membership., 
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 175
 
 
 
 
actions, as it could jeopardise energy deals with Azerbaijan. It is highly stipulated that 
Azerbaijan’s removal from the EITI would be followed loans suspension to fund it energy 
project in Southern Gas Corridor project from the World Bank and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) both significant actors in the EITI. As the 
FT (2016b) reports, the United States was against such aggressive actions. As this 
example illustrates, the EITI is very much dependent on the geopolitics of energy 
pipelines. Such a situation consequently affects the work of donor agencies on ‘blaming 
and shaming’ to effectively put pressure on the government on their actions. Although 
the work on improving and strengthening the capacity of local actors is important, 
however, it would be reckless to ignore domestic factors impeding on democracy 
promotion. In the case of Kazakhstan, as discussed throughout this Chapter, domestic 
actors such as civil society organisations, media and judicial institutions are tightly 
controlled by the Kazakh government. In such a context, external factors such as donors 
can constitute an import tool to advocate for enhanced accountability of the government, 
however, in the present case, we should not ignore that donors are constrained by their 
own internal politics and the agenda of Western states. In doing so, donors’ cautious 
approach risk to legitimise the current autocratic practices of the regime and further 
undermines the value of EITI objectives. Donors’ strategic policy change towards 
reinforcing state institutions through technical assistance and capacity-building efforts 
subvert efforts to pursue wider advocacy goals by exerting normative pressure and 
condemning the government for its wrong doing. In concentrating efforts on technical 
aspcts and shying away from advocacy goals, donors indirectly contribute to consolidate 
authoritarian practices and shield autocratic leaders from wrong doings. As the literature 
observes, autocratic states that do not face external criticism are more likely to escape the 
consequence of their actions. As Nicolas Van de Walle (2014, pp. 66-67) astutely points 
out, in the context of authoritarian states, promoting horizontal accountability, such as 
checks and balances, may have much smaller impact that promoting vertical 
accountability, as a freer press, citizen participation and stronger civil society. As such, 
without strong vertical accountability mechanisms that put pressure on the government to 
establish greater accountability regarding their revenue spending, the political elite in 
Kazakhstan are like to abuse their state power when (using the country’s national 
resources.
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The Extractive Sector 
Prior to 2012, companies were represented on a rotation basis (changing representation 
once every two years),107 at present all companies in the EITI are represented through 
KazEnergyAssociation. My interviews stated that prior to this change; corporate 
engagement in the EITI was much more active and more interesting108. Many refer to 
ExxonMobil, Statoil or BG Group’s active involvement in the Initiative in the earlier 
years. A EITI minute dating back to 2009 illustrates that international companies, such as 
Statoil and ExxonMobil Kazakhstan, were actively involved in EITI meetings. Now, 
however, many note that since the creation of KazEnergy Association, there is only 
minimum involvement from companies109. As my interviews reported, the companies in 
the EITI process comply at its most basic level, thus through reporting of revenues.
KazEnergy Association was established by the government in 2005 as an independent 
non-profit voluntary association designed to promote investor and government relations 
in the oil and gas sector. It addition to the representation of companies by industrial 
associations, it was further agreed that an additional seat for companies should be held by 
one of the major oil producing companies, subject to agreement by the members of 
KazEnergy Association and approved by the EITI national MSG. Since 2012, this 
position was held by Shell Kazakhstan Development BV with Statoil as the nominated 
alternate, but since early 2013, Statoil was replaced by the North Caspian Operating 
Company (NCOC) (EITI Validation Report, 2013). 
Within the EITI coalition, the status of KazEnergy Association raises a potential conflict 
of interest as: 1) it is government's authority; 2) it is the representing body of all the 
companies involved in the EITI; and 3) it represents the interests of the national oil fund 
Samruk-Kazyna and state-owned company KazMunayGas. KazEnergy Association 
unites more than 50 large oil-gas and energy companies operating in Kazakhstan. The 
chairman of the KazEnergy Association is Timur A. Kulibayev who is also the son-in-
law of Nazarbayev. At the same time, Timur A. Kulibayev is also a member of the Board 
of Directors of JSC ‘Fund of National Welfare Samruk-Kazyna’. The Director of 
KazEnergy Association elected in 2016 is Bolat Uralovich Akchulakov who is also the 
                                                            
107 See EITI Validation Report, 2013.
108 Author’s interview with an employee of BG Group Kazakhstan, 4 June 2015, Astana. Author’s 
interview with the World Bank official, 29 June 2016, Skype meeting in Brussels. 
109 Author’s Skype Interview with EITI World Bank representative, 29 June 2016, Brussels.
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President of the National Company KazMunayGas since October 2011 (Bloomberg n.d.-
a; Bloomberg Website, n.d.-b). Prior to his arrival, this position was held by Aset 
Magauov who previously held the position of Director in ‘Mangistaumunaigas’ JSC that 
is fully owned by KazMunayGas and was also leading the EITI process from 2010-2011 
(KazEnergy Association website, 2011; PetroChina Company Limited website, 2009). 
Tracing back these representations one can clearly see that KazEnergy Association also 
equals to KazMunayGas (the state-run company) and the state appatus. Being a state-run 
company, KazMunayGas represents the government's interests in the oil and gas sector 
and is 90 per cent owned by ‘Samruk-Kazyna’ National Welfare Fund JSC, and 10% of 
the company’s shares are also owned by National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan110.
And as stated above, it is also an important equity partner in major projects, such as 
Tengiz and Kashagan. As such, one can clearly see that rather than to represent the 
interests of companies, it represents the interests of the state. By appointing family 
members and members of state-run company to the board of KazEnergyAssociation, 
Nazarbayev’s regime maintains full control over energy operations in the country. As 
consequence, there is little room for international companies, as their operations are 
significantly dependent on the state in order to continue business in the country. 
Given that the President’s son-in-law and his close political circle are the principled board 
members of the KazEnergy Association and are also acting in the state administration and 
previously served in the state-owned company KazMunayGas, it then becomes clear that 
such forms of business association are rather adopted as pragmatic strategies to formalise 
informal relations, thus they are more like a form of control that serves to monitor 
stakeholders operations. As Kusznir (2012, p. 115) points out, in an environment where 
state institutions are weak, the elite allocates rents autonomously, as market and politics 
do not provide mechanisms for political and economic control (Ibid). As such, KazEnergy
Association rather than acting as independent and neutral body acts as a state institutions 
steered by political and oil elites in power. Such a concentration of power gives little 
space to international companies to raise their concerns in the EITI, as their business 
activities are dependent on state decisions. In such an environment, foreign companies 
are likely to make concessions and opt for the status-quo. In doing so, foreign companies 
                                                            
110 KazMunayGas website.( n.d). About the company. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.kmg.kz/en/about/ [Accessed : 4 April,2016].
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use the political system to their own advantage to purse their business operation in the 
country. Such observations are further reflected within the EITI reporting. When it comes 
to transparency in the resource sector, members of the business sector and the government 
indicated that “too much transparency is not good for business—there needs to be 
commercial secrecy and a balance between transparency and ‘non-transparency’. This is 
important for both governments and companies’ interests”111. This statement further 
reflects on the disclosure of contracts. Interviews with members from the extractive sector 
indicate that only half of the contractual agreements are reported, big contracts are not 
disclosed. Hence, many contracts are negotiated behind closed doors112.
The foundation of the EITI is the disclosure of revenues, which requires governments and 
companies to be the subject of a significant degree of scrutiny. Under EITI standards, 
governments must record their revenues they receive from extractive industries (publish 
what you earn) and extractive companies operating within the government’s territory 
must disclose what they pay to government bodies (‘publish what you pay’). The present 
EITI reporting consolidates data from both national and international companies and 
includes data on tax and non-tax payments related to the extractive industries, social 
payments to local budget, royalties and bonuses. It further provides a breakdown of the 
information of payments made to the republican, local and national oil fund. In doing so, 
it provides information on how revenues are allocated in government budgets. Until 2011, 
the reporting was made on an aggregated base with no disaggregation by individual 
revenue streams. It also did not include company’s social contributions to the local 
budget. Since 2012, reporting is made on a disaggregated basis and includes social 
spendings by companies to the region where they operate (see EITI Kazakhstan national 
reporting113). Moreover, the reporting of big companies is not explicitly disclosed, their 
reporting is made available through their operating companies. For instance, in the EITI 
                                                            
111 Author’s interviews with the employee of KazTransOil 15 June  2015, Astana.
Author’s interviews with the members of the EITI collation, KazEnergyAssociation, 5 June 2015, Astana.
112 Author’s interviews with the employee of KazTransOil 15 June 2015, Astana.
Author’s interview with an employee of BG Group Kazakhstan, 4 June 2015, Astana.
Author’s interview with Managing Partner of Parlink Consulting /Oil and Gas, 29 April 2015, Paris.
113 See EITI Kazakhstan Website (n-d). National EITI reports. [Online]. Available at: 
http://eiti.geology.gov.kz/en/national-reports [Accessed: 4 April,2016].
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2013 reporting114, big companies (but there are also others see, for instance, EITI 
Reporting Kazakhstan, 2013a) such as Shell or ExxonMobil, are reporting as follows: 
Shell: ‘Branch of Shell Kazakhstan Development BV in Republic of Kazakhstan’
ExxonMobil: ‘Branch of ExxonMobil Kazakhstan Ink. in the Republic of Kazakhstan’
This makes it difficult to identify the final beneficial owner and the relationship with the 
companies with whom they entertain business transactions. As the scandal of the Panama 
Papers revealed, the use of anonymous companies makes is easier for big multinational 
companies to avoid taxs and other legal obligations. Anonymous ownership often serves 
as a vehicle to conceal illicit wealth through third party involvement (often being political 
leaders). This perhaps explains why international companies involved in the EITI process 
are against the adoption of EITI beneficial ownership115. Such practices are best 
demonstrated with the case of the Shell and ENI corruption scandal in Nigeria in 2016. 
In 2011, Shell and Eni paid $1.1 billion for one of West Africa’s largest oil fields in 
Nigeria. The purchase of the join offshore block, Oil Prospecting Licence 245 (OPL 245) 
was made through Malabu Oil and Gas, a company that was owned by the former 
Nigerian oil minister Dan EteteInstead (FT, 2016a). In the case of Kazakhstan, such 
practices were highlighted by the scandal of Unaoil Company in 2016 (see Huffington 
Post Report, 2016). The Monaco-based company provided industrial solution services in 
the oil and gas sector in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. The leaked files 
revealed how companies, such as ENI, Aker Kvaerner and GATE, used Unaoil as a 
middleman to win government contracts in oil-rich Kazakhstan; a more prominent 
illustration of such practices was also the James Giffin scandal mentioned above. In doing 
so and as pointed out by Oksan Bayulgen (2005, p. 54), FDIs become local actors by 
investing in fixed assets in ad host country and will be more inclined to use the political 
system to further their own interests. FDI guarantees state returns on oil revenues and the 
secrecy of contracts signed with governments. Energy revenues collected through FDI in 
the form of royalties and income taxes feeds the rentier economy of Kazakhstan, further 
consolidating its ruling power (Palazuelos and Fernández, 2012; Bayulgen, 2005). As 
                                                            
114 EITI National Report (2013a). The 9th National Report on implementation of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2013. 
115 Author’ s interview with representative of BG Group, Astana 4 June 2015.
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such, numerous FDIs deals mean more bribes and corruption practices. Consequently, 
such payments are not reported in EITI reports. With the increasing involvement of the 
state in the oil sector that resulted in the tightening of domestic policy towards FDIs, they 
became increasingly vulnerable to state arbitrariness. This perhaps explains also why 
foreign companies are passively active in supporting the EITI process, as more aggressive
participation might hamper their business operations in the country. Under such 
conditions, multinational companies become state tools that contribute to legitimate the 
practice of neopatromonial politics.
Moreover, the lack in revenue reporting is further observed in the National Oil Fund. 
Although the reporting provide data on revenue contribution to the National Oil Fund, 
information on the management and expenditures of the Fund are not revealed. 
Kazakhstan instituted the National Oil Fund for the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2001. The 
Oil Fund was created with the purpose to avoid the ‘Dutch disease’, thus to control the 
impact of volatile oil prices on the economy and to save revenues for future generations. 
All revenues from oil exports first go to this Fund, and from there, a specified amount 
known as the annual guaranteed transfer is put into the state budget (Revenue Watch 
Institute, 2013). However, as a central bank official indicated in an interview with the 
Wall Street Journal (2016), the $64 billion-Oil Fund could run out of money within six 
or seven years due to falling oil prices and the government over-spending on the its from 
the Fund (Wall Street Journal, 2016). Interviews from my field work indicate that there 
is no transparency regarding the management of this Fund, the profit-sharing aspects of 
the agreements for Kazakhstan’s oil fields are not disclosed to the population. In addition, 
there is no legislation that applies to the management and the regulations of the Fund, as 
it was set-up by a presidential decree in the first place. The report of Revenue Watch 
(2013) further states that the little information provided by the National Bank on fund 
assets, transaction and investments is difficult to read and understand. While the 
parliament approves its budget expenditures through formal procedures, financial 
transfers of Oil Fund are not based on disaggregated data. Transfers from the Oil Fund 
budget are deposited along with other budget transfers into one account at the Ministry 
of Finance, making it impossible to track how funds are spent (IIED, 2014, p. 39). 
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Discussion 
The adoption of the EITI was instrumental in responding to domestic and external 
pressure groups. The country’s reputational concerns and domestic legitimacy played an 
important role in the adoption of the Initiative. Clearly, faced with elections, domestic 
instabilities in the extractive sector and corruption scandals, the adoption of the Initiative 
was a tactical move from Nazabayev’s regime to protect its image and legitimacy. In 
doing so, the case highlights that when faced with high political costs, the autocratic 
leader is much more likely to adopt institutional changes towards improving transparency 
in the resource sector. 
However, the adoption of institutional reforms to promote transparency, as the case study 
demonstrates, do not guarantee its effective implementation in practice. As we saw in the 
analysis, institutional reforms are weak and easy to bypass. Further, the regime used the 
formal institutional platform of the EITI strategically to consolidate its power. As such, 
although at the surface the regime appeared to have made concessions, its inside 
dynamics, however, remained unchanged. Through its institutional design, the EITI 
provides a perfect setting that allowed the autocratic leader of Kazakhstan to shield his 
rentier practices from the Initiative, while at the surface pleasing its external audiences. 
As the analysis of the MSG demonstrates, the state created a centralised platform in which 
each individual actor is open to state control or state manipulation. The present format of 
the MSG in Kazakhstan demonstrates that the degree of autonomy of actors is limited, as 
their decisions and activities are performed under the watchful eye of the ‘invisible’
centralised authority of the state. Clearly, the regime’s influence reaches through every 
actor of the MSG. Such a centralisation of power impedes independent actions and limits 
the plural nature of the platform. In fact, what the case study reveals is that the plurality 
of the platform is subject to regime manipulation. The government created a centralised 
web, in which the functions and decisions of civil society groups, donors and extractive 
companies are increasingly state-dependent and state-controlled. In doing so, the case 
demonstrates that in the ETI platform in Kazakhstan the state is increasingly the sole 
decision-making actor dictating the rules of the game. In such a context, the population 
remains largely outside of the game, as one the interviewer states: “Why would it be 
interesting for the population to know about how its revenues from natural resources are 
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spent?”116 A member of the MSG also acknowledged that the issue of sharing rents or 
improving the socio-economic conditions of the population is not a priority for the large 
parts of the members of the EITI coalition, except for civil society and donor actors. 117
The statement of the EITI national Secretariat demonstrates this further:  
“Not everyone needs to know about EITI. There is enough information available on the 
internet. Now all the regions have public hearings where they can hear about EITI” ( EITI 
national Secretariat, Astana 10 June, 2015)
In addition to these dynamics, there is also another important element that influences the 
functioning of the Initiative in Kazakhstan. This factor relates to the decentralisation 
process between the centre and its peripheries. This significantly impedes the EITI 
process and revenue sharing mechanisms with the wider population. The following 
sections examine this element in depth. 
6.2.3 Decentralisation and Fragmentation of the Elite Structures between 
Rural and Urban Areas
A further problem in the EITI in Kazakhstan relates to the distribution of revenue sharing.
Despite the visibility of revenue transfers from companies and governments, reports on 
the spending of revenues is quasi-absent. State institutions provide little information 
about its revenue expenditures and its distribution at local community levels118. EITI 
reports in Kazakhstan provide disaggregated data that include the disclosure of social 
expenditures by companies. However, although this is viewed as a significant step 
towards the improvement of transparency, little information is available on how these 
revenues were spent at local levels. In Kazakhstan, regional Governors, Akimats, hold 
significant power over the management of the regions’ budget planning, the application 
of national legislation and the overall development of the region. Because Akimats are 
responsible for the management and spending of the budget among various rayon’s, 
                                                            
116 Author interviews with a member of the EITI coalition of the Company North Caspian operating 
company, 5 June 5, 2015, Astana.
117 Author’s interviews with a member of the EITI coalition KazEnergy Association, 5 June 2015, Astana.
Author’s Skype interview with a member of the EITI coalition of the Civil society, 15 June 2015, Astana. 
Author’s interviews with a member of the EITI coalition The World Bank, 29 June 2015, Astana.
Author’s interview with an employee of BG Group Kazakhstan, 4 June 2015, Astana.
118 Author’s Skype interviews with a member of the EITI coalition of the Civil society, 15 June 2015, 
Astana. 
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oblast’s the social contributions by foreign companies do not necessarily end up being 
spent in areas adjacent to exploration zones. Hence, corporate social contributions are not 
always visible. Moreover, as a member of the EITI coalition indicates: “the social 
expenditures of the companies once transferred to the local Akimats lack severe 
monitoring over how the money is further spent and distributed to the local 
population”119. In the opinion poll, 87.6 per cent responded that they had not received 
information about the use of natural resource revenues against 12.4 per cent who 
responded positively. As previous studies on devolution in Kazakhstan also indicates (see 
Jones Luong, 2004b), the implementation of national regulatory at the regional level is 
much subject to the influence of the regional Akims.
In Kazakhstan, at the regional level, the local executive power is in the hands of the Akims,
who are directly appointed and dismissed by the President. Akims are responsible for 
realising state policies and for developing economic and social policies in their respective 
administrative and territorial units. As in the case of Kyrgyzstan, local self-governance in 
Kazakhstan is subdivided and characterised by a multi-tier structure. The first tier is 
constituted at oblast level and includes the state administration level in 14 oblasts and 
two cities, Almaty and Astana (with special status to republican subordination and the 
status of oblast administration). The second tier is constituted by the rayon level and 
includes local and state administrations in 160 rayons and 79 cities (Leschenko and
Troshke, 2008). The third tier is situated at the rural level and includes local 
administrations in rural villages (auls). 
As Umbetalieva and Satpayev (2012, p. 87) note, as a result of weak decentralisation 
processes, there is a devide between the political elite at the centre and the state 
administration at the lower levels. Hence, the decisions or communication sent by the 
centre not always directly reaches the lower levels of the state administration apparatus. 
Recent studies (Duisenov et al., 2015; Bhuiyan, 2010) suggest that there is no clear legal 
distinction between central and regional state functions. Furthermore, legislation on 
specific competencies of state agencies are not well-implemented and regulated. Such 
observations demonstrate that the separation of powers and functions between central and 
                                                            
119 Author’s Skype interviews with a member of the EITI coalition of the Civil society, 15 June 2015, 
Astana. 
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local levels of the state administration is fragmented and lacks coordination, where the 
duties of actors are not clearly defined. Such blurring of competencies further impact on 
the collection and redistribution of taxes and the ability to respond to citizens’ demands 
and needs. 
One of the biggest problems in this multilayer governance system relates to the 
redistribution of income between the national and oblast budgets and between the oblast 
and rayon budgets. In Kazakhstan, a large part of the revenues of local authorities derive 
directly from the national budget. The redistribution of the state budget depends on the 
demographic situation of the region. Tax rates are fixed by central and local bodies with 
the exception of land tax that is fixed by regional authorities. In such a process, local 
authorities lack the power to independently manage their regional revenue allocation. 
Since 2002, all corporate income tax is subject to national budget transfers, in return the
government restocks local budgets with revenues from excise duties on alcohol and 
payments for environmental pollution (Makhmutova, 2006; Bhuiyan, 2010). Given the 
importance of the petroleum industry for the Kazakhs economy, it is safe to say that oil 
represents the main source of revenue for the central government. The transfer of 
corporate income tax in 2002 significantly decreased local budget revenues, this 
consequently affected the redistribution of subsidies received from the national budget. 
As Makhmutova (2006, p. 291) in her analysis notes, such a system of allocating charges 
between levels of the budget system turns local authorities not into partners of the 
government but into clients petitioning for resources. Similarly, in her analysis on fiscal 
decentralisation in Kazakhstan, Pauline Jones Luong (2004b, p. 188) observes that 
although tax rates are fixed by the central authority in practice, however, tax rates applied 
at the subnational level are not uniform and are subject to informal renegotiation between 
the regional leaders and the central government. As she demonstrates in her study, when 
it comes to the management of taxes, central tax administrators operating at the 
subnational levels adjust their tax rates according to the “needs and interests of 
subnational government officials” (Ibid). Such observations indicate that revenue sharing 
is subject to informal politics. A member of the civil society coalition in the EITI 
Kazakhstan stated that “Now thanks to the reporting, we are seeing that companies are 
making a significant contribution to the local social budget. However, our monitoring and 
research analysis also demonstrate that such revenues are not shared effectively among 
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 185
 
 
 
 
the local population, and there is an absence of monitoring schemes about the 
management of this revenues, thus how these revenues are spent”120. This significantly 
affects the EITI and corporate contribution to local social revenues. As the EITI 
disaggregated reports indicate, payments are made directly to the regions by companies, 
however, there is no indication on how these revenues are managed. 
In her study, Pauline Jones Luong (2004b, p. 184) further states that “the mode of 
decentralization in Kazakhstan indicates that the central state must engage in on-going 
negotiations with regional authorities in order to both make and implement economic 
policy”, as often central government directives diverged from local practices and 
outcomes. Similarly, Umbetalieva and Satpayev (2012, p. 87) also note that in 
Kazakhstan where different interest groups compete for power, one could observe a 
“vertical deformation” between the political elite and state administration. 
Such relations further contributed to intensify informal political practices, in which the 
regional elites become less loyal to the central authorities. In this view, I concur with 
Pauline Jones Luong’s analysis and argue that contrary to some assumptions 
decentralisation in Kazakhstan, as my field work on EITI also demonstrates, is largely 
driven by regional and local governments rather than by the centre. Although Akims are 
appointed by the state, they do not command the loyalty of their administrators. As 
Cummings observed in her study (2005, p. 128), regional administrators are composed of 
groupings that do not answer to the centre but rather to local or foreign business interests. 
As such, despite their official subordination to the centre, in practice regional leaders are 
not under the exclusive control of the central government. Makhmutova (2006) further 
points out that even though state inspectors are assigned to the regions to supervise 
Akims’ duties and performances, state authorities in general lack resources and time to 
monitor all the activities of the Akims in the oblast and rural areas as well. Consequently, 
such a dynamic impedes the implementation of the EITI at the local level, as the 
communication from the centre to the lower regional level is disrupted by the Akims, who 
                                                            
120 Author’s Skype interview with a member of the EITI civil society coalition, Astana, 15 June 2015
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act as gatekeepers. As EITI members of the coalition also point out: “Akims at the 
regional level don’t understand EITI and don’t want it transfered at the local levels”.121
Such a situation further exacerbates the issue of accountability to the local population. 
One of the main objectives of the EITI is for political leaders to be accountable to the 
population on how resource revenues are spent. In Kazakhstan, this is exacerbated as 
Akims are not elected by the population but appointed by the President. Until 2012, the 
President appointed Akims in the regions. In such a context, Akims were only accountable 
to the President. In August 2013, the first elections of Akims were held in Kazakhstan. 
However, these elections were held on the basis of indirect elections by secret ballot, as 
the Akims were not elected by the electorate as a whole, but by deputies of the maslikhats. 
Such developments seem to be positive steps to enhance accountability provisions, citizen 
engagement with the local government and the wider political decentralisation process. 
However, according to a Freedom House assessment (2015b), the new process of electing 
Akims did not make any difference, as all candidates were nominated by officials and 
elected by legislative councils dominated by the ruling Nur Otan party. Additionally, the 
Akims of major cities and regions continue to be appointed by the President. For instance, 
in the election process of the Akims in the Mangystau oblast, out of 46 elected Akims, 43 
were members of the Nur Otan party (EU Project, Kazakhstan Regional Development, 
2013). Consequently, such a process does not change established practices; rather, it 
contributes to reinforce the democratic façade of Kazakhstan. As described earlier, at the 
national central level, there is an absence of independent institutions to perform effective 
checks and balances. This is further reflected at the subnational level where power is 
solely held by Akimats and its constituencies. The lack of accountability as such provides 
regional leaders with a great deal of discretion for their social spending. As the country 
report of Revenue Watch (2013) further indicates, although the government publishes 
information on revenue transfers, it, however, does not define the rules and formulas for 
revenue sharing at the subnational level. The requirement that these payments for social 
development at the local level will be spent effectively is often violated (Luong, 2004; 
                                                            
121 Author’s interviews with a member of the EITI coalition of the Company North Caspian operating 
company, 5 June 2015 Astana.
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Revenue Watch, 2013). Without a strong system of checks and balances the population 
fails to benefit from national revenue rents.
6.2.4 Soviet Organsiational Culture
Just as in the case of Kyrgyzstan, Soviet legacies left significant imprints on work culture 
and organisational management. In the case of Kazakhstan, we can observe that 
conformity to the rules and orders emanating from the top impedes individual 
entrepreneurship and the meaning assigned to the substance of work. The work of the 
EITI as such becomes a technical function imposed by the state, where individuals 
become confined to the execution of work processes. The case study shows that although 
Kazakhstan had adopted all the measures and the format of the MSG, this format, 
however, largely lacks meaningful content. As my interviews show, “under the current 
EITI format, Kazakhstan is ahead of any other countries involved in the Initiative”122.
Further interviews with the representative of KazEnergy Association and members of the 
government express a sense of loss, as if the organisation were in need of a new purpose. 
As my interviewees indicate: “Kazakhstan has passed the validation process, we are 
continuously producing reporting, we have the MSG that is working, and now what—
could you please tell us what we shall do now?”123. As this statement illustrates, it seems 
that the present MSG is largely driven by organisational standardisation processes, where 
actors perform their operational, procedural and formalised duties attaching a symbolic 
meaning to it rather than attaching a value to it. 
6.3 The EITI—A Technical Success?
However, despite the limitations of the Initiative, the adoption of the EITI produced some 
domestic spill-over effects. In fact, the Initiative generated indirect effects on broader 
domestic reforms. In this regard, the implementation of the Initiative had stimulated a 
dialogue between the state and civil society sector. In 2003, the first civil society forum 
was created. Two years later, which also marked the accession of Kazakhstan to the EITI, 
the government held its second forum in the presence of the President. The forum created 
a platform of dialogue for the civil society sector and the government. It resulted in the 
                                                            
122 Author’s interviews with a member of the EITI coalition of the Company North Caspian operating 
company , 5 June  2015 Astana. Author’s interview with members of the EITI coalition KazEnergy
Association, 5 June 2015, Astana.
123 Author’s interview with members of the EITI collation, KazEnergy Association, 5 June 2015, Astana.
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creation of the Civic Alliance of Kazakhstan (Diyachenko Official Parliamentary Blog, 
2016). Just a year after its accession to the EITI, the government adopted the ‘Concept of 
Civil Society Development for 2006-2011’ to provide a comprehensive framework for 
the development of CSOs and their equal partnership with the state and business sector
(ICNL, 2016). This broadly corresponds to the principles laid out under the EITI 
implementation process. As a result of such initiatives, the government both at national 
and local levels become more inclined to work and consult with civil society actors 
involving them in public hearings or working groups (ADB, 2015; Saktaganova and 
Ospanova, 2013). According to the International Centre for Non-Profit Law (2016), a 
new strategic document for CSO-Government cooperation is now under development. In 
this regard, it we should not disregard the efforts of civil society to push for a popularised 
and more simplified version of the EITI. Thanks to the efforts of civil society, the first 
popular version of EITI reporting was published in 2014. As my interview shows: “Civil 
society was very helpful in the creation of the popular version of the EITI that is more 
accessible to the population”124. Both companies and states were interested in its opinion. 
In the same year, the government digitalised EITI reporting and made it available through 
the website of the Ministry for Investment and Development of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, Committee of Geology and Subsoil Use. The digitalised system enables 
companies to submit reports in electronic format and government agencies to monitor 
them. It further enables the general public to seek information on any particular company 
or payment made (EITI website). Although these are significant steps in reporting 
procedures, it is important to question the size of population who gets access to such 
resources, and how easy it is for the population to read and understand EITI reporting 
given their technicality? Moreover, although the creation of a popular version is 
important, the current template provides a ‘generic’ picture based on resource revenue 
recipients and not on how these revenues are spend by the state and regions on the 
individual level and by companies. In doing so, citizens remain poorly informed about 
the EITI and remain poorly engaged in its process. Such a situation further impedes 
citizens’ right to hold their governments accountable on how their national resource 
revenues are spent. 
                                                            
124 Author’s informal not recorded interview with EITI NSC Secretariat, Astana 10 June 2015.
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In addition, although very weakly, the Initiative started to be implemented at the regional 
levels. The first pilot projects were situated in the Mangystau region and Ust-
Kamenogorsk, Kyzylorda oblast regions that are subject to significant natural resource 
extraction but are also regions weak in economic development. Such steps are significant, 
particularly in the Mangystau region where the Zhanaozen protests erupted. Such moves 
perhaps are further prove that the government takes protests seriously. However, it is still 
too early to declare the success of the implementation of the EITI at regional levels. The
protests in Zhanaozen highlighted that regional disparities and their resource paradox 
needed to be taken into account in order to maintain domestic stability. In this regard, the 
first pilot projects on the implementation of the EITI in regional levels prone to resource 
conflicts are signs that the government recognised the importance to develop their 
regional local economies in order to maintain power and legitimacy. In relation to this, in 
2012, within the framework of the ‘Social-Economic Modernisation in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan’ and with the aim to improve the decentralisation process, the government 
adopted a strategy on the development on local governance. The move came just a year 
after the Zhanaozen protests. The main aim of the strategy is to improve administrative 
quality, extend the participation of citizens on issues of local significance (Nazarbayev, 
2012). The strategy involves two phases: 2013-2014 and 2015-2020. The 2013-2014: 
focused on increasing interaction at the local levels, with implementing a working plan
for improving mechanisms of financing and budgeting at the local governance level. 
Currently, the government is the second phase of the conception that focuses on 
distinguishing the functions of local governance, giving greater independence to local 
governance authorities and population on their budget management as well as the 
development of administrative-territorial units at the level of rural districts. Within this 
framework, the government introduced a legislative reform package125 named the 
‘National Plan-100 concrete steps’ aiming to introduce institutional reforms to boost local 
governance development. The package emphasises the involvement of the local 
population in the decision-making process on the use of local budgets. It further specifies 
the increasing of interaction between the Akims and the local population through public 
                                                            
125 THE OFFICIAL INTERNET RESOURCE MAZHILIS OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN: Mazhilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Available at 
: http://www.parlam.kz/ru/mazhilis/committee-works/presenter/7
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assemblies or councils. A major advancement in this framework is that the package 
provides provisions for the popular involvement in the monitoring of budget funds. Such 
measures are a step toward improving transparency and accountability on revenue 
spending126. In November 2015, a new law was passed on ‘Public Councils’, the law 
became into force in 2016. The role of public councils is to ensure broad participation of 
public authorities and citizens in decision-making of all levels by government bodies. The 
organisation also aims to ensure transparency of activities of local governance authorities 
and must include two to three civil society organisations in its institution (Law on Public 
Councils, Republic of Kazakhstan 2015). Public councils act as advisory boards, hence, 
they can only make recommendations. Such initiatives highlight the indirect effect of the 
EITI. However, although such steps seem to be positive, given the nature of the regime 
of the country, more time is needed to assess the actual impact of such reforms.
Conclusion
The observations of EITI implementation in Kazakhstan reveals that the EITI is largely 
used as a governmental tool. The adoption of the Initiative was primarily motivated by 
reputational concerns and the domestic socio-economic climate. As we have seen, 
corruption scandals in the oil sector involving Nazarbayev family and domestic 
instabilities stemming from the extractive sector, prompted the government to adopt the 
Initiative. In this sense, the EITI served as a pragmatic government instrument to shield 
the government’s image and legitimacy. Popular dissatisfaction and tensions with the 
regime contributed to adopting the EITI principles of transparency and accountability to 
boost the regime’s domestic legitimacy.
However, as we have seen throughout this analysis, the intention of Kazakhstan to 
endorse EITI standards does not translate into its effective compliance to the Initiative. 
The study of the EITI in Kazakhstan reveals that although the EITI in Kazakhstan reached 
all the required implementation processes demanded by the EITI International Secretariat, 
its functioning in practice, however, reveals severe loopholes that pose an impediment to 
                                                            
126Mazhilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Ɉɜɧɟɫɟɧɢɢɢɡɦɟɧɟɧɢɣɢɞɨɩɨɥɧɟɧɢɣɜ
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ɫɚɦɨɭɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɹɜɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɟɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧª ȼɵɫɬɭɩɥɟɧɢɟɜɢɰɟ-ɦɢɧɢɫɬɪɚɇɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣ
ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɢɊɄɍɫɤɟɧɛɚɟɜɚɄȺ©ɈɩɪɨɟɤɬɟɁɚɤɨɧɚɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɩɨɜɨɩɪɨɫɚɦɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɹ
ɦɟɫɬɧɨɝɨɫɚɦɨɭɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɹ. Available at: http://www.parlam.kz/ru/mazhilis/committee-
works/presenter/7]. [Accessed: 10 March, 2017].
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the effective development of the Initiative. Domestic institutional regime structures 
subvert the effective functioning of the Initiative and, in doing so, enable the autocratic 
leader of Kazakhstan to bypass international transparency requirements laid out in the 
EITI. As such, the findings on the EITI in Kazakhstan reveal a highly centralised and 
pyramidal system in which actors are subordinated to the President’s rule and its close 
personal network. The functioning of EITI is arranged into a pyramidal structure with the 
state penetrating the whole structure of the multi-stakeholder group. Such a structure 
enables President Nazarbayev to set up procedures by which he can effectively monitor 
the actions of its actors without running the risk of being offset. By setting up state-led 
institutions, such as KazEnergy Association, the Parliament and CivicAlliance, the state
manages and controls every aspect of the MSG. In such institutional configuration, non-
state actors have little space for independent action. As we saw throughout the analysis, 
private companies are bound to the regime demands as their business depends on it. 
Independent civil society and donor organisations operate within carefully confined 
spaces designed by the state. Their role is primarily reduced to technical capacity-building 
initiatives that aim to go along the lines of state directives. It is further important to note 
that in the aftermath of the Colour Revolutions, the state has severely restricted the 
capacity for donors and civil society to carry out their monitoring and whistle-blowing 
functions127. Moreover, the small reforms that the state adopted, such as the incorporation 
of the EITI into ‘Subsoil Use’ legislation, are easy to bypass and are largely weak in 
content. The study further demonstrates that the state as well as companies used the 
weaknesses of the EITI design for their advantage. Clearly, as the observations 
demonstrate, revenue reportings are murky and lack transparency. 
As such, although at the surface the EITI appears to function well as a multi-stakeholder 
group its internal processes, however, indicate the opposite. Therefore, the commitment 
to the EITI and transparency norms are only applied partially. At the surface, for its 
external (international) audience, the EITI appears to function according to EITI 
standardised practices, while its internal processes show arcane behavioural deviations.
                                                            
127 Author informal interview with the employee of the Friedrich Eberti Foundation, 2 June 2, 2015, 
Almaty.
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Moreover, the distribution of revenue sharing is further exacerbated by the country’s 
decentralisation process and mechanisms where regional actors, Akims, dictate their 
rules. As discussed in this Chapter, the implementation of national policies at the regional 
level is subject to the influence of the regional Akims. A lack of institutional 
accountability and strong judicial reforms impede on the capacity of the population to 
hold their national and regional government accountable on their revenue spending. 
Hence, in such a context, the population plays a passive role and is largely absent in the 
mechanisms of revenue sharing. Additionally, as tensions over socio-economic 
dispartites started to grow (with the most recent once relating to land reforms128), 
competition between the centre and regional peripheries over spheres of influences and 
sharing of resources increase accordingly. The configuration of the decentralisation 
system as such plays an important role in directing resource grievances towards the 
regional leaders rather than to the centre, which is responsible for the allocation and 
redistribution of resources. Such a system enables Nazarbayev to maintain the veil of 
legitimacy over domestic political practices and to escape popular discontent. 
Hence, just as in the case of Kyrgyzstan, what we observe in Kazakhstan is that the 
government designed the EITI platform according to its own internal interests that support 
the consolidation of its autocratic regime. The EITI MSG in Kazakhstan further operates 
a political unified act based on consent and unanimity between the rulers and the 
subordinates. Clearly, the platform of the EITI that embeds plural actors and space is non-
existent in Kazakhstan, rather it is an act of rhetoric or ‘virtual practice’ of the regime. In 
this context, just as in the case of Kyrgyzstan, the Soviet style of organisational and 
management culture further influence the institutional dynamics of the Initiative. As such, 
even though the study founds some small indirect positive effects of the EITI on broader 
domestic reforms, given the nature of the autocratic regime the transformative capabilities 
of international standards need to be considered carefully. 
                                                            
128 See, for instance, FT (2016),“Kazakh leader needs to address real grievances: Any domestic instability 
could have repercussions internationally”, 12 June,2006.  [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/4b69c54e-2eee-11e6-a18d-a96ab29e3c95 [Accessed: 2 November 2016]. 
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Chapter 7. Discussion of the Findings: The EITI and Global 
Governance in Central Asia
 
Main Points of this Chapter
This Chapter reflects on the research question and findings in light of the global 
governance literature. Throughout my case studies, I argued that the EITI operates as a 
dysfunctional platform. The study further demonstrated that domestic institutional 
constrains subvert the effective functioning of the Initiative and, in doing so, enable the 
autocratic states of Central Asia to bypass international transparency requirements laid 
out in the EITI. What the study in both countries further depicts is that the EITI is 
increasingly state orchestrated and state led. In this regard and against some postulates in 
the literature on global governance and globalisation, the study demonstrates that 
processes and effects from global to local nation-states are not uni-directional; rather, they 
are shaped and remodeled by the recipient nation-states. In doing so, this final Chapter 
highlights the limitations of global the governance literature and urges scholars to 
consider the existing dichotomies between global and local contexts. More importantly, 
the Chapter invites scholars and wider policy advisers to question what exactly global 
governance aims to achieve and how it defines its success. 
7.1 Standardised Procedures: Form and Content Lost in Translation 
or in-between Spaces?
Steven Sampson (2008, p. 184) argues that “any national anti-corruption programme is 
but a site in a global anticorruption landscape that measures, assesses, and organizes 
against corruption”. In this regard, the EITI constitutes a form of a global “anti-
corruption” assemblage (according to Collier and Ong, 2005) that involves myriad actors 
and norm promoters. However, the analysis of the EITI in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
reveals the following: although global governance bears standardised forms and practises, 
it nevertheless fails to address the issue of transparency. As the study shows, although 
Central Asian countries adhere to the Initiative, it does not prevent them from continuing 
to engage in corruption. Throughout my case studies, I argue that the EITI operates as a 
dysfunctional platform, and this dysfunctionality is not accidental but rather deliberately 
created by the state. In this sense, as the study demonstrates, domestic institutional 
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constrains subvert the effective functioning of the Initiative, and in doing so, they enable 
autocratic states in Central Asia to bypass the international transparency requirements 
established in the EITI. Clearly, factors related to the local context, such as domestic 
regime type, the level of economic development and configuration of domestic intuitions, 
constitute important determinants in the functioning of the global governance initiative. 
As the analysis reveals, the EITI in Central Asia came to represent a ‘performance act’129
of reproducing standardised global governance practices. By performance, I mean the 
way in which global governance is practiced in local contexts. In this sense, what is 
particularly interesting to observe is how the form of the EITI is given a meaning by its 
recipient actors. As the analysis of both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrates, 
although global governance imposes and provides a standardised template, it nevertheless 
does not stop its recipient objects from re-interpreting and recreating their own agendas 
within the framework of the provided global governance templates. As the cases of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan show, both countries implemented the standardised form of 
the EITI governance framework as imposed by global agenda setters. However, as the 
analysis of cases reveals, in practice, such forms of governance are dysfunctionally 
disconnected from the Initiative’s initial purpose. In this regard and against some 
postulates in the literature on global governance and globalisation, the study demonstrates 
that processes and effects from global to local nation-states are not uni-directional; rather, 
they are shaped and remodeled by recipient nation-states. As the analysis reveals, the 
dynamic of global governance once implemented at local levels is subject to the country’s 
domestic context. In this way, the study of the EITI depicts a mismatch between the 
international global governance rule setters and recipient states as rule followers. As noted 
by Halliday and Carrothers (2007), there is an asymmetry of knowledge between the
global rule setters who can influence law enactment and the national actors who 
effectively control implementation. Concurrently, as the study demonstrates, even when 
global governance has no strong leverage power, global linkages influence compliance 
with international standards. In this regard, the study highlights that the diffusion of 
international global governance is very much linked to internal and external conditions. 
Given such dynamics, one cannot ignore processes of norm adoption driven by 
                                                            
129 The term is coined in the book of Madeleines Reeves et al. (2014) on Ethnographies of the state in 
Central Asia: performing politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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instrumental reasons and strategic bargaining (Risse et al., 1999). However, as the case 
studies demonstrate, such instrumental adoption of international standards has the 
capacity to lead to subtle positive changes. Nonetheless, owing to the nature of autocratic 
regimes, such changes need to be carefully considered. 
7.2 Global Governance as a Site for Domestic Re-interpretation  
As the study demonstrates, in both countries, the EITI is yet another site for the conduct 
of domestic politics. In this regard, the functioning of the EITI and the role of its actors 
within are influenced by practices specific to regime type and the regime’s autocratic state 
leaders. Clearly, as the case study reveals, in Kazakhstan, the EITI is built around the 
centralised authoritarian regime of the President and its inner circle. It further shows the 
shadow of state authority in which different actors within the EITI are allowed to operate. 
In Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, which is more democratically open, the EITI operates 
more independently from the state. However, its internal functioning reflects the 
fragmented intra-elite competition for the desperate search for access to resources. 
The study of the EITI further highlights that the success of norm appropriation will 
depend on how closely a norm resonates with a leaders’ strategic vision. In Kazakhstan, 
reputational concerns combined with domestic and external pressures induced change in 
state behaviour, leading to adherence to EITI standards and norm promotion. In 
Kyrgyzstan, the endorsement of the EITI was primarily motivated to attract foreign aid 
investments and to respond to domestic instabilities in the mining sector. In both 
countries, domestic pressures arising from the extractive sector played an important factor 
in facilitating the adoption of the Initiative. Hence, as the literature on norm transposition 
posits, when norms outweigh domestic costs, norm adherence is likely to occur (see 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al., 1999). 
However, as reflected in the study, norm adherence does not imply norm compliance in 
practice. In both states, as the study of the EITI revealed, despite diligently complying 
with EITI standards, the efficient equitable sharing of resources with populations is 
poorly addressed. Such observations highlight that despite their commitments to address 
the needs of the populations, considering the interest of the population is largely ‘virtual’, 
as the population remains largely excluded from the process. Although civil society 
representatives are deemed to represent the overall population, those who are present are 
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carefully handpicked by the state, and they operate within their confined attributed 
borders. In contrast, any form of entrepreneurship is likely to back fire. Even in the more 
open Kyrgyzstan, the representation of civil society mirrors state officials in disguise.
Furthermore, the EITI is deemed to represent a plurality of actors, and as the case of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrated, this plurality is nonetheless subverted, as the
actors involved within are carefully selected by the state and are allowed to operate within 
the regime’s boundaries. It is therefore increasingly important to analyse global 
governance in its institutional locations. As the analysis of the EITI demonstrates, global 
governance practices in Central Asia are based on ‘performance politics’. In such a 
context, the outcome of global governance initial formulations becomes homogenised in 
form but dysfunctional in content. The ‘performance of politics’ is a dynamic process 
between the form (representation) and representational practices, whose meaning depends 
on being defined, contextualised and configured (Rose, 2002, p. 390). Such an 
understanding implies that representational practices are always embedded in certain 
configurations. In the process of enactment, at the surface, representation practices 
acquire a normative and legitimatised meaning while inside a shadow boxing of 
institutions, actors, networks and material resources that form the architecture of the 
rulers in power arises (Wilson, 2005). As the study has demonstrated, in post-Soviet 
Central Asia, actors involved in the global governance initiative bear the ramifications of 
the state apparatus. 
The concept of pluralism when applied to post-Soviet Central Asia diverges from 
Western realities. As the EITI study shows, the concept of plurality, rather than 
representing independent actors and opinions, represents state power and its embodied 
structures in Central Asia. As seen in the present study and as also noted by Jones Luong 
(2002), a central element in exercising politics in Central Asia revolves around power 
relations, i.e., how power is accessed, allocated, understood and exercised. As the cases 
show, individual actors involved in the EITI pursue their own internal interests and the 
interests of the state, and, in doing so, they diminish the interests of the broader domestic 
population. There is a gap between institutional elites and the population for which they 
should serve. Moreover, contrary to the postulate of global governance participation and 
the concept of limited plurality not being free, the actions of the actors are limited within 
the state’s boundaries. More interestingly, as the case studies show, participation in the 
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global governance creates inclusive and exclusive boundaries of highly selective and 
spatially embedding actors that coexist with the state and that operate in the global 
governance space. In light of this assessment, the imagined community of global 
governance, as postulated by Western-centric visions, differs from its initial formulations 
in Central Asian countries. In this regard, the role of companies, civil society and donor 
organisations is important to highlight. Contrary to postulates in the global governance 
literature, they do not act as independent actors; rather, their roles are dependent on the 
context in which they operate. As the study demonstrated, their roles in the autocratic 
context of Central Asia diverges from the global governance scripts. 
The outcome of the Initiative is defined by state interventions. What the study in both 
countries further depicts is that the EITI is increasingly state orchestrated and state led. 
In this respect, the work of Timothy Mitchell (1991) is increasingly relevant. As he 
argues, state-society relations need to be considered not separate objects but rather “as [a] 
line drawn internally within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a 
social and political order is maintained” (Ibid, p. 78). In this realm, institutions are a 
product of state processes. As Scopcol (1985) emphasises, it is important to consider the 
role of the state as a set of organisations in structuring social and political arrangements, 
through which state officials formulate and implement distinctive strategies and policies 
(Skopcol, 1985, p. 21). Meyer and Rowan (1977) further discuss the power of state 
authority and regulatory agencies in the processes of conformity and institutionalisation. 
In a similar vein, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) recognise the centrality of state-driven 
coercive isomorphism but also acknowledge the importance of mimetic and normative 
isomorphism. As such, organisational structures increasingly come to reflect rules that 
are institutionalised and legitimised by and within the state (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991, 
p. 68). In this context, as argued by Dimaggio and Powell (1991, p. 68), “organisations 
are increasingly homogenous within given domains and increasingly organised around 
wider institutions”. Considering these views, it is then unavoidable to notice that 
standardised practices are inherently shaped by domestic conditions.
7.3 Soviet Legacies Matter 
As this study reveals, although Central Asian countries adapted the EITI standardised 
template in practice, they nevertheless reinterpreted these standards in ways that make 
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sense for them and that fit their local conditions. As Bhabha (1994, p. 1) further notes, 
there is a need to move beyond original and initial subjectivities and to focus on the 
moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences. In line 
with Bhabha’s work (1994) and in relation to the above observations, the translation of 
global governance into a local domestic framework in itself becomes a site for 
collaboration and contestation, as well as a site for the interpretation and re-interpretation 
of the ideas and visions of society itself, when the past and present merge. The ‘past-
present’ in the words of Bhabha (1994, p. 7) becomes part of necessity, when actors re-
invent themselves in relation to the present. In light of the analysis of the EITI, such sites 
become the mimic of political domestic representation, in which actors re-create their role 
and appropriate symbols in relation to their present conditions and the space in which 
they operate. What emerges from the study of the EITI in Central Asian countries is that 
state practices are built on inherited Soviet institutions and practices. Hence, although 
these states aspire to enter the club of ‘modern and global states’, they nonetheless did 
not completely eradicate their past. In this realm, as the present study observes, a 
country’s domestic cultural, historical and institutional legacies affect the transfer of 
global norms and their crystallisation in national practices. The study of the EITI further 
suggests that its interpretation and articulation in the domestic context is shaped by post-
Soviet cultural and historical legacies.
Centralised Regime Practices and Patron-Client Relationships
Soviet top-down imposition continues to resonate in the everyday practices and politics 
of Central Asian countries. The Soviet legacies of highly centralised, institutionalised and 
ritualised political participation leaves its traces in the political practices of today’s 
Central Asian countries. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, Soviet rule in the region 
instilled tribal relations and politics of patronage that remain salient in current politics in 
Central Asia. As seen by the case of the EITI, in a client-patron society such as 
Kyrgyzstan, the public sphere is not a space based on the ideas of common good and 
social justice but a place where individuals strive for power and personal gains (see Shulte 
2008; Luong, 2002; Cummings, 2012). As the case of Kyrgyzstan demonstrates, 
traditional patron-client relationships have not changed; rather, they have adapted to the 
conditions of their new environment. A close association of some local NGOs with 
international donors have created powerful gate keepers, who use their access privilege 
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or status to favour certain groups over others and to cement and further strengthen their 
position. As such, the pursuit of anti-corruption efforts in Kyrgyzstan is increasingly 
entangled with elements regarding ‘who is in the network and who is not’. In Kazakhstan, 
the political domestic realm is based on tied concentric circles around Nazarbayev and 
the related presidential administration (Peyrouse, 2012; Cummings, 2005). These 
conditioning structures of the regime are further mirrored in the EITI, which functions as 
a highly centralised state institution built around the President and the administrative 
apparatus. What we observe from the two case studies is that the autocratic form of the 
regime produces structures of power domination between “dominant and subordinate”. 
Moreover, the political conduct is further conditioned by “hidden and public transcripts” 
that produce specific forms of behaviours, reactions and patterns of resistance (Scott, 
1990). As the study of the EITI reveals, these transcripts are not static; rather, they adapt 
according to the different audiences and social sites in which they operate130.  
Regime Type 
The Soviet Union’s Communist regime was characterised by a plethora of authoritarian 
practices. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Union, 15 Republics emerged with 
different forms of inherited authoritarian governance. In this regard, as the study of the 
EITI shows, the nature of autocratic regime practices determines the variation in the 
functioning of the Initiative between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
In Kyrgyzstan, the EITI shifted from being a standalone initiative to being integrated at 
the time of writing and increased its visibility through major donor agencies programmes 
working on community development and the management of resource revenues. In 
Kazakhstan, the EITI is embedded in the structure of the state. Under the centralised 
structure of the regime, EITI activities are constrained within the state’s apparat. Such 
systemic conditions are further manifest in the representation of the actors within the 
Initiative. In Kyrgyzstan, domestic actors, with the exception of donor agencies, are 
represented by the politics of patronage and various interest groups of power 
representation (which are more salient in the working of civil society groups). In 
Kazakhstan, in contrast, all the actors are handpicked by the President, who, by appointing 
                                                            
130 This also further supports the observations of Scott (1990).
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his most reliable allies, oversees the decisions and activities of the EITI working group. 
As noted in the analysis, even foreign companies are represented by the state-run 
organisation KazEnergy Association. Such different forms of EITI functioning between 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are explained by structural domestic preconditions 
(Heathershaw, 2009; Hale, 2005). Drawing on the concept of the ‘lame duck syndrome’ 
introduced by Henry Hale (2005) to explain the occurrence of ‘Colour Revolutions’ in 
post-Soviet Eurasia, we can distinguish similar patterns to explain differences in the 
functioning of EITI between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. 
The ‘lame duck syndrome’ broadly refers to the incumbent’s low popular support to run 
for office and to elite defection within the incumbent’s coalition (see Hale, 2005). Hale 
states that the ‘lame duck syndrome’ and low popular support for the ruler have given rise 
to opposition movements that have subsequently challenged the current regime. In line 
with this concept, I argue that the strong consolidate autocratic leadership of Kazakhstan 
turned the EITI into a pyramidal centralised institution that was integrated within the state 
apparatus, while weak autocratic leadership, as in the case of Kyrgyzstan, explains a more 
independent EITI. 
Owing to the historically fragmented politics of Kyrgyzstan, marked by diverse regional 
elite competition for power and the subsequent Colour Revolutions in 2005 and 2010, the 
country failed to establish a strong consolidated presidential autocratic regime. Such 
conditions created a space for individual contestation. In addition, Kyrgyzstan was 
affected by its economic conditions and its situation of being a donor-aid dependent that 
was further affected the behaviour of its leaders. As donor aid grants are bound by 
principles of democratic conditionality, the incumbent leaders in Kyrgyzstan were 
inclined to make concessions and initiated reforms according to donor requirements. This 
is also visible in the working of civil societies in the EITI that are bound by donor grants.
On the other hand, the regime in Kazakhstan is firmly consolidated around the President 
and the inner elite circles, leaving little space for opposition to challenge the presidential 
rule. In such a domestic context, as seen by the case of the EITI in Kazakhstan, state 
officials and business community leaders as well as external actors (donors and 
independent civil society) are reluctant to challenge the incumbent’s rule, which can cost 
their job or trigger direct conflict with the state and dry up access to strategic resources. 
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Moreover, Kazakhstan is economically stronger and more independent than Kyrgyzstan. 
Additionally, the geopolitics of energy pipelines that involve Western and American 
vested interests in the country further gives Kazakhstan significant leverage over effective 
EITI norm compliance. Such a situation gives states more room for independent action 
without inference from third parties. In such a context, as discussed in earlier Chapters, 
external actors, such as donors, become complicit in the legitimisation of state autocratic 
practices. 
As Henry Hale (2005 p.135) notes in his explanation of regime transitions, the 
institutional features of hybrid regimes and patterns of elite interactions affect the 
outcome of the regime. In the case of the EITI, such interaction results not only from the 
institutional and domestic elite interaction but also from a country’s interaction with 
external players. Such conditioning explains the divergent structure that the EITI assumes 
in countries. However, despite these differences, both cases show the blurring of domestic 
boundaries between the political and economic realms – between the public and the 
private. Under such systemic conditions, as the case of the EITI demonstrates, the 
outcome of institutional functioning mirrors a regime’s internal structures and bargaining 
preferences of the actors involved. 
Soviet Administration Territorial Divisions
The legacies of territorial divisions stemming from the era of Soviet administration are 
present in the domestic politics and decentralisation processes of Central Asia. As Pauline 
Jones Luong (2002, p. 64) notes, the Soviet administrative territorial structuring of 
Central Asia fostered regional rather than national cleavages. As we have seen in the cases 
studies of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, conflicting governance interests and the dual 
subordination to the authority of local self-government bodies and the centre hindered the 
implementation of top-down regulatory practices to the peripheries and the redistribution 
and sharing of resource revenues. In both countries, local power often tends to override 
central authority and dictates its own governance practices. Furthermore, as the study 
demonstrated, weak institutional structures, marked by weak accountability and 
transparency of decentralisation processes, further complicated the effective 
redistribution of revenues among the local population.
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Soviet Organisational Structures of the Communist Party 
The concept of democratic centralism as the organisational principle of the Communist 
Party—where collective action arises from decisions of higher bodies of authority and 
where communication within the organisation is vertical (Sakwa, 1989, p. 133)—is 
visible in the organisational structure of the EITI in both countries. The character of EITI 
implementation policies is characterised by a top-down approach steered by central 
coalitions, situated in Bishkek and Astana, versus regions. All actions and all decision-
making processes are centralised in capital cities, leaving regions aside. As the case of 
Kyrgyzstan shows, such organisational procedures further reflect the lack of coordination 
from the State Agency for Geology and Mineral Resources in Bishkek, highlighting its 
inability to effectively oversee the implementation of EITI policies at the regional level. 
In Kazakhstan, all decisions are made in Astana, and the EITI is not effectively 
implemented at the regional level. Such observations highlight the top-down 
fragmentation that exists between the centre and regions.
Second, the recruitment of members within the EITI is very similar to that practiced by 
the Communist Party. As Sakwa (1989, p. 133) describes, recruitment in the Communist 
context aims at representing the “cream of the population”. The recruitment of cadres 
within the Communist Party is made through the systematic nomination of favoured elites 
and is further based on the principles of loyalty (favoured over competences), rewards 
and upwards mobility as well as patronage politics and long tenure of elite cadre positions 
(Sakwa 1989). These patterns of recruitment are also visible in the EITI. As the case 
studies demonstrate, the selection of individuals is closely affiliated with the state and 
politics of informal networks. In Kazakhstan, the selection of individuals is conducted by 
the state. In Kyrgyzstan, as the case of civil society demonstrates, recruitment is based on 
‘who do you know in the network’. In both cases, access to the EITI creates an 
‘empowerment’ effect for the selected actors, who use the international resources of the 
global governance initiative to strengthen their personal interests while neglecting the 
broader interests of the population. 
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Participation and Plurality under the Soviet System
Following Robert Dahl’s (1978) definition, the concept of pluralism in a political system 
implies representation of diverse political self-independent groups that are permitted to 
organise themselves, express themselves and participate in political life within the state. 
Under the Soviet totalitarian system of governance, one might think that such forms of 
political representation were prohibited. However, as Skilling and Griffiths (1971) argue, 
even in the most oppressed political regimes, some notion of pluralism can be found. The 
Soviet system totalitarianism inhibited a complex industrial society, divided into a 
number of functional groupings and institutions with strong loyalties and parochial 
interests, each striving towards greater autonomy (Kolkowicz, 1970, p. 447). In the Soviet 
context, as Sakwa (1989, p., 188) further notes, interest groups were “forced to behave in 
informal ways, with overt lobbying forbidden but discreet bargaining possible”. He 
further adds that interactions with group interests were not central to policy outcomes, as 
decisions were taken by the Soviet state system (Ibid, p. 191). As Skilling and Griffiths 
(1971) also note, group influence in the Soviet context could affect only the form of 
policies, not their substance; thus, they could affect only on those who were deemed not 
to be politically sensitive. 
This is clearly visible in the EITI decision-making processes. As the cases of Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan show, diverse interest groups exist; however, just as in Soviet times, they 
have little capacity for independent action and are often subject to state manipulation. 
Furthermore, as the cases show, the success of policies promoted by individual interest 
groups is guaranteed under the support within the state apparatus and the pursuit of 
uncontroversial policies that do not conflict with state interests. Moreover, as Sakwa 
(1989, p. 191) notes, “in the context of weak legal traditions and diffuse 
constitutionality[,] there is a tendency for groups to form on the basis of ‘patronage’ and 
professional ties”. As the cases of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan show, the participation of 
civil society is limited and not representative. In both countries, civil society groups are 
informally selected by the state, and they operate along the lines of state interests. As the 
case of Kyrgyzstan demonstrates, hierarchical patronage relations among civil society 
groups dominate group interactions and their internal functioning. In contrast, in 
Kazakhstan, civil society groups act as ‘service providers’ under the state’s umbrella. 
Furthermore, both cases show that in an environment in which the judiciary is bound to 
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the ruler, institutions are weak, and independency from the state is lacking, foreign 
companies have little room to raise concerns, as doing so could backfire with respect to 
their business interests. EITI financial reporting in both countries indicates that 
transparency in reporting does not reflect transparency in practice, as the reported figures 
show only one part of the greater picture. As such, just as in the Soviet context, 
participation of the groups is subverted by the state system. Additionally, as the case of 
Kazakhstan shows, the boundaries between state structures and individual interest groups 
are blurred, as members simultaneously act in several ways. Moreover, as the analysis of 
the EITI demonstrates, the interaction between members is limited, and there are few 
interactions between groups beyond the institutional system. Nevertheless, owing to the 
regime’s democratic openness (although limited), the interactions among members are 
more prompted in Kyrgyzstan than in Kazakhstan. 
Such observations indicate that while the possibility to participate in state decisions has 
broadened, the capacity to participate in state institutions has not done so. Additionally, 
the top-down EITI approach further reflects the lack of communication, cooperation and 
participation among members of the MSG from the centre and regions. Furthermore, the 
case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan highlight that government turnover further 
complicates the development of stable cooperation and a cohesive platform with a 
consolidated group identity. The rapid turnover of government changeability has 
complicated the development of a stable cooperation and cohesion platform. Levitsky and 
Murillo (2009, p. 116) observe that “where actors do not expect formal institutions to 
endure or be enforced, their behaviour will differ, often markedly.” Such a situation 
further affects the transfer of organisational learning culture. As the organisational 
management studies have documented (see Carley, 1992), since organisational learning 
rests of individual experiences, high organisational turnover affects the ability to learn 
and perform. As such, when people leave without mechanisms for transferring knowledge 
experience, intuitional memory is reduced, and there is a high risk that gained knowledge 
is lost (see Caroll, 1984). 
Additionally, this study also demonstrates that the EITI created international and external 
participatory opportunity structures. In particular, from an internal point of view and as 
shown by the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the EITI gave life and legitimacy to 
specific NGOs that are now considered ‘expert opinion’ groups in the field of transparent
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and accountable revenue sharing in the extractive sector. Concurrently, the EITI provides 
them with knowledge and material resources through international collaboration or direct 
access to state resources. These actors, as the case studies show, are aware of the 
privileges assigned to them, and hence, they have learned to preserve them by limiting 
the access of other NGOs. As the analysis demonstrates, although participation is open to 
all NGOs, long-established NGOs in the EITI act as gatekeepers and jealously defend 
their privileges against others. Regarding state actors and companies, their involvement 
in the EITI provides them with knowledge. Opinions and information sharing with NGOs 
serve as a barometer for their internal strategies. For instance, as the cases demonstrate, 
environmental NGOs are privileged by the state, since the state often uses environmental 
fines against companies as a strategy for co-optation. 
Concurrently, the Initiative provides external opportunities driven by ideological and 
material interests. As seen by the analysis, in Kyrgyzstan state, involvement in the EITI 
was largely driven by attempts to gain access to aid, attract FDIs and increase the 
country’s visibility on the international stage. In the case of Kazakhstan, access was 
primarily motivated by state reputational concerns and the national project of image 
building. As outlined in the case study description, international scandals involving 
Nazarbaeyv’s family and internal oil protests had a destabilising effect on the domestic 
regime and the image of the President. Hence, access to the Initiative allowed Nazarbayev 
to manage domestic concerns and, simultaneously, to project the image of Nazarbayev as 
a protector of order and modernity. As stated earlier, the accession to international 
rankings boosts the state’s legitimacy at both the national and international level; hence, 
Central Asian countries could not stay passive with respect to tags attached to 
international rakings. At the globalised stage, the world opinion increasingly matters. For 
extractive industries, the Initiative is a signal that serves to enhance their Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). For local civil society, as mentioned above, the Initiative provides 
material resources in the form of access to international grants, knowledge-based 
expertise and capacity building.
Bureaucracy and Technocracy 
The Soviet Union’s political organisation was built upon a tight bureaucratic system. 
Rigby (1970, p. 5) defines bureaucracy as “the practice of structuring institutions and 
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decision making processes in a hierarchy of offices, occupied by salaried, appointed and 
replaceable official”. Hence, there are chains of command running from top to bottom, 
where given orders take the form of a bundle of rights and responsibilities and immediate 
assignments (Ibid, p. 7). Tasks as such aim not to promote individual community interests 
but to promote an overall community on behalf of the Soviet political leadership. The 
backbone of the commands was monitored by the Party apparatus, ensuring that orders 
were executed according to Party demands without deviation for specialised groups 
(Rigby, 1970). In such circumstances, there was thus little room for individual 
entrepreneurship or competitive interaction. 
As Rigby (1970) astutely notes, such a bureaucratic organisational structure had an active 
life of its own that served to support the legitimacy of the Soviet state. Here, he 
distinguishes between mobilisation and the exchange of experience. As he argues, in 
Soviet society, where decisions were assigned from above, there was a need to create an 
awareness of objectives for individuals and thus to create a positive meaning around the 
specific objectives assigned. In the words of Rigby, achieving such aims required a “high-
pressure public relations job” (Rigby, 1970, p. 9) – in other words, the mobilisation of the 
population to achieve state objectives. Such mobilisation took various forms, such as 
meetings and conferences, where collective action by the population was needed to create 
meaning around specific tasks in order to fulfil the overall objective assigned. The other 
strategy to attain such objectives was the exchange of experience. Information exchange 
in meetings was strategic for people working on the same problems in different agencies 
(Rigby, 1970 p. 9). As Rigby notes, large bureaucratic organisations, as those in Soviet 
times, were prone to poor lateral communication. To prevent factionalism in the Party 
(resulting from asymmetrical information), it was thus essential to create a framework 
that could control the flow of information between different agencies and actors. 
Conferences and meetings provided an ideal venue for reaching such objectives. The use 
of such mechanisms was essential for the implementation of Union policy. As Rigby 
(1970, p. 8) notes, the Soviet regime needed to represent itself as “functioning 
democratically”. Such claims demanded efforts to create institutions pretending that 
democratic forms of power were effectively exercised. The form of such exercise (i.e., 
the creation of a democratic façade) operated not only at this rational level but also at the 
level of symbolism and ritual. The administration of bureaucratic rituals as such was the 
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backbone for legitimising the construct of the state’s democratic façade. In relation to this 
analysis, Alexei Yurchak’s important contribution about the end of the Soviet Union 
system is crucial. Drawing on the work of John Austin, Yurchak (2006 p. 19) argues that 
performative acts or rituals can be felicitous or infelicitous. The success of the 
performative act is determined by the institutional conditions attached to it. In doing so, 
Yurchak posits that an individual in such a situation has two choices: “wearing a mask 
and act[ing] as if or revealing the truth” (Ibid, p. 26). 
Reflecting on the above observations, the EITI study demonstrates that the platform 
created standardised routine practices, such as EITI roundtable meetings, participation in 
the conferences, reports, and exchanges of opinions. The mobilisation of actors around 
these events became a ‘fundamental work’ in itself and came to act as a legitimising 
function for different actors. As such and here echoing Weberian studies of bureaucracy, 
bureaucracy is a social force in itself with powers and values of its own, and its 
development increases the forces of its subjects (Beetham, 1985, p. 71). Clearly, as the 
case examination demonstrated, the mobilisation of actors around the EITI has an 
empowering effect for the actors involved in the process. The empowerment of these 
actors thus created distinct groups operating within the state apparatus. In this regard, as 
mentioned, the participation of actors in the Initiative is constrained by the state. As the 
cases of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan demonstrate, states either create opportunities (such 
as directly supporting the Initiative through stable financing) or create barriers for EITI 
implementation (such as non-compliance with EITI requirements, as in the case of 
Kazakhstan). As the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan show, the participation of civil 
society is cherrypicked and aims to legitimate state policies or to act as a transmitter of 
state decisions. Alternatively, domestic institutions, such as the legal and parliamentary 
system, exist only in forms where in reality they are strictly controlled and operated under 
the state’s tutelage. Such a framework brings about a shadow of co-opted and 
bureaucratised participation. Such analysis draws attention to a view that sees the state as 
a socially constructed entity. As readings of Bourdieu (2014), Anderson (1991), Foucault 
(2007) suggest, states are constructed and transcend through powerful, socially 
constructed symbols or technological devices. Such observations draw attention to the 
social and imaginative processes through which state verticality is made effective and 
authoritative (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002 p. 981). Clearly, as the analysis of the EITI 
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demonstrates, states operate through multiple channels of representation that are not 
always evident or expressed within a traditional physical form. In this realm, the role of 
civil society serves to support the ‘art of government’, as described by Foucault. 
Therefore, as seen in this study, civil society involved in the EITI in Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan came to constitute a form of a governmental technological tool (see Foucault, 
2008) for shaping states’ power interests and for ensuring control over overall society. 
Furthermore, the Initiative’s standardised practices became ‘routine’ procedures and 
came to define the individuals involved in it. However, as the literature on organisational 
institutions argues, ‘routines’ reduce the quest for innovation and effectiveness, often 
because they are literally not perceived or ignored (Zucker, 1987). Since validation was 
achieved, it seems that the actors became more complaisant in their EITI activities or 
search for ‘what to do next’ (as in the case of Kazakhstan). Under the autocratic regime 
practices in Central Asian states, where decisions emanate from ‘above’ and where actors 
are subject to state monitoring, there is little room for individual entrepreneurship, as any 
departure from regime procedures bears the risk of backfiring on individuals. As such, 
even if individuals are conscious of the reality of state affairs, institutional systemic 
conditions prompt actors to be performatively felicitous and to reproduce the state in 
which they are embedded. As in the case of the Soviet Union, the impetus for further 
progress needs to be instilled from above. Hence, the unity of performative and systemic 
institutional dimensions makes the EITI what it is: an act of form performance with 
multiple legitimacy positions. Moreover, as seen by the analysis of the cases, the EITI 
platform created ‘facade institutions’ that pretend to exercise the Initiative’s form of 
governance while, in reality, in it is business as usual, corrupt practices between the state 
and companies in the extractive sector continue to dominate. There is also a disturbing 
“performative subjectivation”131 of the state attached to this, as the actors involved in the 
EITI platform are either formally or informally acting on behalf of the state. As such, they 
became constitutive elements of the state machinery and are thus used to reinforce state 
sovereignty.
  
                                                            
131 The term derives from Madeleine Reeves (2014) analysis Border Work: Spatial lives of the state in 
rural Central Asia. Cornell University Press.
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Soviet Judicial System
In the Soviet context, the nature of the judicial system was subject to arbitrary decisions 
of the Soviet system and state (Sakwa, 1989). Such practices, as the cases of Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan show, are still present in the governance of domestic societies. 
Consequently, in the absence of a strong independent judicial system, marked by weak 
accountability and laws, decisions are subject to state arbitrariness, as the case of the EITI 
demonstrates. Accordingly, the features of national governance systems, as seen in the 
present study, further hinder the mechanisms of transparency and accountability in 
revenue sharing. 
7.4. Resistance 
The study of EITI global governance reveals the underlying sources of power relations 
between domestic and global levels. However, this is not to say that forms of resistance 
are absent from such dynamics. As Laura Adams astutely notes, “the apparent lack of 
resistance to state power may be seen in terms of actions they take within this field of 
possibility and their institutional location as state actors themselves” (Adams, 2004, p. 
96; see also Scott, 1990). As the cases of the EITI show, the Initiative has a life of its 
own, where individuals operate within their own internal institutional domain with 
structures and interactions that mirror domestic regime powers, as such state power is 
exercised not through one source of authority but rather through multiple institutional 
locations (see also Adams, 2004; Jones Luong, 2004a). As such, the study also shows that 
forms of resistance are present and given voice by civil society actors (e.g., the internal 
split that occurred in Kazakhstan during the first validation or the feeling of dissatisfaction 
between civil society and state actors and companies in Kyrgyzstan). The form of 
resistance is often expressed through the discourse of ‘us versus them’. In the EITI 
framework, resistance occurs between civil society actors against the state and 
companies. At the broader domestic level and beyond the framework of the Initiative, 
resistance exists in the relations between the state and its institutions, such as the Akims 
or the state and or companies against the population. Forms of resistance also exist in the 
relations between the national and international level. As the cases show, there is 
resistance from national actors who perceive the Initiative to be a Western geopolitical 
project aiming to impose its own rules. Therefore, resistance in countries of Central Asia 
is multidimensional. It is not only political and ideological but also driven by specific 
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resources. Writing on cultural ideological production and the state in Uzbekistan, Laura 
Adams (2004, p. 115) also observes that “conflicts between state actors in Uzbekistan are 
not likely to be framed in ideological terms but rather as struggles over the allocation of 
resources and the appointments of credit and blame”. However, resistance is itself limited, 
since its articulations need to be carefully tailored ‘to what is permissible’ within the 
confines of the state. Therefore, unless resistance poses a direct threat to the interests of 
the state, as the Zhanaozen protests in Kazakhstan show, in autocratic states of Central 
Asia, even the strongest form of resistance are ultimately hardly able to produce any 
significant changes. 
7.5 Analysing the Findings in Light of the Global Governance 
Literature 
In light of these findings, it then became increasingly important to analyse global 
governance in terms of ‘global assemblages’ (Ong and Collier, 2005) – that is, the 
articulation of a global form. The implication, as Collier further writes (2006, p. 400), is 
that “global forms are everywhere but that they have a distinctive capacity for 
decontextualisation and recontextualisation, abstractability and movement, across diverse 
social and cultural situation”. Such analytical observations allow us to grasp the 
interwoven relationship between the global and the local, where actors are highly 
entangled with each other and where the global can also be constituted inside the national 
(Sassen, 2008). In such settings, the global is “coded, formulated or experienced through 
the vocabularies and institutional instruments of the national as historically constructed” 
(Sassen, 2008, p. 75). With this account, the state becomes transformed rather than 
‘eroded’, and it becomes constitutive or the enabling part of the globalisation process. As 
both case studies on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrate, although the Initiative is 
parachuted by global agenda setters, its implementation in the respective national contexts 
is increasingly state dependent and state orchestrated. The study as such illustrates that 
the adoption of global forms and norms further highlight practices that are culturally 
authentic and politically resistant within the domestic national realm. In this sense, 
Central Asian states mimic global governance practices to be accepted to the ‘club of 
global society’, but this does not mean that they are intentionally committed to global 
governance norms and that they follow a Western-imposed agenda. As Bhabha suggests, 
the concept of mimicry is a technique of camouflage: as such, “it is almost the same but 
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not quite” (Bhabha, 1994 p. 86). Mimicry gives space to ambivalences and opens spaces 
for hybridity. As the implementation of the EITI in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan indicates, 
although the EITI created a participatory platform for dialogue among different 
stakeholders, in reality, it is nonetheless embedded within a state umbrella and has 
become a ‘performative’ act of governance. The constant presence of the shadow of the 
state undermines the legitimacy of the plurality of opinions. As such, the participatory 
platform of the EITI provides a space for voice representation (that is, the dialogue 
platform), but not for a plurality of opinions. In doing so, the dialogue platform seems to 
re-create the domestic structures of state governance and state power. Bound by interests 
of geopolitics and cash flows, international actors, such as companies and donors, become 
complicit in sustaining such ‘performative’ acts of governance. In such a context, the 
success of global governance is thus limited, as it is largely characterised by the triumph 
of form over content and substance132.  
However, the act of such ‘performative politics’ is multidimensional, and as such, it 
carries intended and unintended consequences. As the study of the EITI demonstrates, the 
Initiative has created unintended spillovers that have implicitly redesigned the 
institutional fora of domestic politics. For instance, in Kazakhstan, as discussed in the 
respective Chapter, the EITI dialogue platform created a pace for civil society 
participation. In Kyrgyzstan, the EITI was implemented at broader regional levels 
through Public Opinion Desks. By creating these new ‘spaces’ that would have not 
existed otherwise, the EITI indirectly contributed to shape domestic political practices of 
autocratic states. However, in authoritarian contexts, such spaces need to be carefully 
analysed, as they are likely to become a function of autocratic policy strategies. Given the 
nature of the authoritarian regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the small positive 
changes towards processes of democratic openness, the accountability and transparency 
introduced by the EITI global governance initiative are likely to be subverted by the state 
and its political system. A clear illustration of this is found in the implementation of the 
legislation on ‘Subsoil Use’. As the study demonstrated, even though timely reporting 
                                                            
132 These findings also mirror John Heathershaw’s (2014) analysis of Tajikistan and international peace 
building operations. See Chapter 1 “The global performance state: a reconsideration of the Central Asian 
Weak states”. In Ethnographies of the state in Central Asia: Performing Politics. Reeves, M., Rasanaygam 
J., Beyer J.(eds) Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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produced legislative changes, these have nevertheless had little effect in practice. 
Moreover, the study also indicates that reports do not reflect the full picture, as the data 
have been only partially disclosed. 
Such observations bring us to consider the role of state and global governance, as the case 
of the EITI demonstrated that rather than being separate objects, they are rather 
constitutive of one another. However, as the implementation of global governance 
initiatives takes place in national contexts and flows through state domestic institutions, 
it is ultimately the state that decides the directions of its implementation. The analysis 
further demonstrates that under the local autocratic context of Central Asia, the creation 
of a new institution, such as the EITI, bears within key patterns of the structural-historical 
Soviet system. In the context of Central Asian countries, as the analysis shows, 
institutional design is understood as a transfer of pre-existing domestic power relations 
and power distribution onto seemingly new structures. Consequently, in such a context, 
there is no alteration of old domestic practices. The study therefore indicates that 
institutional outcomes should be measured not by design but rather by internal decision-
making procedures and mechanisms of accountability. 
Moreover, Meyer and Rowan (1991) argue that formal standardised structures have both 
symbolic and action-generating properties. As the case studies show, the EITI in both 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan is largely characterised by procedural and symbolic rituals. 
As outlined by Meyer and Rowan (1991, p. 49), such a system incorporates elements that 
are legitimated externally rather than in terms of efficiency; they employ external or 
ceremonial value assessment criteria (Meyers and Rowan, 1991, p. 49). As shown in the 
case studies, for many individuals in the EITI, the produced meaning behind such 
procedural actions remains unclear, yet such ceremonial actions increasingly sustain the 
survival of the organisation and legitimate its internal participants. Consequently, in such 
a context, the outcome of standardised practices becomes largely driven by conformity to 
formal structures and procedures rather than efficiencies and meanings of the content 
produced. 
Considering these observations, the study further demonstrates that the EITI is not an 
effective tool to fight the resource curse syndrome. Clearly, given the domestic context 
and institutional conditions of the autocratic states of Central Asia, transparency alone is 
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insufficient to address the issue of corruption. To be effective, domestic state institutions 
and mechanisms of vertical accountability that enable the population to hold their 
governments responsible need to be in place. Furthermore, as the case studies 
demonstrate, the proliferation of global financial mechanisms, such as offshore centres, 
should bypass transparency. I therefore argue that the quality of institutions of EITI 
recipient countries matters; without improving domestic institutional contexts and wider 
global regulatory financial systems first, mechanisms of transparency, as addressed under 
the EITI, are doomed to fall short on their promises.
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this thesis is to understand the functioning of global governance in the 
autocratic states of Central Asia endowed with post-colonial legacies. By empirically 
examining the implementation of the EITI in the countries of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
this thesis aimed to contribute to the theoretical debate on global governance and its 
practice in autocratic contexts.
The process of the EITI in the countries of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan suggests that 
although the Initiative has a standardised path of implementing goals, its structural 
governance mechanisms follow a distinct internal logic that disconnects it from the rules 
and principles imposed from the outside. As the EITI’s institutional template 
demonstrates, formal and quantitative indicators based on revenue reporting do not 
always reflect reality. As the study shows, standardised routine practices, as perpetuated 
under the EITI, have an active life of their own that serves to support the legitimacy of 
autocratic states and the actors involved within them. Moreover, as seen from the above 
discussion, Soviet cultural and historical legacies and national state objectives determine 
the functioning of the global governance initiative. 
In light of these findings, the institutionalised form of ‘self-discipline’, as often 
proclaimed under global governance initiatives, needs to be more carefully considered by 
inquiring the politics of the internal governance dynamics of domestic actors. Such 
observations call for a deeper and more critical analysis of the functioning of global 
governance institutions as well as of the composition and behaviour of the actors 
involved, particularly with respect to non-democratic regimes. Considering these 
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 214
 
 
 
 
observations, the study urges scholars to analytically separate form and content in the 
study of global governance.
Therefore, in the theoretical frenzy on global governance, one must first determine the 
sites in which global governance occurs. Clearly, as the case of the EITI demonstrates, 
the process of global governance is not linear, and it is subject to the exogenous and 
endogenous conditions in which it operates. As such, a discussion on global governance 
necessitates a deeper focus on the contextual sites in which global governance occurs. In 
this quest, the question of statehood in such interwoven dynamics needs to be emphasised. 
In particular, what is the articulation of statehood within global governance, and how is 
its power exercised—particularly in autocratic contexts? As seen throughout the analysis, 
statehood and power in Central Asian autocratic states are multidimensional and 
constitutive of one another. Moreover, the study further highlights that in autocratic states 
of Central Asia, global governance configurations serve to reproduce domestic 
institutional structures of power sources. It will be therefore interesting to investigate 
whether similar patterns are found in other autocratic states endowed with colonial 
legacies. 
More importantly, the analysis of the EITI in Central Asian countries raises important 
questions about the concept of state and power relations in the context of globalisation. 
In this regard, a Foucauldian-inspired enquiry on governmentality might help us 
understand the role of different agents with relations to the state. A large part of 
Foucault’s work focuses on the reciprocal constitution of power, techniques and forms of 
knowledge and regimes of representation and modes of intervention (Lemke, 2007, p. 
44). In his analysis of the state, Foucault takes a rational stand on government practices. 
His conception of governmentality implies the “rationalisation of governmental practice 
in the exercise of political sovereignty” (2004, p. 4). In this regard, government means 
the “conduct of the conduct”— “the government of the self and the others” (Foucault, 
2007). In this realm, economic actors and civil society are the subordinates of the ‘art of 
government’. 
As he puts it in lecture 12 in his Birth of Biopolitics (2008): 
“An Omni-present government, a government which nothing escapes, a government 
which conforms to the rules of the right and a government which nevertheless respect the 
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specificity of the economy, will be government that manages civil society, the nation, 
society, the social” (Foucault, 2008, p. 298).
Hence, in this realm, the transfer of operations to non-state actors results not in the retreat 
of the state but rather in the transformation of forms of government or ‘art of governing’, 
as well as how these can be altered in specific context. As the analysis of the EITI 
demonstrates, states are the ultimate decision makers in how they use global governance 
to advance their internal goals and reach desired outcomes. Non-state actors play a 
secondary role in this process. Their interaction with the state is murky, and it depends 
on domestic configurations. As the study clearly demonstrates, in the powerful autocratic 
state of Kazakhstan, non-state actors are more likely to be subordinate to the rule of the 
state than they would be in the weaker autocratic state of Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the 
relationship between state and non-state actors is less straightforward and is thus more 
nuanced. Hence, there is a need to reconsider the relationship and the roles between state 
and non-state actors, as on some occasions, they act as independent agenda setters, but in 
most cases, as the present study demonstrated, they act as agents of state interests. In light 
of globalisation movements and global governance, it is then necessary to examine the 
modes of government that are being instituted on a transnational and global scale and how 
they shape each other.
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that EITI in Central Asia represents a ‘performative 
act’, yet as James C. Scott notes (1999, p. 34), “the performance is often collective, as 
subordinates collude to create a piece of theatre that serves their superiors’ view of the 
situation that is maintained in their own interest”. Reflecting upon this in the context of 
EITI, I would argue that perhaps the ‘performative act’ is practiced not only by the 
domestic leaders of the states of Central Asia but also by the agents of Global Governance 
for the sake of preserving the appearances and giving the impression of coverage (Weiss, 
2011). Nonetheless, as this thesis has revealed, scratching the surface of global 
governance can sometimes be deceitful. Moreover, considering the findings on the EITI 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, it is worth questioning the success story of global 
governance for autocratic states. Is it simply an institutional checkmark, as an indicator 
for the donor and wider global governance community that the awarded grant or project 
achieved its institutional formal goals? Clearly, as this study demonstrates and with 
reference to the writings of Danny Rodrik (2011), it is inconceivable to reach 
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democratisation, good governance and globalisation simultaneously. Further research is 
needed to examine what global governance aims to achieve in particular in oppressive 
contexts and how its success or its failure can be defined.
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Appendix 1: Interview Consent Form and Ethical Considerations
Dear Madam/Sir, 
My name is Saipira Furstenberg and I am currently pursuing a Doctoral degree at the Research 
Centre for East European Studies and I am also affiliated as a PhD fellow at the Bremen Gradual 
School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS) University of Bremen. My research project explores the role 
and the interactions of domestic and foreign actors within the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). 
To conduct my research I am inviting key relevant stakeholders of the initiative to take part in the 
study to inform me about their views and perception on EITI transparency initiative. I would like 
to invite you to tell me your views in a one-off interview. You will be asked to provide answers 
to a series of questions related to the functioning of EITI transparency initiative as a multi-
stakeholder group platform. Participation in this study will require 30 minute of your time. The 
information collected will be used for support my study purposes only and will help to further 
enhance research on EITI and transparency. There are not right or wrong answers to this. In fact 
I am very keen to gain a wide variety of opinions. 
The collected individual responses will be recorded anonymously and kept in the strictest 
confidence and will be destroyed after the completion of analyses.  The results of the study may 
be published in an academic journal or presented as a conference paper and may include questions 
from your interviews. 
Participation is this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to answer any 
questions, or withdraw from the study at any time with no effect on your employment status. 
There are no known risks to participating in this study. 
If you have any further questions about the conduct of the study or your rights as a research 
participant you may contact Director of Studies, Mandy Boehnke (e-mail: boehnke@bigsss-
bremen.de) Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS), Germany and 
Heiko Pleines (pleines@uni-bremen.de)  at The Research Centre For East European Studies at 
the University of Bremen, Germany. 
If you have any questions about this research, or any comments to make now or at a later date, or 
if you would like a copy of the published results of this study, please contact me at: 
furstenberg@bigsss.uni-bremen.de
If you agree to take part in the study, please sign the enclosed consent form. 
Yours sincerely,
Saipira Furstenberg 
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Regulation for research-related data storage at the Research Centre for East European 
Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, FSO) at the University of Bremen (as of 02 September 
2014) 
1. The storage of research related data at the FSO is based on the respective recommendation in 
the DFG’s Rules of Good Scientific Practice (in the present version: Recommendation 7: 
Safeguarding and Storing of Primary Data). 
2. Data from all research projects (including PhD projects) conducted at the FSO are stored at the 
FSO indefinitely and for a guaranteed minimum of 10 years (save force majeure events). Data 
storage is organized by the Department of Politics and Economics. Data are stored in a locked 
place in a water- and fireproof box. Data storage comprises the data, a documentation of data 
collection and any letters of consent concerning the data collection (e.g. from respondents in the 
case of interviews). 
3. For the purpose of data storage the FSO concludes a data storage contract with the responsible 
researcher(s). The contract explicitly regulates who can access the data under which conditions. 
4. The researcher must possess all relevant rights concerning the data and must have collected all 
data in line with the respective regulations of the FSO and German legislation. 
5. The FSO has the right to publish a short description of the archived data collection.
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Appendix 2: Interview Topic Guide
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MSG Standards Indicators Variables Sous-variables Interview Questions
Membership Representation Categories of actors involved in the MSG
Sort of Actors 
represented from 
different sectors.
Q: How the formation of the MSG 
takes place? How actors became 
involved in the EITI?
Governance Participation and Interactions
Collaboration 
between actors
Decision making 
process in 
addressing 
issues.
Q: Who host the meetings?
Q: How the decisions are taken 
during meetings?
Q: Is it easy to raise and discuss  
your concerns with other 
stakeholders?
Learning and 
Exchanging practices
Platform for 
dialogue
Workshops/Semi
nars/Trainings
Q: Has the implementation of the 
EITI created a space for dialogue, 
learning and exchanging ideas 
among different stakeholders? 
How does it take place? Is it 
sufficient?
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MSG Standards Indicators Variables Sous-variables Interview Questions
Implementation 
Accountability Complaints Complaints procedures 
Q: What are the existing 
complaints procedures within 
the EITI MSG?
Transparency(acces
s to information)
Access to meetings 
Meetings
Q: Are EITI meetings open 
access or under invitation? Is it 
only limited to the local MSG?
Q: How often do the 
stakeholders meet u and 
collaborate? Is it sufficient?
Communication 
with the public 
–(Consulting 
and working 
with 
communities on 
EITI process).
Q: How do you communicate 
about the EITI decisions and its 
implementation in the country?
Q: To what extent the EITI has 
facilitated public engagement 
in the management of country’s 
natural resources?
Reporting Standards
Information 
containing in 
the reports.
Q: Is the information 
containing in the reports is 
complete, easy to access (of so 
through which channels) and 
understand?
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Appendix 3: EITI Workshop participation, Participant Observations
“EITI implementation problems within the EITI Standard: Kyrgyzstan’s case” 
Workshop Program 9 December 2014
Venue: 37 Isanov Str., Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, “Golden Tulip” Hotel (2nd floor, “Sultan” 
room)
Objectives of the workshop:
- Capacity building of MSG stakeholders (government agencies, extractive 
companies and civil society) regarding the further EITI implementation.
- Identification of the most pressing issues of transparency and governance in the 
extractive industries of Kyrgyzstan. 
- Preparation of proposals for the development of EITI in Kyrgyzstan.
8:30-9:00 Registration
9:00-
09:30
Welcome, introduction to the workshop and objectives of the 
workshop
Opening remarks:
- Karybek Ibraev, Head, Kyrgyzstan EITI Secretariat
- Gary McMahon, Senior Mining Specialist, Oil, Gas and Mining Policy 
Division, World Bank
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09:30-
10:00
Preliminary results of data of government agencies on companies 
involved in the EITI for 2013
Karybek Ibraev, Head, Kyrgyzstan EITI Secretariat
10:00-
10:30
Medium and Long-term Strategy of Mining Industry Development of 
the Kyrgyz Republic
Valentin Bogdetsky, Board Member of the Kyrgyz Mining Association, 
Member of the Kyrgyzstan EITI Supervisory Board
10:30-
11:00
Issues of preparation of the annual report on the EITI 
implementation in Kyrgyzstan
Jamalbek Turgunbekov, Consultant, Kyrgyzstan EITI Secretariat
11:00-
11:30
Break
11:30-
12:00
Consideration of the materiality threshold level for extractive 
companies
Karybek Ibraev, Head, Kyrgyzstan EITI Secretariat
12:00-
12:30
On the development of the reporting template that reflects the 
information on payments and data on volumes of mining activities 
from extractive companies
Representative of the State Agency for Geology and Mineral Resources 
under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
13:00-
14:00
Lunch
14:00-
14:55
Working in groups. General issues on the development of EITI in 
Kyrgyzstan
x Development of mechanisms for monitoring and reporting 
of local administrations on the issues of resources for 
infrastructure development;
x Investigation of the alleged benefits from the activities of 
the extractive companies;
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x Understanding of mandatory social contributions from 
extractive companies;
x Investigation of mechanisms of distribution of revenues 
from extractive companies at the subnational level;
x Promoting understanding of the local population of public 
revenues and expenditures by extractive companies;
x Dissemination of information.
What has already been done for each of the above issues? What agencies 
have taken part? What is planned to implement and what agencies will be 
involved in 2015?
14:55-
15:00
Summing up the workshop, awarding certificates
Karybek Ibraev, Head, Kyrgyzstan EITI Secretariat
15:00-
15:30
Break
15:30-
17:00
Meeting of the Kyrgyzstan EITI Supervisory Board
EITI implementation problems within the EITI Standard: Kyrgyzstan’s case”, 
examples of workshop exercises held with participants on revenue sharing and 
transparency
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Appendix 4a: Survey Questionnaire
Ɉɦɧɢɛɭɫɧɨɟɢɫcɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɟ
,BɈɛɥɚɫɬɶ
1. Ȼɢɲɤɟɤ
2. ɑɭɣ
3. ɂɫɫɵɤ-Ʉɭɥɶ
4. ɇɚɪɵɧ
5. Ɍɚɥɚɫ
6. Ɉɲɫɤɚɹɨɛɥɚɫɬɶ
7. ɀɚɥɚɥɚɛɚɬ
8. Ȼɚɬɤɟɧ
9. ɝɈɲ
IBɌɢɩɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɧɨɝɨɩɭɧɤɬɚɜɤɨɬɨɪɨɦɩɪɨɜɨɞɢɬɫɹɢɧɬɟɪɜɶɸ"
1) ȽɨɪɨɞBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBɭɤɚɡɚɬɶɧɚɡɜɚɧɢɟ
2) ɉȽɌBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBɭɤɚɡɚɬɶɧɚɡɜɚɧɢɟ
3) ɋɟɥɨBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBɭɤɚɡɚɬɶɧɚɡɜɚɧɢɟ
ɇɨɦɟɪɚɧɤɟɬɵ
Ʉɨɞɝɨɪɨɞɚɫɟɥɶɫɤɨɣɦɟɫɬɧɨɫɬɢ
ȼɪɟɦɹɧɚɱɚɥɚ ɱɚɫ ɦɢɧ
ɈɌȻɈɊɊȿɋɉɈɇȾȿɇɌɈȼȾɅəɈɉɊɈɋȺ.
- ɉɟɪɟɱɢɫɥɢɬɟ ɜɫɟɯ ɜɡɪɨɫɥɵɯ ɦɭɠɱɢɧ ɠɟɧɳɢɧ ɜ ɜɨɡɪɚɫɬɟ  ɥɟɬ ɢ ɫɬɚɪɲɟ
ɩɪɨɠɢɜɚɸɳɢɯɜɫɟɦɶɟɫɭɤɚɡɚɧɢɟɦɢɯɜɨɡɪɚɫɬɚɧɟɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɨɨɬɬɨɝɨɧɚɯɨɞɹɬɫɹ
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ɥɢɨɧɢɞɨɦɚɜɧɚɫɬɨɹɳɟɟɜɪɟɦɹɢɥɢɧɟɬɇɚɱɧɢɬɟɫɫɚɦɨɝɨɫɬɚɪɲɟɝɨɱɥɟɧɚɫɟɦɶɢ
ɢɩɪɨɞɨɥɠɚɣɬɟɜɩɨɪɹɞɤɟɭɦɟɧɶɲɟɧɢɹɜɨɡɪɚɫɬɚ
- ɉɨɫɦɨɬɪɢɬɟ ɧɚ ɤɚɤɭɸɰɢɮɪɭ ɡɚɤɚɧɱɢɜɚɟɬɫɹɧɨɦɟɪȼɚɲɟɣ ɚɧɤɟɬɵ ɢɧɚɣɞɢɬɟ
ɬɚɤɨɣɠɟɧɨɦɟɪɜɜɟɪɯɧɟɣɫɬɪɨɤɟɌɚɛɥɢɰɵɫɦɧɢɠɟ
- ɇɚɣɞɢɬɟ ɜ ɷɬɨɣ ɤɨɥɨɧɤɟ ɰɢɮɪɭ ɪɚɫɩɨɥɨɠɟɧɧɭɸ ɜ ɫɚɦɨɣ ɧɢɠɧɟɣ ɫɬɪɨɤɟ ɫ
ɢɦɟɧɚɦɢɜɫɟɯɜɡɪɨɫɥɵɯɩɪɨɠɢɜɚɸɳɢɯɜɫɟɦɶɟɗɬɚɰɢɮɪɚɹɜɥɹɟɬɫɹɤɥɸɱɨɦɤ
ɬɨɦɭɤɚɤɨɝɨɩɨɫɱɟɬɭɱɥɟɧɚɫɟɦɶɢȼɚɦɧɟɨɛɯɨɞɢɦɨɨɩɪɨɫɢɬɶ
- ȼɟɪɧɢɬɟɫɶ ɤ ɫɩɢɫɤɭ ɜɡɪɨɫɥɵɯ ɦɭɠɱɢɧ ɠɟɧɳɢɧ ɩɪɨɠɢɜɚɸɳɢɯ ɜ ɫɟɦɶɟ ɢ
ɩɨɩɪɨɫɢɬɟɪɚɡɪɟɲɟɧɢɹɩɨɝɨɜɨɪɢɬɶɫɬɟɦɢɡɧɢɯɱɟɣɧɨɦɟɪɜɫɩɢɫɤɟɫɨɜɩɚɞɚɟɬɫ
ɧɨɦɟɪɨɦɭɤɚɡɚɧɧɵɦɜɌɚɛɥɢɰɟ
- ȼɢɡɢɬɵɞɨɥɠɧɵɛɵɬɶɫɞɟɥɚɧɵɜɪɚɡɧɵɟɞɧɢɢɯɨɬɹɛɵɨɞɢɧɜɢɡɢɬɜɜɵɯɨɞɧɵɟ
ɉɈɋɅȿȾɇəəɐɂɎɊȺȼɇɈɆȿɊȿȺɇɄȿɌɕ
Ɏɚɦɢɥɢɢɢɢɦɟɧɚɱɥɟɧɨɜ
ɫɟɦɶɢ
ɩɨ
ɥ
ɜɨ
ɡɪ
ɚɫ
ɬ
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1
3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1
4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1
2
5 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2
3
6 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1
7 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4
5
8 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3
4
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9 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0
ɎɂɈɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɚ
Ɍɟɥɟɮɨɧɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɚ
Ⱥɞɪɟɫ
 ɋɤɚɠɢɬɟ ɩɨɠɚɥɭɣɫɬɚ  ɢɡ ɫɩɢɫɤɚ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɨɜ ɤɨɬɨɪɵɣ  ɹ ɜɚɦ ɩɨɤɚɠɭ ɤɨɦɭ ɜɵ
ɞɨɜɟɪɹɟɬɟɛɨɥɶɲɟɜɫɟɝɨȼɨɡɦɨɠɟɧɬɨɥɶɤɨɨɞɢɧɜɚɪɢɚɧɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
ɂɇɌɉɈɄȺɀɂɌȿɄȺɊɌɈɑɄɍʋɉɈɁȼɈɅɖɌȿɊȿɋɉɈɇȾȿɇɌɍȼɕȻɊȺɌɖɈȾɂɇ
ȼȺɊɂȺɇɌɈɌȼȿɌȺɇȿɁȺɑɂɌɕȼȺɃɌȿɇȿɉɈɄȺɁɕȼȺɃɌȿɊȿɋɉɈɇȾȿɇɌɍȼȺɊɂȺɇɌ
ɈɌȼȿɌȺ©ɇȿȾɈȼȿɊəɘɇɂɄɈɆɍª
ɇɟɞɨɜɟɪɹɸɧɢɤɨɦɭ
ʋ Ɏɚɦɢɥɢɹ
1. ȺɬɚɦɛɚɟɜȺɥɦɚɡɛɟɤ-ɉɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɄɊ
2. ɀɷɷɧɛɟɤɨɜȺɫɵɥɛɟɤ-ɌɨɪɚɝɚɀɨɝɨɪɤɭɄɟɧɟɲɚɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
3. Ɉɬɨɪɛɚɟɜɀɨɨɦɚɪɬ- ɉɪɟɦɶɟɪɆɢɧɢɫɬɪ
4. ɋɚɬɵɛɚɥɞɢɟɜɀɚɧɬɨɪɨ-ɛɵɜɲɢɣɉɪɟɦɶɟɪɆɢɧɢɫɬɪ
5. ȻɚɛɚɧɨɜɈɦɭɪɛɟɤ- ɛɵɜɲɢɣɉɪɟɦɶɟɪɆɢɧɢɫɬɪ
6. ɄɟɥɞɢɛɟɤɨɜȺɯɦɚɬɛɟɤ-ɱɥɟɧɩɚɪɬɢɢ©Ⱥɬɚ-ɀɭɪɬªɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
7. ɄɭɥɨɜɎɟɥɢɤɫ- ɥɢɞɟɪɩɚɪɬɢɢ ©Ⱥɪ-ɇɚɦɵɫªɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
8. ɌɚɲɢɟɜɄɚɦɱɵɛɟɤ- ɱɥɟɧɩɚɪɬɢɢ©Ⱥɬɚ-ɀɭɪɬª
9. Ɍɭɪɫɭɧɛɟɤɨɜɑɵɧɵɛɚɣ- ɥɢɞɟɪɩɚɪɬɢɢ ©ɋȾɉɄªɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
10. ɌɟɤɟɛɚɟɜɈɦɭɪɛɟɤ- ɥɢɞɟɪɩɚɪɬɢɢ ©Ⱥɬɚ-ɆɟɤɟɧªɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
11. ɋɭɥɚɣɦɚɧɨɜȺɥɬɵɧɛɟɤ-ɱɥɟɧɩɚɪɬɢɢ«Ɋɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɚ»ɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
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12. ɀɚɩɚɪɨɜɋɚɞɵɪ- ɱɥɟɧɩɚɪɬɢɢ«Ⱥɬɚ-ɀɭɪɬ»
13. ɆɚɞɭɦɚɪɨɜȺɞɚɯɚɧ- ɥɢɞɟɪɩɚɪɬɢɢ©ȻɭɬɭɧɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧª
14. Ʉɭɥɦɚɬɨɜ Ʉɭɛɚɧɵɱɛɟɤ - ɦɷɪ ɝ Ȼɢɲɤɟɤ ɨɬ ɩɚɪɬɢɢ ©ɋȾɉɄª ɛɵɜɲɢɣ ɩɨɥɩɪɟɞ ɩɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɚ ɜ
ɑɭɣɫɤɨɣɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ
15. ȺɣɬɦɚɦɚɬɄɚɞɵɪɛɚɟɜ- ɦɷɪɝɈɲ
16. ɆɵɪɡɚɤɦɚɬɨɜɆɟɥɢɫ- ɛɵɜɲɢɣɦɷɪɝɈɲɱɥɟɧɩɚɪɬɢɢ©ɍɥɭɬɬɚɪȻɢɪɢɦɞɢɝɢª
17. ɋɚɪɢɟɜɌɟɦɢɪ-ɆɢɧɢɫɬɪɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɢɄɊ
18. ȺɛɞɵɥɞɚɟɜɆɵɤɬɵɛɟɤ- ɱɥɟɧɩɚɪɬɢɢ«Ⱥɬɚ-ɀɭɪɬ», ɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
19. Ⱦɠɨɥɞɨɲɟɜɚɀɵɥɞɵɡɤɚɧɥɢɞɟɪɩɚɪɬɢɢ©Ⱥɬɚ-ɀɭɪɬªɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
20. ɂɦɚɧɚɥɢɟɜɄɚɧɵɛɟɤ- ɱɥɟɧɩɚɪɬɢɢ«Ⱥɪ-ɇɚɦɵɫ»ɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
21. Ɇɚɫɚɥɢɟɜɂɫɯɚɤ- ɥɢɞɟɪɄɨɦɦɭɧɢɫɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɣɩɚɪɬɢɢɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɚ
22. ɋɚɥɵɦɛɟɤɨɜ Ⱥɫɤɚɪ - Ɉɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɣ ɞɟɹɬɟɥɶ ɥɢɞɟɪ ɩɚɪɬɢɢ ©ɗɦɝɟɤª ɍɱɪɟɞɢɬɟɥɶ ɈɎ ©Ɏɨɧɞ
ɉɪɨɝɪɟɫɫɢɜɧɵɯɂɧɢɰɢɚɬɢɜª
 ȼ ɰɟɥɨɦ ɩɨ ɜɚɲɟɦɭ ɦɧɟɧɢɸ Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧ ɪɚɡɜɢɜɚɟɬɫɹ ɜ ɩɪɚɜɢɥɶɧɨɦ ɢɥɢ ɜ
ɧɟɩɪɚɜɢɥɶɧɨɦɧɚɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɢ"
ɇɚɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɟɩɪɚɜɢɥɶɧɨɟ 1
ɇɚɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɟɧɟɩɪɚɜɢɥɶɧɨɟ 2
ɇɟɡɧɚɸɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ 99
3. ɋɟɣɱɚɫ ɹ ɡɚɱɢɬɚɸ ȼɚɦ ɢɦɟɧɚ ɧɟɤɨɬɨɪɵɯ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɨɜ Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɚ
ɉɨɠɚɥɭɣɫɬɚ ɪɚɫɫɤɚɠɢɬɟɦɧɟȼɚɲɟɦɧɟɧɢɟ ɨ ɤɚɠɞɨɦɤɚɠɞɨɣ ɢɡ ɧɢɯ ɨɱɟɧɶ
ɩɨɥɨɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɟɩɨɥɨɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɟɨɬɪɢɰɚɬɟɥɶɧɨɟɨɱɟɧɶɨɬɪɢɰɚɬɟɥɶɧɨɟɢɥɢȼɵ
ɧɟɫɥɵɲɚɥɢɨɛɷɬɨɣɥɢɱɧɨɫɬɢ"
ɂɇɌɉɈɄȺɀɂɌȿɄȺɊɌɈɑɄɍʋ
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ʋ Ɏɚɦɢɥɢɹ Ɉɱɟɧɶ
ɩɨɥɨɠɢɬ
ɟɥɶɧɨɟ
ɉɨɥɨɠɢ
ɬɟɥɶɧɨɟ
Ɉɬɪɢɰɚɬ
ɟɥɶɧɨɟ
Ɉɱɟɧɶ
ɨɬɪɢɰɚ
ɬɟɥɶɧɨɟ
ɇɟ
ɫɥɵɲ
ɚɥ o
ɧɟɦɧɟ
ɣ
ɇɟ
ɡɧɚɸ
ɇɟɬ
ɨɬɜɟɬɚ
1. ȺɬɚɦɛɚɟɜȺɥɦɚɡɛɟɤ-ɉɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬ
ɄɊ
1 2 3 4 8 99
2. ɀɷɷɧɛɟɤɨɜȺɫɵɥɛɟɤ-Ɍɨɪɚɝɚ
ɀɨɝɨɪɤɭɄɟɧɟɲɚɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
1 2 3 4 8 99
3. Ɉɬɨɪɛɚɟɜɀɨɨɦɚɪɬ- ɉɪɟɦɶɟɪ
Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɪ
1 2 3 4 8 99
4. ɋɚɬɵɛɚɥɞɢɟɜɀɚɧɬɨɪɨ-ɛɵɜɲɢɣ
ɉɪɟɦɶɟɪɆɢɧɢɫɬɪ
1 2 3 4 8 99
5. ȻɚɛɚɧɨɜɈɦɭɪɛɟɤ- ɛɵɜɲɢɣ
ɉɪɟɦɶɟɪɆɢɧɢɫɬɪ
1 2 3 4 8 99
6. ɄɟɥɞɢɛɟɤɨɜȺɯɦɚɬɛɟɤ-ɱɥɟɧ
ɩɚɪɬɢɢ©Ⱥɬɚ-ɀɭɪɬªɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
1 2 3 4 8 99
7. ɄɭɥɨɜɎɟɥɢɤɫ- ɥɢɞɟɪɩɚɪɬɢɢ
©Ⱥɪ-ɇɚɦɵɫªɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
1 2 3 4 8 99
8. ɌɚɲɢɟɜɄɚɦɱɵɛɟɤ- ɱɥɟɧɩɚɪɬɢɢ
©Ⱥɬɚ-ɀɭɪɬª
1 2 3 4 8 99
9. Ɍɭɪɫɭɧɛɟɤɨɜɑɵɧɵɛɚɣ- ɥɢɞɟɪ
ɩɚɪɬɢɢ ©ɋȾɉɄªɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
1 2 3 4 8 99
10. ɌɟɤɟɛɚɟɜɈɦɭɪɛɟɤ- ɥɢɞɟɪ
ɩɚɪɬɢɢ ©Ⱥɬɚ-Ɇɟɤɟɧªɞɟɩɭɬɚɬ
ɀɄ
1 2 3 4 8 99
11. ɋɭɥɚɣɦɚɧɨɜȺɥɬɵɧɛɟɤ-ɱɥɟɧ
ɩɚɪɬɢɢ«Ɋɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɚ»ɞɟɩɭɬɚɬ
ɀɄ
1 2 3 4 8 99
12.ɀɚɩɚɪɨɜɋɚɞɵɪ- ɱɥɟɧɩɚɪɬɢɢ
«Ⱥɬɚ-ɀɭɪɬ»
1 2 3 4 8 99
13.ɆɚɞɭɦɚɪɨɜȺɞɚɯɚɧ- ɥɢɞɟɪ
ɩɚɪɬɢɢ©ȻɭɬɭɧɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧª
1 2 3 4 8 99
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14. ɄɭɥɦɚɬɨɜɄɭɛɚɧɵɱɛɟɤ- ɦɷɪɝ
Ȼɢɲɤɟɤɨɬɩɚɪɬɢɢ©ɋȾɉɄª
ɛɵɜɲɢɣɩɨɥɩɪɟɞɩɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɚ
ɜɑɭɣɫɤɨɣɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ
1 2 3 4 8 99
15.ȺɣɬɦɚɦɚɬɄɚɞɵɪɛɚɟɜ- ɦɷɪɝɈɲ 1 2 3 4 8 99
16.ɆɵɪɡɚɤɦɚɬɨɜɆɟɥɢɫ- ɛɵɜɲɢɣ
ɦɷɪɝɈɲɱɥɟɧɩɚɪɬɢɢ
©ɍɥɭɬɬɚɪȻɢɪɢɦɞɢɝɢª
1 2 3 4 8 99
17. ɋɚɪɢɟɜɌɟɦɢɪ-Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɪ
ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɢɄɊ
1 2 3 4 8 99
18.ȺɛɞɵɥɞɚɟɜɆɵɤɬɵɛɟɤ- ɱɥɟɧ
ɩɚɪɬɢɢ«Ⱥɬɚ-ɀɭɪɬ», ɞɟɩɭɬɚɬ
ɀɄ
1 2 3 4 8 99
19. Ⱦɠɨɥɞɨɲɟɜɚɀɵɥɞɵɡɤɚɧɥɢɞɟɪ
ɩɚɪɬɢɢ©Ⱥɬɚ-ɀɭɪɬªɞɟɩɭɬɚɬɀɄ
1 2 3 4 8 99
20.ɂɦɚɧɚɥɢɟɜɄɚɧɵɛɟɤ- ɱɥɟɧ
ɩɚɪɬɢɢ«Ⱥɪ-ɇɚɦɵɫ»ɞɟɩɭɬɚɬ
ɀɄ
1 2 3 4 8 99
21.Ɇɚɫɚɥɢɟɜɂɫɯɚɤ- ɥɢɞɟɪ
Ʉɨɦɦɭɧɢɫɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɣɩɚɪɬɢɢ
Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɚ
1 2 3 4 8 99
22. ɋɚɥɵɦɛɟɤɨɜȺɫɤɚɪ-
Ɉɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɣɞɟɹɬɟɥɶɥɢɞɟɪ
ɩɚɪɬɢɢ©ɗɦɝɟɤªɍɱɪɟɞɢɬɟɥɶɈɎ
©Ɏɨɧɞɉɪɨɝɪɟɫɫɢɜɧɵɯ
ɂɧɢɰɢɚɬɢɜª
1 2 3 4 8 99
ɄɚɤȼɵɨɰɟɧɢɜɚɟɬɟɞɟɹɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɶɉɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚȺɥɦɚɡɛɟɤɚȺɬɚɦɛɚɟɜɚ"
1. ɉɨɥɨɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨ
2. ɋɤɨɪɟɟɩɨɥɨɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨ
3. ɋɤɨɪɟɟɨɬɪɢɰɚɬɟɥɶɧɨ
4. Ɉɬɪɢɰɚɬɟɥɶɧɨ
ɇɟɡɧɚɸɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
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5. Ʉɚɤȼɵɨɰɟɧɢɜɚɟɬɟɞɟɹɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɶɉɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚ"
1. ɉɨɥɨɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨ
2. ɋɤɨɪɟɟɩɨɥɨɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨ
3. ɋɤɨɪɟɟɨɬɪɢɰɚɬɟɥɶɧɨ
4. Ɉɬɪɢɰɚɬɟɥɶɧɨ
ɇɟɡɧɚɸɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
6. Ʉɚɤȼɵɨɰɟɧɢɜɚɟɬɟɞɟɹɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɶɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɚ"
1. ɉɨɥɨɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨ
2. ɋɤɨɪɟɟɩɨɥɨɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨ
3. ɋɤɨɪɟɟɨɬɪɢɰɚɬɟɥɶɧɨ
4. Ɉɬɪɢɰɚɬɟɥɶɧɨ
ɇɟɡɧɚɸɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
7. ȽɨɜɨɪɹɨɛɢɧɢɰɢɚɬɢɜɟɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚȺɬɚɦɛɚɟɜɚɩɨɛɨɪɶɛɟɫɤɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɟɣɫɤɚɤɢɦ
ɢɡɧɢɠɟɩɟɪɟɱɢɫɥɟɧɧɵɯɜɵɫɤɚɡɵɜɚɧɢɣȼɵɫɨɝɥɚɫɧɵɛɨɥɶɲɟɜɫɟɝɨ"   ɂɇɌ
ɉɈɄȺɀɂɌȿɄȺɊɌɈɑɄɍʋ
1. Ȼɵɬɶɤɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɨɧɟɪɨɦɫɬɚɥɨɨɩɚɫɧɨ
2. ɂɦɟɸɬɫɹɪɟɚɥɶɧɵɟɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɵɛɨɪɶɛɵɫɤɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɟɣ
3. ɉɨɹɜɢɥɢɫɶɬɨɥɶɤɨɩɟɪɜɵɟɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɵɛɨɪɶɛɵɫɤɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɟɣ
4. Ȼɨɪɶɛɚɫɤɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɟɣɜɟɞɟɬɫɹɜɵɛɨɪɨɱɧɨɢɧɚɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɚɩɪɨɬɢɜɨɩɩɨɡɢɰɢɢ
5. Ʉɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɢɫɬɚɥɨɦɟɧɶɲɟ
6. Ʉɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɢɫɬɚɥɨɛɨɥɶɲɟ
7. Ʉɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɹɧɟɩɨɛɟɞɢɦɚ
8. ȾɪɭɝɨɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
ɇɟɡɧɚɸɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
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8. ɑɬɨȼɵɨɠɢɞɚɟɬɟɨɬȺɥɦɚɡɛɟɤɚȺɬɚɦɛɚɟɜɚɡɚɜɪɟɦɹɟɝɨɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɫɬɜɚ"ɇɚɡɨɜɢɬɟ
ɩɨɠɚɥɭɣɫɬɚɬɪɢɨɫɧɨɜɧɵɯɨɠɢɞɚɧɢɹɢɧɚɱɧɢɬɟɫɫɚɦɨɝɨɡɧɚɱɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɝɨɢɡɧɢɯ
ȼɇɂɆȺɇɂȿɂɇɌȿɊȼɖɘȿɊȼȺɊɂȺɇɌɕɈɌȼȿɌɈȼɇȿɁȺɑɂɌɕȼȺɌɖ
ɉɟɪɜɨɟ
ɭɩɨɦɹɧɭɬɨɟ
ȼɬɨɪɨɟ
ɭɩɨɦɹɧɭɬɨɟ
Ɍɪɟɬɶɟ
ɭɩɨɦɹɧɭɬɨɟ
Ɋɟɲɢɬɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵɛɟɡɪɚɛɨɬɢɰɵ 1 1 1
ɉɨɜɵɲɟɧɢɟɡɚɪɚɛɨɬɧɨɣɩɥɚɬɵ 2 2 2
ɗɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɨɟɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɟ 3 3 3
Ȼɨɪɶɛɚɫɤɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɟɣ 4 4 4
Ɋɚɡɜɢɬɢɟɫɟɥɶɫɤɨɝɨɯɨɡɹɣɫɬɜɚ 5 5 5
Ɋɚɡɜɢɬɢɟɫɨɰɢɚɥɶɧɨɣɡɚɳɢɬɵɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɹ 6 6 6
Ɂɞɪɚɜɨɨɯɪɚɧɟɧɢɟ 7 7 7
Ȼɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɶɫɨɯɪɚɧɟɧɢɟɦɢɪɚ 8 8 8
Ɋɚɡɜɢɬɢɟɢɧɞɭɫɬɪɢɢɢɩɪɨɢɡɜɨɞɫɬɜɚ 9 9 9
ɉɟɧɫɢɨɧɧɚɹɩɨɞɞɟɪɠɤɚɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɹ 10 10 10
ȼɨɩɪɨɫɵɦɟɠɷɬɧɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɣ 11 11 11
Ɋɟɲɟɧɢɟɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɫɝɪɚɧɢɰɟɣ 12 12 12
Ɋɟɲɟɧɢɟɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɷɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɢ 13 13 13
Ȼɨɪɶɛɚɫɤɪɢɦɢɧɚɥɨɦ 14 14 14
ɉɪɟɨɞɨɥɟɧɢɟɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨɤɪɢɡɢɫɚ 15 15 15
Ȼɨɪɶɛɚɫɩɪɚɜɨɜɵɦɛɟɫɩɪɟɞɟɥɨɦ 16 16 16
Ȼɨɪɶɛɚ ɫ ɤɥɚɧɨɜɨɫɬɶɸ ɜ ɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɦ
ɭɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɢ
17 17 17
ɉɪɢɜɟɞɟɬ ɧɨɜɭɸ ɷɥɢɬɭ ɤ ɭɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɸ
ɫɬɪɚɧɨɣ
18 18 18
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ȾɪɭɝɨɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
_
19________
_
19________
_
19________
_
ɇɟɡɧɚɸɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ 99 99 99
ɉɪɨɱɢɬɚɣɬɟ  ɩɨɠɚɥɭɣɫɬɚ  ɭɬɜɟɪɠɞɟɧɢɹ ɫɜɹɡɚɧɧɵɟ ɫ ɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɟɦɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɚɢ
ɜɵɪɚɡɢɬɟɫɜɨɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɢɟɢɥɢɧɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɢɟɩɨɤɚɠɞɨɦɭɢɡɧɢɯ
ɂɇɌɉɈɄȺɀɂɌȿɄȺɊɌɈɑɄɍʋ
ɋɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ ɇɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ ɇɟ ɡɧɚɸɇɟɬ
ɨɬɜɟɬɚ
1.      Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧ ɫ ɬɪɭɞɧɨɫɬɹɦɢɧɨ ɬɜɟɪɞɨɢ
ɩɨɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɬɟɥɶɧɨ ɢɞɟɬ ɩɨ ɩɭɬɢ ɩɨɫɬɪɨɟɧɢɹ
ɩɪɚɜɨɜɨɝɨɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɚ
1 2 99
 ȼ Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɟ ɧɟɬ ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜ ɩɨɫɬɪɨɟɧɢɹ
ɩɪɚɜɨɜɨɝɨɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɚ
1 2 99
 ȼ Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɟ ɧɟɫɩɨɤɨɣɧɨ ɧɨ ɷɬɨ ɥɭɱɲɟ
ɱɟɦ ɞɢɤɬɚɬɭɪɚ Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɰɵ ɩɪɢɜɵɤɚɸɬ ɤ
ɫɜɨɛɨɞɟ ɢ ɩɨɫɬɟɩɟɧɧɨ ɨɫɨɡɧɚɸɬ ɫɨɛɫɬɜɟɧɧɭɸ
ɨɬɜɟɬɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɫɬɶ
1 2 99
 ȼ Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɟ ɩɪɨɞɨɥɠɚɟɬ ɭɯɭɞɲɚɬɶɫɹ
ɫɢɬɭɚɰɢɹɢɧɚɪɚɫɬɚɬɶɧɟɫɬɚɛɢɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ
1 2 99
 Ɂɚ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɧɢɟ  ɦɟɫɹɰɟɜ ɜ ɤɚɤɨɣ ɦɟɪɟ  ɮɢɧɚɧɫɨɜɨɟ ɩɨɥɨɠɟɧɢɟ ɜɚɲɟɣ ɫɟɦɶɢ
ɭɥɭɱɲɢɥɨɫɶɢɥɢɭɯɭɞɲɢɥɨɫɶ"
1. ɇɚɦɧɨɝɨɭɥɭɱɲɢɥɨɫɶ
2. ɇɟɫɤɨɥɶɤɨɭɥɭɱɲɢɥɨɫɶ
3. Ɉɫɬɚɥɨɫɶɧɚɩɪɟɠɧɟɦɭɪɨɜɧɟ
4. ɇɟɫɤɨɥɶɤɨɭɯɭɞɲɢɥɨɫɶ
5. ɇɚɦɧɨɝɨɭɯɭɞɲɢɥɨɫɶ
ɇɟɡɧɚɸɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
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ȿɫɥɢɦɵɡɚɞɭɦɚɟɦɫɹɨɧɵɧɟɲɧɟɣɫɢɬɭɚɰɢɢɜɧɚɲɟɣɫɬɪɚɧɟɢɨɛɭɞɭɳɟɦɱɟɝɨȼɵ
ɛɨɢɬɟɫɶɛɨɥɶɲɟɜɫɟɝɨ"ɇɚɡɨɜɢɬɟɬɪɢɚɫɩɟɤɬɚɧɚɱɢɧɚɹɫɫɚɦɨɝɨɡɧɚɱɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɝɨ
1 ɉɟɪɜɨɟɭɩɨɦɢɧɚɧɢɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB _ _
2 ȼɬɨɪɨɟɭɩɨɦɢɧɚɧɢɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB _ _
3 ɌɪɟɬɶɟɭɩɨɦɢɧɚɧɢɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB _ _
ɧɟɡɚɱɢɬɵɜɚɬɶɇɁɇɈ 99
1. ȼɨɣɧɚɝɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɤɚɹɦɟɠɷɬɧɢɱɟɫɤɚɹ
2. ɇɟɫɬɚɛɢɥɶɧɨɫɬɶɜɫɬɪɚɧɟ
3. Ɇɢɬɢɧɝɢɩɟɪɟɜɨɪɨɬɵɪɟɜɨɥɸɰɢɢ
4. ɉɨɜɬɨɪɟɧɢɟ©ɚɩɪɟɥɶɫɤɢɯªɫɨɛɵɬɢɣ
5. ɉɨɜɬɨɪɟɧɢɟ©ɢɸɧɶɫɤɢɯªɫɨɛɵɬɢɣ
6. Ɋɚɡɜɚɥɫɬɪɚɧɵɪɚɡɞɟɥɟɧɢɟ©ɋɟɜɟɪ-ɘɝª
7. ɉɪɟɫɬɭɩɧɨɫɬɶɤɪɢɦɢɧɚɥɧɚɪɤɨɦɚɧɢɹ
8. Ɉɛɟɫɩɨɤɨɟɧɧɨɫɬɶɡɚɛɭɞɭɳɟɟɫɬɪɚɧɵɛɭɞɭɳɟɟɞɟɬɟɣɢ ɦɨɥɨɞɟɠɢ
9. Ȼɟɡɪɚɛɨɬɢɰɚ
10. ɗɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɢɣɤɪɢɡɢɫɪɨɫɬɰɟɧɢɧɮɥɹɰɢɹɢɬɞ
11. ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɵɫɷɥɟɤɬɪɢɱɟɫɬɜɨɦɨɬɨɩɥɟɧɢɟɦ
12. ɗɤɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɟɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵɩɪɢɪɨɞɧɵɟɤɚɬɚɤɥɢɡɦɵ
13. Ȼɨɝ
14. ȾɪɭɝɨɟɍɌɈɑɇɂɌȿBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
12. ɇɚɡɨɜɢɬɟ ɩɨɠɚɥɭɣɫɬɚ    ɨɫɧɨɜɧɵɯ  ɞɨɫɬɢɠɟɧɢɹ ɜ ɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɢ ɫɬɪɚɧɵ ɡɚ
ɩɨɫɥɟɞɧɢɟɝɨɞɚ
1._____________________________________________________________
2._____________________________________________________________
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3._____________________________________________________________
ȾɨɫɬɢɠɟɧɢɣɧɟɛɵɥɨɇȿɁȺɑɂɌɕȼȺɌɖ
Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
13. ɋɤɚɠɢɬɟɩɨɠɚɥɭɣɫɬɚɤɚɤɞɚɜɧɨ ɫɤɨɥɶɤɨɥɟɬ ɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɭɸɬɨɫɧɨɜɧɵɟɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ
ɫɬɪɚɧɵ"
ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɚ
Ɉɱɟɧɶ ɞɚɜɧɨ
ɜɤɥɸɱɚɹ ɋɨɜɟɬɫɤɨɟ
ɜɪɟɦɹ
ɋɨ ɞɧɹ
ɧɟɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɨɫɬɢɄɊ
ɉɨɫɥɟɞɧɢɟɥɟɬ
ɉɨɫɥɟɞɧɢɟ-ɝɨɞɚ
 Ⱦɪɭɝɨɟ
ɍɄȺɀɂɌȿBBBBB
Ʉɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɹ
Ʉɪɢɦɢɧɚɥ
ɇɟɫɬɚɛɢɥɶɧɨɫɬɶɜɫɬɪɚɧɟɦɢɬɢɧɝɢɪɟɜɨɥɸɰɢɢ
Ȼɟɡɪɚɛɨɬɢɰɚ
 ɂɧɮɪɚɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɧɵɟ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ ɞɨɪɨɝɢ ɷɥɟɤɬɪɨɫɧɚɛɠɟɧɢɟ ɢ
ɬɞ
Ʉɚɱɟɫɬɜɨɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɹ
Ʉɚɱɟɫɬɜɨɦɟɞɢɰɢɧɫɤɢɯɭɫɥɭɝ
ȾɪɭɝɨɟɭɤɚɠɢɬɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
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14. Ɉɞɨɛɪɹɟɬɟ ɥɢ ȼɵ ɜɫɬɭɩɥɟɧɢɟ Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɚ ɜ Ɍɚɦɨɠɟɧɧɵɣ ɫɨɸɡ ɢ
ɩɪɢɫɨɟɞɢɧɟɧɢɟɤȿɜɪɚɡɢɣɫɤɨɦɭɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɨɦɭɫɨɸɡɭȿȺɗɋ"
1. Ɉɩɪɟɞɟɥɟɧɧɨɨɞɨɛɪɹɸ
2. Ɉɬɱɚɫɬɢɨɞɨɛɪɹɸ
3. Ɉɬɱɚɫɬɢɩɪɨɬɢɜ
4. Ɉɩɪɟɞɟɥɟɧɧɨɩɪɨɬɢɜ
5. ɇɁɇɈ
Ʉɚɤɨɜɨȼɚɲɟɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɟɤɜɨɩɪɨɫɭɦɟɫɬɨɪɨɠɞɟɧɢɹ©Ʉɭɦɬɨɪª"
ɂɇɌɉɈɄȺɀɂɌȿɄȺɊɌɈɑɄɍʋ
1. Ƚɥɚɜɧɨɟ ɱɬɨɛɵ ɩɪɟɞɩɪɢɹɬɢɟ ɪɚɛɨɬɚɥɨ ɢ ɩɥɚɬɢɥɨ
ɧɚɥɨɝɢ
2. ɋɱɢɬɚɸɱɬɨɞɨɥɹɢɧɜɟɫɬɨɪɨɜɢɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɚɞɨɥɠɧɚ
ɨɫɬɚɜɚɬɶɫɹɩɪɟɠɧɟɣ
3. Ⱦɨɥɹ ɚɤɰɢɣ Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɚ ɞɨɥɠɧɚ ɛɵɬɶ ɜɵɲɟ ɱɟɦ
ɫɟɣɱɚɫ
4. Ɇɟɫɬɨɪɨɠɞɟɧɢɟɞɨɥɠɧɨɛɵɬɶɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɢɡɢɪɨɜɚɧɨɢ
ɩɪɢɧɚɞɥɟɠɚɬɶɩɨɥɧɨɫɬɶɸɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɭ
5. Ⱦɪɭɝɨɟ
ɍɌɈɑɇɂɌȿBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
16. Ɉɬɦɟɬɶɬɟ ɩɨɠɚɥɭɣɫɬɚ  ɧɚɢɛɨɥɟɟ ɡɧɚɱɢɦɵɟ ɞɨɫɬɢɠɟɧɢɹ ɉɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚ Ⱥ
Ⱥɬɚɦɛɚɟɜɚɡɚɜɪɟɦɹɟɝɨɪɚɛɨɬɵ
1
ɉɟɪɜɨɟɭɩɨɦɢɧɚɧɢɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
______________________________________________________
__
2
ȼɬɨɪɨɟɭɩɨɦɢɧɚɧɢɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB____________________
_______________________________________________________
__
3
Ɍɪɟɬɶɟ ɭɩɨɦɢɧɚɧɢɟ
________________________________________________________
__
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ɧɟɡɚɱɢɬɵɜɚɬɶɇɁɇɈ 99
1. Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɨɦɩɨɞɩɢɫɚɧɵɢɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɢɨɧɧɵɟɫɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɹɢɧɚɣɞɟɧɵɢɫɬɨɱɧɢɤɢ
ɮɢɧɚɧɫɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɩɨɱɬɢɧɚɦɥɪɞ
2. ɋɬɚɛɢɥɶɧɨɫɬɶɢɆɢɪɜɫɬɪɚɧɟ
3. ɇɚɱɚɥɨ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɫɚ ɫɬɪɨɢɬɟɥɶɧɵɯ ɪɚɛɨɬ ɩɨ ɜɨɡɜɟɞɟɧɢɸ ȼɟɪɯɧɟ-ɇɚɪɵɧɫɤɨɝɨ
ɤɚɫɤɚɞɚȽɗɋ
4. ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɩɨ ɫɬɪɨɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɭ ɚɥɶɬɟɪɧɚɬɢɜɧɨɣ ɚɜɬɨɦɨɛɢɥɶɧɨɣ ɞɨɪɨɝɢɦɟɠɞɭ
ɫɟɜɟɪɧɵɦɢɸɠɧɵɦɪɟɝɢɨɧɚɦɢɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɚ
5. ɉɪɨɤɥɚɞɤɚɝɚɡɨɩɪɨɜɨɞɚɜɄɢɬɚɣ
6. ɊɟɤɨɧɫɬɪɭɤɰɢɹɌɗɐȻɢɲɤɟɤɚ
7. ɋɬɪɨɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɥɢɧɢɢɷɥɟɤɬɪɨɩɟɪɟɞɚɱɢȾɚɬɤɚ-Ʉɟɦɢɧ
8. ɉɨɞɫɬɚɧɰɢɢɜɄɟɦɢɧɟ
9. ɉɟɪɟɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɟɚɪɦɢɢ
10. Ȼɨɪɶɛɚ ɫ ɤɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɟɣ ɤɨɬɨɪɚɹ ɭɠɟ ɞɚɟɬ ɪɟɚɥɶɧɵɟ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɵ ɞɥɹ ɩɪɨɫɬɵɯ
ɥɸɞɟɣɫɧɢɠɟɧɢɟɬɚɪɢɮɨɜɧɚɜɧɭɬɪɟɧɧɢɟɪɟɣɫɵ
11. Ɂɚɩɭɫɤɩɪɨɟɤɬɚɩɨɮɨɪɦɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɸɧɨɜɨɣɷɥɢɬɵ
12. ȾɟɧɨɧɫɚɰɢɹɫɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɹɫɋɒȺɨɐɌɉ "Ɇɚɧɚɫ"
13. ɊɚɬɢɮɢɰɢɤɚɰɢɹɫɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɹɩɨɄɵɪɝɵɡɝɚɡɭɦɟɠɞɭɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɨɦɢɊɨɫɫɢɟɣ
14. ȾɪɭɝɨɟɇɚɩɢɲɢɬɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB________________________
Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
ɇɚȼɚɲɜɡɝɥɹɞɧɚɫɤɨɥɶɤɨɩɪɢɟɦɥɟɦɵɞɨɩɭɫɬɢɦɵɞɥɹɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɹɫɥɟɞɭɸɳɢɟɜɢɞɵ
ɩɪɨɬɟɫɬɚ"ɂɇɌ: ɉɈɄȺɀɂɌȿɄȺɊɌɈɑɄɍʋ
ɉɨɥɧɨɫɬ
ɶɸ
ɞɨɩɭɫɬɢ
ɦɨ
ɩɪɢɟɦɥɟ
ɦɨ
ɋɤɨɪɟɟ
ɞɨɩɭɫɬɢɦɨ
/
ɩɪɢɟɦɥɟɦɨ
ɱɟɦɧɟɬ
ɋɤɨɪɟɟ  ɧɟ
ɞɨɩɭɫɬɢɦɨ
ɧɟ
ɩɪɢɟɦɥɟɦɨ
ɱɟɦ
ɞɨɩɭɫɬɢɦɨ
ɋɨɜɫɟɦ
ɧɟ
ɞɨɩɭɫɬɢɦ
ɨ ɧɟ
ɩɪɢɟɦɥɟɦ
ɨ
ɇɟ
ɡɧɚɸ
 ɇɟɬ
ɨɬɜɟɬ
ɚ
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ɋɛɨɪɩɨɞɩɢɫɟɣɞɥɹ
ɨɛɪɚɳɟɧɢɹɩɢɫɶɦɚ
1 2 3 4 99
Ȼɨɣɤɨɬ 1 2 3 4 99
Ɂɚɤɨɧɧɵɟɞɟɦɨɧɫɬɪɚɰɢɢ 1 2 3 4 99
ɇɟɡɚɤɨɧɧɵɟ
ɞɟɦɨɧɫɬɪɚɰɢɢ
1 2 3 4 99
Ɂɚɤɨɧɧɵɟɡɚɛɚɫɬɨɜɤɢ 1 2 3 4 99
6. ɇɟɡɚɤɨɧɧɵɟɡɚɛɚɫɬɨɜɤɢ 1 2 3 4 99
Ɂɚɯɜɚɬɡɞɚɧɢɣɢɥɢ
ɩɪɟɞɩɪɢɹɬɢɣ
1 2 3 4 99
ɉɟɪɟɤɪɵɬɢɟɭɥɢɰɞɨɪɨɝ 1 2 3 4 99
ɉɢɫɶɦɟɧɧɵɟɢɭɫɬɧɵɟ
ɨɛɪɚɳɟɧɢɹɢɡɚɹɜɥɟɧɢɹ
1 2 3 4 99
18. ɑɬɨɡɧɚɱɢɬɞɥɹȼɚɫɞɟɦɨɤɪɚɬɢɹ"
ɂɇɌ ɇȿ ɁȺɑɂɌɕȼȺɃɌȿ ȼȺɊɂȺɇɌɕ ɈɌȼȿɌɈȼ ɁȺɉɂɒɂɌȿ ɂ ɉɈɋɌȺȼɖɌȿ
ɋɈɈɌȼȿɌɋɌȼɍɘɓɂɃɄɈȾ ȼɈɁɆɈɀɇɕɌɈɅɖɄɈɌɊɂɈɌȼȿɌȺ
ɉɟɪɜɵɣɭɩɨɦɹɧɭɬɵɣBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB_
2.  ȼɬɨɪɨɣ ___________________________________________________________
3. ɌɪɟɬɢɣBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
1. ɋɜɨɛɨɞɚɜɵɛɨɪɚɫɥɨɜɚɫɨɛɪɚɧɢɣ
2. ɉɪɚɜɚɱɟɥɨɜɟɤɚ
3. ɋɜɨɛɨɞɧɵɟɢɱɟɫɬɧɵɟɜɵɛɨɪɵ
4. Ɋɚɜɟɧɫɬɜɨɩɟɪɟɞɡɚɤɨɧɨɦ
5. ɋɬɚɛɢɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ
6. ɇɟɫɬɚɛɢɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ
7. Ɂɚɳɢɬɚɱɚɫɬɧɨɣɫɨɛɫɬɟɧɧɨɫɬɢ
8. ȼɟɪɯɨɜɟɧɫɬɜɨɡɚɤɨɧɚ
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9. Ɉɬɫɭɬɫɬɜɢɟɤɨɪɪɭɩɰɢɢ
10. Ɋɚɡɜɢɬɢɟɜɵɫɨɤɢɣɭɪɨɜɟɧɶɠɢɡɧɢ
11. ȾɪɭɝɨɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
             ɇȿɁɇȺɘɇȿɌɈɌȼȿɌȺ
ɉɨȼɚɲɟɦɭɦɧɟɧɢɸɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɭɟɬɥɢɞɟɦɨɤɪɚɬɢɹɜɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɟ"
1. Ⱦɚɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɭɟɬ             
2.   Cɤɨɪɟɟ ɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɭɟɬBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB 
ɋɤɨɪɟɟɧɟɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɭɟɬBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB 
4. ɇɟɬɧɟɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɭɟɬ 
5. Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ             
ɇȿɁɇȺɘɇȿɌɈɌȼȿɌȺ                         
 ɋɤɚɠɢɬɟ ɟɫɥɢ ɛɵ ɩɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɫɤɢɟ ɜɵɛɨɪɵ ɜ ɀɨɝɨɪɤɭ Ʉɟɧɟɲ ɫɨɫɬɨɹɥɢɫɶ
ɜ ɛɥɢɠɚɣɲɟɟɜɨɫɤɪɟɫɟɧɶɟɡɚɤɨɬɨɪɭɸɢɡɧɢɯɜɵɛɵɩɪɨɝɨɥɨɫɨɜɚɥɢ"
1. Ⱥɤɒɭɦɤɚɪ
2. Ⱥɪɇɚɦɵɫ
3. Ⱥɬɚɀɭɪɬ
4. ȺɬɚɆɟɤɟɧ
5. ȻɢɪȻɨɥ
6. ȻɭɬɭɧɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧ
7. Ɂɚɦɚɧɞɚɲ
8. Ɋɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɚ
9. ɋȾɉɄ
10. ɗɦɝɟɤ
11. ȾɪɭɝɨɟɭɤɚɠɢɬɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB________________
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12. əɟɳɟɧɟɨɩɪɟɞɟɥɢɥɫɹ
13. əɧɟɛɭɞɭɭɱɚɫɬɜɨɜɚɬɶɧɚɜɵɛɨɪɚɯ
14. ɉɪɨɬɢɜɜɫɟɯ
ɇɟɡɧɚɸɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
Ʉɚɤɜɵɨɬɧɨɫɢɬɟɫɶ ɤ ɢɧɢɰɢɚɬɢɜɟɉɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚ ȺɥɦɚɡɛɟɤɚȺɬɚɦɛɚɟɜɚɩɨɫɦɟɧɟ ɷɥɢɬ
ɜɫɬɪɚɧɟ"
1. ɉɨɥɨɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨ
2. ɋɤɨɪɟɟɩɨɥɨɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨ
3. ɋɤɨɪɟɟɨɬɪɢɰɚɬɟɥɶɧɨ
4. Ɉɬɪɢɰɚɬɟɥɶɧɨ
ɇɟɡɧɚɸɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
22. ɋɥɵɲɚɥɢɥɢȼɵɨɂɉȾɈɂɧɢɰɢɚɬɢɜɚɉɪɨɡɪɚɱɧɨɫɬɢȾɨɛɵɜɚɸɳɢɯɈɬɪɚɫɥɟɣ"
1. Ⱦɚ
2. ɇɟɬ
23. ȼɵ ɩɨɥɭɱɚɟɬɟ ɞɨɫɬɚɬɨɱɧɨ ɢɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɢ ɩɨ ɷɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɢɢ ɪɚɡɪɚɛɨɬɤɟ
ɦɟɫɬɨɪɨɠɞɟɧɢɣɩɪɢɪɨɞɧɵɯɪɟɫɭɪɫɨɜɜɜɚɲɟɣɫɬɪɚɧɟ"
1. Ⱦɚ
2. ɇɟɬ–»
ɩɟɪɟɯɨɞQ1
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24. Ɉɛɨɡɧɚɱɶɬɟɨɬɤɨɝɨɩɨɥɭɱɚɟɬɟɢɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɸ"
1. Ƚɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɤɨɟɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɨ
2. ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨ
3. Ʉɨɦɩɚɧɢɢ
4. ȾɪɭɝɨɟɭɤɚɠɢɬɟBBBBBBBBBB
_____________
ȾȿɆɈȽɊȺɎɂɑȿɋɄɂȿȾȺɇɇɕȿ
4ȼȺɒȼɈɁɊȺɋɌBBBBɅȿɌ
4ɉɈɅ
Ɇɭɠɱɢɧɚ 1
ɀɟɧɳɢɧɚ 2
4ȼȺɒȿɈȻɊȺɁɈȼȺɇɂȿ
Ȼɟɡɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɹ 1 ȼɵɫɲɟɟɧɟɨɤɨɧɱɟɧɧɨɟ 7
ɇɟɩɨɥɧɨɟɫɪɟɞɧɟɟ 2 ȼɵɫɲɟɟɨɤɨɧɱɟɧɧɨɟ 8
Ɉɛɳɟɟɫɪɟɞɧɟɟ 3 ɇɚɭɱɧɚɹɫɬɟɩɟɧɶɤɚɧɞɢɞɚɬɞɨɤɬɨɪɧɚɭɤ 9
ɋɪɟɞɧɟɟ ɩɪɨɮɟɫɫɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨ-
ɬɟɯɧɢɱɟɫɤɨɟ
4 ɧɟɡɚɱɢɬɵɜɚɣɬɟɇɟɡɧɚɸ 98
Ʌɢɰɟɣ 5 ɧɟɡɚɱɢɬɵɜɚɣɬɟɇɟɨɬɜɟɱɚɸ 99
Ʉɨɥɥɟɞɠ 6
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Q4 ɋȿɆȿɃɇɈȿɉɈɅɈɀȿɇɂȿ"
4ɋɄɈɅɖɄɈɑȿɅɈȼȿɄɀɂȼȿɌȼȼȺɒȿɃɋȿɆɖȿȼɄɅɘɑȺəɂȼȺɋ"BBBB
Q6 ɄȺɄ Ȼɕ ȼɕ ɈɐȿɇɂɅɂ ɆȺɌȿɊɂȺɅɖɇɈȿ ɉɈɅɈɀȿɇɂȿ ɋȼɈȿɃ
ɋȿɆɖɂ"ɂɇɌɉɈɄȺɀɂɌȿɄȺɊɌɈɑɄɍ4.
1. Ⱦɟɧɟɝɧɟɯɜɚɬɚɟɬɞɚɠɟɧɚɩɪɨɞɭɤɬɵɩɢɬɚɧɢɹ
2. Ⱦɟɧɟɝɯɜɚɬɚɟɬɬɨɥɶɤɨɧɚɩɢɬɚɧɢɟɧɨɭɠɟɧɟɯɜɚɬɚɟɬɧɚɤɨɦɦɭɧɚɥɶɧɵɟɭɫɥɭɝɢ
3. ɇɚɩɢɬɚɧɢɟɞɟɧɟɝɯɜɚɬɚɟɬɧɨɩɨɤɭɩɤɚɨɞɟɠɞɵɜɵɡɵɜɚɟɬɭɧɚɫɡɚɬɪɭɞɧɟɧɢɹ
4. Ⱦɨɯɨɞɨɜ ɯɜɚɬɚɟɬ ɧɚ ɩɢɬɚɧɢɟ ɢ ɨɞɟɠɞɭ ɧɨ ɩɨɤɭɩɤɚ ɞɨɪɨɝɢɯ ɜɟɳɟɣ ɞɥɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɝɨ
ɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɹɬɚɤɢɯɤɚɤɬɟɥɟɜɢɡɨɪɯɨɥɨɞɢɥɶɧɢɤɞɥɹɧɚɫɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɚ
5. Ɇɵɛɟɡɬɪɭɞɚɦɨɠɟɦɩɪɢɨɛɪɟɬɚɬɶɜɟɳɢɞɥɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɝɨɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɹɧɨɜɨɬɩɨɤɭɩɤɚ
ɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɞɨɪɨɝɢɯɜɟɳɟɣɬɚɤɢɯɤɚɤɚɜɬɨɦɨɛɢɥɶɫɜɹɡɚɧɚɞɥɹɧɚɫɫɛɨɥɶɲɢɦɢ
ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɚɦɢ
6. ȼɧɚɫɬɨɹɳɟɟɜɪɟɦɹɦɵɦɨɠɟɦɩɨɡɜɨɥɢɬɶɫɟɛɟɦɧɨɝɨɟ- ɦɚɲɢɧɭɞɚɱɭɡɚɪɭɛɟɠɧɨɟ
ɩɭɬɟɲɟɫɬɜɢɟ
4ɄȺɄɈȼȿɀȿɆȿɋəɑɇɕɃȾɈɏɈȾȼȺɒȿȽɈȾɈɆȺɒɇȿȽɈɏɈɁəɃɋɌȼȺȼ
ɋɈɆȺɏ" ɉɈɀȺɅɍɃɋɌȺ ȼɈɁɖɆɂɌȿ ȼ ɊȺɋɑȿɌ ȼɋȿ ɑɂɋɌɕȿ ȾɈɏɈȾɕ
ȼɄɅɘɑȺə ɁȺɊɉɅȺɌɕ ɉȿɇɋɂɂ ɉɈɋɈȻɂəɂ ɌȾ ɉɈɄȺɀɂɌȿ ɄȺɊɌɈɑɄɍ
Q7)
Ⱦɨɫɨɦɨɜ 1 6001-ɫɨɦɨɜ 9
701-ɫɨɦɨɜ 2 8001-ɫɨɦɨɜ 10
901-ɫɨɦɨɜ 3 10001-ɫɨɦɨɜ 11
ɏɨɥɨɫɬ\ ɧɟɡɚɦɭɠɟɦ 1
ɀɟɧɚɬ\ ɡɚɦɭɠɟɦ 2
Ɋɚɡɜɟɞɟɧɚ\ ȼɞɨɜɟɰɚ 3
ɋɨɫɬɨɸɜɝɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɤɨɦɛɪɚɤɟ 4
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1201- ɫɨɦɨɜ 4 12001-ɫɨɦɨɜ 12
1501-ɫɨɦɨɜ 5 15001-ɫɨɦɨɜ 13
2001-ɫɨɦɨɜ 6 18001-ɫɨɦɨɜ 14
3001-ɫɨɦɨɜ 7 Ȼɨɥɟɟɫɨɦɨɜ 15
4001-ɫɨɦɨɜ 8 ɇɟɡɧɚɸɈɬɤɚɡ 99
4ɑȿɆȼɕɁȺɇɂɆȺȿɌȿɋɖȼɇȺɋɌɈəɓȿȿȼɊȿɆə"
Ɋɭɤɨɜɨɞɢɬɟɥɶ 1
ɋɥɭɠɚɳɢɣ\ ɫɩɟɰɢɚɥɢɫɬ 2
Ɋɚɛɨɱɢɣ 3
Ɋɚɛɨɬɧɢɤɜɫɮɟɪɟɭɫɥɭɝ 4
Ȼɢɡɧɟɫɦɟɧ\ ɱɚɫɬɧɵɣɩɪɟɞɩɪɢɧɢɦɚɬɟɥɶ 5
ɍɱɚɳɢɣɫɹ\ ɫɬɭɞɟɧɬ 6
Ȼɟɡɪɚɛɨɬɧɵɣ 7
Ⱦɨɦɨɯɨɡɹɣɤɚ 8
ɉɟɧɫɢɨɧɟɪ 9
ɂɧɜɚɥɢɞ 10
Ɏɟɪɦɟɪ 11
ȾɪɭɝɨɟBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB 12
4ɇȺɐɂɈɇȺɅɖɇɈɋɌɖ
Ʉɵɪɝɵɡ 1 Ʉɚɡɚɯ 4 Ⱦɭɧɝɚɧɢɧ 7
ɍɡɛɟɤ 2 Ɍɚɬɚɪ 5
Ⱦɪɭɝɨɟ ɡɚɩɢɲɢɬɟ
___________________
8
Ɋɭɫɫɤɢɣ 3 ɍɣɝɭɪ 6 ɧɟɡɚɱɢɬɵɜɚɬɶɇɁɇɈ 99
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4əɁɕɄɇȺɄɈɌɈɊɈɆɉɊɈȼɈȾɂɅɈɋɖɂɇɌȿɊȼɖɘ
Ʉɵɪɝɵɡɫɤɢɣ 1
Ɋɭɫɫɤɢɣ 2
ɍɡɛɟɤɫɤɢɣ 3
Ɉɤɨɧɱɚɧɢɟɢɧɬɟɪɜɶɸ: |__|__|:|__|__|   
Ⱦɥɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɶɢɧɬɟɪɜɶɸ: |__|__
ɋɉȺɋɂȻɈɁȺɍɑȺɋɌɂȿ
ɈɩɪɨɫɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɹɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɬɚɧɚ Ɇɟɬɨɞɨɥɨɝɢɹ
x ɂɡɭɱɢɬɶɦɧɟɧɢɟɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɹɨɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɞɟɹɬɟɥɹɯɜɄɵɪɝɵɡɫɤɨɣɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɟ
                                                                         
x Ⱦɥɹ ɫɛɨɪɚ ɞɚɧɧɵɯ ɫ ɰɟɥɶɸ ɩɨɥɭɱɟɧɢɹ ɞɨɫɬɨɜɟɪɧɨɣ ɢɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɢ  ɢ ɞɚɥɶɧɟɣɲɟɣ
ɭɫɩɟɲɧɨɣ ɪɚɛɨɬɵ ɩɪɨɟɤɬɚ ɛɵɥ ɩɪɢɦɟɧɟɧ ɤɨɥɢɱɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɣ ɦɟɬɨɞ ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹ
ɅɢɱɧɨɟIDFH-to-IDFHɢɧɬɟɪɜɶɸ
x ȼɵɛɨɪɨɱɧɚɹɫɨɜɨɤɭɩɧɨɫɬɶɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹɫɨɫɬɚɜɢɥɚɞɨɦɨɯɨɡɹɣɫɬɜɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɟ
ɜɜɨɡɪɚɫɬɟɨɬɥɟɬɢɫɬɚɪɲɟɂɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɟɩɪɨɯɨɞɢɥɨɤɚɤɜɝɨɪɨɞɫɤɨɣɬɚɤɢɜ
ɫɟɥɶɫɤɨɣɦɟɫɬɧɨɫɬɢɜɨɜɫɟɯɨɛɥɚɫɬɹɯɪɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɜɤɥɸɱɚɹɝȻɢɲɤɟɤ
Ɇɟɬɨɞɨɥɨɝɢɹɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹ
ɐɟɥɟɜɚɹɝɪɭɩɩɚ
ɉɨɥɟɜɵɟɪɚɛɨɬɵ
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ɉɨɥɟɜɵɟ ɪɚɛɨɬɵ ɩɪɨɜɨɞɢɥɢɫɶ ɧɚ ɯ ɹɡɵɤɚɯ ɤɵɪɝɵɡɫɤɢɣ ɪɭɫɫɤɢɣ ɫ  ɨɤɬɹɛɪɹ ɩɨ 
ɧɨɹɛɪɹɝɨɞɚ
Appendix 4b: EITI-related Survey Results
ɋɥɵɲɚɥɢɥɢȼɵɨɂɉȾɈɂɧɢɰɢɚɬɢɜɚɉɪɨɡɪɚɱɧɨɫɬɢȾɨɛɵɜɚɸɳɢɯɈɬɪɚɫɥɟɣ"
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
167 16.7 16.7
833 83.3 83.3
1000 100 100
ȼɵɩɨɥɭɱɚɟɬɟɞɨɫɬɚɬɨɱɧɨɢɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɢɩɨ
ɷɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɢɢɪɚɡɪɚɛɨɬɤɟɦɟɫɬɨɪɨɠɞɟɧɢɣ
ɩɪɢɪɨɞɧɵɯɪɟɫɭɪɫɨɜɜɜɚɲɟɣɫɬɪɚɧɟ"
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
196 19.6 19.6
804 80.4 80.4
1000 100 100
ȼɵɩɨɥɭɱɚɟɬɟɞɨɫɬɚɬɨɱɧɨɢɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɢɩɨ
ɷɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɢɢɪɚɡɪɚɛɨɬɤɟɦɟɫɬɨɪɨɠɞɟɧɢɣ
ɩɪɢɪɨɞɧɵɯɪɟɫɭɪɫɨɜɜɜɚɲɟɣɫɬɪɚɧɟ"
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Ⱦɚ 196 19.6 19.6
ɇɟɬ 804 80.4 80.4
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Ɉɛɨɡɧɚɱɶɬɟɨɬɤɨɝɨȼɵɩɨɥɭɱɚɟɬɟɢɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɸ"
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Ƚɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɤɨɟɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɨ 65 6.5 33.16326531
ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨ 48 4.8 24.48979592
Ʉɨɦɩɚɧɢɢ 24 2.4 12.24489796
Ɋɨɞɫɬɜɟɧɧɢɤɢɞɪɭɡɶɹɡɧɚɤɨɦɵɟ 12 1.2 6.12244898
ɋɆɂɬɜɝɚɡɟɬɵɪɚɞɢɨɢɧɬɟɪɧɟɬ 47 4.7 23.97959184
Total 196 19.6 100
System 804 80.4
1000 100
Survey results: Kazakhstan
ɈɦɧɢɛɭɫɧɨɟɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɟɩɨɂɉȾɈ
Ɉɛɨɫɧɨɜɚɧɢɟɦɟɬɨɞɚɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹ
Ⱦɥɹɪɟɲɟɧɢɹɩɨɫɬɚɜɥɟɧɧɨɣɰɟɥɢɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹɛɵɥɩɪɢɦɟɧɟɧɤɨɥɢɱɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɣɦɟɬɨɞɫɛɨɪɚ
ɢɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɢ– ɦɚɫɫɨɜɵɣɨɩɪɨɫɫɢɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɟɦɚɧɤɟɬɵɩɨɫɪɟɞɫɬɜɨɦɥɢɱɧɨɝɨɢɧɬɟɪɜɶɸ
ɫɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɨɦface-to-face). 
ȼɵɛɨɪɤɚɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹ
ɋɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɨɫ  ɛɵɥ ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧ ɜɨ ɜɫɟɯ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɹɯ ɫɬɨɥɢɰɟ ɝɨɪɨɞɚɯ
ɪɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɚɧɫɤɨɝɨ ɡɧɚɱɟɧɢɹ ɫ ɜɵɛɨɪɤɨɣ  ɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɨɜ ȼɵɛɨɪɤɚ ɮɨɪɦɢɪɨɜɚɥɚɫɶ
ɫɥɭɱɚɣɧɵɦɨɛɪɚɡɨɦɢɪɟɩɪɟɡɟɧɬɢɪɭɟɬɜɡɪɨɫɥɨɟɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɟɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɚɩɨɩɨɥɭɜɨɡɪɚɫɬɭ
ɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣɩɪɢɧɚɞɥɟɠɧɨɫɬɢɭɪɨɜɧɸɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɹɢɦɟɫɬɭɩɪɨɠɢɜɚɧɢɹ ɜɫɨɨɬɜɟɬɫɬɜɢɢ
ɫɬɢɩɨɦɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɧɨɝɨɩɭɧɤɬɚ
ɈɬɛɨɪɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɨɜɨɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɥɹɥɫɹɫɥɭɱɚɣɧɵɦɨɛɪɚɡɨɦɫɢɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɟɦɬɚɛɥɢɰɄɢɲɚɫ
ɢɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɟɦɦɚɪɲɪɭɬɧɨɣɦɟɬɨɞɢɤɢ
Ɉɛɴɟɤɬɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɟɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɚɨɬɥɟɬɢɫɬɚɪɲɟ
Ɏɨɪɦɚɨɩɪɨɫɚ– ɢɧɬɟɪɜɶɸFace-to-Face)
Ɉɛɪɚɛɨɬɤɚ ɜɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɟSPSS ɜɟɪɫɢɹɈɲɢɛɤɚɜɵɛɨɪɤɢ ɫɨɫɬɚɜɥɹɟɬ
Ƚɟɨɝɪɚɮɢɹɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹ – ɨɛɥɚɫɬɟɣɊɄɝɨɪɨɞɚȺɫɬɚɧɚɢȺɥɦɚɬɵ
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ȼɵɛɨɪɤɚ ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹ –  ɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɨɜ ȼɵɛɨɪɤɚ ɮɨɪɦɢɪɨɜɚɥɚɫɶ ɫɥɭɱɚɣɧɵɦ
ɨɛɪɚɡɨɦɢɪɟɩɪɟɡɟɧɬɢɪɭɟɬɜɡɪɨɫɥɨɟɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɟɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɚɩɨɩɨɥɭɜɨɡɪɚɫɬɭɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣ
ɩɪɢɧɚɞɥɟɠɧɨɫɬɢ ɭɪɨɜɧɸ ɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɢ ɦɟɫɬɭ ɩɪɨɠɢɜɚɧɢɹ ɜ ɫɨɨɬɜɟɬɫɬɜɢɢ ɫ ɬɢɩɨɦ
ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɧɨɝɨɩɭɧɤɬɚ
ȼɵɛɨɪɨɱɧɚɹɫɨɜɨɤɭɩɧɨɫɬɶɦɚɫɫɨɜɨɝɨɨɩɪɨɫɚ– ɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɨɜ
ɨɛɥɚɫɬɟɣɝɝȺɫɬɚɧɚȺɥɦɚɬɵ
ʋ Ɉɛɥɚɫɬɶ
ȼɵɛɨɪɤɚ
/ 2000 
ɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟ
ɧɬɨɜ
Ƚɨɪɨɞ
1120 
ɪɟɫɩ
ɋɟɥɨ
880
ɪɟɫɩ
ɤɨɥ-ɜɨ
ɠɢɬɟɥɟɣ
ɨɬɥɟɬ
ɬɵɫɱɟɥ
Ƚɨɪɨɞɫɤ
ɨɟ
ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢ
ɟ
ɬɵɫɱɟɥ
ɋɟɥɶɫɤɨɟ
ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢ
ɟ
ɬɵɫɱɟɥ
ɸɝ
1. Ⱥɥɦɚɬɢɧɫɤɚɹ 225 54 171 1342947 315353 1027594
2. ɀɚɦɛɵɥɶɫɤɚɹ 117 57 60 692158 286884 405274
3.
Ʉɵɡɵɥɨɪɞɢɧɫɤɚ
ɹ
79
35 44 462708 201020 261688
4. ɘɄɈ 274 124 150 1621750 662221 959529
ɫɟɜɟɪ
5. ɉɚɜɥɨɞɚɪɫɤɚɹ 97 44 53 568744 401092 167652
6. Ʉɨɫɬɚɧɚɣɫɤɚɹ 115 59 56 678349 356772 321577
7. ɋɄɈ 76 32 44 442797 190995 251802
ɡɚɩɚɞ
8. ɁɄɈ 73 36 37 450608 227985 222623
9. Ⱥɬɵɪɚɭɫɤɚɹ 62 30 32 364829 178655 186174
10. Ɇɚɧɝɢɫɬɚɭɫɤɚɹ 62 32 30 363394 190993 172401
11. Ⱥɤɬɸɛɢɧɫɤɚɹ 97 60 37 565144 357478 207666
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ɜɨɫɬɨɤ
12. ȼɄɈ 179 97 82 1056787 636985 419802
ɰɟɧɬɪ
13. Ⱥɤɦɨɥɢɧɫɤɚɹ 92 44 48 537994 256772 281222
14. Ʉɚɪɚɝɚɧɞɢɧɫɤɚɹ 172 136 36 1014214 806952 207262
15. Ⱥɫɬɚɧɚ 98 98 0 574538 574538
16. Ⱥɥɦɚɬɵ 182 182 0 1142879 1142879
ɂɬɨɝɨ 2000 1120 880 11879840 6787574 5092266
ȼɵɛɨɪɤɚ ɪɚɫɫɱɢɬɚɧɚ ɩɨ ɞɚɧɧɵɦ Ʉɨɦɢɬɟɬɚ ɩɨ ɫɬɚɬɢɫɬɢɤɟ Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɚ
ɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣ ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɢ Ɋɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢ Ʉɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧ - ©Ⱦɟɦɨɝɪɚɮɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɟɠɟɝɨɞɧɢɤ
Ʉɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɚªɝ
EITI Results
Ⱦɚ 1,112 55.6%
ɇɟɬ 888 44.4%
ɋɥɵɲɚɥɢɥɢɜɵɨɂɉȾɈ"
Ⱦɚ 248 12.4%
ɇɟɬ 1,752 87.6%
ȼɵɩɨɥɭɱɚɟɬɟɞɨɫɬɚɬɨɱɧɨ
ɢɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɢɩɨ
ɷɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɢɢ"
Ƚɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɤɨɟɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɨ 145 58.5%
ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨ 59 23.8%
Ʉɨɦɩɚɧɢɢ 27 10.9%
ɇɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ 17 6.9%
Ɉɛɨɡɧɚɱɶɬɟɨɬɤɨɝɨ
ɩɨɥɭɱɚɟɬɟɢɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɸ"
Ɇɭɠɫɤɨɣ 908 45.4%
ɀɟɧɫɤɢɣ 1,092 54.6%
'ɉɨɥɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɚ
18-29 538 26.9%
30-39 476 23.8%
40-49 424 21.2%
50-59 320 16.0%
60+ 242 12.1%
'ɋɤɚɠɢɬɟɩɨɠɚɥɭɣɫɬɚ
ɫɤɨɥɶɤɨȼɚɦɩɨɥɧɵɯɥɟɬ"
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ȼɵɫɲɟɟɫɨɫɬɟɩɟɧɶɸ 58 2.9%
ȼɵɫɲɟɟ 617 30.9%
ɇɟɡɚɤɨɧɱɟɧɧɨɟɜɵɫɲɟɟ 150 7.5%
ɋɪɟɞɧɟɟɫɩɟɰɢɚɥɶɧɨɟɩɪɨɮɟɫɫɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɟ
ɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɟ 765 38.3%
Ɉɛɳɟɟɫɪɟɞɧɟɟ 368 18.4%
ɇɟɩɨɥɧɨɟɫɪɟɞɧɟɟ 39 2.0%
ɇɟɬɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɹ 3 0.2%
'Ʉɚɤɨɜɭɪɨɜɟɧɶȼɚɲɟɝɨ
ɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɹ
Ʉɚɡɚɯ 1,241 62.1%
Ɋɭɫɫɤɢɣ 592 29.6%
Ɍɚɬɚɪɢɧ 35 1.8%
ɍɤɪɚɢɧɟɰ 12 0.6%
Ⱥɡɟɪɛɚɣɞɠɚɧɟɰ 10 0.5%
Ɍɚɞɠɢɤ 1 0.1%
ɇɟɦɟɰ 7 0.4%
ȿɜɪɟɣ 2 0.1%
ɉɨɥɹɤ 3 0.2%
Ⱥɪɦɹɧɢɧ 3 0.2%
Ȼɚɲɤɢɪ 2 0.1%
ɍɣɝɭɪ 20 1.0%
ɍɡɛɟɤ 37 1.9%
Ȼɟɥɨɪɭɫ 2 0.1%
Ɍɭɪɨɤ 22 1.1%
Ʉɭɪɞ 2 0.1%
Ʉɨɪɟɟɰ 7 0.4%
Ⱦɭɧɝɚɧ 1 0.1%
ɑɟɱɟɧɟɰ 1 0.1%
'ɇɚɡɨɜɢɬɟɩɨɠɚɥɭɣɫɬɚ
ȼɚɲɭɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ
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Appendix 5: Contacts of EITI MSG
EITI Composition Kyrgyzstan 
Composition of the Kyrgyzstan Supervisory Board and MSG representatives on the 
implementation of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
from government agencies
ʋ Name Position held
1 Duishenbek Zilaliev
Representative:
Ulan Ryskulov
ulanrys@gmail.com
Director of State Agency for Geology and Mineral 
Resources under the Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Chairman of Kyrgyzstan EITI Supervisory 
Board
2 Zuura Baiamanova
Representative:
Anyi Isabaeva
a.isabaeva@minfin.kg
State Secretary of the Ministry of Finance of the 
Kyrgyz Republic
3 Kubanychbek Kumashov
Representative:
Burulkan Mambetshaeva
tic062@sti.gov.kg
Deputy Chairman of State Taxation Service under the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
4 Mukai Kadyrkulov
Representative:
Aizada Khalikova
utpd@customs.gov.kg
First Deputy Chairman of State Customs Service 
under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
5 Janbulat Baijumanov
Representative:
First Deputy Chairman of National Statistics 
Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic
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from extractive companies
Svetlana Valuiskaya
s.valuyskaya@stat.kg
Adilet Akmataliev
akmataliev_adilet@mail.ru
Ministry of Economy of the Kyrgyz Republic
Almaz Alimbekov
almaz.alimbekov@gmail.com
Government’s Office of the Kyrgyz Republic
Elmira Usupova
eko-fondkg@mail.ru
State Agency for Environmental Protection under the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
ʋ Name Position held
1 Tokon Mamytov
Representative:
Guzel Valieva
g_valieva@mail.ru
Chairman of Board of “Kyrgyzaltyn” Joint Stock 
Company
2 Andrey Sazanov,
+996 (312) 900707,
andrew_sazanov@kumtor.com
Representative:
Rysbek Toktogul
rysbekt@gmail.com
President of “Kumtor Gold Company” Joint Stock 
Company
3 Valentin Bogdetsky, Board Member of the Kyrgyz Mining Association
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from public associations
+996 (312) 300478,
bogdez@mail.ru
4 Orozbek Duisheev,
+996 (312) 909867
Chairman of the Association of Miners and 
Geologists of the Kyrgyz Republic
5 Vyacheslav Isaev,
pk_spectr@mail.ru,
+996 (772) 522446
President of the “Guild of Miners” Association
ʋ Name Position held
1 Cholpon Dyikanova,
+996 (770) 285507,
cholponcbf@gmail.com
Executive Director of “Bashat” Public Fund
2 Kalia Moldogazieva,
hdc3tol@yahoo.com,
+996 (312) 486587,
+996 (772) 408926
Coordinator of the NGO Consortium for EITI 
Promotion in Kyrgyzstan
3 Natalia Ablova,
+996 (772) 925804,
nata.ablova@gmail.com
Director of the Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of 
Law
4 Tolekan Ismailova,
+966 (312) 314166,
+996 (555) 747452,
tolasani@yahoo.com,
hrccac@gmail.com
Chairman of the “Bir duino – Kyrgyzstan” Human 
Rights Movement
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Kyrgyzstan EITI Secretariat
5 Turgunbek Atabekov,
+996 (557) 844784,
turgunbek2003@mail.ru
Head of the “Foat” Public Association
Kumushkan Konurbaeva
+996 (312) 663475
kkonurbaeva@soros.kg
Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan
Genura Alybaeva
galybaeva@mail.ru
Independent expert
Anara Dautalieva
dautalieva@mail.ru
Head of the “Taza Tabigat” Public Association
Taalaibek Dyikanov
cmdi@mail.ru
Executive Director of Community and Mining 
Development Institute
Larisa Lee
leelora@mail.ru
Independent expert
Nazgul Aksarieva
nazgula@ef-ca.org
Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia
Nurlan Djoldoshev
nurlandjoldoshev@gmail.com
Independent expert
ʋ Name Position held
1 Jamalbek 
Turgunbekov,
+996 (312) 909853,
+996 (555) 757659
jturgunbekov@mail.ru
Consultant of Kyrgyzstan EITI Secretariat
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EITI Composition Kazakhstan
ɋɩɢɫɤɢɱɥɟɧɨɜ ɇɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɝɨɫɨɜɟɬɚɡɚɢɧɬɟɪɟɫɨɜɚɧɧɵɯɫɬɨɪɨɧɂɉȾɈ
ɂɫɟɤɟɲɟɜȺɫɟɬɈɪɟɧɬɚɟɜɢɱ Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɪ ɩɨ ɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɸ ɢ ɢɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɢɹɦ ɊɄ
ɉɪɟɞɫɟɞɚɬɟɥɶ
ɊɚɭȺɥɶɛɟɪɬɉɚɜɥɨɜɢɱ ȼɢɰɟ-ɦɢɧɢɫɬɪɩɨɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɸɢɢɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɢɹɦɊɄ
Ɂɚɦɟɫɬɢɬɟɥɶɉɪɟɞɫɟɞɚɬɟɥɹ
ɇɭɪɚɛɚɟɜȻɚɡɚɪɛɚɣɄɚɧɚɟɜɢɱ ɉɪɟɞɫɟɞɚɬɟɥɶ ɤɨɦɢɬɟɬɚ ɝɟɨɥɨɝɢɢ ɢ
ɧɟɞɪɨɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɹɱɥɟɧ
ɆɢɪɡɚɝɚɥɢɟɜɆɚɝɡɭɦɆɚɪɚɬɨɜɢɱ ȼɢɰɟ-ɦɢɧɢɫɬɪɷɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɢɊɄɱɥɟɧ
ɌɟɧɝɟɛɚɟɜȺɪɞɚɤɆɵɪɡɚɛɚɟɜɢɱ ȼɢɰɟ-ɦɢɧɢɫɬɪɮɢɧɚɧɫɨɜɊɄɱɥɟɧ
ɂɡɛɚɫɬɢɧȻɟɤɟɬɌɟɦɢɪɬɚɟɜɢɱ Ⱦɢɪɟɤɬɨɪ ɞɟɩɚɪɬɚɦɟɧɬɚ ɤɨɧɬɪɚɤɬɨɜ ɧɚ
ɧɟɞɪɨɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɟɆɗɊɄɡɚɦɟɫɬɢɬɟɥɶɱɥɟɧɚ
ȺɥɞɚɲɟɜɊɭɫɬɟɦȺɝɢɛɚɟɜɢɱ Ɂɚɦɟɫɬɢɬɟɥɶ Ⱦɢɪɟɤɬɨɪɚ ɞɟɩɚɪɬɚɦɟɧɬɚ
ɤɨɧɬɪɚɤɬɨɜ ɧɚ ɧɟɞɪɨɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɟ Ɇɗ ɊɄ
ɡɚɦɟɫɬɢɬɟɥɶɱɥɟɧɚ
ɆɢɥɸɬɢɧȺɥɟɤɫɚɧɞɪȺɥɟɤɫɚɧɞɪɨɜɢɱ Ʉɨɦɢɬɟɬ ɩɨ ɜɨɩɪɨɫɚɦ ɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɢ ɢ
ɩɪɢɪɨɞɨɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɸ Ɇɚɠɢɥɢɫɚ ɉɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚ
ɊɄɱɥɟɧ
ɆɭɪɚɞɨɜȺɯɦɟɬɋɟɣɞɚɪɚɯɦɚɧɨɜɢɱ ɑɥɟɧ Ʉɨɦɢɬɟɬɚ ɩɨ ɜɨɩɪɨɫɚɦ ɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɢ ɢ
ɩɪɢɪɨɞɨɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɸ Ɇɚɠɢɥɢɫɚ ɉɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚ
ɊɄɱɥɟɧ
ɇɢɤɢɬɢɧɫɤɚɹȿɤɚɬɟɪɢɧɚɋɟɪɝɟɟɜɧɚ ɑɥɟɧ Ʉɨɦɢɬɟɬɚ ɩɨ ɮɢɧɚɧɫɚɦ ɢ ɛɸɞɠɟɬɭ
ɆɚɠɢɥɢɫɚɉɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚɊɄɱɥɟɧ
ɋɨɥɨɜɶɟɜɚȺɣɝɭɥɶɋɚɝɚɞɢɛɟɤɨɜɧɚ ɑɥɟɧɄɨɦɢɬɟɬɚ ɩɨ ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɨɣ ɪɟɮɨɪɦɟ ɢ
ɪɟɝɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɦɭ ɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɸ Ɇɚɠɢɥɢɫɚ
ɉɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚɊɄɱɥɟɧ
ɀɚɦɩɢɢɫɨɜɊɚɦɚɡɚɧ Ⱥɫɫɨɰɢɚɰɢɹ.D]HQHUJ\ɱɥɟɧ
Ʉɚɪɚɠɚɧȿɪɥɢɤɇɚɪɢɦɚɧɭɥɵ Ɇɟɧɟɞɠɟɪ ɩɨ ɭɫɬɨɣɱɢɜɨɦɭ ɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɸ
ɇɨɪɬɄɚɫɩɢɚɧɈɩɟɪɟɣɬɢɧɝ Ʉɨɦɩɚɧɢ Ȼȼ,
ɱɥɟɧ
Doctoral Thesis Saipira Furstenberg 256
 
 
 
 
 
ɍɦɢɪɡɚɤɨɜȻɚɭɪɠɚɧȺɣɞɚɪɨɜɢɱ Ƚɥɚɜɧɵɣ ɦɟɧɟɞɠɟɪ ɚɫɫɨɰɢɚɰɢɢ ©.D]HQHUJ\ª
ɱɥɟɧ
ɄɨɧɨɧɨɜɆɚɤɫɢɦɋɟɪɝɟɟɜɢɱ Ⱥɫɫɨɰɢɚɰɢɹ ɝɨɪɧɨɞɨɛɵɜɚɸɳɢɯ ɢ ɝɨɪɧɨ-
ɦɟɬɚɥɥɭɪɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɩɪɟɞɩɪɢɹɬɢɣɱɥɟɧ
Ɇɚɯɚɧɛɟɬɨɜɚɀɚɤɫɵɝɭɥɶɒɚɯɡɚɞɚɟɜɧɚ ȽɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɤɢɣɚɥɶɹɧɫɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɚɱɥɟɧ
ɅɨɛɚɱɟɜɚɆɚɪɢɹȽɟɨɪɝɢɟɜɧɚ Ʉɨɚɥɢɰɢɹ ©ɇɟɮɬɹɧɵɟ ɞɨɯɨɞɵ - ɩɨɞ ɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɶ
ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɚªɱɥɟɧ
ɏɭɞɹɤɨɜɋɟɪɝɟɣȽɟɪɨɥɶɞɨɜɢɱ ȽɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɤɢɣɚɥɶɹɧɫɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɚɱɥɟɧ
ɏɚɥɚɛɭɡɚɪɶɈɥɟɫɹɉɟɬɪɨɜɧɚ ɊɈɈ ©Ɉɛɳɟɫɬɜɨ ɦɨɥɨɞɵɯ ɩɪɨɮɟɫɫɢɨɧɚɥɨɜ
ɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɚªɈɆɉɄɡɚɦɱɥɟɧɚ
ɑɟɪɧɵɲɨɜɈɥɟɝȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪɨɜɢɱ Ƚɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɤɢɣ Ⱥɥɶɹɧɫ Ʉɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɚ ɝ ɍɫɬɶ-
Ʉɚɦɟɧɨɝɨɪɫɤɡɚɦɱɥɟɧɚ
ɈɫɢɧɄɢɪɢɥɥȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪɨɜɢɱ Ʉɨɚɥɢɰɢɹ ɇɉɈ ©ɇɟɮɬɹɧɵɟ ɞɨɯɨɞɵ – ɩɨɞ
ɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɶɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɚªɝȺɤɬɚɭɡɚɦɱɥɟɧɚ
Ʉɨɧɫɭɥɶɬɚɧɬɵ
ɋɟɞɨɜɚɌɚɬɶɹɧɚ ȼɫɟɦɢɪɧɵɣȻɚɧɤɜɄɚɡɚɯcɬɚɧɟ
ɀɚɤɫɵɥɵɤȾɢɧɚɪɚ ɉɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɢɬɟɥɶGIZ
ȺɧɬɨɧȺɪɬɟɦɶɟɜ Ɏɨɧɞ ©ɋɨɪɨɫ-Ʉɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧª ɉɪɟɞɫɟɞɚɬɟɥɶ
ɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɹ
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Appendix 6: Interview List
Interview notes in Kyrgyzstan 
Author interview with Abildalda Temirberdiev, Public Reception Desk representative of Chong-
Alay District, Osh, 17th of November, 2014. 
Author interview with Cholpon Dyikanova, Executive Director of “Bashat” Public Fund, 
Bishkek, 18 December, 2014. 
Author interview with Elmira Usupova, the State Agency for Environmental Protection under the 
Government Bishkek December, 2015
Authori interview with employees of Soros Foundation, Bishkek , 31 October, 2014. 
Author interview with George Glukhov, Kyrgyzaltin Bishkek , 19 November, 2014. 
Author interview with Kalia Moldogazieva, Coordinator of the NGO Consortium for EITI 
Promotion in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, 8 October, 2014. 
Author interview with Karibek Ibraev, EITI Secretariat for the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, 31
October, 2014. 
Author’s Interview with Karibek Isaev, Aarhus Centre, Osh, 17 November, 2014 
Author interview with Larisa Lee, Independent expert, Bishkek, 17 October, 2014. 
Author interview with Nathalie Lee, GIZ, Bishkek, 16 October, 2014. 
Author interview with Nurlan Djoldoshev Independent expert, Bishkek, 11 November, 2014. 
Author interview with Orozbek Duisheev, Chairman of the Association of Miners and Geologists 
of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, 18 December, 2014. 
Author’s Interview with Roza Otunbayeva, Bishkek, 10 December, 2014. 
Author interview with Rysbek Toktogul Kumtor Gold Company , Bishkek, 20 November, 2014.
Author interview with Tolekan Ismailova, Chairman of the “Bir duino – Kyrgyzstan” Human 
Rights Movement Bishkek, 31 October, 2014.
Author interview with Turgunbek Atabekov, Head of the “Foat” Public Association, Bishkek, 23 
November, 2014.
Author interview with Valentin Bogdetsky, Board Member of the Kyrgyz Mining Association, 
Bishkek 25 November, 2014. 
Author interview with Vyacheslav Isaev, President of the “Guild of Miners” Association, 
Bishkek, 16 December, 2014.
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Author’s interviews with Aizada Khalikova, representative of First Deputy Chairman of State 
Customs Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, 15 December, 2014. 
Author’s Skype Interview with Gary McMahon, The World Bank MDTF, Bishkek, 18 December,
2014. 
Interview notes in Kazakhstan
Author informal interview with an employee of BG Group Kazakhstan, 4 June 4, 2015, Astana.
Author informal interview with the employee of the Friedrich Eberti Foundation, 2 June 2, 2015, 
Almaty.
Author informal interviews with the employee of KazTransOil, 15 June 15, 2015, Astana.
Author informal not recorded interview with EITI NSC Secretariat, Astana, 10th of June 2015.
Author interview with a World Bank official, 29th of June, 2016, Skype meeting Brussels. 
Author interview with Managing Partner of Parlink Consulting /Oil and Gas, 29 April 29, 2015, 
Paris.
Author interview with Soros employee, Almaty, 2 June, 2015.
Author interviews with a member of the EITI coalition of the Company North Caspian operating 
company, 5 June 5, 2015, Astana.
Author’s interviews with a member of the EITI coalition KazEnergy Association, 5 June 2015, 
Astana.
Author Skype interview with member of the EITI civil society coalition, 15th June, Astana. 
Author Skype interview with representative of Soros Foundation, 17 June 17th, 2015 Astana.
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